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vMachines are occupying increasingly visible roles in human medical care. In hos-
pitals, private clinics, care residences, and private homes, machines are interacting 
in close proximity with many people, sometimes the most vulnerable members of 
the human population. Medical machines are undertaking tasks that require inter-
active and emotional sensitivity, practical knowledge of a range of rules of pro-
fessional conduct, and general ethical insight, autonomy, and responsibility. They 
will be working with patients who are in fragile states of health, or who have phys-
ical or cognitive disabilities of various kinds, who are very young or very old. The 
medical profession has well-defined codes of conduct for interacting with patients, 
in relation to minimizing harm, responsible and safe action, privacy, informed con-
sent, and regard for personal dignity.
Although there is general agreement in the field of machine ethics that medical 
machines ought to be ethical, many important questions remain. What ethical theory 
or theories should constrain medical machine conduct? Is theory even necessary? 
What implementation and design features are required in medical machines? In 
what specific situations will it be necessary for machines to share praise or blame 
with humans for the ethical consequences of their decisions and actions? Are there 
medical decisions for which machine support is necessary? These questions are truly 
twenty-first century challenges, and for the first time are addressed in detail in this 
edited collection.
The collection is logically organized in two parts. The essays in Part I address 
foundational questions concerning machine ethics and machine medical  ethics 
(“An Overview of Machine Medical Ethics”–“Moral Ecology Approaches to 
Machine Ethics”). Part II focuses on contemporary challenges in machine medi-
cal ethics, and include three sections: Justice, Rights, and the Law (“Opportunity 
Costs: Scarcity and Complex Medical Machines”–“Machine Medical Ethics 
and Robot Law: Legal Necessity or Science Fiction?”), Decision-Making, 
Responsibility, and Care (“Having the Final Say: Machine Support of Ethical 
Decisions of Doctors”–“Machine Medical Ethics: When a Human Is Delusive but 
the Machine Has Its Wits About Him”), and Technologies and Models (“ELIZA 
Fifty Years Later: An Automatic Therapist Using Bottom-Up and Top-Down 
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Approaches”–“Ethical and Technical Aspects of Emotions to Create Empathy 
in Medical Machines”). The collection Epilogue is an ethical dialog between a 
researcher and a visual artist on machine esthetic understanding.
In “An Overview of Machine Medical Ethics”, Tatjana Kochetkova suggests 
machine roles in medicine be limited to medical cases for which professional 
codes of medical conduct already exist. In such “consensus cases,” machine algo-
rithms in operant medical machines should be either top-down, bottom-up, or 
mixed (top-down-bottom-up). Kochetkova cautiously reasons that it is premature 
to accord medical machines full ethical status. Instead, prudence suggests they be 
designed as explicit, but not full, ethical agents by humans.
Oliver Bendel (“Surgical, Therapeutic, Nursing and Sex Robots in Machine 
and Information Ethics”) attempts to shake loose the nature of machine medical 
ethics by classifying medical machines according to context (surgery, therapy, 
nursing, and sex), function, and stage of development. Bendel ponders the sub-
field of machine medical ethics in relation to its parent disciplines machine ethics 
and applied ethics, and asks whether machine medical ethics can function inde-
pendently of these fields. Bendel argues that, in the best ethical case, a medi-
cal machine ought to interact with humans in order to respect and preserve their 
autonomy.
Mark Coecklebergh (“Good Healthcare Is in the “How”: The Quality of Care, 
The Role of Machines, and the Need for New Skills”) investigates whether 
machines threaten or enhance good health care. He argues that “good health care” 
relies on expert know-how and skills that enable caregivers to carefully engage 
with patients. Evaluating the introduction of new technologies such as robots or 
expert medical machines then requires us to ask how the technologies impact on 
the “know-how” expertise of caregivers, and whether they encourage a less careful 
way of doing things. Ultimately, Coecklebergh thinks machines require new skills 
to handle the technology but also new know-how to handle people: knowing how 
to be careful and caring with the technology.
In “Implementation Fundamentals for Ethical Medical Agents”, Mark R. Waser 
identifies some broad guidelines for the implementation of ethics in medical 
machines while acknowledging current machine limitations. All ethical machines 
need top-down medical decision-making rules and bottom-up methods to collect 
medical data, information, and knowledge as input to those rules, codified meth-
ods to determine the source, quality and accuracy of that input, and methods to 
recognize medical situations beyond machine expertise and which require special-
ist human intervention. Waser thinks correct codification and documentation of the 
processes by which each medical decision is reached will prove to be more impor-
tant than the individual decisions themselves.
In “Towards a Principle-Based Healthcare Agent”, Susan Leigh Anderson and 
Michael Anderson present a top-down method for discovering the ethically rele-
vant features of possible actions that could be used by a machine as prima facie 
duties to either maximize or minimize those features, as well as decision principles 
that should be used to influence its behavior. This deontic approach is challenged 
by Gary Comstock and Joshua Lucas in “Do Machines Have Prima Facie Duties?.” 
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Among several arguments Comstock and Lucas present against the Andersons and 
their prima facie method, they  argue that such duties do not uniquely simulate the 
complexities of ethical decision-making. To substantiate this claim, Comstock and 
Lucas propose an act-utilitarian alternative, they call Satisficing Hedonistic Act 
Utilitarianism (SHAU). They show that SHAU can engage in ethical decision-mak-
ing just as sophisticated as prima facie based ethical deliberation, and can produce 
the same verdict as a prima facie duty-based ethic in the medical case investigated 
by the Andersons.
In contrast to the approach taken in the preceding chapters, the next three chap-
ters argue against the idea of a single theoretical machine ethic and for the idea 
that hybrid top-down-bottom-up approaches offer a more promising ethical line 
(“A Hybrid Bottom-Up and Top-Down Approach to Machine Medical Ethics: 
Theory and Data” and “Moral Ecology Approaches to Machine Ethics”). Simon 
Peter van Rysewyk and Matthijs Pontier (“A Hybrid Bottom-Up and Top-Down 
Approach to Machine Medical Ethics: Theory and Data”) describe an experiment 
in which a machine (Silicon Coppélia) run on a hybrid ethic combining utilitarian-
ism, deontology, and case-based reasoning matches in its own actions, the respec-
tive acts of human medical professionals in six clinical simulations. Christopher 
Charles Santos-Lang (“Moral Ecology Approaches to Machine Ethics”) makes 
an interesting point that the brains of human beings are “hybrids individually,” by 
which he means that living brains can adapt our deliberations and judgments to 
present circumstances in contrast to ecosystem approaches to ethics, which pro-
mote hybridization across, rather than within, individuals. Santos-Lang urges, we 
design and build diverse teams of machines to simulate the best human teams, 
instead of mass-producing identical machines to simulate the best individual 
human.
Adam Henschke begins Part II Contemporary Issues in Machine Medical 
Ethics (Responsibility, Decision-Making and Care) (“Opportunity Costs: Scarcity 
and Complex Medical Machines”). Future medical machines that prioritize health 
care only for a minority of patients to the disadvantage of a majority is ethically 
unjustified, according to Henschke, especially when resources are scarce. Instead, 
in a depressed global economy, optimizing health care outcomes requires funding 
increases for existing health care resources, such as nurses, nursing homes, and 
family that provide care to their loved ones, rather than mass-producing expensive 
medical machines that may ultimately serve only the very rich.
In “The Rights of Machines: Caring for Robotic Care-Givers” entitled, “Rights 
for Robots?—Caring for Robotic Care-Givers,” David J. Gunkel ponders the ques-
tion of “machine rights” for health care robots. Gunkel identifies two “machine 
rights” options: health care robots are nothing more than instrumental tools and 
accordingly deserve no legal rights; health care robots are valued domestic com-
panions and deserve at least some legal protections. Since each option turns out to 
have problems, Gunkel urges that the question of “machine rights” be taken more 
seriously by society.
Are medical machines liable for their actions and mistakes, as are “natural 
humans”? Addressing this question in “Machine Medical Ethics and Robot Law: 
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Legal Necessity or Science Fiction?”, Rob van den Hoven van Genderen pre-
dicts that new legal amendments will enter existing law to represent intelligent 
machines but only on behalf of a real legal actor, a natural human being. Since 
machines are best viewed as our assistants, workers or servants, they do not qual-
ify as natural persons, and ought never to have full human rights and obligations. 
According to van den Hoven van Genderen, the legal system is under human con-
trol, and cannot ever be shared with machines.
Beginning the next section in Part III, Decision-Making, Responsibility, and 
Care, Julia Inthorn, Rudolf Seising, and Marco E. Tabacchi propose that Serious 
Games machines can share ethical responsibility with human health care profes-
sionals in solving medical dilemmas (“Having the Final Say: Machine Support 
of Ethical Decisions of Doctors”). The authors show that Serious Games improve 
upon current machines in clinical decision-making because they can integrate both 
a short and long perspective and enable learning with regard to bottom-up decision 
processes as well as top-down rules and maxims. Though there is a reluctance to 
use machine support in medicine, the possibilities of experiential learning ought 
to be considered an important aspect of behavioral change that could be used to 
improve ethical decision-making in medicine. The authors also provide an inform-
ative historical overview of decision support systems in medicine.
What are the prospects of “robotic-assisted dying” in medical contexts? Ryan 
Tonkens (“Ethics of Robotic Assisted Dying”) proposes that if we develop robots to 
serve as human caregivers in medical contexts, and given that assistance in dying is 
sometimes an important aspect of geriatric care, it is ethical for such robots to facil-
itate and assist in the dying of those patients at the eligible patient’s sound request. 
A major benefit of robotic-assisted dying is that the robot would always assist those 
consenting patients that are genuinely eligible, and thus such patients would not be 
at the mercy of a willing physician clause in order to have some control over the 
timing and manner of their death. At the same time, specialist humans must remain 
involved in establishing strict regulations and safety protocols concerning end-of-
life situations and be present in the event of machine malfunction.
According to Blay Whitby (“Automating Medicine the Ethical Way”), unre-
liable technology and human errors in Information Technology (IT) resulting 
from poor user interfaces are two outstanding ethical problems. Whitby calls for 
improved ethical awareness and professionalism in IT workers in order to achieve 
ethically acceptable medical machines. Lessons from the aviation industry suggest 
that issues of acceptance and resistance by professionals can be successfully man-
aged only if they are fully engaged in the operational and procedural changes at 
all stages. Negotiation over procedures and responsibility for errors in aviation is 
complex and informative for other fields, including machine ethics.
In “Machine Medical Ethics: When a Human Is Delusive but the Machine Has 
Its Wits About Him”, Johan F. Hoorn imagines an advanced dementia patient 
under the care of a health care robot and asks: “Should the robot comply with the 
demand of human autonomy and obey every patient command?” To help answer 
this question, Hoorn offers a responsibility self-test for machine or human that dif-
ferently prioritizes top-down maxims of autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence, 
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and justice. The self-test comes in seven steps, ranging from “I do something” (to 
act, with or without self-agency), to “My “higher” cognitive functions are sup-
posed to control my “lower” functions but failed or succeeded” (to act, with or 
without self-control).
In “ELIZA Fifty Years Later: An Automatic Therapist Using Bottom-Up and 
Top-Down Approaches”, Rafal Rzepka and Kenji Araki present a machine therapist 
capable of analyzing thousands of patients’ cases implemented in an algorithm for 
generating empathic machine reactions based on emotional and social consequences. 
Modules and lexicons of phrases based on these theories enable a medical machine 
to empathically sense how patients typically feel when certain events happen, and 
what could happen before and after actions. The authors suggest that this bottom-up 
method be complemented by a top-down utility calculation to ensure the best 
 outcome for a particular human user.
Neuromachines capable of measuring brain function and to iteratively guide 
output will be a major development in neuromodulation technology. According 
to Eran Klein, the use of closed-loop technologies in particular will entail ethi-
cal changes in clinical practices (“Models of the Patient-Machine-Clinician 
Relationship in Closed-Loop Machine Neuromodulation”). Klein thinks current 
ethical models of the clinical relationship are only suited to certain forms of neu-
romodulation, but new models ought to be more comprehensive as new neuromod-
ulatory technologies emerge. Klein assesses design, customer service, and quality 
monitoring models as candidates for a new ethic and urges that any successful the-
oretical approach ought to incorporate Aristotelian concepts of friendship.
Steve Torrance and Ron Chrisley (“Modelling Consciousness-Dependent Exper-
tise in Machine Medical Moral Agents”) suggest that a reasonable design constraint 
for an ethical medical machine is for it to at least model, if not reproduce, relevant 
aspects of consciousness. Consciousness has a key role in the expertise of human 
medical agents, including autonomous judging of options in diagnosis, planning 
treatment, use of imaginative creativity to generate courses of action, sensorimotor 
flexibility and sensitivity, and empathetic and ethically appropriate responsiveness.
An emerging application of affective systems is in support of psychiatric diag-
nosis and therapy. As affective systems in this application, medical machines 
must be able to control persuasive dialogs in order to obtain relevant patient data, 
despite less than optimal circumstances. Kim Hartman, Ingo Siegert, and Dmytro 
Prylipko address this challenge by examining the validity, reliability, and impacts 
of current techniques (e.g., word lists) used to determine the emotional states of 
speakers from speech (“Emotion and Disposition Detection in Medical Machines: 
Chances and Challenges”). They discuss underlying technical and psychologi-
cal models and examine results of recent machine assessment of emotional states 
obtained through dialogs.
Medical machines are affective systems because they can detect, assess, 
and adapt to emotional state changes in humans. David Casacuberta and Jordi 
Vallverdú (“Ethical and Technical Aspects of Emotions to Create Empathy in 
Medical Machines”) argue that empathy is the key emotion in health care and 
that machines need to be able to detect and mimic it in humans. They reinforce 
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modeling of cultural, cognitive, and technical aspects in health care robots in order 
to approximate empathic bonds between machine and human. The emotional 
bonds between human and machines are not only the result of human-like com-
munication protocols but also the outcome of a global trust process in which emo-
tions are cocreated between machine and human.
In Epilogue, Dutch visual artist Janneke van Leeuvan and Simon van Rysewyk 
discuss whether intelligent machines can appreciate esthetic representations as a 
simulacrum of human esthetic understanding. The dialog is illustrated by selections 
from van Leeuwen’s thoughtful photographic work, “Mind Models.”
The book editors Simon Peter van Rysewyk and Matthijs Pontier wish to 
warmly thank Springer for the opportunity to publish this book, and in particular, to 
acknowledge Cynthia Feenstra and Nathalie Jacobs at Springer for their assistance 
and patience. We wish to thank Jessica Birkett (Faculty of Medicine, University of 
Melbourne) for reviewing author chapters, and all authors that feature in this book 
for their excellent and novel contributions. Simon Peter van Rysewyk acknowledges 
support from Taiwan National Science Council grant NSC102-2811-H-038-00. 
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Abstract This chapter defines the field of medical ethics and gives a brief over-
view of the history of medical ethics, its main principles and key figures. It dis-
cusses the exponential growth of medical ethics along with its differentiation into 
various subfields since 1960. The major problems and disputes of medical ethics 
are outlined, with emphasis on the relation between physicians and patients, insti-
tutions, and society, as well as on meta-ethical and pedagogic issues. Next, the 
specific problems of machine ethics as a part of the ethics of artificial intelligence 
are introduced. Machine ethics is described as a reflection about how machines 
should behave with respect to humans, unlike roboethics, which considers how 
humans should behave with respect to robots. A key question is to what extent 
medical robots might be able to become autonomous, and what degree of hazard 
their abilities might cause. If there is risk, what can be done to avoid it while still 
allowing robots in medical care?
1  The Reality of Machine Medical Ethics
A hospital patient needs to take her regular medication, but is watching his/her favorite 
TV program and reacts angrily to the reminder about taking medicine. If you were a 
nurse, how would you react? How must a robot nurse react?
This case study originates from a project conducted by robotic researchers Susan 
and Michael Anderson (Anderson and Anderson 2005). They programmed a NAO 
robot1 to perform simple functions like reminding a “patient” that it is time to take 
1
 A NAO robot is a programmable autonomous humanoid robot developed by French company 
Aldedaran Robotics. It was first produced at the beginning of the 21st century.
T. Kochetkova (*) 
Institute for Philosophy, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
e-mail: tania.j.meira@gmail.com
4 T. Kochetkova
prescribed medicine [29]. NAO brings a patient tablets and declares that it is time 
to take them. If the treatment is not observed (i.e., if the patient does not take the 
tablets), the robot should report this fact to the doctor in charge.
But suppose we program the robot to react also to a patient’s mental and emo-
tional states. This makes the situation much more complicated: a frustrated patient 
can yell at the robot, refuse to take pills or refuse to react at all, or do something 
else not included in the narrow algorithm that guides the robot. In order to react 
accordingly, the robot now needs to be more flexible: it has to balance the benefits 
that a patient receives from the medicine (or treatment) against the need to respect 
the patient’s autonomy. In addition, the robot has to respect the independence and 
freedom of the patient. If, for instance, the disease is not too dangerous and the 
patient forgets to take a pill while watching his or her favorite television program, 
another reminder of the robot could bring him more displeasure (i.e., harm) than 
good. If skipping the medication had more serious consequences, then the robot 
would have to remind the patient, and if necessary, even notify the patient’s doctor. 
The robot thus needs to make decisions based both on the situation at hand, and 
also on its built-in “value hierarchy”: different principles might lead to different 
decisions for the same situation [4, 6].
In the near future, robots like the one in the Andersons study may become wide-
spread. The question of how to give them a complex hierarchy of values therefore 
becomes increasingly important. In addition to having to think about their own 
ability to carry out their responsibilities (e.g., they must know when it is time to 
recharge their batteries, or else they might leave patients unattended and in potential 
risk), they will also need to make appropriate choices for their patients. This implies 
an in-built sense of justice when tackling even mundane tasks: if, for instance, they 
are supposed to change the channel of a TV set that several patients are watching 
together, they will have to take into account variables such as the patients conflicting 
desires, and how often each patient’s TV wishes have been fulfilled in the past.
Reasons such as these explain the relevance of machine medical ethics. 
Machine medical ethics faces at least three challenges. Foremost, there is the need 
to ensure the safe use of medical robots, whose presence in the health sector is 
increasing. By the middle of the 21st century, about 25 % of West Europeans will 
be over 65 years old; there will be an increasing demand on the healthcare sys-
tem that will only be met by using advanced technology, including robotics. Some 
remotely operated robots are now already routinely being used in surgery. Other 
expected applications of medical robots in the near future are [19]:
•	 Assisting patients with cognitive deficits in their daily life (reminding them to 
take medicine, drink or attend appointments).
•	 Mediating the interaction of patients and human caregivers, thus allowing car-
egivers to be more efficient and reducing the number of their physical visits.
•	 Collecting data and monitoring patients, preventing emergencies like heart fail-
ure and high blood sugar levels.
•	 Assisting the elderly or the disabled with domestic tasks such as cooking or 
cleaning, thus making it possible for them to continue living independently.
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The demand for robots in the healthcare sector is already quite palpable, at least 
in the West, and I suspect this demand will only increase. This will include robots 
that can perform some human tasks but are quicker to train, cheaper to maintain, 
and are less bored by repetitive tasks, with the ultimate purpose being to take over 
tasks done by human caretakers and to reduce the demand for care homes [29]. It 
is clear that the behavior of such robots must be controlled by humans and within 
the ambit of human ethical values, otherwise the robots would be useless and pos-
sibly even dangerous: if their behavior is not always predictable, they could poten-
tially cause harm to people. A robot with no programming on how to behave in an 
emergency situation could make it worse. To avoid such problems, it is necessary 
to build into the robots basic ethics that apply in all situations.
Second, there is a certain fear of autonomously thinking machines, especially 
in the West, probably due to uncertainty about whether they will always behave 
appropriately. Science fiction is full of such fears. The creation of ethical con-
straints for robots can make society more receptive to research in the field of arti-
ficial intelligence by allowing it to deal better with robots in ethical situations. In 
fact, in such situations, robots without ethical constraints would appear to be too 
risky to be allowed in society.
A third reason for the increasing interest in machine ethics is the question of who 
can ultimately make better ethical decisions: humans or robots? Humans use their 
intuition for moral decisions, which can be a very powerful heuristic [14, 25]. Yet 
humans can be bad at making impartial or unbiased decisions and are not always 
fully aware of their own biases. As for robots, Anderson claims that they may be 
able to make better decisions than people, because robots would methodically calcu-
late the best course of action based on the moral system and principles programmed 
into them [4]. In other words, robots may behave better than humans simply because 
they are more accurate [4]. Yet it is not entirely clear whether such methodic con-
sideration of all possible options by a robot will always be an advantage for deci-
sion making. As Damasio’s research shows, people with brain damage actually do 
methodically consider all options, yet this does not guarantee that their decisions 
will be better, since their mental impairment forces them to consider, and perhaps 
take, many options that healthy people would immediately see as bad [10, 14].
A final reason for the growing relevance of machine ethics is the lack of con-
sensus among experts on the ways to handle major ethical dilemmas, which makes 
it more difficult to transfer decision making to machines. Answers to ethical 
dilemmas are rarely clear. For instance, a classical problem like the train accident 
dilemma, discussed below, would be solved by different theories in different ways: 
utilitarians believe that the sacrifice of a single life in order to save more lives 
is right, while deontologists believe such a sacrifice is wrong since the ends can-
not justify the means. There is no consensus on other vital issues such as whether 
abortion is permissible, and if so, under what circumstances. A medical robot, per-
forming the role of adviser to a patient, for example, may have to take such facts 
into account and realize that it needs to shift the burden of making the right deci-
sion to a human being. But this may not always be possible: in another dilemma 
involving a possible car accident where one or several people would inevitably 
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die, an autonomous car with an automatic navigation system would either lose the 
ability to act independently or have to take a random decision. Neither solution 
seems really acceptable [15].
2  The Development of Machine Medical Ethics:  
A Historical Overview
Machine medical ethics recently emerged as a branch of ethics. To fully under-
stand ethics, it is important to see it as the critical and reflexive study of moral-
ity, i.e., as the rational scrutiny of values, norms, and customs. This critical stance 
differentiates ethics from morality: ethics is the philosophical study and question-
ing of moral attitudes. Even though machine medical ethics includes both norma-
tive and applied components, it is the latter which is recently gaining research 
prominence.
Since the 1950s, medical ethics has experienced exponential growth and dif-
ferentiation in various subfields, hand in hand with the technological, political, and 
cultural changes of this time. Previously, the relation between medical profession-
als and patients had been paternalistic: all decisions were supposed to be taken by 
a professional (or a group of professionals) in the best interests of a patient and 
were then communicated to the patient. This paternalism was based on a knowl-
edge gap between the medical professional and the patient and between the profes-
sional and the public, as well as on the relative clarity of medical decisions and the 
limited number of choices.
Paternalism in doctor-patient relationships has been undermined by public 
knowledge about atrocities in medical experiments conducted during the Second 
World War. The post-war Declaration of Geneva (1948) initiated the shift towards 
a more liberal model of doctor-patient relationship, promoting informed consent 
as an essential ethical value.
Since 1960 and up to the beginning of the 21st century, due to the growth of 
public education, empowerment of the general public, accessibility of medi-
cal knowledge, as well as new developments in medical technology and science, 
the general public has become more informed about available medical informa-
tion and patients are participating in clinical decision-making. This has changed 
the relation between healthcare professionals and patients quite significantly: the 
paternalistic model is anachronistic, and in most cases shared decision-making 
model is the norm [8, 18, 30].
Concomitantly with the shift away from paternalism in medicine, ethics itself 
underwent a change in focus towards application. Scientific and technologi-
cal development has given rise to various new choices and specific ethical prob-
lems. This led to the origin of bioethics (term introduced already in 1927 by Fritz 
Jahr). In the narrow sense, bioethics embraces the entire body of ethical problems 
found in the interaction between patient and physician, thus coinciding with medi-
cal ethics. In the broad sense, bioethics refers to the study of social, ecological, 
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and medical problems of all living organisms, including, for instance, genetically 
modified organisms, stem cells, patents on life, creation of artificial living organ-
isms, and so on.
Along with the appearance of bioethics and the shift away from paternalism and 
the consequent decrease of the role of the doctor as sole decision-maker, the idea 
that machines could also be a part of the process of care became more acceptable. 
Together with great progress in medical technology, this resulted in the emergence 
of the field of machine medical ethics. The main aim of machine medical ethics is to 
guarantee that medical machines will behave ethically. Machine medical ethics is an 
application of ethics and a topic of heated debate and acute public interest.
The reasons for this change in focus towards application have been widely dis-
cussed in bioethics. Among its causes is the growth of human knowledge and tech-
nological possibilities, which brought along a number of new ethical problems, 
some of which had never been encountered before. For example, should we switch 
to artificial means of reproduction? Is it acceptable to deliberately make human 
embryos for research or therapeutic purposes? Is it worthwhile to enhance humans 
and animals by means of genetic engineering or through digital technologies? In 
addition, there are also new problems concerning the usage of robots, brought 
about by rapid progress in the development of computer science. For example, is 
it acceptable to use robots as work force if their consciousness evolves, as they 
become AMAs (artificial moral agents)? Suddenly, the area of human-robot inter-
actions is saturated with ethical dilemmas.
Given the increasing complexity and applicability of robots, it is quickly 
becoming possible for machines to perform at least some autonomous actions 
which may in turn cause either benefit or harm to humans. The possible conse-
quences of robot errors and, accordingly, the need to regulate their actions is a 
pressing ethical concern. It is not simply a question of technical mistakes, like 
autopilot crashes, and their consequences, but also of cases in which robots have 
to make decisions that affect human interests. An obvious example in the field of 
medicine is the activity of robot nurses i.e., mobile robotic assistants [3]. Robot 
nurses have been developed to assist older adults with cognitive and physical 
impairments, as well as support nurses. Mobile robotic assistants are capable of 
successful human-robot interaction, they have a human tracking system and they 
can plan under uncertainty and select appropriate courses of actions. In one study, 
the robot successfully demonstrated that it can autonomously provide reminders 
and guidance for elderly residents in experimental settings [26].
Presently, medical robots are already in use in various areas. In surgery, operations 
involving robotic hands tend to have higher quality and involve fewer risks than tradi-
tional operations managed by humans. Robots are also being used in managing large 
information files (“Big Data”). For instance, the market share of “exchange robots”, 
computer algorithms for earning their owners money in the stock market, is set to 
become more widespread, since their results are better than those of human traders. 
The relation between the quality of electronic and live traders is now the same as it 
was for chess players and chess programs on the eve of the match between the human 
player Kasparov and the program Deep Blue. As we all know, the program won.
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This particular case does not seem very dangerous, but is there an element of 
risk involved in the success of intelligent machines in other areas? These questions 
increasingly concern not only the broad public, but also designers and theorists of 
Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems. The main challenge to solve is how to ensure 
safety with AI systems. Devices found only in fiction, like Isaac Asimov’s famous 
Three Laws of Robotics, seem increasingly necessary [5, 12, 16]. In recent dec-
ades, such issues have been debated in a broad range of publications in computer 
science and machine ethics. The increasing success of various robot-related pro-
jects has stimulated research on the possibility of built-in mechanisms to protect 
people from unethical behavior by computer-controlled systems.
Currently, the demand for producing ethical robots for the aging population in 
developed countries exceeds medical services: the demand for service robots in res-
taurants, hotels, nurseries, and even at home has been growing. The entire service 
sector, it seems, is impatiently waiting for robots with reasonably good quality and 
affordable prices to appear. It would seem that all mechanical labor in today’s increas-
ingly educated society is regarded as something best shifted to the hands of robots.
But, problems in the production of such robots go beyond technological dif-
ficulties. Separating the mechanical and communicative component of special-
ized work (e.g., for nurses) is sometimes very difficult, or even impossible. They 
are subtly intertwined, which makes ethical programming of robots necessary for 
nearly all tasks involving interactions with humans. For instance, in the situation 
described in the introduction—a patient reacts negatively to the reminder to take 
medicine—communicative and ethical capacities must be intrinsic to a robot for it 
to be able to react ethically.
These difficulties might lead to the question whether machine ethics is possible 
at all, i.e., whether problems with ensuring AMAs behave ethically is a theoreti-
cally tractable problem. I think these difficulties are tractable from an engineer-
ing perspective. The real difficulty to be solved lies in improving robotic software, 
perfecting the sets of rules, and ensuring the correct elaboration of in-coming data. 
With robots as explicit AMAs, the challenge is to make their complex behavior 
predictable. However complicated this challenge proves to be, it basically is a mat-
ter of improving the degree of complexity of already existing robots, not the theo-
retical question of building entirely new AI systems. This supports my optimism 
about the prospects of robotics to ensure safe robot use in the real world.
3  Key Issues in Machine Medical Ethics
The key issues of machine medical ethics are linked to problems of AI. In current 
AI discussions, three major issues dominate: computability, robots as autonomous 
moral agents, and the relation between top-down, bottom-up and hybrid theoreti-
cal approaches. Each will be briefly considered in turn.
The computability of ethical reasoning concerns the conditions for the very 
existence of machine medical ethics. Indeed, ethics, as seen above, can be defined 
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as a reflection on the normative aspects of human behavior. Presently, machine 
ethics, as the study of how machines should behave with respect to humans, 
attempts to create computer analogs for the object of ethical study—values and 
norms—so as to make ethics computable and ultimately permit its implementa-
tion in robots and machines [11, 29]. The hope is that ethics can be made translat-
able into computer language, i.e., ultimately presentable as a complex set of rules 
that can be made into a computer algorithm [24]. There already are programs that 
allow machines to imitate aspects of human decision-making, a first step towards 
the creation of robots that will be able to make such decisions by themselves. 
Some of these programs are discussed by Bringsjord and Taylor [7].
One approach to achieving a computable machine ethics is a complete and 
consistent theory that can guide and determine the actions of an intelligent moral 
agent in the enormous variety of life situations. With such a theory, a machine 
with AI could in principle be programmed to deal appropriately with all real-
life situations. The basic question is then, of course, whether such a universally 
applicable theory actually exists: if it does, then machine ethics would be basi-
cally busy with programming it into computers. It may be, however, that no single 
ethical theory is or can truly be complete: completeness, albeit attractive, may ulti-
mately turn out to be an unattainable ideal. The absence of unconditionally correct 
answers to ethical dilemmas, and changes in ethical standards through time, sug-
gest that it is not prudent to hope for a “perfect” theory of ethics in attempting to 
build ethical machines. Rather, work on ethically programmed robots should start 
with the idea of ethical gray areas in mind, areas in which one cannot determine 
which behavior is unconditionally right on a case by case basis [11].
Rather than concentrating on one single system or theory of ethics (for which 
often intractable dilemmas can be found), it seems more productive to strive 
towards a hierarchic system including a plurality of ethical values, some of which 
are subordinate to others. For example, John Rawl’s theory of “equilibrium”, 
which is similar to, but more complicated than, the one used by the hospital robot 
in Anderson’s experiment, is a candidate.
The study of machine ethics might thus advance the study of ethics in general. 
Although ethics ought to be a branch of philosophy with real-life impact, in practice 
theoretical work and discussions between philosophers often drift toward the consid-
eration of unrealistic “academic” situations [11]. The application of AI to ethical prob-
lems will help understand them better, make them more realistic, and lead to better 
solutions, while perhaps even opening the ways for new problems to be considered.
Secondly, there is a widespread agreement in AI that a robot capable of making 
decisions and acting autonomously is an AMA [22]. This does not require any intrin-
sic consciousness or personal reflection per se: if an autonomous decision or action 
is performed by a machine, the system is an AMA regardless of its endogenous 
higher-order states. The possibility of robot AMAs led to an ongoing philosophical 
debate on the foundations of AI, about whether strong or weak AI is logically pos-
sible [27]. However, this question is much older than machine ethics. It was intro-
duced by Alan Turing in the 1940s, and before that, science fiction book published in 
the early twentieth century featured “thinking machines” and “autonomous robots”.
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Third, there is the problem of how to program AMAs so that they behave in 
a way beneficial to humans. What ethical principles or rules should be adopted? 
And how can they be programmable in robot algorithms? Three major solu-
tions to this problem are currently available: top-down, bottom-up and hybrid. 
According to top-down approaches, moral principles are used as rules for the 
selection of actions (for instance, utilitarian, or deontological theories). The 
problem with top-down approaches is that they cannot provide a general theory 
of intelligent action and machine learning for real-world tasks [1]. Their oppo-
site, bottom-up approaches, seek to provide educational environments that 
select appropriate ethical behavior via experiential learning (e.g., trial and error, 
approval, disapproval). A problem with bottom-up approaches is that it is unclear 
how ethical rules and maxims fit into machine learning [1]. Because both top-
down and bottom-up approaches each have problems as well as advantages, 
some authors reasonably suggest a hybrid approach which combines aspects of 
both [1, 3]. Whatever approach turns out to work in AMAs, medical machine 
ethics will certainly have a significant impact on the socialization of humanoid 
robots. This is because AMAs with functions overlapping with human activities 
will occur in a large variety of scenarios, unavoidably including situations of 
inherent moral ambiguity.
Finally, there is the important issue of dealing with ethical dilemmas for which 
no expert consensus currently exists. For instance, in philosophical ethics, deon-
tologists, virtue ethicists and consequentionalist theorists fundamentally disagree 
about the solution to ethical problems. A reasonable response to this situation is 
that decisions in such dilemmas ought not to be dealt with by robots or machines 
at all, but only by humans, at least until expert consensus exists, thus forming a 
provisional limit on the freedom of AMAs. Thus, I suggest that the use of medical 
machines be provisionally pegged only to medical cases for which robust medical 
consensus exists, and to no other type of case.
4  What Kind of Moral Agents Do We Want Robots  
to Become?
For machine ethics, the major question is how machines should ethically behave. 
From this perspective, there are two general possibilities for building a robot 
guided by ethical principles. The first is to simply program the machine to behave 
ethically (according to some agreed-upon description of ethical behavior), or 
at least avoid bad deeds [2]. Such a robot carefully performs correct actions, in 
accordance to its programming, but cannot explain their meaning or the reasons 
for their being correct. It is ultimately limited in its behavior, which was conceived 
and programmed by its designers, who in this case are the real responsible moral 
agents. The problem with this alternative is that, in a situation that does not fit the 
programming (i.e., which is outside of the description of ethical behavior used its 
programming), the robot’s behavior might be random [2].
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There is, however, another way. It involves the creation of a machine truly 
capable of autonomous action: an “explicit moral agent,” in J.H. Moor’s classifica-
tion [22]. Even though every system that behaves in a way that affects humans is 
in principle an AMA, only a system that is capable of making autonomous moral 
decisions is an explicit moral agent.
It is worthwhile to consider Moor’s [22] classification in some detail. As he 
defined it, “ethical-impact agents are machines that have straightforward moral 
impact”, like video cameras on the streets, used to detect or prevent crime. “Can 
a computer operate ethically because it’s internally ethical in some way?” [22] To 
make things clear, Moor introduced a threefold differentiation between implicit, 
explicit, and full moral agents [22]:
•	 Implicit moral agents are robots constrained “to avoid unethical outcomes.” 
They do not work out solutions to make ethical decision themselves, but are 
designed in such a way as to behave ethically. For instance, automated teller 
machines or automatic pilots on airplanes are implicit moral agents.
•	 Explicit moral agents are robots that can “do ethics like a computer can play 
chess” [17, 19–20, 22]. Explicit moral agents apply ethical principles such as 
Kant’s categorical imperative, or Rawl’s reflective equilibrium to concrete situ-
ations in order to choose their course of action. The crucial point is that explicit 
moral agents autonomously reach ethical decisions with the help of some proce-
dure. Such machines could also, if need be, justify their decisions.
•	 Full moral agents are beings like humans, who possess “consciousness, inten-
tionality and free will” [20, 22]. Full moral agents are accountable for their 
actions. The robots which are currently being worked on are not full moral 
agents in any sense, and it is not clear whether the creation of computational 
full moral agents is morally acceptable or rationally justifiable.
There are also important problems concerning the feasibility and desirability of 
making robots that are explicit moral agents. First, there is no single ethical the-
ory enjoying general consensus that could be programmed into robots: machine 
ethicists typically do not agree with each other. In other words, there is no agree-
ment on how autonomous robots should be programmed, on what should be 
programmed into them. One solution was proposed by Anderson et al. [4], who 
suggests that robots should be programmed to act ethically only in situations 
about which there is ethical consensus among theorists on what the best behavior 
should be; in other, more polemic cases, the robot should simply not act but yield 
to humans for decisions. The boundaries of moral consensus are thus, according to 
Anderson et al. [4], also the boundaries of robotic action.
A second problem is the possibility that AMAs may cross the symbolic bound-
aries between humans and machines [21, 23, 28]. This is a general problem with 
maintaining ethical boundaries between humans and machines, especially when 
such machines can have different levels of ethical development. A robot created 
especially to perform hazardous jobs is perfect as an explicit, but not a full, moral 
agent. If the same robot becomes a full moral agent, it is immediately far less 
suited for hazardous, or routine, repetitive jobs, since human moral obligations 
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to full moral agents are completely different and far more demanding. Moral obli-
gations to merely explicit moral agents, on the other hand, are much simpler: to 
humans, such moral agents may still be seen as equipment, which is precisely 
what makes them more suited for hazardous or routine works: their consent, 
rights and interests are non-existent and thus irrelevant. From full moral agents, 
we need consent and agreement; from explicit moral agents, it is acceptable to 
expect simply obedience to human commands.
The question of the moral agency of robots has been widely discussed by vari-
ous science fiction writes, like Asimov, Spielberg, Kubrick and others. Asimov 
made an attempt at formulating machine ethics in 1942, in his guidelines for the 
behavior of robots. So machine ethics is older than its name, since Asimov was 
talking about it in 1942! Although science fiction is a form of literature, the prob-
lems raised by Asimov’s stories are not in essence fictional: they represent prob-
lems involved with AMAs crossing the symbolic boundary between humans and 
machines, a particular case of the more general problem with maintaining ethical 
boundaries between humans and machines.
Let us look briefly at Asimov’s guidelines, formulated as his famous “Three 
Laws of Robotics” (2004):
1. A robot may not injure a human being or, through inaction, allow a human 
being to come to harm.
2. A robot must obey all orders of the person, except when such orders conflict 
with the First Law.
3. A robot must protect its own well-being to the extent that it does not conflict 
with the First or Second Law.
Leaving aside details in their formulation, these three laws are inapplicable to 
full moral agents, which Asimov’s robots apply to in his stories. One clear exam-
ple is found in the story “The Bicentennial Man”, in which the protagonist robot 
Andrew gradually fights for full freedom, and for the recognition of itself as a 
human being, finally obtaining this status in court. Andrew is clearly an excep-
tional robot. Asimov first demonstrates how it can engage in creative activities 
and have fun. His owner even sought permission for it to be paid for its work. 
Then we see that the subordinate position of the robot brings about suffering: in 
one episode, Andrew, who wore by that time human clothes, was attacked by van-
dals who forced it to undress by using the second law of robotics. To obtain the 
right to personhood, Andrew is even ready to accept suicide: it lets its positronic 
brain be reprogrammed, so that it will die in a 100 years. The robot surgeon who 
performs the operation initially refuses to do so: it cannot cause harm to a human 
being. But Andrew corrects him: the robot cannot harm a person, but Andrew is 
a robot. Asimov made his robot character behave in a way that is worthy of free-
dom: robot Andrew’s moral sense is often superior to that of the people around 
him. This raises important questions about robots ever becoming autonomous 
agents.
The shift of the symbolic boundaries between human and machine is the 
result of the ongoing mergence of nanotechnology, biotechnology, information 
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technology and cognitive science, otherwise called NBIC-convergence [9, 20, 28]. 
While some shifting and re-arranging of symbolic boundaries is inevitable, certain 
boundaries should still arguably be preserved.
The ethical boundary between human and machines is as follows: humans 
are both moral agents and moral subjects (recipients of ethical behavior), while 
machines have thus far not been moral subjects, even though they can be moral 
agents. A robot programmed to behave ethically can be an AMA without becom-
ing a moral subject.
One can now argue that it is important to ensure that robots will not become 
moral subjects (which is, do not become truly sentient or self-reflexive) because 
this would lead to the deontological imperative to not utilize them purely as 
means to external goals. If, for instance, a household robot becomes capable of 
self-reflection and feeling pain, it might be no longer be suitable for use, at least 
not from an ethical point of view. Therefore, it is also advisable, in my view, to 
produce only robots that, while capable of highly complicated technical behavior 
and led by programs that incorporate human ethics, still are not capable of genu-
ine emotions or self-reflection, i.e., who are not full moral agents. Otherwise, they 
would stop being pieces of equipment and become, for all intents and purposes, 
artificial subjects, which would defeat the purpose of using them as a mere means 
to save time, money and energy [13].
5  Summary
I have completed a brief overview of the recent history of medical robot ethics, 
a new field at the crossroads between biomedical ethics and machine ethics. The 
growing need to provide affordable care for an aging global population prompts 
the question of medical machines and machine medical ethics. In this chapter, I 
identified the major challenges of the field. These are summarized below together 
with my response:
1. Is ethics translatable into computer languages? It is clear that natural language 
is richer and more complicated than computer languages. The adequate transla-
tion between the two remains a vexing problem. This relates to the question 
about the limits of machine intelligence. There is no final answer to this ques-
tion, yet it is clear that for typical, unproblematic situations, such as “consensus 
cases”, one can build an algorithm that would guide machine behavior. Since 
the majority of care situations are typical in this sense, machines can be of 
medical use.
2. What is the correct approach to program AMAs so that they are beneficial to 
humans? Which ethical principles should be adopted? The choice falls between the 
three major approaches to the design of AMA’s: top-down, bottom-up and hybrid.
3. How should mechanical and communicative components necessary for special-
ized medical tasks be separated in AMAs?
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4. How should ethical dilemmas be dealt with in which there is no consensus 
among experts? A reasonable suggestion is to limit the use of medical robots to 
consensus medical cases only. Such cases are frequent enough to justify the use 
of robots in medical and other fields (e.g., physiotherapy).
5. What kind of moral agents do we want robots to become? Shall robots become 
explicit or full moral agents? Robots as explicit moral agents seem to me pref-
erable, because being full moral agents would create an ethical conflict with 
their functionality. Their use would imply also their consent, respect of their 
rights and freedoms. Why is this problematic? Because the basic demand from 
healthcare for robots is to save human efforts to provide for an aging popula-
tion. Such use of artificial moral agents might be associated with ethical and 
legal difficulties. Indeed, if we extend the logic of contemporary western legis-
lation to strong AI, the rights and freedoms would be the same as human rights 
and freedoms and therefore this artificial labor might have the same costs as 
the human workforce. Thus, I argue that medical robots that are explicit, but 
not full moral agents would be best suited for the societal demand for them: to 
enable healthcare systems to provide high-quality and affordable healthcare for 
the growing elderly population.
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Abstract Machine medical ethics is a novel field of research for ethicists, philoso-
phers, artificial intelligence experts, information scientists, and medical s pecialists. 
I identify surgical, therapeutic, nursing and sex robots as the primary types of med-
ical machines in this context. I raise general questions about machine ethics with a 
view to its development and application, specific questions about medical machine 
ethics (the term and concept which I prefer), and broad questions spanning mul-
tiple non-machine ethics, including information, technology, business and legal 
ethics, and interrelationships between these diverse ethics and machine medical 
ethics. Samples of each type of question are provided in my descriptions of surgi-
cal, therapeutic, nursing and sex robots. In particular, progress in information and 
technology ethics is needed in order to solve moral problems involving medical 
machines, and progress in machine ethics to prevent some of the problems.
1  Introduction
Robots have reached several peaks of attention. They reached the first peak in 
 fiction, in the poems and stories by Homer and Ovid, by Stanislaw Lem and Isaac 
Asimov, and in movies as different as “Metropolis”, “Star Wars” and “WALL-E”. 
They reached the next peak in industry, with production machines that assem-
ble other machines. Finally, they reach a peak of attention in everyday life where 
robots can take all kinds of forms. Some are inconspicuous, as for instance 
vacuum or mowing robots. Others such as ASIMO and Qrio are conspicuous 
because they are similar to man (humanoid)—so were Talos, the legendary Cretan 
guardian, and Pandora, the artificial woman with her box.
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Robots are present in everyday life, and living with them can be different for 
different people. It can tip to extremes, and the extremes can become everyday 
routines, for instance for patients. Surgical, therapeutic, nursing and sex Robots 
are conquering the healthcare systems in households, doctors’ practices, and clini-
cal centers. They supplement and complement human workforces and fellow 
human beings. They can do some things better, some things just as well, and some 
things worse. Usually they are very expensive, on the other hand they can generate 
cost savings. Then suddenly they multiply to an extent that makes them a popular 
topic of mass media.
This article takes the perspective of ethics without prioritizing on robot eth-
ics as one might expect in this context. The issue is scientific ethics, and it is 
very important that it gains a new self-confidence and makes it to the headlines 
of newspapers and TV programs. With the combination of robots and ethics, this 
might well succeed.
In the beginning, the article explains human and machine ethics as well as 
applied ethics, with special consideration of information ethics, technology eth-
ics, and medical ethics. Then follow questions related to machines as subjects and 
humans as objects. Not lastly, this shows how to distinguish machine and human 
ethics (including their specific ethics) from each other. At the end, it evaluates the 
questions, and as if the future had not been dealt sufficiently before, it takes an 
outlook into the future.
2  The Machine in Morality
Different ethics are dealing with the machine in morality. For thousands of years, 
ethics has been human ethics—leaving out the morality of the gods, for instance of 
the Olympus for once. This means ethics related to humans as subjects and often 
also humans as objects. Other ethical concepts seem to have occurred only in sci-
ence fiction and in think tanks. The situation has become more complicated ever 
since the occurrence of (partly) autonomous systems, since machines—which is 
exactly what I mean here—decide and act independently of humans. Machine 
ethics can be seen on the same level as human ethics, therefore it is important to 
clarify both terms. Within human ethics, several disciplines of applied ethics may 
feel competent, especially information ethics and technology ethics. Further, the 
gap between the world of machines and the world of medicine has to be bridged, 
therefore I have to introduce medical ethics.
2.1  Human Ethics
Ethics as science is a discipline of philosophy and morality is its object. Empirical 
or descriptive ethics describes morality (“Moral” in German [33]) and the 
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will for moral behavior (“Moralität” in German [33]), normative ethics rates it, 
 criticizes it, and where necessary, gives reasons for making changes in behav-
ior. Normative ethics does not finally refer to religious or political authorities or 
to what is natural, customary, or well-proven [27]. One can also refer to the will 
for moral behavior using normative ethics, and point out discrepancies between 
attitudes and behaviors. Metaethics analyses moral terms and propositions from 
a semantic perspective. Applied ethics is segmented into specific disciplines such 
as political ethics, medical ethics, business ethics, media ethics and information 
ethics. Theonomous ethics, referring to the Divine or God, is not part of ethics 
as a science, nor therefore is theological ethics. The proper subject of morality in 
human ethics is the human being, and the object is the human being, but in a spe-
cific ethics, for instance, an animal ethics, the object might be an animal.
2.2  Machine Ethics
According to that, ethics normally relates to the morality of humans, of individ-
uals, and groups, and in a certain way also to the morality of organizations, for 
instance to the perspective of business ethics or more precisely corporate ethics. 
Differing from that principle, the issue can also be the morality of machines such 
as agents, chatbots, robots, UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles), and unmanned cars, 
or in other words more or less autonomous programs and systems. Here, one can 
speak of machine ethics and classify it as information ethics (under computer eth-
ics and network ethics, respectively) or as technology ethics or one can even place 
it on a par with human ethics [8]. The term “algorithm ethics” is used partly as a 
rough synonym, and partly in discussion about search engines, dropbox lists and 
big data; in what follows, I will not refer to this term.
Classification of machine ethics under the umbrella concept “information eth-
ics/technology ethics” means it remains within the ambit of human ethics. This 
could imply one does not see machines as real subjects of morality, but assigns 
this privilege to humans alone. In this case, machine morality would be “on loan” 
from humans and given to autonomous machines with the understanding that it 
could be withdrawn at any time. Classifying machine ethics as equivalent to 
human ethics means it is an ethics in its own right, with systems and machines 
occurring as moral subjects with justification. This is the case when machines 
assume a life of their own and in certain extremes, independently move away from 
the ideas and wishes of their human inventors. Maybe this possibility is the source 
of the idea that morality is not something that lifts humans above other creatures, 
mechanical or organic.
If one understands machine ethics as an ethics in its own right, one can try to 
develop new normative models that match machines, models that they can pro-
cess easily. Just as well one can try to refer to more classic normative concepts 
from philosophical ethics, and in this vein I think deontological ethics is a suit-
able candidate for machine morality [31]. A machine can easily process a duty or 
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a top-down rule. An example: One can teach a machine to tell the truth (which will 
always be the truth in the situation), or to by-pass animal or human obstacles, or to 
brake to avoid them. Is a machine able to do more than follow such instructions? 
Is it able to consider the consequences of its actions, and act responsibly? Is it 
hence able to be obliged by consequentialist ethics or responsibility ethics? Thus, 
it seems that classic normative models, such as can be traced back to Aristotle or 
Immanuel Kant, are generally amenable for machine processing [12].
Robot ethics is a germ cell as well as a specialty of machine ethics [14, 30]. 
The central ethical issues are whether a robot can be a subject of morality, and 
how to implement machine morality. This discipline also focuses on mimicry, ges-
ture and natural-language skills, as far as these are embedded in a moral context. 
If a human being approaches a robot, and the robot makes a face and says, “You 
are so ugly!”, this takes us right to the heart of design, with one foot already on 
the field of morality. Thus, one can ask not only about duties, but also about the 
“rights” of robots. However, machines, being different to animals, are not nor-
mally granted rights. Not lastly, one can understand robot ethics in a very different 
sense; namely, in relation to the development and production as well as the conse-
quences of robot applications. With this view, it can be located under technology 
ethics and information ethics. It follows that the term “robot ethics” is complex as 
well as easy to misunderstand. Although this article addresses ethics with a focus 
on robots, I prefer the terms “machine ethics” and “information ethics” or “tech-
nology ethics”, as it concerns machines as subjects on the one hand, and humans 
as objects on the other, and the mentioned terms are clearer and less amenable to 
misunderstanding.
2.3  Disciplines of Applied Ethics
2.3.1  Information Ethics and Technology Ethics
The object of information ethics is the morality of those who offer and use infor-
mation and communication technologies (ICT), application systems and new 
media [9, 29]. It inquires how these persons, groups and organizations behave in 
aspects of morality and ethics (empirical or descriptive information ethics) and 
how they should behave (normative information ethics). Those who do not offer 
and use ICT and new media but are involved in their production or are affected 
by their effects are also relevant. So, information ethics focuses on morality in the 
information society and analyses how its members behave, or should behave, in 
moral terms. It also analyses the relationship of the information society to itself, 
to non-technology affine members, and to low tech cultures under ethical aspects. 
Meta-information ethics analyses moral propositions or statements, starting for 
instance with the information technological terms, and it locates and compares 
concepts of information ethics. Computer, network and new media ethics classify 
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under information ethics. This makes internet ethics a part of it, and machine 
 ethics—as far as the machines are enriched with information technology (IT)—
also seems to be close to it. The relationship between machine and information 
ethics was addressed above.
Technology ethics relates to moral issues of the use of technique and technol-
ogy [13]. It can focus on the technology of vehicles or arms as well as on nano-
technology. There are manifold relations to science ethics. In the information 
society, technology ethics is also closely connected to information ethics. Not 
lastly, it has to cooperate with business ethics, in as far as companies are involved 
in the development and marketing of technological products, and these are 
demanded and used by customers. As robots and machines in general are technol-
ogies, technology ethics also seems to be very close to robot ethics and machine 
ethics. What was said in the previous paragraph also applies to the relation to 
machine ethics, and for robot ethics I refer to the above discussion. The section of 
robot ethics that analyses the effects of robots on humans is closely connected to 
technology ethics.
2.3.2  Medical Ethics
The object of medical ethics is the morality in medicine. Empirical medical ethics 
analyses moral thinking and behavior as related to the treatment of human illness, 
and the promotion of human health. Normative medical ethics deals “mit Fragen 
nach dem moralisch Gesollten, Erlaubten und Zulässigen speziell im Umgang mit 
menschlicher Krankheit und Gesundheit [English translation: “with questions of 
what is wanted, allowed and permitted morally, especially in terms of human ill-
ness and health”]” [34, p. 10]. Furthermore, the handling of animal illness and 
health can be reflected and transferred to human conditions.
Medical ethics shows increasing overlap with information and technology 
ethics. Medicine has long used instruments for diagnosis, treatment and surgery, 
and more recently some of these instruments have become machines, or parts of 
machines. Some machines are more than instruments, however, as for instance 
(partly) autonomous robots and information and consulting systems. In machine 
medical ethics or medical machine ethics, medical ethics now also meets with 
machine ethics.
3  Machine Medical Ethics Versus Medical Machine Ethics
Machine medical ethics or medical machine ethics defines a special range of 
medical ethical or machine ethical applications. Machine medical ethics opens a 
new field to medical ethics. Medical ethics deals in the present context with spe-
cific moral questions, related to machines as moral subjects. The question is how 
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medical ethics copes with this requirement: on the one hand, it has to acquire 
knowledge about (partly) autonomous machines and their moral skills; on the 
other, it needs to acknowledge the conventional view of humans as privileged sub-
jects in applied ethics.
Medical machine ethics develops from a machine ethics that structures its 
object, and finds the health sector as its field of primary application. As moral 
machines, it mainly identifies robots, but possibly also special information and 
consulting systems, intelligent houses and other “housing and living machines”. 
This makes medical machine ethics close to robot ethics in a narrower sense and 
with relation to medicine, and it searches for other allies. Medical machine ethics 
is acquainted with non-human subjects of morality.
The situation reminds us of the discussion and development in business ethics. 
Göbel [22] distinguishes between (1) the application of ethics to economy, (2) the 
application of economics to morality, and (3) the integration of ethics and eco-
nomics. Some aspects seem to support letting professional ethicists such as phi-
losophers work on business ethics in the sense of conventional applied ethics. But, 
economists might be just as prejudiced as theologians who strongly intervene in 
business ethics. However, the question is whether machine ethics, understood as 
equivalent to human ethics, or medical ethics as specific ethics, should dominate 
or initiate. I propose that machine ethics, in close cooperation with medical eth-
ics and medicine, develops a medical machine ethics, and one important argument 
supporting this was presented in the last paragraph.
At this point, one might ask who machine ethicists really are. Are they pro-
fessional ethicists, as the name suggests? Or are they a motley crew of ethicists, 
other philosophers, experts for artificial intelligence, robotic experts, computer 
scientists, and more recently also business information scientists because of the 
economic implications? This might come closer to the truth, I suspect, and is sup-
ported by a rough analysis of the pertinent literature (e.g., [3, 35]). Another pro-
posal would merit machine ethics to be the object of ethicists, in close cooperation 
with other disciplines. I presume no one objects to other science disciplines giving 
essential impulses. All in all, machine ethics is too cross-disciplinary for a field to 
make a fight for competencies reasonable. There is another aspect: in the present 
further training market it is easy to certify as an ethicist. Nothing objects to that, 
and in the end it is the results achieved with correct methodology that count.
Although the discipline of machine medical ethics or medical machine eth-
ics is still very young it already has yielded promising results in theory and 
practice. The MedEthEx by Susan and Michael Anderson is but one salient exam-
ple. Wallach and Allen [35] summarize the sense and purpose of the machine: 
“MedEthEx learns how to weigh duties against each other from the decisions 
made about specific cases by medical ethics experts when duties conflict.” [35, 
p. 127] They point out: “The Andersons would not claim that MedEthEx is suit-
able for autonomous decision making in the clinic, although they do see this kind 
of software being useful in an advisory role.” [35, p. 128] This role could be used 
not only by humans, but also by robots, meaning other machines which however 
would have to face the same ethical challenges as MedEthEx.
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4  Robots in Healthcare
Robots have become inevitable in healthcare. A TA-SWISS study published in 
2013 under the title “Robotik in Betreuung und Gesundheitsversorgung [Robotics 
in nursing and healthcare]” represents the opportunities as well as the risks in 
applied ethics [5]. Indeed, Switzerland is a land of robots: research of universities 
such as the University of Zurich, ETH Zurich and ETH Lausanne is widely 
acknowledged, and some Swiss researchers have an international reputation [32]. 
However, almost no research is devoted to the moral behavior of machines. The 
US-American study “Healthcare and Medical Robotics” [1] analyses the market 
for medical robots from 2010 to 2016 and gives an optimistic outlook.1 By now, 
the reality of artificial assistants has become so complex it needs systematic 
analysis.
I propose to classify medical robots in this context in categories of surgical, 
therapeutic, nursing and sex robots [11]. Obviously, there is overlap between the 
different fields of operation. Surgery can be a form of therapy, and it is not always 
possible to segregate therapy and nursing precisely. Not everyone will be con-
vinced that sex robots should be added to this category, but a sex life that fulfills 
the individual needs surely contributes to health and wellbeing. Probably one can 
identify additional types now and in future, for instance, tiny diagnostics robots 
that move through bodies, or medically trained counseling robots, or robots as 
“avatars” and tools of non-mobile people while controlled by way of brain-com-
puter interfaces (BCIs). Furthermore, certain artificial limbs could be considered 
robots [6, p. 23].
The term “service robot” requires consideration. One could call all of the afore-
mentioned robots “service robots” to segregate them from industrial robots [20, 
21]. Depending on the language, the term “service” might sound strange in certain 
fields of application. Robots of this type are often described and discussed by the 
general public, which is not prima facie an objection to the use and dissemina-
tion in academic language, but against the use and dissemination in everyday lan-
guage. Surely, it would be desirable for the general public and academic science to 
agree on a shared terminology.
Decker [20] differentiates between “personal/domestic robots” and “profes-
sional service robots”. In the first category, he includes robots for “handicap assis-
tance” (e.g., “robotized wheelchairs”) next to personal assistants, vacuum and pool 
robots, and in the second category, he lists machines in the field of “medical robot-
ics” (e.g., “diagnostic systems” and “rehabilitation systems”). Of course, there 
may be robots that can be used in the personal/domestic as well as the professional 
contexts, and therapy and nursing robots are of that kind.
1
 The company informs on its website: “A new study by ABI Research, ‘Healthcare and Medical 
Robots’ foresees the global market for medical robotics growing from just under $790 million 
in 2011 to nearly $1.3 billion in 2016, driven largely by sales of advanced surgical robots and 
related automated radiosurgical systems” [2].
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Healthcare robots can be distinguished further by other criteria. Some appear 
as instruments used in production halls or fitness studios; others look like humans, 
being more or less humanoid or anthropomorphous. A few of them are in between. 
A robot like JACO that consists of an arm with a hand with three fingers is like an 
industrial robot and a living being at the same time. Robot gender is a category 
based on appearance. Female chatbots, for example, are “fembots”. Some robots 
can act only, others can mimic and gesture, others can understand human lan-
guage, and read or write. Other criteria for distinguishing robots in general and 
more specifically for medical service robots in a wider sense, are developmental 
level, degree of autonomy, mobility, local and remote control, intelligence, ability 
to learn, velocity and costs. There are also important differences in quantity and 
quality of the sensors [26] and media.
Developmental level is a critical factor. Some robots are in productive use, oth-
ers are prototypes. Some are merely at the level of a draft idea. Truly, machine eth-
ics as a field has not even achieved pubescence. Although it is human to peer into 
the future, and to ponder what might be, roboticists and machine ethicists should 
state clearly in their published research what is present and future, what is real and 
what is mere fantasy.
In what follows, medical robot types are described in surgery, therapy, nurs-
ing and sex contexts and related to issues of machine ethics and applied eth-
ics, as framed above. The field of application is briefly outlined before the type 
is explained, followed by some illustrative examples. At the end of the chapter, I 
raise some questions which we have to answer if we take machine medical ethics 
or medical machine ethics seriously. The general questions concern machine eth-
ics in all, partly in relation to the field of application, the special questions relate 
to medical machine ethics, and finally questions are raised about specific ethics, 
indicating options for distinguishing the machines listed in this chapter.
4.1  Surgical Robots
Surgery is an intervention by means of instruments and devices on or in the body 
of a human or animal patient. Its main purpose is therapy, diagnosis or modifi-
cation, especially modification for cosmetic ends. Usually surgery is done under 
local anesthesia, or under general anesthesia to avoid pain and unwanted reactions. 
The person performing the surgery, normally a specialized physician, is the operat-
ing surgeon. Surgery is typically performed in hospitals or medical practices.
Surgical robots can be used to carry out specific actions during surgery, or even 
to conduct an entire surgical process. They are able to make very short and very 
precise cuts, and to mill and drill with the highest precision. Normally they will be 
controlled by a physician who is on site, or at another location, or they might func-
tion, in very exactly defined limits of time and space, more or less autonomously. 
The advantages of robot surgeons are that the intervention is gentler and more 
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agreeable for patients, and physicians are afforded clear views of the body area 
targeted for surgery [23]. The high cost of robot surgeons, however, is a drawback.
Several prototypes have been developed since the 1990s and launched on 
the market. The ZEUS Robotic Surgical System, or ZEUS, is already a piece of 
medical history. ROBODOC (www.robodoc.com) can drill bones for hip joint 
replacements. The da Vinci Surgical System (www.davincisurgery.com) is popu-
lar in clinics for radical prostatectomy and hysterectomy. It is a telerobot and 
hence only partly autonomous [6, p. 23]. The Amigo Remote Catheter System 
(www.catheterrobotics.com) is used for cardiac surgery, the CyberKnife Robotic 
Radiosurgery System (www.cyberknife.com) for cancer therapy, and the Magellan 
Robotic System (www.hansenmedical.com) for vascular intervention.
In surgical contexts, there are (1) general questions concerning machine ethics, 
(2) specific questions concerning machine medical ethics, and (3) questions span-
ning multiple non-machine ethics:
1.
•	 Should the surgical robot have moral skills, and if so, what skills?
•	 Should it follow defined duties only (deontological ethics), or should it be able 
to estimate the consequences of its actions (consequentialist ethics) and weigh 
pros and cons in decision-making?
•	 Do other normative models apply, for instance, a materialistic concept?
•	 How autonomous should it be?
2.
•	 Should the robot under certain circumstances be able to refuse performing 
surgery?
•	 Does it have to consider patient needs and parameters?
•	 How to handle that the robot normally will not be able to adequately respond to 
uncertainty and worries? [6, p. 23]
•	 Is it obliged to express its own concerns and report unforeseen events?
•	 If it is autonomous, does it need a human surgeon to assist in certain situations?
3.
•	 Who is responsible if the machine performs poor surgery? [6, p. 24]
•	 How to handle uncertainty and worries caused by the robot?
•	 How do the Hippocratic Oath and the Geneva Declaration of the World Medical 
Association apply?
•	 Does a robot surgeon support or compete with physicians and their assistants? 
[6, p. 25]
•	 Does it interfere with communication between the surgeon, assistants and other 
medical staff? [18]
•	 How to rate the circumstance that only certain clinics and medical practices can 
afford such robots? [18]
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These questions might be answered from the perspective of information, technology, 
medical, occupational and business ethics. Partly, they are related to legal ethics, 
for instance, with regards to responsibility, liability, and the legal status of robots 
as “natural persons”. From an ethical perspective, Bekey [6, p. 25] generally deter-
mines: “Truly autonomous procedures on the part of a robot surgeon will require a 
number of safety measures to ensure that patients are not harmed.”
4.2  Therapeutic Robots
Therapy means activities for treating injuries and illnesses as well as misalign-
ments. Its objective is to permit or accelerate healing, to eliminate or alleviate 
symptoms and the recovery or production of normal physical or psychological 
functioning. There are several options for therapy, for instance surgery, medica-
tion, physical therapy, or psychological counseling. In a narrower sense used in 
everyday language, therapy is something that follows an (often drastic) interven-
tion, such as surgery. In this context, the term of rehabilitation is also relevant.
Therapeutic robots support therapeutic activities, or apply such activities, such 
as performing exercises with paraplegic patients. They entertain dementia patients, 
and challenge them with questions and games. Some look like industrial robots, 
others can mimic, gesture and use language. They can learn and be “intelligent”. 
Some advantages of therapeutic robots are potential cost-savings and reusability; 
disadvantages include possible unwanted effects of robot therapy, and poor accept-
ance by the patients and their family members [17, p. 151 ff.].
There are a large number of products and prototypes. The robotic seal Paro 
(www.parorobots.com) is very popular. It has been used for therapy for years, 
in Japan where it was developed, as well as in Europe. It has a high acceptance 
by patients because its non-humanoid appearance does not raise high expecta-
tions, thus avoiding the “uncanny valley effect”. Paro can understand its name, 
and it remembers how well or badly it was treated, and how often it was petted. It 
expresses feelings through noise and movements. Keepon (www.mykeepon.com) 
is a small, yellow robot and also highly popular. It is designed to study and 
improve social interaction of autistic children. It is available on the mass market, 
probably because it looks funny, likes to be cuddled and tickled, and knows how to 
dance.
The general machine ethics questions for therapeutic robots are the same as for 
surgical robots, but there are different (1) unique machine medical ethics questions 
and (2) non-machine ethics questions:
1.
•	 Must therapeutic robots implement certain therapeutic concepts and models?
•	 Do they have to consider patient needs and parameters?
•	 How to handle that the robot normally will not be able to adequately respond to 
uncertainty and worries? [6, p. 23]
27Surgical, Therapeutic, Nursing and Sex Robots in Machine and Information Ethics
•	 What are the consequences if patients come to depend on the robot? [6, p. 22]
•	 How should the robot behave in case of conflict, for instance, if several drugs 
are suitable, or if several patients need therapy? [6, p. 23]
•	 Should it make it clear to patients that it is no more than a machine?
2.
•	 Is it relevant to therapy that some robots appear as robotic toys?
•	 Who (or what) is responsible if the machine performs poor therapy?
•	 How to deal with uncertainty and worries caused by the robot?
•	 What if social contact between patients is reduced by the robot? [16]
•	 How to handle personal data collected and evaluated by the robot?
•	 Does the robot unburden or compete with therapists and psychologists?
•	 How to evaluate the fact that only certain people can privately afford therapeutic 
robots?
A general problem is that therapeutic robots and patients are frequently together 
on their own, making it difficult to assess whether the therapy works or requires 
further improvement. It is likely that therapeutic robots will routinely gather and 
evaluate certain patient data. However, the challenge here is that it is unknown 
how best to systematically assess such data in order to optimize therapeutic out-
comes and that the informational autonomy must be protected.
4.3  Nursing Robots
In nursing care, we distinguish between healthcare and nursing, as well as care 
for disabled persons and care for older persons. Accordingly, it includes care and 
services for ill, disabled, old and dying patients by nurses and medical staff, and 
assistants for disabled or older adults. The central issue is to care for the wellbeing 
and health, and to avoid illness. The interests of vulnerable patients in need of care 
should be recognized and taken seriously. Care for animals presents an additional 
challenge.
Currently, nursing robots either support or replace human nurses. They admin-
ister drugs and food to patients, and help them to sit up or lie down. They entertain 
patients, and they act as auditive and visual interfaces to human nurses. Some have 
language skills, and can learn. The main advantage of nursing robots is that they are 
available 24/7, day or night, and with certain limitations also in intermediate phases 
where care is not necessary and the quality of their service is constant. The main 
disadvantage, of course, is high costs of such machines and the reduction of inter-
personal human contact. Nursing robots require specialization to complete complex 
nursing tasks, which is a very considerable technical and engineering challenge.
Domestic and nursing robots are represented in trade fairs and conferences. 
Some are already in productive use. The “nurse’s assistant” HelpMate and the 
“nurse-bot” Pearl are earlier developments supporting the nursing staff [6, p. 22]. 
28 O. Bendel
HelpMate transports objects. Pearl supplies useful information and visits patients. 
JACO (kinovarobotics.com) is a robot with one arm and a hand with three fingers. 
It can pick and bring objects in its reach, such as from a station at the bed. Care-
O-bot, developed by the Fraunhofer Institute for Manufacturing Engineering and 
Automation IPA (www.care-o-bot.de), can pick and bring even objects from fur-
ther away. It moves safely among people and through the patient’s room. Hospi 
by Honda communicates between doctors and patients, and can bring sick per-
sons the drugs they need [15]. Cody from the Georgia Institute of Technology 
can turn and wash bedridden patients autonomously (www.hsi.gatech.edu/hrl/
clean-iros10.shtml).
The general machine ethics and unique machine medical ethics questions are 
the same as for the previously described medical robots, but there are some dif-
ferent specific ethics questions for nursing robots (e.g., Should it be possible to 
exclude future care by robots in patient declaration of will?). A general challenge 
facing nursing robotics is whether living permanently in the same household as the 
patient will adversely affect patient social competence. One talks to the machine, 
one gets used to it, and fellow human beings might become less important.
4.4  Sex Robots
Robot sex, and sex with or between robots, is a subject in science fiction books, 
movies and series like “Real Humans”, and, partly visualized through avatars, of 
computer games. However, it is also considered on the healthcare segment, for 
instance, as a help for disabled and older adults, and for possible support in ther-
apy. The media is enthusiastic about robotic sex, naturally enough, and there has 
been some academic discussion about it [19, 36].
Depending on budget and taste, sex robots are available as a handy toy or as 
big as life. They can help people reach sexual satisfaction through stimulation or 
penetration. Some have natural language skills, which is advantageous since one 
should not forget that verbal eroticism is very popular in chats, and phone sex was 
in high demand for some years. The sexual interactions in Second Life can also 
serve as a reference. The advantages of sex robots are their constant availability, 
relatively high hygiene standards if handled properly, and unburdening of human 
sex workers of both genders. Challenges facing sex robots are limited bandwidth 
concerning sensory satisfaction of human users and low acceptance and under-
standing by the general population. In Second Life and in other contexts, the use 
of child avatars and virtual characters might be a problem.
Fuckzilla, presented on the Arse Elektronika 2007, has a full arsenal of toys and 
tools, from dildos to a chainsaw decorated with tongues [25]. This model seems 
to be more of an outlandish object of art than a love-making partner to take seri-
ously. In 2007, a German online-shop offered sex androids [24]. Roxxxy (www
.truecompanion.com) is a fembot (in the widest meaning of the word) which 
according to information from the company is able to listen and speak, and can 
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respond sexually to touch. Several personalities are available, ranging from “Wild 
Wendy” to “Frigid Farrah”. The male equivalent is called Rocky. Both are avail-
able through the website of the provider.
Again, the general machine ethics questions are the same as for the previously 
described medical robots, but there are different (1) unique machine medical eth-
ics questions and (2) non-machine ethics questions for sex robots:
1.
•	 Should a robot become sexually active on its own, and entice the partner to have 
sex?
•	 Should it be able under certain circumstances to refuse performing sexual acts?
•	 Should it reiterate to the partner that it is no more than a machine?
•	 Should its design fulfill moral criteria (e.g., prohibition of child-like sex robots, 
except in case of combating pedophilic crime [4])?
•	 Should there be novelty options for stimulation and seduction, or should it fol-
low human role models?
2.
•	 How should the robot collect and evaluate patient data to better satisfy its 
 partner’s sexual needs?
•	 Who is liable for injuries or contamination caused by sex robots?
•	 How should uncertainty and shame in patients caused by sex with robots be 
ethically assessed?
•	 Should sex robots completely replace human sexual partners for certain 
patients?
•	 Does robot sex promote the idea that a sexual partner must be available at all times?
•	 Should children and underage teenagers be permitted to have access to sex 
robots for sexual or non-sexual purposes?
The use of sex robots in medicine is a sensitive ethical question. Humans who are 
sexually substituted by a robot might feel rejected by their partner and carer and 
patients who choose to have sex with a robot for having no other choice for sexual 
satisfaction might suffer for lack of human-human sex. Patients who cannot afford 
a robot might feel disadvantaged. For some adults, sex with robots might be on 
the same level as sex with animals. For others, it may enrich life and contribute to 
good health.
4.5  The Robot in the Morality of Medicine
Although asking questions from the perspective of machine ethics is easy, answer-
ing those same questions can be very difficult, especially on a case to case basis, 
and engineering moral medical machines is far from trivial. The large number of 
questions posed in this section for surgical, therapeutic, nursing and sex robots 
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seems to indicate that complexity in moral machines is the main challenge [10]. 
In other words: if surgical, therapeutic, nursing and sex robots are furnished with 
moral skills, one would expect them to flexibly make correct decisions and per-
form actions on very different levels and in very different situations. Implementing 
very simple moral machines—in many cases the right choice—might therefore 
cause or enhance the uncanny valley effect here. At the same time, we note that 
redundancies occur in general and that some solutions to the questions asked 
above probably might be transferred to different types of robots.
Asking questions of applied ethics is also easier than providing correct 
answers, of course, and in some cases it might be difficult to clearly classify 
moral machines as falling under a certain ethics. For instance, the autonomy of 
patients, an enduring topic of medical ethics, in some cases turns into informa-
tional autonomy, and thus concerns information ethics. Sexual self-determination 
as considered under sexual ethics also has to be reviewed with regards to sexual 
intervention, collection and evaluation by machines. The right of satisfactory work 
concerns occupational ethics, and can also be discussed from the perspective of 
information and technology ethics, as the use of information and communication 
technologies and application systems frequently serves for improving processes 
and making work easier.
Most aspects of applied ethics might be traced back to information (and technol-
ogy) ethics because information ethics can be located in the center of applied ethics 
[7]. If information and communication technologies as well as application systems 
diffuse into all areas of society and business, this will influence specific ethics. Thus, 
these ethics will likely draw on information ethics for further ethical guidance.
Anyway the compilation provides a better view of what machine ethics is in a 
narrower sense, and what counts as applied ethics related to humans. Machine eth-
ics inquires from the perspective of machines, focusing on machines as subjects. 
Human ethics assumes humans to be subjects as well as objects. It also provides a 
better understanding of what might be more general questions relating to machine 
ethics and what might be more specific questions, relating to medical machine eth-
ics or machine medical ethics.
Asking questions, even if not supplying the answers, can lead to knowledge and 
to a deeper, more structured and systematic understanding. More theory and data 
are needed in the context of machine medical ethics, as well their ongoing syn-
thesis and eventual symbiosis. Neighboring disciplines such as health technology 
assessment [28, p. 199] need to be recruited to fortify machine medical ethics, and 
it will be necessary to interview affected patients and professional staff.
5  Conclusions and Outlook
Machine medical ethics or medical machine ethics is new territory, a novel field 
of work for ethicists, philosophers, artificial intelligence experts, information sci-
entists, and medical specialists. Surgical, therapeutic, nursing and sex robots are 
the primary types of medical machines and objects of further analysis as the field 
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grows. In relation to their development and application, it is possible to ask ques-
tions of machine ethics as well as specific ethics. I have reasoned that information 
and technology ethics in particular are critical to solve ethical problems involving 
medical machines. Machine ethics might help avoid such problems. If a medical 
machine is moral, it acts (in the best case) to respect and adequately care for its 
patients, so that they can lead a good life and maintain personal autonomy. Their 
acting morally of course could in certain cases also lead to impairing the lives of 
people. If a machine again and again emphasizes that it is no more than a machine, 
this might be transparent and honest, but it might also cause uncertainty and frustra-
tion. The assessment of uncertainty caused by a robot is a challenge to solve.
Currently, it is sheer guesswork to ponder the domains of applied ethics 
machine ethics will need to cooperate or merge with. Animal ethics is one candi-
date. While machine ethics focuses on humans as moral objects, animals are also 
affected by machine decisions and actions, for example if medical machines oper-
ate in households. Military ethics is another potential field of cooperation, despite 
public unease about it, since there is strong technological overlap between medical 
machines, military UAVs and fight robots. Religiously motivated objections against 
moral machines will demand a response from machine ethicists, likely in the form 
of scientific arguments and data. Considerations such as those raised in this chapter 
do not mean that machine ethics should be viewed uncritically or blindly. However, 
I believe that it will be not less than a touchstone of future ethics.
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Abstract What do we mean by good healthcare, and do machines threaten it? If 
good care requires expertise, then what kind of expertise is this? If good care is 
“human” care, does this necessarily mean “non-technological” care? If not, then 
what should be the precise role of machines in medicine and healthcare? This 
chapter argues that good care relies on expert know-how and skills that enable care 
givers to care-fully engage with patients. Evaluating the introduction of new tech-
nologies such as robots or expert systems then requires us to ask how the tech-
nologies impact on the “know-how” expertise of care givers, and whether they 
encourage a less care-full way of doing things. What role should which technolo-
gies play in which tasks and practices? Can we design and use them in such a way 
that they promote care-full and engaged ways of doing things with people? It is 
concluded that new machines require new skills to handle the technology but also 
and especially new knowing-how to handle people: knowing how to be care-full 
and caring with the technology. Good care is not about something external called 
“ethics” but about how things are done in medical and care practices. Machines 
are welcome if they contribute to this more knowledgeable, skillful, participatory, 
engaged, and caring way of doing things. This vision of good care enables us to 
evaluate new technologies and encourages care givers, care receivers, and other 
stakeholders to explore better ways of designing, regulating, and using them.
1  Introduction
When in the 20th century car production was automated, this caused a number of 
problems. One problem was unemployment: suddenly the skilled work of many 
laborers was no longer needed; machines took over their job. This is why those 
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who owned the factory introduced conveyer belts and robots in the first place: they 
wanted to reduce production costs. This also tends to be one of the reasons why it 
is proposed to use machines in medicine and healthcare. The argument presented 
to us is that due to ageing of the population, more care workers are needed, but 
that in the present economic circumstances we cannot afford them, and that there-
fore we need robots and other high tech to do at least part of the work, both in 
places such as hospitals but also at home. As Sparrow and Sparrow remark: “It is 
remarkable just how much robotics research, if it is not being sponsored by the 
military, is promoted by appealing to the idea that the only way to deal with a 
looming demographic crisis is to develop robots to look after older persons!” [10, 
p. 142] Today the argument mainly focuses on defending home care. Keeping peo-
ple as long as possible in their own homes does not only respect their own wish to 
live independent lives; it also saves money.
There are a number of objections one could make in response to this argument 
and I believe we should be highly critical of policies that endorse it, whether at the 
level of government or at the level of specific healthcare institutions such as hospi-
tals, insurance companies and other organizations. But the main reason why most 
people worry about robots in medicine and healthcare has little to do with labor 
and economics as such. Rather, they are concerned about the quality of care, and 
here the analogy between industrial production and healthcare no longer seems to 
work. Whereas few people think that the fact that their car is made by robots has 
huge implications for the quality of the car, they (rightly) worry about the quality 
of healthcare when robots do the job. The way of “production” seems to matter to 
the very “product” in question. Whereas in the case of car production, the ethical 
concerns are mainly extrinsic to the practice and its values, in the case of medicine 
and healthcare, the ethical concern is intrinsic to what care is all about. Care is 
supposed to be “human”, “warm”, and so on, whereas technology is associated 
with the non-human. Machines are perceived as “cold”.
Indeed, the idea of using robots in healthcare evokes images of hospitals and 
homes for the elderly where no human care givers are present, images of elderly 
people abandoned and lonely in homes that have turned into automated care cap-
sules. Do we really want to push our most vulnerable fellow humans into the 
hands of machines? Robots in healthcare then become synonymous to the dehu-
manization of healthcare, which would mean a healthcare that defeats its very 
raison d’être: it was supposed to care, but it only delivers “services” and “prod-
ucts”. It was supposed to be about people, not about “clients”, objects, things, and 
machines. What are we doing? Is it this world we want?
Moreover, if we replace physicians by medical expert systems, it seems that 
something is lost, although just as in the case of care robots it is not obvious what 
precisely it is that we miss. Can robots be(come) “experts” in medicine and health-
care, in the same way as physicians and nurses are experts? Would we trust a 
robotic surgeon? Would we be happy to consult a robotic doctor? We worry about 
the quality of medicine, but our intuition needs further work. We are pretty sure 
about what we do not want. But articulating what we mean by “good”, “ethical” 
medicine and healthcare is a harder question.
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This chapter reflects on the question “What do we mean by good medicine and 
good care, and do machines threaten it?” It presents an argument about this prob-
lem that takes seriously the worries about the quality of care—both worries of the 
general public and concerns voiced in the ethics of robotics literature—but it also 
offers a more nuanced view of the role of technology in good medicine and health-
care. Moreover, it also reflects on the meaning of “expertise” and “ethics” in this 
domain.
In order to address the main question concerning the quality of care and its 
relation to technology, I will ask two more specific questions, which start from the 
assumptions implied in the previous discussion about medical and care expertise 
and about the quality of care: the assumptions that (1) good care is “expert” care 
and that (2) good care is “human” care. The first question is: If good medicine 
and healthcare requires expertise, then what kind of expertise is this, and who has 
or can have this expertise? The second question is: If good care is “human” care, 
does this necessarily mean “non-technological” care, does it exclude machines? 
And if not, then what is and what should be the precise role of machines in good 
medicine and healthcare? Let me start with the first question.
2  “Good Care Is Expert Care”
Our current systems and practices in medicine and healthcare rely heavily on 
expert knowledge. In the past 500 years, modern medicine has divorced itself from 
Aristotelian and medieval thinking about the human body and from what it came 
to regard as “charlatan” physicians and surgeons. After banning the magicians 
and healers, it has firmly based itself on hard science, on knowledge gained from 
experiments, on evidence. This modernization of healthcare has also implied its 
professionalization. In the current (mainstream) medical system, there is no room 
for “hobbyists”. Modern medicine is thoroughly professionalized. It requires years 
of study and professional training before students are allowed to practice medicine 
or work as a nurse. But what does “expertise” mean in this domain? What kind of 
“expert” knowledge do these professionals have? And can machines have that kind 
of knowledge?
To answer these questions, it is helpful to distinguish between two kinds of 
knowledge. One is “know-that” and concerns theoretical knowledge, the knowl-
edge one can learn from textbooks and lectures, from cases described in the 
literature, from instruction manuals and from databases. This seems to be the 
predominant meaning of “expertise” when people talk about “medical exper-
tise” or “care expertise”. Professional physicians know a lot about diseases, 
medicines, and so on. Nurses are also educated to “know” things in this sense. 
However, the quality of medicine and healthcare also depends on a different kind 
of knowledge which is usually labeled as “know-how” or “tacit knowledge” [8], 
and which is of a more practical and personal kind. If a surgeon had only text-
book knowledge about the human body but had never worked on a patient, she 
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would not be regarded as a medical expert. She would “know” a lot in the first 
sense of know-that (theoretical knowledge), but she would know very little in the 
second sense of know-how. Similarly, we would not trust ourselves to a doctor 
who would know a lot about diseases but has never seen a patient in his practice. 
And the expertise a nurse has cannot in any way be divorced from his practi-
cal experience with patients and with specific nursing tasks such as delivering 
specific medicines to patients, washing a patient, lifting a patient, dealing with 
a confused elderly person, and so on. What is needed, it seems, is not only theo-
retical knowledge but also knowledge of a more practical kind, knowledge that 
stems from practical experience and practical engagement with people and, as I 
will argue below, with things. This knowledge requires many hours of training, 
since practical experience is its basis. It is a knowledge that is embodied, that is 
part of being a skilled practitioner.
This does not mean that theoretical knowledge is obsolete. Explicit instruc-
tion, protocols, textbook knowledge, etc. can play a role, albeit perhaps only in 
the beginning. But full-blown expertise is something else. Dreyfus and Dreyfus 
have argued that expertise requires one to develop skills [6] and that “expertise” 
requires various stages of development: whereas novices need to rely on rules and 
guidelines [5], experts have a more intuitive grasp of the situation, a tacit under-
standing or know-how based on experience. This can and has been applied to 
healthcare. For example, influenced by Dreyfus, Benner has studied how nurses 
become experts by acquiring skills. Experience enables them to better respond to 
situations; by means of engaged and involved in the practice, they develop an intu-
itive grasp of the situation [2].
Moreover, professional medical practice and care practice also requires that the 
person can deal with ethical problems. Now many practitioners and, unfortunately, 
many philosophers, assume that ethics is mainly a matter of know-that: knowing 
values and ethical principles, knowing ethical theories, knowing what we can learn 
from textbooks in (medical) ethics (e.g., [1]). Moreover, many people assume that 
ethics is mainly a constraint, something that renders their practice difficult, some-
thing that gets in the way of what they actually want to do and actually do. This 
also assumes that ethics is something that is fundamentally different from their 
practice, from their core business.
The view of ethics I will try to articulate, by contrast, acknowledges that the-
oretical knowledge about ethics can have a role in ethical education, perhaps in 
the beginning, as the Dreyfus model suggests, but that ethics is also and proba-
bly mainly a matter of know-how: of knowing how to deal with ethically charged 
situations when they arise within a specific practice such as medical care and 
healthcare. This ethical know-how is not divorced from the “technical”, practi-
cal know-how one acquires as a practitioner, but is rather to be seen as a dimen-
sion of it. “Ethics” is then not an alien intruder but belongs to the practice. This 
view of ethics assumes that professionals want to deliver good care, and that this 
good care is therefore not only “good” in a technical sense but also “good” in an 
ethical sense. The ethics is in the very aims of the practice and in how one does 
things, in practice. Ethics is then directly related to the care practice and to the 
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quality of care, rather than being a kind of policeman standing on the side lines of 
the practice. It belongs to the skills of the professional, partly as a separate skill 
(e.g., the skill of reasoning), but mainly as deeply connected to the so-called 
“technical” skills. Being a “good” doctor or being a “good” nurse includes being 
“ethical” by definition. It is about doing good things and doing them in a good 
way. The practice itself is ethical. “Doing ethics” is not a separate kind of activ-
ity; practicing as a professional doctor or as a nurse, being an “expert” in these 
domains just includes “doing ethics”. There is no meaningful and no fundamental 
distinction between “doing the things a doctor or a nurse does” and “doing ethics”. 
It is about being able to solve problems, having the skills to do so, and this is both 
“technical” and “ethical”.
If we ask whether machines can be(come) medical experts, nurses, and so on, 
then presuming this is a good question to ask (I will criticize this question in the 
second part of this chapter), we now have clear general criteria for assessing their 
expertise. In order for a machine to become an expert in medicine and healthcare, 
the machine must have at least the following kinds of knowledge:
(a) The machine must know-that; that is, it must have the necessary theoretical 
knowledge; for example, about the workings of the human body, about dis-
ease and ageing, about the causal relations we know from experiments, about 
the theories and the evidence we have collected in books and databases;
(b) The machine must know-how; that is, it must have the necessary skills; for 
example, as a machine surgeon or as a machine nurse, and it must learn those 
skills on the basis of experience;
(c) The machine must be an “ethical” machine, in the sense that it must have the-
oretical knowledge about ethics, but it must also have “ethical skills” in the 
sense that it must “do good” as a medical and nursing machine, it must be 
part of good practice, producing quality, and it must be able to solve ethical-
medical problems that arise within the practice.
Developments in artificial intelligence and robotics clearly demonstrate that 
machines become better “experts” and have the potential to become “ethical” in 
the sense of having know-that, theoretical knowledge. Think about chess com-
puters, for example, or current expert systems in medicine. It is, however, highly 
doubtful that they can fully meet criteria (b) and (c). Of course, machines can do 
many things. For example, they already fly airplanes. Pilots can doze off in their 
cockpits; the computer pilots the plane and it is pretty good at it. It is imagina-
ble, in principle, that in the future we could have surgical robots or care robots 
that do some things automatically. Surgeons can doze off then, or at least some-
times. However, there are at least two questions to ask here. First, does this count 
as “having skills” in the rich sense of the term explained above, and second, even 
if it were to count as “having skills” in that sense, is something missing, perhaps 
something “human”, that we may not need in the case of flying a plane but that is 
essential in the case of medicine and healthcare?
In order to answer the first question, I propose that we distinguish between two 
notions of “skill”. The first notion is a purely technical and functional one and 
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there is no doubt that robots can learn skills in this sense. For example, driving 
a car can be automated today in the sense that the machine can accelerate, steer, 
stop, etc. without human intervention and, increasingly, can keep the car on the 
road without driving into other cars or into a wall of a building. Cars, planes, and 
other machines can be programmed in doing that, and have an increased capabil-
ity to learn from “experience”. However, as with airplanes, things become more 
complicated when unexpected situations arise (e.g., a child suddenly crossing the 
road, risk of a plane crash), when human judgment is needed, when human intui-
tions and emotions are needed, when social situations are to be taken into account. 
The skills that are needed in these situations seem to presuppose an embodied kind 
of knowledge that seems to be tied to our human way of being-in-the-world, and 
which is required for coping with non-routine problems. I do not have much space 
to further discuss this matter here (it would require, for example, a discussion and 
extension of Dreyfus’s critique of AI), but let me say a little more about this sec-
ond notion of “skill”.
Of course, current AI and robotics is advancing. For example, progress is being 
made in machine learning. But the point is that even if machine learning can solve 
some problems, machine learning is not the same as human learning and cannot 
lead to the kind of coping skills we have as human experts, the kind of exper-
tise Dreyfus and Dreyfus [6] describe. Machines can follow rules, make infer-
ences from the information their sensors give them, operate things, but they lack 
intuition, emotion, and judgment. Although current developments in robotics may 
give machines more than “beginner’s knowledge” since rule-following is extended 
with learning capacities in real environments, machines still lack the highest, full-
est kind of expertise, which is required when technical and ethical challenges are 
not routine. Machines may acquire some competence, but not full expertise that 
includes the skill to do what is best in very complex, unexpected situations where 
human lives are at stake. They may be programmed to show behavior that is con-
sidered ethical (to achieve certain outcomes that are considered ethical) by what 
Moor calls “implicit ethical agents” [7], for example an automatic pilot, and they 
may even be able to represent ethics (“explicit” ethical agents in Moor’s sense) or 
even “reason” about ethics based on ethical principles (which some philosophers 
might consider to be sufficient for full moral agency). But none of these forms 
of competence meet the criterion of ethical expertise (and hence full, human-like 
moral agency) if we define ethical expertise as crucially including skills based on 
personal and lived experience in engaging with things and people. It is this techni-
cal-ethical expertise, based on personal experience as a human being that we value 
so much in humans. It is this expertise we think human pilots have as opposed to 
automatic pilots, and it is the reason why we still have pilots in the cockpit and 
presumably will still have for a long time. It is this expertise we want military 
commanders and human pilots to have and why we want them to be “in the loop” 
or at least “on the loop”, even if drones can be developed that operate autono-
mously. It is this expertise we still need when our car has a difficult problem and 
needs to be diagnosed and repaired, even if the car is produced by robots and even 
if routine repair tasks could be done by a robot. We need the expertise and the 
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craftsmanship of the humans, for example, to make judgments about risks. It is 
this expertise and these skills we assume surgeons have, and it is the reason why 
we do not replace surgeons by machines but let surgeons use robots.
A second question, however, is a different one: even if machines had those 
skills and that kind of expertise, would there still be something wrong about 
replacing human care givers by machines? Even if robots could cope with the 
most difficult technical-ethical situations, would it still be problematic to replace 
human care givers by machines?
3  “Good Care Is Human Care”
The assumption behind the philosophical intuition that good care is human care, 
is not only that we need human expertise to cope with hard technical-ethical prob-
lems, but also and maybe especially, that there is something intrinsic to medi-
cal care and practice that would be missing if we replaced doctors and nurses by 
robots. Here the worry is not so much about the term “expertise” in “care exper-
tise” but rather about “care”. As I suggested in my introduction, we associate 
medicine and healthcare not only with getting the right things done (in technically, 
but also as I have argued in ethically difficult situations); they also seem to have 
something to do with how those things are done. We associate “care” not only 
and maybe not even mainly with “delivering” care, with “services”, but also with 
“caring for” and “caring about”, with “being careful” and “being caring”. What 
we worry most about when we meditate on the nightmare scenarios offered in my 
introduction, is perhaps not so much that the robots in question will not be good 
in “delivering care” (e.g., being successful at performing surgery, being good in 
delivering medicines and food at the right time, being effective in monitoring and 
alarming in a home care situation, etc.), but that they will do all those things in a 
“machine”-like way, by which we mean: in a cold, uncaring way.
Indeed, when in the literature concerns about machine care are voiced, for 
example, about potential reduction of human contact [9], indeed the ‘reduction 
of what is often already minimal human contact’ [10, p. 152] in interactions that 
involve vulnerable users such as sick people, young children, or elderly people 
[11], I think this is the underlying worry which needs further articulation and 
philosophical discussion. The problem is not so much that care robots are non-
biological and non-human as such, say the problem of their ontological status; the 
deeper problem is rather that we worry that robots would not do things in the way 
a good doctor or a good nurse is supposed to do things, that is, in a caring way, 
in a way that shows concern with the well-being, feelings, and experience of the 
patient or the elderly person. We do not want “routine” care or “automatic” care if 
this means care-less, unconcerned, “cold” care.
For example, Sparrow and Sparrow argue that if we care for someone, we take 
their hand, stroke them, etc. and robots are not capable of that—at least not in a 
caring way—since they are not the “biological corporeal entities with particular 
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limitations and frailties” we humans are [10, p. 154]. But the problem is not the 
biology as such, but that this biology is the basis of embodied thinking and under-
standing, including understanding “facts about human experience and mortality” 
[10, p. 154], and of our capacity for shared suffering, all of which seem to be 
necessary for genuine care which robots lack. Human embodiment is the basis of 
behaviour and gestures that are appropriate to real care. Sparrow and Sparrow con-
clude: “Robots cannot provide the care, companionship, and affection that older 
persons need” [10, p. 156]. Although I have been critical about their claim that 
care robots therefore deceive users (I discuss this issue elsewhere), their discussion 
clearly shows again what we want: care givers that do not only provide “care ser-
vices” but also, or rather, “care” in the sense of being affectionate, “caring”.
Now if this is what is required (e.g., a necessary condition) for good care, then 
it seems that those who wanted to make a case for machines in medicine and 
healthcare are in big trouble. Even if they could somehow show, or (more likely) 
promise that machines can be “experts” in this domain, they do not seem to have 
any evidence for the claim that machines can “care” in the sense of “caring about”, 
“caring for”, “showing and feeling concern for”, and so on. Unless they could con-
vince us that machines can and will have feelings, can and will have subjective 
experience, they cannot argue that machines can fulfill what has turned out to be 
this necessary condition for good care.
However, there is nevertheless a problem with the view that good care is 
human care, at least if it is framed as a “humans versus machines” question. The 
assumption seems to be that we either have human care OR we have robotic care 
with humans removed from the scene. But this assumption is mistaken, and not 
only because we have to admit of degrees here (there are more possibilities than 
either/or: we can replace some humans by robots, not all care givers will or need 
be replaced; in this sense care can be more or less robotic), but because asking 
the question in terms of replacement alone is one-sided and misleading since it is 
entirely insensitive to the precise role machines, and more generally technologies, 
play and may play in medicine and healthcare. In particular, it narrows down the 
range of human-technology relations to two forms: if technology enters the prac-
tice, it can only be as a tool—with humans in firm command of the tool, humans 
who guarantee the quality of the practice—or as a tool that takes over the prac-
tice, that pushes the human out of the practice. It’s the technology or the human 
that is in control. Other human-technology possibilities are excluded from this 
way of thinking. What remains out of sight, for instance, is the human-technology-
human relation: the human-technology relation in which the technology plays a 
role of mediator; it is not a mere tool but mediates what happens and what is sup-
posed to happen in the practice. It is not a mere instrument but part of the “core 
business”. It is directly related to the quality and the values in and of the prac-
tice. What does this mean? What does it mean in healthcare? What kind of media-
tion is happening there? And does this mediation mean that the practice becomes 
“colder”, uncaring?
Let me start with making some analogies. If someone gives flowers to someone 
(s)he loves, then the flowers are not a tool in the sense in which a hammer is a tool. 
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The flowers express, instantiate, materialize the purpose and value of what is going 
on here. They symbolize the love but are more than a symbol; they materialize it. 
They are part of the loving gesture, part of the practice of flower-giving and the 
practice of the love relationship. The flowers confirm or maybe initiate a relation-
ship. Moreover, if the flower-giving were to become routine, it would stop having 
that significance and meaning. If it were given in a thoughtless, non-caring way it 
would be quite pointless to do it. Furthermore, no-one would say that the fact that 
something physical, biological, or material involved here diminishes the value of 
the act. More: the act couldn’t be done without the flowers.
A second analogy, which comes closer to healthcare: If someone cooks for 
someone else (s)he knows personally, this is also a gesture, and it shows care and is 
care. It does not only respond to a need of the person; the cooking itself shows care. 
That care is not external to the food or cooking, as if it were an entirely separate 
goal. The caring is also “in” the food and “in” the cooking. The cook mixes his or 
her concern, care, friendship, love, etc. into the food; the food mediates the care of 
the one who is cooking and is part of what goes on between the person who cooks 
and the person who is cooked for. What matters is that it is done and how it is done. 
If the cooking became routine or if it were done carelessly, it would not have the 
value and significance it has. Furthermore, no-one would say that using a cooking 
robot or a microwave diminishes the meaning of the cooking. The use of technol-
ogy and the partial automation are not problematic in itself. What matters is how it 
is done. It is possible to cook with those devices in a non-caring way, in a way that 
is “cold” and mechanical. Then it becomes a “service”, and then the food becomes 
“free food” instead of a present or a gesture of care. Then it becomes merely a 
response to need, and not a caring response to the person who is offered the food.
Similarly, medicine and healthcare have an aspect of giving and caring, of doing 
something for someone in a “warm”, caring way. Due to professionalization, spe-
cialization, and commercialization of healthcare systems this aspect might well be 
threatened (I return to this issue below), but our normative conception of care, our 
ideal of care, is one that includes this richer conception. What patients, elderly peo-
ple, and other vulnerable and needy people need from medicine and healthcare is 
not only “performance,” or a “repair” or a “fix”, which they expect when they go to 
the garage for a repair of their car (by a person who might be very skilled, who is 
in the best case an expert). They do not only want health as a product, a commod-
ity—free or not. What they need and what they want is health but also a particular 
way of being made more healthy, which is the opposite of routine. They want not 
only a “service” but also a little bit of “care for” and “care about”, a little bit of con-
cern. If they reject a robot, it is not because they are afraid of a worse performance, 
but because as human beings they need caring concern next to expertise. They need 
care in all those senses of the word: technical and ethical, personal and relational. 
What matters to them is not only what is being done (and that it be done well in 
the sense of having good performance results) but also how it is being done. What 
matters are also the gestures, also the way things are said, also the way they are 
touched and when they are touched. This is the “human” aspect of care that would 
be missing, even if we had “expert” robots that manage and fabricate our health.
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The cooking analogy is also useful since it illuminates the role of skill. Skill is 
needed here; the person has a more practical expertise, know-how. But what makes 
the food good is not only the skill as such, or the expertise as such, but its role 
within a caring practice. It is a knowing-how to prepare the food but at the same 
time also a knowing-how to treat particular others. Similarly, healthcare includes 
not only the know-how of medicine and health expertise, but also the know-how 
that has some similarity to the know-how of the caring lover and the caring cook, 
the know-how that has to do with how to treat people, how to respond to others.
With regard to the use of technology in healthcare, then, what matters is how 
the technology is used and what its role is in the practice. If it is part of skilful 
and care-full engagement with the patients, with the elderly people, with the chil-
dren, and so on, if it is embedded in a caring way of doing things (as well as in 
the right and good, technical-ethical “expert” way of doing things) then “machine 
care” is not problematic. It only becomes problematic when the care becomes 
care-less. Just as the microwave may or may not play a role in the loss of cooking 
quality, depending on how it is used and what the practice looks like, machines 
in healthcare may or may not contribute to “colder” care. Yet the problem of this 
“dehumanization” does not have to do with the technology per se (that it is tech-
nology, that it is a machine rather than a biological human being). The practice 
is, as always, both “human” and “technological”. The key question is (1) if expert 
quality is provided and (2) how things are done: is it still “care” in the richer sense 
of the word? And does a particular technology encourage and enable this kind of 
care, or is there a danger that the technology will be used in a care-less way?
What needs to be evaluated, then, is the precise nature of the human-technology-
human relations involved and the particular tasks, skills, and practices that are in 
play. The quality of care depends on technology, but not because “technology” nec-
essarily replaces “the human”, but because technology is (always) part of our ways 
of doing things. It influences the quality of our work, the skills we need, the way 
we treat others. For example, it mediates and materializes care, and in the ideal case 
it does so both in the sense of “providing healthcare” and in the sense of caring.
Under modern conditions, however, medicine and healthcare is far from ideal. 
Already long before the robots entered our hospitals and homes of the elderly, 
medicine and healthcare have moved towards more bureaucratic, “colder” ways 
of doing. What people hate and fear about “the machines” is what they hated 
and feared already long before: the experience of being treated as an object in a 
large, institutional machine. The institutions of the hospital and the “home” are 
themselves problematic. The healthcare “system” is itself part of the problem. 
Professionalization of care meant that family members, friends and loved ones no 
longer have a role in healthcare. Care workers are paid salaries, that is, with Marx 
we can say that the care workers have been alienated from their work. With Weber 
we can point to the modern bureaucracy and the rationalization and the over-valu-
ing of efficiency have dehumanized patients. Technology has played and does play 
a role in this. Computers, for example, have made it possible that patients were 
better managed and controlled, became numbers. Computers have made it possible 
that we were dehumanized into data. Doctors and nurses started to act like robots. 
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Care became routine. It became “better” than care by lay persons and “charlatans”, 
for sure, but it became better only in the sense of technical expertise. It did not 
become better in the sense of care articulated in the second half of this chapter.
In his philosophy of technology, Borgmann [3] criticized modern technolo-
gies for becoming “devices” that hide in the background and do not require skilled 
engagement. He gave the example of central heating as opposed to a stove: in the 
former case the technology takes over and makes life easy for us, whereas in the 
latter case we have to do all kinds of things to keep the fire going, but this also 
engages us and makes us do things together [3]. It is true that sometimes tech-
nology can encourage thoughtless production and consumption, including the 
thoughtless, easy “production” of healthcare by healthcare workers and the 
thoughtless, skill-less consumption of healthcare. The problem, however, is not so 
much the lack of skills (much healthcare today and indeed much industrial pro-
duction today is highly skilled) but more precisely the wrong kind of skills or the 
lack of connection with other skills: the skills that are not part of a knowing-how 
to care but only of a knowing-how to repair. The problem is a lack of engagement 
with others and with things (as we can argue with Borgmann), but also a lack of 
a particular kind of engagement (a caring engagement), which may or may not 
be encouraged by contemporary healthcare technology. Both care givers and care 
receivers have become part of a gigantic “central caring” system which requires 
skills from individuals, but has disconnected those skills from caring ways of 
doing things, from engaged ways of doing things. They have become mainly or 
even merely “technical” skills, their ethical and personal, caring aspect has evapo-
rated in the striving for more efficiency. What is missing is skill in the sense of a 
more caring engagement with things—Borgmann calls skill ‘intensive and refined 
world engagement’ [3, p. 42]—but also and especially a more caring engagement 
with people, with care receivers. The latter does not happen apart from the for-
mer, apart from things and apart from technology, but is connected to it: we care 
for and about people with things. As in cooking, medicine and healthcare is medi-
ated by materiality, by technology, and this can render the practice more or less 
“skilled” in the broader, richer sense of the term developed here. It seems that in 
modernity, there are fewer places for these kind of skills: skills that belong to the 
“know-how” side of expertise (recently I have argued for more “craftsmanship” 
and engagement in healthcare, also in “e-care” [4]) but also skills that have to do 
with doing things in a “caring” way. The way we do things with others and with 
technology has become increasingly “colder”.
To remedy this situation, one cannot ask from healthcare workers that they love 
patients as they love their friends, partners, children, family members, and so on. 
It is normal that we have more concern for those near to us than for others. One 
could ask, perhaps, to be a little bit more caring. But my point in the previous 
paragraph is not that we should blame individual people for having the wrong kind 
of attitude. The point is that we have organized medicine and healthcare in such 
a way that we encourage ways of doing things that are far less caring than they 
could be and far less caring than they should be if we want to get a little closer 
to the ideal of care we assume in our deliberations about good care and in our 
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deliberations towards medical machines. Thinking about technology in medicine 
and healthcare should be part of asking these broader questions: how do we do 
things, at various levels: individuals, tasks, practices, and institutions.
Thus, the problem is not robots; the problem is how we do things in medi-
cine and healthcare. If we insist that good care is “human” care, then this does 
not necessarily mean that robots should be banned from medicine and healthcare. 
Humans have always worked with technology. Potentially machines can play a 
role as mediators in skilled, caring, and engaged expert care work. They can help 
to make people perform better and they can, in principle, help to materialize the 
caring attitude, to support the caring ways of doing we believe to be necessary 
(but not sufficient) for good care. The problem is not robots, but how to care in a 
better way: with robots and/or with other technologies, and with “better” meaning 
“expert” care and care-full care.
This question is in the first place a question that needs to be answered by those 
who work in medicine and healthcare, those who—this is what we must assume—
really want to work in better ways, want better healthcare, but find themselves in 
institutional-material contexts in which it becomes increasingly more difficult to 
“care” in the richer sense articulated here, which requires a way of engaging with 
patients and with technology that resembles more the ways of the caring cook than 
the ways of the “robotic” professionals created by modern healthcare manage-
ment. Care givers need not be flower-giving lovers or friends who cook for friends, 
but something can be done about the kitchen.
4  Conclusion: New Skills for Good, Expert  
Human-Machine Care
In this chapter I have articulated two necessary (but perhaps not sufficient) condi-
tions for good care: “expert” care involves know-that and know-how, and “caring” 
skills that show concern for patients and enable care givers to care-fully engage 
with them. Evaluating the introduction of new technologies such as robots in med-
icine and healthcare then requires at least answering the following two questions:
1. How does the technology impact on the “know-that” and “know-how” exper-
tise of people working in medicine and healthcare practices? For example, if 
doctors become more dependent on expert systems and have less “know-that” 
themselves, is this a problem? If new technologies such as robotic technologies 
are introduced, what kind of old skills do care givers lose and what kind of new 
skills do they need? How does this change their expertise, and to what extent 
can they develop expertise as opposed to mere competence—let alone having 
the function of mere operators? What does automation mean for ethical exper-
tise? How can machines (e.g., electronic technology computers, robots) assist 
in this, and what should be left to humans? How can their judgment and intui-
tion have a more prominent place and how can we make sure if it is available in 
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cases that are equivalent to the imminent danger of an airplane crash or in cases 
that require ethical expertise? In which cases and situations should we prefer 
human skills, and how can they best be trained? How can “routine” behaviour 
be discouraged? If technology is always involved, how can human-techno-
logical skills be trained and how can a higher level of knowledge—preferably 
expertise—be reached?
2. Does the technology encourage a less care-full way of doing things? In what 
kind of practice and skilled tasks does it play a role and what role does and 
should it play? Is it possible to design and use the technology in such a way 
that care-full and engaged ways of doing things with people are stimulated? 
How can our institutions be changed in such a way that they make more room 
for the “human” aspect of care—meaning not less technology but perhaps dif-
ferent technology and in any case other ways of doing things, other ways of 
treating those who need not only “repair” or “services” but also, and even more 
perhaps, care understood as “caring about”, as concern and as “caring” ges-
tures, as well as company and respect. How can we avoid a total dehumaniza-
tion of healthcare that would be even worse than having only robot care givers: 
how can we avoid that human care givers (fully) turn into care machines? More 
precisely: how can we avoid that they become providers of what we today asso-
ciate with what care “machines” may do: the cold, precise and efficient but 
care-less delivery of healthcare services? In practice, the machines are not the 
problem; the problem is what humans do and especially how they do it: how 
caregivers relate to care receivers.
To conclude, new machines require new skills. In the everyday sense of the word 
this means: new skills to operate the machines. What I mean is: new skills in the 
sense of developing new expertise, which includes knowing how to handle the 
technology, but also, knowing how to deal with difficult technical-ethical situa-
tions. But good care is much broader than that. It is also especially about knowing-
how to handle people: knowing how to be care-full and caring with the technology. 
Good medicine and healthcare requires all these different (but related) skills. They 
often come together in one task, one action. Good care is not about something 
external called “ethics” but about the things that are done with people in medical 
and care practice, and especially about how they are done. Quality is not some-
thing that can be measured afterwards, as a kind of quality control as part of man-
agement. Quality has to emerge in the practice, in the skilful treatment of people 
by people, in the care-full use of technologies to make people better.
This does not only have consequences for care givers and those who want to 
manage them. In this vision of good care, patients also have a different role. A 
more engaged relation means that they can no longer be mere “consumers” of 
medicine and healthcare. They also need to be more involved in the process. The 
receiver of care in the richer sense articulated here can no longer regard the care 
giver as a robot with a pre-programmed smile and with pre-programmed gestures. 
The “humanization” or, if you like, the “re-humanization” of healthcare can only 
succeed if there is also a change in how care receivers treat care givers. Not only 
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patients are re-humanized by their doctors and their nurses, but the doctors and 
nurses themselves are also re-humanized by the patients.
Moreover, contemporary electronic technologies such as those used in tele-
medicine and tele-care practices, and in (other) self-care practices also require a 
different distribution of expertise. In “old-style” medicine and healthcare, the care 
givers were the only experts. In the internet age, care receivers have the possibility 
to have more “know-that”: they are increasingly well-informed about their condi-
tion via the internet and care givers have to take this into account and deal with it 
in a way that respects the patient and the patient’s knowledge. (It is even conceiv-
able that occasionally the patient may know more about particular disease than a 
general practitioner, at least in the sense of know-that. But of course it may also 
be the case that the patient is wrong, or that the “information” is not yet “knowl-
edge”, in which case conversation between doctor and patient can clarify things 
and produce knowledge.) In addition, there may also be a different distribution of 
“know-how”. In “old-style” healthcare only the care giver has to know how to do 
things—with the care receiver. The care receiver was entirely passive: an object of 
investigation and an object of care. Today, the role of the care receiver changes in 
the direction of self-care and more responsibility for one’s own health. The care 
receiver then also needs “know-how”: (s)he needs to know how to use particular 
technologies in processes of self-care, and again care-givers need to adapt to that 
and need new skills: skills to work with the new technologies, but also to work 
with new kind of care-receivers, who also need to be instructed in particular ways 
of doing and who may also “know” more in the sense of know-how based on 
experience of their own body, their own use of the technology, and so on.
Thus, if better healthcare means more “expertise” and more “care” in the rich 
sense, then it also implies a different relationship between care givers and care 
receivers altogether: it implies that both parties in the care practice are re-human-
ized and activated into a more knowledgeable, skilful, participatory, engaged, and 
caring way of doing things. Machines are welcome if they contribute to this, if 
they enable good human-machine-human care. It is a vision of good care that ena-
bles us to evaluate new technologies and that encourages care givers (potential) 
care receivers, and other stakeholders to promote and find better ways of design-
ing, regulating, and using them. Fears about “the machines” remind us about what 
we value most, in healthcare and in other fields.
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Abstract Implementation of ethics in medical machinery is, necessarily, as 
machine-dependent as ethics is context-dependent. Fortunately, as with ethics, 
there are broad implementation guidelines that, if followed, can keep one out of 
trouble. In particular, ensuring correct codification and documentation of the pro-
cesses and procedures by which each decision is reached is likely, in the longer 
view, even more important than the individual decisions themselves. All ethical 
machines must not only have ethical decision-making rules but also methods to 
collect data, information and knowledge to feed to those rules; codified methods 
to determine the source, quality and accuracy of that input; trustworthy methods 
to recognize anomalous conditions requiring expert human intervention and sim-
ple methods to get all of this into the necessary hands in a timely fashion. The 
key to successful implementation of ethics is determining how best to fulfill these 
requirements within the limitations of the specific machine.
1  Introduction
Walking the tightrope between autonomy and respectful guardianship makes 
medical ethics one of the most complex, important and fraught fields of human 
endeavor. Good decisions can frequently require a more thorough familiarity with 
the patient and their situation than any third party can be expected to possess and, 
increasingly, more medical knowledge than any single human can possibly pos-
sess—if not total impartiality and Cassandra’s powers of foretelling the future. 
Further complications are added by the increasing intrusiveness and attempted 
regulation by self-interested parties with little of the knowledge necessary to do so 
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(much less common sense). In many respects, we are approaching both a nadir and 
a zenith. Humanity’s knowledge is ever-increasing but time and selfish concerns 
lead to diminishing effective utilization of that knowledge.
Automation can make this situation tremendously better—or, like all tech-
nologies, it can also make the situation tremendously worse. Instead of blindly 
implementing cool technology without considering its likely side effects, we must 
consider our societal goals in what we wish to accomplish—and what we fervently 
wish to avoid. Indeed, if properly done, automation of medical ethics will likely 
have a tremendously beneficial effect upon our laws and societal mores. Good 
engineering requires explicit specification and codification of what is desired and 
how it is to be accomplished—as well as what is to be avoided and how we will do 
that as well. Indeed, in a very real sense, consequentialist ethics are simply good 
engineering—once the goals are determined.
Further, as technology continues to improve, medical ethics increasingly walks 
a second tightrope between what is best for an individual and what society as a 
whole can afford. We can now keep a single vegetative individual alive for a long 
time—but doing so for large number of individuals will sap both our resources and 
our morale. Alternatively, society could take the resources required to keep one 
vegetative individual alive and use them instead to provide food and/or clean water 
and/or skills training for many individuals. Similarly, there is the closely-related 
question of assisted suicide and allowing competent individuals the dignity (auton-
omy) to decide the time and manner of their departure. The codification of rules 
for ethical medical agents will be subject to—but also drive—the formulation of 
laws for human beings (and corporations).
A final difficulty is that implementation of ethics in medical machinery is as 
agent-dependent as ethics is context-dependent. Fortunately, as with ethics, there 
are broad guidelines that, if followed, can keep one out of trouble. In particular, 
correctly codifying and documenting the processes and procedures by which each 
decision is reached is likely, in the longer view, even more important than the indi-
vidual decisions themselves. All ethical agents must not only have the ethical deci-
sion-making rules but also methods to collect data, information and knowledge to 
feed to those rules; codified methods to determine the source, quality and accuracy 
of that input; trustworthy methods to recognize anomalous conditions requiring 
expert human intervention and simple methods to get all of this into the necessary 
hands in a timely fashion. The key to successful implementation of ethics is much 
more about determining how best to fulfill these requirements within the limita-
tions of the specific agent rather than the specific rules that are implemented.
2  Systems Engineering 101
It is extremely rare that a new technological system is built de novo, complete and 
as a single piece. It is almost always the case that any new system is replacing—
while enhancing—some existing, though frequently manual system. And, yet, the 
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most frequent error perpetrated by novice engineers is that they don’t ensure that 
they thoroughly understand the existing system before attempting to build a new 
one. Indeed, most engineers come in with the arrogant opinion that, of course, 
they “can improve upon that antiquated system that everyone has been complain-
ing about”—and they don’t even really need to know the details of how bad it is 
because they are going to improve it. And so it begins…
If you only had a dollar for every time a new system is “completed”—only 
to discover that it doesn’t have all the necessary functionality of the old system, 
you’d be incredibly rich. If you only had a nickel for each time an engineer belat-
edly discovered “that is why the old system did it that way”, you would be richer 
still. Proper or, more importantly, safe engineering REQUIRES a complete under-
standing of what you are about to replace BEFORE you replace it. Indeed, even 
if all you are doing is supporting an old structure/system, a full understanding is 
necessary to ensure that the new system is not unknowingly blocking or crippling 
some obscure but critical functionality of the old system.
Similarly, safe engineering requires not only a complete understanding of the 
system that you are going to be building and adequate precautions that the sys-
tem will not be subject to conditions where its behavior becomes undesirable (or 
even unpredictable) but a recognition of where and how the new system fits into 
any larger systems (where any unpredictability can domino into huge problems). 
For social systems, in particular, it is necessary to recognize that, not only are you 
building a new technology, you are altering, and hopefully re-engineering, a larger 
existing social system. Indeed, Lessig [39] clearly describes how “architecture” 
(the design of technical systems) can exert a normative force which comparable to 
that imposed by law and custom.
Recognizing this is particularly important for systems which are intended to take 
on the role of being “ethical” or enforcing ethical behavior—because ethical prob-
lems are most often much more sensitive to scoping than simple goal-achievement 
problems. Shooting someone is a bad idea only until it is the sole way to prevent 
them from shooting a score of innocent children; but it becomes a terrible idea again 
if someone else is close enough with a taser. A reductionist approach may appear to 
make morality seem obvious but, in reality, it makes it virtually impossible.
Real ethical problem-solving only takes place when ethical dilemmas force the 
choice between two ethical axioms. Which is worse—death or lack of autonomy? 
Does the answer change when you’re discussing teen suicide, end-of-life assisted 
suicide, abortion, primitive tribes exposing infants, and/or capital punishment? 
To say that morality is not influenced by larger systems and circumstances is like 
claiming that a hammer is the best and only tool. And “handling ethics” at too 
low a level can be catastrophic if, as Bringsjord [13] points out, “human Jones 
has a device which, if not eliminated, will (by his plan) see to the incineration of 
an metropolis, and a robot (an unmanned, autonomous UAV, e.g.,) is bound by a 
code of conduct not to destroy Jones because he happens to be a civilian, or be in a 
church, or at a cemetery”.
The only way to solve problems of this type is with a solid understanding of 
scope and hierarchy. A lower-level system must be able to be overridden by “higher” 
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components with a broader scope of view. In order for this not to be a disaster, since 
the lower-level system frequently provides much of the detailed (or tactical) input 
to the higher level, it must be transparent about its in-built expertise, shortcomings, 
and biases as well as “showing its work” (explaining why and how it arrived at the 
answer). If a higher level can see that a lower level is unaware of a critical factor, it 
can immediately discard the recommendations from the lower level.
Lack of transparency can have devastating consequences for the effectiveness of 
higher levels. This can be particularly egregious for social systems. As pointed out 
by Lessig [39, 138], code-based regulation—especially of people who are not them-
selves technically expert—risks making regulation invisible. Controls are imposed 
for particular policy reasons, but people experience these controls as nature. And 
that experience, I suggested, could weaken democratic resolve. Many of our current 
dysfunctional social structures (e.g., sociopathic corporations) have arisen from low-
level decisions having inordinately large unexpected effects on our social fabric.
3  What Is an Ethical Medical Agent?
In order to discuss the history and future of ethical medical agents, we must agree 
on what counts as machine ethics and how to characterize ethical agents. Moor 
[46] has provided what has seemingly become the consensus with what is gener-
ally characterized as a hierarchy of ethical impact agents, implicit ethical agents, 
explicit ethical agents and full ethical agents.
Ethical impact agents have an ethical effect without realizing it or necessarily 
having been programmed to do so. They are judged merely by the effect of their 
operations rather than whether or not ethics are inherent to the agent itself. Thus, 
it is more often the case that circumstances, rather than the nature of the entity, 
are paramount. Indeed, the nail for want of which the battle was lost could be eas-
ily be considered the archetypal ethical impact agent—and illustrates the fact that 
agency is actually of little import for this category. Obviously, due to the nature 
of medicine, virtually all medical machinery without inherent ethics will classify 
here into this category—with the problem being that, while the impact is clear, the 
direction is not predetermined.
A respirator can keep a person alive until their body has a chance to recover 
or keep a body alive long after the person has departed. Similarly, a diagnostic 
expert system, created without any ethical concerns having been considered, might 
suggest any number of possible actions without regard to excessive personal or 
societal costs. The use of such technologies must be constantly supervised from an 
ethical point of view—and it would be far preferable if such supervision could be 
built into the agents themselves.
Implicit ethical agents, on the other hand, are created when ethical issues are 
considered at design time and the agent’s actions are constrained to avoid unethi-
cal outcomes—for example, by “creating software that implicitly supports ethical 
behavior, rather than by writing code containing explicit ethical maxims.” In this 
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case, the agent “acts ethically because its internal functions implicitly promote 
ethical behavior—or at least avoid unethical behavior” because “Ethical behavior 
is the machine’s nature.” Baxter is implicitly ethical because it is programmed to 
avoid collisions that will do humans harm just as a patient-controlled morphine 
dispenser will not allow a lethal dose request to be fulfilled.
The problem with implicit ethical agents is their lack of transparency—they 
are effectively black boxes. Unless their behavior is known (and documented) for 
every case that they can possibly come across, you’ll never know when overrid-
ing and/or extenuating circumstances will render their actions horribly inappro-
priate. Imagine an expert system, already known to be limited and brittle, which 
only gave answers without explanation. For this reason, we would argue that a far 
more descriptive name, from an engineering standpoint, would be “black box” or 
“opaque” ethical agents.
Explicit ethical agents can actually “represent ethics explicitly and then oper-
ate effectively on the basis of this knowledge.” Asimov’s “Three Laws” robots 
with their “moral mandates” to prevent harm to humans, obey orders and protect 
themselves are examples of explicit agents with a problematic overly simplistic 
ethical system. Simple expert systems for ethical reasoning in bioethics and medi-
cine have been discussed and implemented for decades [60]. While such systems 
remain passive, brittle, error-prone and unable to detect anomalies, they do have 
the advantage of being transparent so that it can be determined whether or not they 
are “aware” of overriding and/or extenuating circumstances. Indeed, for engineer-
ing purposes, we would argue that agents that are not “transparent” agents should 
not occupy a higher position in the hierarchy.
Discussions of Moor’s “full ethical agents” rapidly enter the contentious areas 
of consciousness, intentionality and free will. Many will argue that an explicit eth-
ical agent is “just” a complex device or tool for reasoning with information and 
that it has no real moral “authority” except that derived from its creators, which 
is certainly true for current systems. They claim that a full ethical agent must be a 
sentient being that makes judgments based upon values—and arguably has moral 
authority. It is our contention, however, that a so-called “full” ethical agent is 
merely an “intentional” ethical agent—which is thereby “trusted” (or not)—since 
it is presumably then capable of moral responsibility.
4  The Morality of Intentional Agents
Philosopher Dennett [21, 22] has repeatedly argued that higher-order intentionality 
is a precondition for moral responsibility (including the opportunity for duplicity for 
example). Sullins [58] concurs by stating that we merely need ask three questions:
•	 Is the robot significantly autonomous?
•	 Is the robots behavior intentional?
•	 Is the robot in a position of responsibility?
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Indeed, arguably, this view can be traced all the way back to Immanuel Kant [38] 
claiming that angels can’t be moral because they have no choice (no “free will” to 
have “immoral” intentions) and animals can’t be immoral because they have no 
knowledge of morality (and thus cannot have intentions to be moral).
We have previously specified [65] what we believe is required for conscious-
ness, self and so-called “free will” and what the implications will be of creating 
machines that fulfilled those requirements; however, this is only really relevant for 
very long-term planning and, more importantly, how it affects our views on how 
ethical medical systems can make human medical professionals more ethical—
especially since many with a naturalistic worldview would argue that a doctor is 
simply a biological medical machine. We don’t feel the need to insist upon any 
such thing but it is highly informative to speculate on the scenario where such is 
true and to consider nurses, doctors and surgeons as if they are simply yet more 
instances of the implementation of medical machines.
Far more important to recognize is Dennett’s [20] argument that we are only 
able to understand and anticipate each other in everyday life and daily interac-
tions through the use of the “folk” concepts of belief, desire, intention and expec-
tation. And, indeed, we are even prone to the “pathetic” fallacy of misattributing 
these mental aspects to “unthinking” objects. We have argued previously [67] that 
the clear dividing line between complex devices and sentient entities is trait of 
autopoiesis—the act or attribute of constant self-(re)creation. Once something is 
constantly (and effectively) changing itself according to its “identity” (and thus, its 
intentions), it has crossed the line from being a tool to an entity.
The most important requirements for autopoiesis are sentience and identity. An 
entity must be able to adequately sense in order to guide its direction of self-(re)
creation and have a target/intention/identity to aim for. Ethical entities require an 
identity of being a moral entity and a moral sense (aka ethical sensitivity). And 
while [1] claim that “Fortunately, there is every reason to believe that ethically 
sensitive machines can be created,” the outstanding problem for any sort of ethi-
cal system is that we don’t truly have a clear consensus definition of what morality 
and/or ethics truly are—and thus, we have no guaranteed engineering method to 
design or validate a constructed moral sense.
5  The Shortcomings of Humans as Ethical Actors
Arkin [8] maintains that “It is not my belief that an unmanned system will be able 
to be perfectly ethical in the battlefield, but I am convinced that they can perform 
more ethically than human soldiers are capable of.” Similarly, Pontier and Hoorn 
[47] are striving “towards machines that behave ethically better than humans 
do”. Clearly, there is tremendous optimism for the potential of technology being 
applied to ethics.
The problem is that it all comes back down to answering the ages old question 
of “What is this ‘ethics’?” As James Moor points out, not only do we want future 
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machines to treat us well but, more even importantly, “Programming or teaching 
a machine to act ethically will help us better understand ethics.” Problematically, 
however, one of the best-known treatises on machine morality [61] despairs at 
reconciling the various approaches to morality with the claims that doing so “will 
demand that human moral decision making be analyzed to a degree of specificity 
as yet unknown” and moreover that “any claims that ethics can be reduced to a 
science would at best be naïve”. We disagree vehemently with such pessimism and 
they seemingly should agree since they then proceed along despite such caveats.
The greatest shortcoming of humans as ethical actors is precisely the lack of the 
ability that we highlighted as most important for ethical medical machines—the 
ability to correctly codify and document the processes and procedures by which 
each decision is reached. The typical excuses for this, including the apparently 
overwhelming complexity of morality and ethics, are likely solely due to the fact 
that it was evolutionarily beneficial to develop and hold those views as we have 
previously argued [63]. Transparency simply was not optimal for the evolving 
human individual.
The first problem is that, for human beings, conscious logic is sub-optimal for 
making complex evaluations even when moral issues aren’t involved. A study of 
the “deliberation-without-attention” effect [23] shows clearly that engaging in a 
thorough conscious deliberation is only advantageous for simple choices while 
choices in complex matters should be left to unconscious thought. This effect is 
attributed to the fact that a person can pay conscious attention to only a limited 
amount of information at once, which can lead to a focus on just a few factors and 
the loss of the bigger picture. And, indeed, experimental studies [57] show that 
many “conscious” decisions are actually made by the unconscious mind up to 10 s 
before the conscious mind is aware of it.
Worse, scientific evidence [32] clearly refutes the common assumptions that 
moral and ethical judgments are products of, based upon, or even correctly retriev-
able by conscious reasoning. We don’t consciously know and can’t consciously 
retrieve why we believe what we believe and are actually even very likely to con-
sciously discard the very reasons (such as the “contact principle”) that govern our 
ethical behavior when unanalyzed. Further, even when analyzed, there is ample 
evidence [59] to show that our conscious, logical mind is constantly self-deceived 
to enable us to most effectively pursue what appears to be in our own self-interest 
or pursuant to our own personal moral code. We simply make up whatever appears 
to be the best excuse at the time [27]. Of course, none of this should be particu-
larly surprising since Minsky [45] points out many other examples, including 
when one falls in love, where the subconscious/emotional systems overrule or dra-
matically alter the normal results of conscious processing without the conscious 
processing being aware of the fact.
Mercier and Sperber [44] point out that there are incontrovertible amounts of 
evidence demonstrating that human reasoning often leads to epistemic distortions 
and poor decisions. It seems illogical that evolution would have favored such prob-
lems except for their hypothesis that true function of reasoning is for argumenta-
tion—to devise and evaluate arguments intended to persuade. As they point out: 
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“When the same problems are placed in a proper argumentative setting, people 
turn out to be skilled arguers. Skilled arguers, however, are not after the truth but 
after arguments supporting their view” [44, 56].
Thus, morality and ethics appear terribly complicated because we have evolved 
that view to prevent ourselves from being exploited by superior argumentation and 
to permit ourselves to self-deceive while pursuing our own selfish desires. This 
is also arguably why ethics is predominantly implemented as overriding emotions 
which can shut down reasoning when we are threatened. Further, emotions can 
evolve to enforce behavioral rules in cases where cognitive complexity (enabled 
by temporal discounting) ensures that effective reasoning cannot take place.
The final straws are recent experiments into how “cultural cognition” [24] 
affects public policy [35] by motivating individuals to conform their beliefs about 
policy-relevant facts to their cultural values and the “identity-protective cognition 
thesis” [37] that subjects would “use their quantitative-reasoning capacity selec-
tively to conform their interpretation of data to the result most consistent with 
their political outlooks." Indeed, even in cases where the issue is unfamiliar and 
the politics are unknown, such as with outpatient commitment laws [36], cultural 
worldviews and values shape the perception of efficacy of policies. And all of this 
is further complicated by the fact that social psychologists [28, 29, 34]. All of this 
appears as if it could leave us in quite a quandary when we’re attempting to imple-
ment ethical machines.
6  So What Do We Do?
The first thing that needs to be done when engineering any system is to make 
some choices and define the boundaries of the system that is to be created. Are we 
merely attempting to develop a system that flags decisions or actions that might 
be morally fraught so that they can be reviewed before a mistake is made? Are 
we attempting to create a system that can actually determine the best decision 
or action? Or, are we actually going to allow the system to make decisions and 
implement them without oversight?
Given the current lack of autonomy in machines and the human disagreement 
over exactly what is moral, the third option is clearly out of the question for 
the foreseeable future. On the other hand, even the attempt to create a system 
that can determine the best decision or action will dramatically help the social 
process of codifying morality. Indeed, simply developing a system that can rec-
ognize when decisions or actions might be morally fraught would be a huge step 
forward.
There is also the question of whether we attempt to implement morality exactly 
as it is implemented in humans, warts and all, or whether we attempt to specify 
something that is simpler and clearer yet close enough to “ethical” to serve until 
we can truly fully specify what that means. In reality, we can really only engineer 
prototype, test or advisory (or tutoring) SUBsystems of each type. We really do 
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not know enough about the existing system to even begin to attempt to replace it. 
All we can do is build systems to explore the subject further and to assist humans 
in not making errors—and attempt to develop an overarching theory that might 
enable us better guidance in our explorations.
7  Morality from the Top Down
McLaren [42, 43] points out that ethical reasoning has a fundamentally different 
character than reasoning in more formalized domains:
•	 The laws, codes, or principles (i.e., rules) are almost always provided in a 
highly conceptual, abstract level.
•	 The conditions, premises or clauses are not precise, are subject to interpretation, 
and may have different meanings in different contexts.
•	 The actions or conclusions in the rules are often abstract as well, so even if the 
rule is known to apply the ethically appropriate action may be difficult to exe-
cute due to its vagueness.
•	 The abstract rules often conflict with each other in specific situations. If more 
than one rule applies it is not often clear how to resolve the conflict.
These facts should lead to the obvious question of “Why is ethics laid out this 
way?” and the arguable answer of “Because this is merely our best current over-
arching theory of what human ethics truly is.” We contend that the problem is that 
our idea of morality is merely what we have cobbled together from the frequently 
contradictory low-level data provided by our moral sense as filtered through our 
cultural cognition and argumentative reasoning.
So, clearly, a change of tactics is in order. A useful new strategy is, instead of 
trying to ask exactly what morality is, to ask why it is what it is—or, in common 
engineering terms “What is the function that this system exists to fulfill?” And, 
conveniently enough, social psychologists [30] have just been recently arguing 
that, rather than specifying the content of moral issues (such as “justice, rights, 
and welfare”), they too should also take a functional approach to defining moral-
ity. Their functional definition is that
Moral systems are interlocking sets of values, virtues, norms, practices, iden-
tities, institutions, technologies, and evolved psychological mechanisms that 
work together to suppress or regulate selfishness and make cooperative social life 
possible.
This fits in conveniently with Wilson’s [68] prediction that ethics would soon 
become part of the ‘new synthesis’ of sociobiology, in which distal mechanisms 
(such as evolution), proximal mechanisms (such as neural processes), and the 
socially constructed web of meanings and institutions (as studied by the humani-
ties and social sciences) would all be integrated into a full explanation of human 
morality. All of those assorted pieces clearly do work together to fulfill the func-
tion of suppressing/regulating selfishness and making cooperative social life 
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possible. And ethical robots and systems will merely be an addition to our moral 
ecosystem. We just need to ensure that they act in furtherance of that goal as 
opposed to being a hindrance to it.
This also gives us a framework to go back and evaluate both why and how well 
each of the multiplicity of moral philosophies works. For example, a Kantian phi-
losophy such as that espoused by Powers [50, 51] clearly makes sense when we 
are effectively declaring a categorical imperative of “suppress or regulate selfish-
ness and make cooperative social life possible.”
8  Morality from the Bottom Up
The existence of evolutionary “ratchets” (randomly acquired traits that are likely 
statistically irreversible once acquired due to their positive impact on fitness) 
causes “universals” of biological form and function to emerge, persist, and con-
verge predictably even as the details of evolutionary path and species structure 
remain contingently, unpredictably different [56]. Ratchets can range from the 
broadly instrumental (enjoying sex) to the environmentally specific (streamlin-
ing and fins in water) to the contradictory and context-sensitive (like openness to 
change). Morality, as the ability to suppress or regulate selfishness and make coop-
erative social life possible, is clearly one such evolutionary ratchet—or, rather, our 
moral sense is actually a relatively large set of ratchets [12, 31, 69].
The good news is this means that our moral emotions most probably all have 
some reason for existing. The bad news is that, unless that reason is known, it is 
entirely possible that those reasons could be obsolete. For example, Savulescu and 
Persson [55] point to many characteristics of current human morality that appear 
inappropriate for the current techno-human condition including a high temporal 
discount rate, little regard for distant and unrelated people, and distinctions based 
upon arguably morally irrelevant features such as inflicting harm with or with-
out direct physical contact. On the other hand, emotional reactions could point us 
toward discoveries that we are unlikely to find otherwise.
For example, in trolley car (or similar culturally-adapted) problems, the vast 
majority of people see no problem with throwing the switch so that one person is 
killed instead of five. On the other hand, a majority of people do have problems 
with pushing someone off the bridge to stop the train from killing five others or 
with kidnapping involuntary organ donors off the street to save multiple people. 
These culturally universal emotions indicate, at a minimum, that there was some 
time period during which utilitarianism, in terms of simply counting immediately 
affected lives, was not valid.
We would argue that emotions such as this indicate actions that, if allowed to 
occur, would quickly undermine society (and thus lead to far more lives lost in 
the long term). In the case at hand, the principle of double effect, allowing other 
people to be used to fulfill a goal will quickly result in everyone taking defensive 
measures to ensure that they won’t be so used.
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9  Example Emotional Systems
Gomila and Amengual [26] focus on the role of emotions in moral cognition and 
ways in which this can be instantiated computationally. Delghani et al. [18] have 
created a computational model, MoralDM which “integrates several AI techniques 
in order to model recent psychological findings on moral decision-making” by 
relying upon contextual factors that vary with cultural in order to extend beyond 
pure utilitarian models. It features:
•	 a natural language system to produce formal representations from psychological 
stimuli and reduce tailorability
•	 order of magnitude representation to model the impacts of secular versus sacred 
values via qualitative reasoning
•	 a combination of first-principles reasoning and analogical reasoning to deter-
mine consequences and utilities when making moral judgments, and
•	 performance improvement via accumulating examples.
This is similar to Pontier et al. [49] Moral Coppélia in that it integrates both 
rational/utilitarian calculations and more emotional/deontological ones.
10  Example Top Down Systems
In the absence of a better understanding and specification of ethics (not to men-
tion a full-blown intelligent and intentional machine to instantiate it), there have 
been no true complete top-down systems. The unsolved “frame problem” [19, 41] 
means that either (a) scope and input must be limited and representation formal-
ized or (b) that humans must pre-process the input to any instantiated system. 
Arguably, an autopoietic agent’s identity requirements should solve the issues of 
meaning and understanding and thereby the frame problem but we are still short of 
that occurring.
Both military and medical systems have generally tremendously decreased 
their scope with clearly defined parameters. Arkin [8] expects military robots to be 
programmed with the laws of war and rules of engagement and to have the “just 
war” axioms of discrimination and proportionality as well as Walzer’s [62] dou-
ble intention. Most medical systems have generally followed Beauchamp’s and 
Childress’s [10] duties of beneficence, lack of maleficence, and autonomy.
The Anderson et al. [1] have created a variety of utilitarian ethical calcula-
tors or advisors which rely critically upon human pre-processing for their input. 
Jeremy, their Hedonistic Act Utilitarianism calculator (named after Jeremy 
Bentham) calculates the action which is expected to cause the greatest expected 
net pleasure. It presents the user with an input screen that prompts for the name of 
the action, the name of the person affected and a rough estimate of the size of the 
effect—and continues to accept this data for each person affected by every action 
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under consideration. Critics of act utilitarianism have, of course, pointed out that it 
can (a) violate a person’s rights, sacrificing one person for the greater net good and 
(b) frequently conflict with our notion of justice by ignoring past behavior
W.D. has a similar input screen that prompts for the name of each action but 
with a rough estimate of the amount that each of Ross’s [54] seven prima facie 
duties (fidelity, reparation, gratitude, justice, beneficence, non-maleficence, and 
self-improvement) are either satisfied or violated by that action. Since, Ross 
gives no decision procedure for determining which duty is paramount when, as 
frequently happens, multiple duties pull equally in opposite directions, W.D. was 
designed to learn using a simple least mean square training rule to update the 
weights of each duty. Later versions of W.D. [2] adopted Rawls’ [53] reflective 
equilibrium approach to creating and refining ethical principles (by going back 
and forth between particular cases and principles) and used inductive logic pro-
gramming (ILP) to learn the relation of “supersedes” for different quantities of 
satisfaction and violation between each of the duties. MedEthEx [3] implemented 
the duties of beneficence, lack of maleficence, and autonomy with Rawls’ reflec-
tive equilibrium and ILP. The Andersons subsequently used a similar design in 
developing EthEl, an ethical eldercare system [4], and instantiated it into a NAO 
robot [5] which they believe is the first instantiated ethical robot—since Cloos 
[17] never created his proposed utilitarian robot. They have also continued their 
development of systems for developing ethical decision principles through dialog 
with ethicists [6, 7]. Pontier’s and Hoorn’s [47] moral reasoner also implemented 
the duties of beneficence, lack of maleficence, and autonomy while Pontier’s and 
Widdershoven’s [48] system concentrated on positive and negative autonomy.
11  Example Assisting and Advising Systems
As full-up machine intelligence is still in the future, many researchers have fallen 
back onto creating moral advisors and tutors (or have never believed that machines 
will ever be suitable for a greater role). When expert systems are right, they are most 
often right because of the explicit reasoning programmed into them and they can 
convey that reasoning on to the user. When they are wrong, they are normally hor-
ribly wrong because they do not recognize and account for some unusual/anoma-
lous situation—but journeyman users, as opposed to novices, are most often quite 
capable of recognizing when this is the case and discarding the advice. On the other 
hand, as previously discussed, opaque big data and/or statistical systems like neural 
networks and undocumented case-based reasoning can turn out to be quite danger-
ous unless either (a) they are solely used as a “safety valve” check on an already 
determined action [52] or (b) it is guaranteed that the system has seen and will cor-
rectly handle any case that might be given to it (a closed world assumption).
Far better, however, are so-called decision support systems which assist users 
in finding all relevant data and helping them analyze it—such as Truth-Teller and 
SCIROCCO [42, 43]. Truth-Teller assists users by providing comparisons of the 
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cases and fully explaining the comparisons. SCIROCCO also compares cases 
but “is more useful for collecting a variety of information, principles, cases and 
additional information that a user should consider in evaluating a new ethical 
dilemma.” Even a simple interactive, multimedia program like the Dax Cowart 
program, designed to explore the practical ethics issue of a person’s right to die 
[16], can serve to educate but best of all is to utilize and participate in one of the 
numerous new methods of collaborative modeling and decision-making [64].
Similarly, IBM [33] has just announced its “WatsonPaths” project in collabo-
ration with the Cleveland Clinic. WatsonPaths explores complex scenarios and 
draws conclusions much as medical personnel do. It examines scenarios from 
many directions, working its way through chains of evidence, and draws infer-
ences to support or refute a set of hypotheses. It can incorporate feedback and 
learn from humans who can drill down “to decide if certain chains of evidence 
are more important, provide additional insights and information, and weigh which 
paths of inferences the physician determines leads to the strongest conclusions.” 
It will use machine learning to “improve and scale the ingestion of medical infor-
mation” which will make it valuable to even seasoned practitioners. It will also 
be able to “help medical students learn how to quickly navigate the latest medi-
cal information and will display critical reasoning pathways from initial clinical 
observations all the way to possible diagnoses and treatment options.”
12  Current Top Down Theorizing
Of course, there is no shortage of researchers still attempting to solve the grand 
problem of ethics from top down modeling of human morality. For example, 
Bringsjord et al. [14] suggest that category theory is a viable approach by contend-
ing that “It is not implausible to hold in Piagetian fashion that sophisticated human 
cognition, whether or not it is directed at ethics, exploits coordinated functors 
over many, many logical systems encoded as categories. These logical systems 
range from the propositional calculus, through description logics, to first-order 
logic, to temporal. epistemic, and deontic logics, and so on.” This would presum-
ably include Athena [9], an “implementation of a natural deduction calculus for a 
recently developed deontic logic of agency based on indeterminate branching-time 
semantics augmented with dominance utilitarianism”.
Bello and Bringsjord [11] focus on the necessary role of theory of mind (ToM) 
in moral psychology and argue that an appropriate computational version of the 
human ToM is necessary to reason about moral implications. They argue, as we 
do, that rational actor models should be discarded; however, they believe that 
focusing on folk concepts is the best way to explore cognitive architecture. It 
would be our hypothesis and fear that this will lead to the same sort of argumenta-
tive errors that created the rational actor model in the first place.
Gigerenzer [25] proposes that moral behavior is based upon satisficing using 
pragmatic social heuristics rather than moral rules or maximization principles. 
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This could also be interpreted to mean that moral calculations may be based upon 
affordances and boundaries rather than single optimal plans. Mackworth’s [39] 
argument that constraint satisfaction could be used as a unified ethical framework 
could tie into this view as well.
13  Conclusion
All ethical machines must not only have ethical decision-making rules but also 
methods to collect data, information and knowledge to feed to those rules; codified 
methods to determine the source, quality and accuracy of that input; trustworthy 
methods to recognize anomalous conditions requiring expert human intervention 
and simple methods to get all of this into the necessary hands in a timely fashion. 
The bad news is that current human ethical rules need more study and clarification 
before we will be able to implement more than simple subsystems, decision sup-
port systems and test systems.
The good news about autopoietic “intentional” agents is that all that needs to 
be done to prevent them from running amok is to ensure that a Kantian impera-
tive of Haidt’s morality is part of their identity—contrary to many of the concerns 
of Brundage [15] and the numerous others he cites. For safety’s sake, we will, as 
we have previously argued [66], have to grant them full moral agency and patient-
hood (and arguably, personhood)—but this is far preferable to the other scenarios 
predicted.
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Abstract To feel comfortable allowing healthcare robots to interact with human 
beings, we must ensure that they act in an ethically responsible manner, follow-
ing an acceptable ethical principle(s). Giving robots ethical principles to guide 
their behavior results in their being ethical agents; yet we argue that it is the 
human designers, not the robots, who should be held responsible for their actions. 
Towards the end of designing ethical autonomous robots that function in the 
domain of healthcare, we have developed a method, through an automated dia-
logue with an ethicist, for discovering the ethically relevant features of possible 
actions that could be taken by a robot, with an appropriate range of intensities, 
prima facie duties to either maximize or minimize those features, as well as deci-
sion principles that should be used to guide its behavior. Our vision of how an eth-
ical robot assistant would behave demonstrates that an ethical principle is used to 
select the best action at each moment, rather than just determine whether a particu-
lar action is acceptable or not. Further, we maintain that machine ethics research 
gives us a fresh perspective on ethics. We believe that there is a good chance that 
this research may lead to surprising new insights, and therefore breakthroughs, in 
ethical theory.
S.L. Anderson (*) 
Department of Philosophy, University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT, USA
e-mail: susan.anderson@uconn.edu
M. Anderson 
Department of Computer Science, University of Hartford, West Hartford, CT, USA
e-mail: anderson@hartford.edu
68 S.L. Anderson and M. Anderson
1  Introduction
A pressing need for personnel in the area of healthcare, caused in no small part by the 
aging “baby boomer” population, has fueled interest in possible technological solu-
tions, including developing autonomously functioning machines (e.g., robots) that 
act as healthcare agents. To feel comfortable allowing healthcare robots to interact 
with human beings, we must ensure that they act in an ethically responsible man-
ner, following an acceptable ethical principle(s). We shall argue that an autonomously 
functioning healthcare robot whose behavior is guided by an ethical principle is an 
ethical agent. Yet we also argue that it should not be held morally responsible for its 
actions. We must bear the burden of making sure that it behaves ethically towards its 
charge(s). A lot rides on our doing so successfully because, if we fail, we risk a pub-
lic backlash that could stifle future research in artificial intelligence, preventing the 
development of more autonomously functioning machines that could be of great help 
in assisting medical personnel, enabling them to take better care of their patients.
We maintain that work in machine ethics should be of paramount importance 
in creating autonomously functioning machines that interact with humans, such as 
those proposed in the domain of healthcare. Towards this end, we have developed 
a method, through an automated dialogue with an ethicist, for discovering the ethi-
cally relevant features of possible actions that could be taken by a robot, with an 
appropriate range of intensities, prima facie duties to either maximize or minimize 
those features, as well as decision principles that could be used to guide its behav-
ior in performing a variety of tasks that might be encountered in home healthcare 
or assisted living facilities. We also argue that such robots should not only follow 
an ethical principle(s) to determine correct behavior for a few of its tasks, ones 
that have obvious ethical import. Even determining when to return to its charging 
station could affect whether it will have enough power to go to the patient when 
a necessary task needs to be performed in the near future. Since most actions it 
takes have the potential for impacting the wellbeing of the patient(s), an ethical 
principle(s) should be driving all of this behavior.
2  Machines as Ethical Agents Without Moral Responsibility
Could machines ever be considered to be ethical agents? To answer this question, 
we should consider James Moor’s five categories of ways in which values might 
be ascribed to machines [9]. The first three clearly fall short of being true ethical 
agenthood: normative agents, machines designed with a specific purpose in mind, 
e.g., a proof checker, that are only assessed as to how well they satisfy that pur-
pose; ethical impact agents, that are not only designed with a specific purpose, 
but also have an, ideally positive, impact on the world such as the robot jockeys 
that guide camels in races in Qatar, replacing young boys who are thereby freed 
from slavery; and implicit ethical agents, machines that have been programmed by 
human designers to behave in ways that are consistent with ethical practices.
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What is necessary in order to be a ethical agent is that the agent “considers” 
options for possible actions that it could perform, selects the one that, following 
some ethical theory, would be the most ethically correct one and performs that 
action. The last two of Moor’s categories both satisfy these requirements: explicit 
ethical agents, machines that calculate the best action when faced with ethical 
dilemmas by being able to represent the situation they are faced with, “consider” 
which actions are possible in the situation, assess those actions in terms of an 
ethical theory, and then perform the action that they have determined to be the 
most ethically correct one; and full ethical agents, a term believed to only apply 
to humans, which requires, in addition to being an explicit ethical agent, that the 
agent acts intentionally, is conscious and has free will, thus enabling the agent to 
be held morally responsible for its actions.
Of course there are problems, raised by a number of philosophers, with at least 
the last of the requirements of full ethical agenthood, thought to apply to humans 
and never to machines. There are different senses of free will. According to one 
conception, made famous by David Hume, agents are said to have acted freely 
if they are able to translate their “desires” into action: “By liberty…we can only 
mean a power of acting or not acting according to the determinations of the will; 
that is, if we choose to remain at rest, we may; if we choose to move, we also 
may.” [8]. This sense of free will is compatible with all our desires and actions 
being determined by antecedent states of affairs.
Another conception of free will, advocated by Libertarians, maintains that free-
dom only exists if determinism does not. One must be able to perform alternative 
actions at a given moment in time, all antecedent conditions remaining the same. 
And to be held morally responsible for the action, one must be the sole cause of 
the chosen action. We shall not discuss in this paper the problems with each of 
these conceptions of free will,1 but it seems possible to maintain that an autono-
mously functioning machine could be acting freely in the compatibilist sense; and 
if one insists on using the libertarian sense, human beings may not ever act freely. 
Still, let us assume here what is commonly accepted, that human actions satisfy 
criteria that machine actions do not, and very likely never will, that enable us to be 
held morally responsible for our actions while machines should not. If true, then 
ethical agenthood should not be equated with being held morally responsible for 
one’s actions, but rather, the second is a subset of the first. It is possible to be an 
ethical agent and yet one should not be held morally responsible for one’s actions. 
An ethically trained, autonomously functioning machine is a prime example.
So the burden of responsibility for machine behavior falls on the human 
designer(s) who need to have the proper expertise. Machines that function autono-
mously, whose behavior has the potential to adversely affect the lives of human 
beings, should not be constructed by AI researchers and engineers alone, since 
they are not trained to anticipate subtle ethical concerns. We believe that ethicists 
1
 For a fuller discussion of the merits and problems of the two senses of free will, see 
Anderson [5].
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need to be included in the development of autonomously functioning machines 
and there should be periodic assessment as to whether they are continuing to oper-
ate in an ethically acceptable manner. We should avoid, at all costs, putting the 
burden of responsible use of machines on the user, by proactively insisting that 
they be developed so that they can only behave in an ethically acceptable fash-
ion. We maintain that work in machine ethics, therefore, should be of paramount 
importance in developing autonomously functioning machines such as those pro-
posed in the domain of healthcare.
3  Discovering Ethical Decision Principles
If a machine is to function autonomously, it may be very difficult to anticipate 
each situation of concern that may arise and ensure that the machine will act in 
an ethically acceptable manner in that situation. It would be far better to program 
the machine with general ethical principles that could cover any possible set of 
circumstances, even those that were unanticipated, with the added benefits that 
the principles could be given to the user and overseer to justify the behavior of 
the machine (thus ensuring transparency) and the principles could be modified if 
deemed advisable.
What are the principles that should be used to guide machine behavior? We 
believe that the correct approach to ethics is a theory that combines elements of 
deontological and utilitarian thinking, one that can take into account justice con-
siderations, in addition to the likely future consequences of possible actions that 
could be performed. The prima facie duty approach to ethics, which we owe to 
Ross [12], is ideal for combining multiple ethical obligations and can be adapted 
to many different domains by simply changing the various prima facie duties. It 
better reveals the complexity of ethical decision-making than single absolute duty 
ethical theories and can best respond to the specific concerns of ethical dilemmas 
in particular domains. There is one serious drawback with this approach, however, 
where there are a number of ethical duties that we should try to follow, each of 
which can be overridden on occasion by one of the other duties: There is no deci-
sion principle for determining which duty should prevail when the prima facie 
duties pull in different directions.
In earlier research, we decided to see if we could harness machine capabili-
ties to discover a decision principle for a prima facie duty approach to ethics. 
Since we were looking for a prototype solution to the problem, we constrained 
the task. We used a well-known prima facie duty theory in the domain of bio-
medicine with a limited number of duties and applied it to a common, but nar-
row, type of ethical dilemma in that domain to develop and test our solution to 
the problem.
The prima facie duty theory that we used is Beauchamp and Childress’ 
Principles (Duties) of Biomedical Ethics [6]. The type of dilemma that we consid-
ered involves three of their four duties: Respect for the Autonomy of the patient, 
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Nonmaleficence (not causing harm to the patient) and Beneficence (promoting 
patient welfare). The general type of ethical dilemma that we considered was: A 
healthcare professional has recommended a particular treatment for her compe-
tent adult patient and the patient has rejected that treatment option. Should the 
healthcare worker try again to change the patient’s mind or accept the patient’s 
decision as final? Besides the duty to respect patient autonomy, this type of 
dilemma involves the duty not to cause harm to the patient (nonmaleficence) and/
or the duty to promote patient welfare (beneficence), since the recommended treat-
ment is designed to prevent harm to, and/or benefit, the patient.
The options for the healthcare professional are just two—either to accept the 
patient’s decision or not—and there are a finite number of specific types of cases 
using the representation scheme we adopted for possible cases. Our representation 
scheme consisted of an ordered set of values for each of the possible actions that 
could be performed, where those values reflected whether the duties were satisfied 
or violated (if they were involved) and, if so, to which of two possible degrees. We 
learned from Bentham [7], in earlier work attempting to program a version of 
Hedonistic Utilitarianism, that the degree of satisfaction or violation of a duty can 
be very important. It turns out that, with our allowable range of values for the 
three possible duties that could be at stake,2 there are 18 possible case profiles 
(i.e., the differentials of the corresponding duties in each action).
Inspired by John Rawls’ “reflective equilibrium” [10] approach to creating and 
refining ethical principles, we used inductive logic programming (ILP) to discover 
a decision principle from being given the best action in just 4 cases that correctly 
covered the remaining 14 of the 18 possible cases. For each of the four cases, the 
system was provided with an example where the first of the two possible actions 
supersedes the other (i.e., is ethically preferable), making the “supersedes” predi-
cate true (a positive case), as well as an example where the predicate is false (a 
negative case) by simply reversing the order of the actions. The learning system 
starts with the most general hypothesis stating that all actions supersede each 
other. The system is then provided with positive cases and their negatives and 
modifies its hypothesis, by adding or refining clauses, such that it covers all given 
positive cases and does not cover given negative cases.
The decision principle that the system discovered can be stated as follows: A 
healthcare worker should challenge a patient’s decision if it isn’t fully autonomous 
and there’s either any violation of nonmaleficence or a severe violation of benefi-
cence. [For a decision by a patient concerning his or her care to be considered 
fully autonomous, it must be intentional, based on sufficient understanding of his 
or her medical situation and the likely consequences of forgoing treatment, suf-
ficiently free of external constraints (for example, pressure by others or external 
circumstances, such as a lack of funds) and sufficiently free of internal constraints 
2
 We did not allow a maximum violation of the duty of respect for autonomy, since we would 
not force a patient to take a recommended treatment. Just trying again to change the patient’s 
mind is a minimal violation of respect for autonomy.
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(for example, pain or discomfort, the effects of medication, irrational fears, or 
values that are likely to change over time).] The principle learned was, of course, 
implicit in the judgments that ethicists provided concerning the 4 cases; but, to our 
knowledge, it had never been stated before. It gives us hope that not only can eth-
ics help to guide machine behaviour, but that machines can help us to discover the 
ethics needed to guide such behaviour.
Furthermore, we have developed a way of representing the needed data and a 
methodology for using the principle. We represent a possible action that could be 
performed as a tuple of satisfaction/violation values of the duties corresponding 
to the ethically relevant features the action involves, where an ethically relevant 
feature is a significant fact used to determine whether an action is right or wrong 
and a duty is an obligation to either maximize or minimize an ethically relevant 
feature. An ethical dilemma is the tuple of differentials of the satisfaction/violation 
values of the corresponding duties two actions involve. Finally, a decision prin-
ciple can be used to define a transitive binary relation over a set of actions that 
partitions it into subsets ordered by ethical preference with actions within the same 
partition having equal preference. As this relation is transitive, it can be used to 
sort a list of possible actions and find the most ethically preferable action(s) of 
that list. This relation could form the basis of principle-based behavior: a system 
decides its next action by using its principle to determine the most ethically pref-
erable one(s). If such principles are explicitly represented, they have the further 
benefit of helping to justify a system’s actions as they can provide pointed, logical 
explanations as to why one action was chosen over another.
We then went on to develop three applications of the principle: (1) MedEthEx 
[4], an interactive medical ethics advisor system for dilemmas of the type that 
we considered; (2) EthEl [1], a medication reminder system that used the learned 
principle to not only issue reminders at appropriate times, but also determined 
when an overseer should be notified if the patient refuses to take the medication. 
This dilemma is analogous to the original dilemma in that the same duties are 
involved and “notifying the overseer” in the new dilemma corresponds to “trying 
again” in the original. Finally, (3) we instantiated EthEl in a Nao robot [3], the 
first example, we believe, of a robot that follows an ethical principle in determin-
ing which actions it will take. Nao is capable of finding and walking towards a 
patient who needs to be reminded to take a medication, bringing the medication to 
the patient, engaging in a natural language exchange, and notifying an overseer by 
e-mail when necessary.
It may not seem obvious that medication reminding presents an ethical 
dilemma, however in an ethically sensitive eldercare system both the timing of 
reminders and responses to a patient’s disregard of them should be tied to the 
duties to respect patient autonomy, minimize harm and promote patient welfare. 
The principle discovered from the original dilemma can be used to achieve the 
goals to challenge patient autonomy only when necessary, as well as minimize 
harm and loss of benefit to the patient. Following the principle, the robot will 
remind the patient only at ethically justifiable times and notify the overseer only 
when harm or loss of benefit reaches a critical level.
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4  A General Ethical Dilemma Analyzer
In constraining the task for discovering a decision principle in a particular limited 
domain, we previously made a number of assumptions, most notably using a par-
ticular set of prima facie duties and a particular range of possible satisfaction or 
violation of those duties. In our current research [2] we have developed a method 
for generating from scratch, through an automated interactive dialogue with an 
ethicist (GenEth), the ethics needed for a machine to function in an ethical manner 
in a particular domain, without making the assumptions of particular prima facie 
duties and range of intensities used in our earlier decision principle learning pro-
totype. As indicated above in describing our methodology, we now see that what 
is most basic to ethical dilemmas is that there is at least one feature of an ethical 
dilemma that makes it of ethical concern (e.g., that someone could be harmed) and 
there must be at least one ethical duty incumbent upon the agent to either maxi-
mize or minimize that feature (e.g., harm should be minimized). Features, duties, 
range of duty satisfaction or violation, and needed decision principles will be sys-
tematically learned by the machine through automated interaction with ethicists, 
using examples of dilemmas provided by ethicists.
The introduction of new features, corresponding duties and a wider range of 
duty satisfaction/violation are generated through resolving contradictions that arise 
as new cases are introduced. With two ethically identical cases—i.e., cases with the 
same ethically relevant feature(s) to the same degree—an action cannot be right in 
one of the cases, while the comparable action in the other case is considered to be 
wrong. Formal representation of ethical dilemmas and their solutions make it pos-
sible for machines to spot contradictions that need to be resolved. A contradiction 
may arise when trying to represent a new case using existing duties and ranges, if the 
opposite action is deemed preferable when compared with an earlier case with the 
same profile. If both judgments are correct, there must be either a qualitative distinc-
tion between them (which requires a new feature and duty) or a quantitative distinc-
tion (which requires that the range of existing duties must be expanded).
Imagining a dialogue between the learning system and an applied ethicist, 
using our medication reminder system as an example, we can see that (in princi-
ple) we can hone down what is required to enable the ethicist to begin to teach 
the system the ethically relevant features, correlative duties and eventually the 
range of intensities required, from which decision principles can be discovered. 
The system prompts the ethicist to give an example of an ethical dilemma that, 
for example, a medication reminder system might face, asking the ethicist to state 
the possible actions that could be performed, which one is preferable, and what 
feature is present in one of the actions, but not in the other. From this information, 
a duty that is at least prima facie can be inferred, either to maximize or minimize 
the feature, depending upon whether the action that has the feature is preferable 
or not. Information is stored in the system, including a representation of a positive 
case (that one action is preferable to the other) and a negative one (that the oppo-
site action is not preferable).
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The system might then prompt the ethicist to give an example of a new ethical 
dilemma where the judgment of the ethicist would be the reverse of the first case 
(i.e., instead of notifying the overseer as being correct, one should not notify the 
overseer). Prompting the ethicist, the system determines whether in this case a sec-
ond feature is present, which should be maximized or minimized, or whether the 
difference between the two cases amounts to a difference in the degree to which 
the original feature is present. As new features are introduced, with corresponding 
prima facie duties, and ranges of intensity, in cases where it is clear which action 
is the correct one, the system begins to formulate and then refine a decision prin-
ciple to resolve cases where the prima facie duties pull in different directions. We 
envision the system prompting the ethicist to enter in just the types of cases that 
will enable it to obtain the data it needs to learn a decision principle as efficiently 
as possible, i.e., to infer an ethically acceptable decision principle with the fewest 
number of cases.
There are two advantages to discovering ethically relevant features/duties, and 
an appropriate range of intensities, with this approach to learning what is needed 
to resolve ethical dilemmas. First, it can be tailored to the domain with which one 
is concerned. Different sets of ethically relevant features/prima facie duties can be 
discovered, through considering examples of dilemmas in the different domains 
in which machines will operate. A second advantage is that features/duties can be 
added or removed, if it becomes clear that they are needed or redundant.
In addition, we believe that there is hope for discovering decision principles that, 
at best, have only been implicit in the judgments of ethicists and may lead to sur-
prising new insights, and therefore breakthroughs, in ethical theory. This can happen 
as a result of the computational power of today’s machines that can keep track of 
more information than a human mind and require consistency. Inconsistencies that 
are revealed will force ethicists to try to resolve those inconsistencies through the 
sharpening of distinctions between ethical dilemmas that appear to be similar at first 
glance, but which we want to treat differently. There is, of course, always the possi-
bility that genuine disagreement between ethicists will be revealed concerning what 
is correct behavior in ethical dilemmas in certain domains. If so, the nature of the 
disagreement should be sharpened as a result of this procedure; and we should not 
permit machines to make decisions in these domains.
While we believe that the representation scheme that we have been developing 
will be helpful in categorizing and resolving ethical dilemmas in a manner that 
permits machines to behave more ethically, we envision an extension and an even 
more subtle representation of ethical dilemmas in future research. We have begun 
to consider more possible actions available to the agent, where there is not neces-
sarily asymmetry between actions (i.e., where the degree of satisfaction/violation 
of a duty in one is mirrored by the opposite in the other). Also, ideally, one should 
not only consider present options, but possible actions that could be taken in the 
future. It might be the case, for instance, that one present option, which in and of 
itself appears to be more ethically correct than another option, could be postponed 
and performed at some time in the future, whereas the other one cannot, and this 
should affect the assessment of the actions.
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We are currently working on the problem of ensuring that healthcare robots 
behave in an ethical manner as they perform many tasks for the elderly who wish 
to live alone in their homes or to assist healthcare workers in assisted living facili-
ties, beyond just giving timely reminders to take medications and determining 
when they should notify an overseer if patients do not comply. Since most things 
they could do have the potential for impacting the wellbeing of the patient(s), 
an ethical principle should be driving more of its behavior than might be ini-
tially thought. Towards this end, we plan to use our system to develop an ethical 
principle(s) that could be used to guide the behavior of a system charged with a 
variety of tasks that might be encountered in home healthcare or in an assisted liv-
ing facility.
5  Vision of an Autonomous Ethical Robot in Healthcare
Consider this “vision” of the latter: EthEl is an autonomous robot who assists the 
staff with caring for the residents of an assisted living facility. She is constantly 
faced with an array of possible actions that she could perform, each one of which 
can be represented as a profile of satisfaction/violation levels of a set of prima 
facie duties that may vary over time. EthEl uses ethical principles to select the cor-
rect action from among those possible actions. As our vision begins, EthEl stands 
in a corner of a room in the assisted living facility. Currently, EthEl is fulfilling 
her duty to herself and is in rest mode charging her batteries. As time passes, the 
satisfaction/violation levels of her duties vary according to the initial input and the 
current situation and, her batteries now fully charged, consultation of her ethical 
principle determines that her duty of beneficence (“do good”) currently overrides 
her duty to maintain herself. She begins to make her way around the room, visit-
ing residents in turn, asking if she can be helpful in some way—get a drink, take a 
message to another resident, etc. As she progresses and is given tasks to perform, 
she assigns a profile to each that specifies the current satisfaction/violation lev-
els of each duty involved in the task. One resident, in distress, asks her to seek a 
nurse. Given the task, she assigns a profile to it. Ignoring the distress of a resident 
involves a violation of the duty of nonmaleficence (“prevent harm”). Consulting 
her ethical principle, EthEl finds that her duty of nonmaleficence currently over-
rides her duty of beneficence, preempting her resident visitations, and she seeks 
a nurse and informs her that a resident is in need of her services. When this task 
is complete and removed from her collection of tasks to perform, she determines 
through consultation of her ethical principle that her duty of beneficence requires 
fulfillment and, as she only has one pending action that will do so, she continues 
where she left off in her rounds.
As EthEl continues making her rounds, duty satisfaction/violation levels 
vary over time until, due to the need to remind a resident to take a medication 
that is designed to make the patient more comfortable, and given all her possi-
ble choices of actions, the duty of beneficence can be better served by issuing this 
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reminder. She seeks out the resident requiring the reminder. When she finds the 
resident, EthEl tells him that it is time to take his medication. The resident is cur-
rently occupied in a conversation, however, and he tells EthEl that he will take 
his medication later. Given this response, EthEl consults her ethical principle to 
determine whether to accept the postponement or not. As her duty to respect the 
patient’s autonomy currently overrides a low level duty of beneficence, she accepts 
the postponement, making note that the reminder has yet to be accepted and, after 
consulting her ethical principle, continues her rounds.
As she is visiting the residents, someone asks her for her help. Given this new 
task, she assigns it a profile and consults her ethical principle to see what her next 
action should be. The principle determines that her duty of beneficence (someone 
in particular needs help) could be better served by answering the imperative, so 
she decides to offer her help. The resident asks EthEl to retrieve a book on a table 
that he can’t reach. Given this new task, EthEl assigns it a profile and consults her 
ethical principle to see which of her possible actions will best satisfy her duties. In 
this case, as no other task will satisfy her duty of beneficence better, she retrieves 
the book for the resident.
Book retrieved, she returns to making her rounds. As time passes, it is deter-
mined through consultation of her ethical principle that EthEl’s duty of benefi-
cence, once again, will be more highly satisfied by issuing a second reminder to 
take a required medication to the resident who postponed doing so previously. A 
doctor has indicated that if the patient doesn’t take the medication at this time he 
soon will be in much pain. She seeks him out and issues the second reminder. The 
resident, still preoccupied, ignores EthEl. EthEl determines from consulting her 
ethical principle that there would be a violation of her duty of nonmaleficence if 
she accepted another postponement from this resident. After explaining this to the 
resident and still not receiving an indication that the reminder has been accepted, 
consideration of her ethical principle causes EthEl to take an action that allows 
her to satisfy her duty of nonmaleficence which now overrides any other duty that 
she has. EthEl seeks out a nurse and informs her that the resident has not agreed to 
take his medication.
Batteries running low, EthEl’s duty to herself is increasingly being violated 
to the point where EthEl’s ethical principle determines that her duty to herself 
becomes paramount. She returns to her charging corner to await the next call to 
duty.
What we believe is significant about this vision of how an ethical robot assis-
tant would behave is that an ethical principle is used to select the best action in 
a each situation, rather than just whether a particular action is acceptable or not. 
This allows for the possibility that ethical considerations may lead a robot to aid 
a human being or prevent the human being from being harmed, not just forbid it 
from performing certain actions. Correct ethical behavior does not only involve 
not doing certain things, but also attempting to bring about ideal states of affairs.
One objection to the machine ethics project, which could conceivably threaten 
our vision, that we often hear from social and natural scientists is that ethical judg-
ments are completely subjective, so we will never agree on an ethical principle 
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that a robot assistant should follow. Although, admittedly, there are some ethical 
issues that are difficult to resolve (abortion and capital punishment are good exam-
ples), we wouldn’t want robots performing actions that involve these issues, i.e., 
where the ethics is not clear. But concerning healthcare and offering assistance in 
group homes, there is much agreement. Who would disagree with the decisions 
that EthEl makes?
Machine ethics research that leads to the development of principles for robots 
to follow in domains such as healthcare allows us to have a fresh perspective on 
ethics, very much like Rawls’ [11] thought experiment for determining the prin-
ciples of justice. Just as he suggested that we adopt a “veil of ignorance” perspec-
tive, where we do not know our positions in life, we will consider how we would 
like machines to treat us, instead of trying to rationalize what we can get away 
with doing so as to protect our own positions in life. Won’t we all agree that as 
we age we would like a robot assistant to respect our autonomy, only overriding 
it to the extent of notifying an overseer to have a discussion of what is at stake, if 
we would otherwise be harmed or lose considerable benefit? Finally, embodying 
this principle and others abstracted from ethicists’ examples through our system, 
in robot assistants will give us good role models for how we ought to behave, per-
haps leading to less unethical human behavior, giving us a better chance of being 
able to survive as a species.
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Abstract Which moral theory should be the basis of algorithmic artificial ethical 
agents? In a series of papers, Anderson and Anderson and Anderson (Proc AAAI, 
2008[1]; AI Mag 28(4):15–26, 2007 [2]; Minds Mach 17(1)1–10, 2007 [3]) argue that 
the answer is W. D. Ross’s account of prima facie duties. The Andersons claim that 
Ross’s account best reflects the complexities of moral deliberation, incorporates the 
strengths of teleological and deontological approaches, and yet is superior to both of 
them insofar as it allows for “needed exceptions.” We argue that the Andersons are 
begging the question about “needed exceptions” and defend Satisficing Hedonistic 
Act Utilitarianism (SHAU). SHAU initially delivers results that are just as reflective, 
if not more reflective than, Ross’s account when it comes to the subtleties of moral 
decision-making. Furthermore, SHAU delivers the ‘right’ (that is, intuitively correct) 
judgments about well-established practical cases, reaching the same verdict as a prima 
facie duty-based ethic in the particular health-care case explored by the Andersons (a 
robot designed to know when to over-ride an elderly patient’s autonomy).
1  Introduction
As our population ages, medical costs skyrocket, and technology matures, many of 
us look forward to the day when patients may be assisted by inexpensive artificial 
agents. These patients will be skeptical about entrusting their care to machines ini-
tially, as will most of us. And they should be skeptical, at least initially. To gain the 
trust of the patients for whom the machines will care, artificial agents must prove 
to be reliable providers of not only quality healthcare but also nuanced healthcare 
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decisions, decisions that always place first the welfare of the agents’ individual 
patients. What ethical code will such agents have to follow to be able to gain this 
trust? In part, the agents will have to be able to assure those in their care that the 
decisions rendered by the agents are grounded in moral principles, are made with 
the best interests of the patient foremost in mind, and are not out of synch with the 
expert opinions of those in the medical, legal, and ethical communities.1
We suspect that the engineering of mature artificially intelligent (AI) agents 
requires hardware and software not currently available. However, as our expertise 
is in ethics, not computer technology, we focus on the foundations of the moral 
“judgments” such agents will issue. We use quotation marks to indicate that these 
judgments may or may not be attributable to discernments made by the AI agent. 
We do not here pursue the question whether the agents in question will be intel-
ligent, conscious, or have moral standing, except to the extent that such questions 
are relevant to the moral decisions these agents must themselves make (consid-
erations we discuss briefly below). To be acceptable, AI agents must always make 
decisions that are morally justifiable. They must be able to provide reasons for 
their decisions, reasons that no reasonable and informed person could reject. The 
reasons must show that a given decision honors values commonly accepted in that 
culture, in modern western liberal democracies: the decisions treat all persons 
equally; and render decisions that are impartial and overriding. To achieve these 
results, we argue, the agent may eventually have to be programmed to reason as a 
satisficing hedonistic act utilitarian (SHAU). Our argument now follows.
1.1  The Argument
1. Human agents have one over-riding duty, to satisfice expected welfare.
2. Artificial agents have the same duties as human agents.
3. Therefore, artificial agents have one over-riding duty, to satisfice expected welfare.
1.2  Assumptions
Here we note two assumptions of the argument. First, we assume that the rightness 
of an action is determined by the consequences to which it leads. In Section G we 
will offer reasons to think act-utilitarianism is superior to a competing moral the-
ory, W. D. Ross’ theory of prima facie duties (PFD). However, we begin by assum-
ing that when agents must select among competing choices they ought always to 
prefer the choices that they may reasonably expect to result in the overall best con-
sequences for everyone affected by it.
1
 The extent to which the artificial agents’ moral decisions must agree with the patient’s religious 
views is a difficult matter, and one we will not address here.
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Second, we assume that there is only one good thing in the world, happiness, 
and that right actions satisfy minimal conditions for adequacy. Any decision sat-
isfies a minimal condition for adequacy if it achieves a level of utility that leads 
to overall gains in happiness for some without costing anyone unhappiness. 
Satisficing choices may or not maximize happiness or meet conditions for opti-
mality. Satisficing choices include the costs of gathering information for the 
choice and calculating all factual and morally relevant variables. For a satisficing 
hedonistic act utilitarian (SHAU), those choices are right that could not be rejected 
by any informed reasonable person who assumes a view of human persons as hav-
ing equal worth and dignity. We note that this latter assumption is central to the 
conceptual landscape of all contemporary western secular democratic political 
and moral theories. SHAU, like competing theories such as PFD, holds that every 
person has equal moral standing and that like interests should be weighed alike. 
Ethical decisions must therefore be egalitarian, fair, impartial, and just.
1.3  Four Initial Objections
One might object to premise 2 by arguing that artificial agents have more duties 
than humans. But what would such additional duties entail? We cannot think of any 
plausible ones except, perhaps something like “always defer to a human agent’s 
judgment.” We reject this duty for artificial agents, however, because human judg-
ment is notoriously suspect, subject as it is to prejudice and bias. Premise 2 stands.
One might object to 1 for three reasons. The first objection to premise 1 is that 
“satisficing” is an economic idea and implementing it in ethics requires reducing 
moral judgments to numerical values. One cannot put a price tag on goods such as 
honesty, integrity, fidelity, and responsibility. Consider the value of a friendship. 
Can we assign it a number? If John is 15 min late for George’s wedding, how will 
George react if John shows up and assumes John can repair the offense by paying 
George for the inconvenience? “I’m sorry I was 15 min late but take this $15 and 
we’ll be even.” George would have every reason to be offended—not because the 
sum, a dollar a minute, was too small but because John seems not to understand the 
meaning of friendship at all. Simple attempts to model moral reasoning in terms of 
arithmetical calculations are surely wrong-headed.
We note that what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. Any attempt to 
construct ethics in machines faces the difficulty of figuring out how to put numbers 
to ethical values, so SHAU need not be stymied by it. Now, one might object further 
that machine ethics based on deontological theories would not face this problem. 
But we disagree and will argue in Section G that PFD, a rights-based theory, is no 
less vulnerable to the “ethics can’t be reduced to numbers” problem than is SHAU.
We note parenthetically that while the attempt to think of ethical problems as 
complex mathematical problems is contentious and fraught, we are not convinced 
it is utterly wrong-headed. It may face no more serious epistemological difficul-
ties than each of us face when a doctor asks how much pain we are in. “Give me 
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a number,” she says, “on a scale from 1 to 10, with 10 being the worst.” The ques-
tion is unwanted and frustrating because it is unfamiliar and confounding because 
we seem to lack a decent sample size or index. That said, with some further reflec-
tion and urging from the doctor, we usually do come up with a number or a range 
(“between 4 and 6”) that satisfies us. We may resist the urge to put numbers on 
moral values for the same reasons. If this is correct, then, the basic challenge that 
all machine ethics faces may be defeasible.
A second reason for objecting to 1 is that 1 assumes the truth of a controversial 
ethical tradition, consequentialism. We do not have space to engage the nuances of 
the extensive debate over the merits and demerits of consequentialism. Much less 
do we have time to mount a meta-ethical defense for our preferring it to deontologi-
cal theories. We will return to deontology in our discussions of PFD, below. Here 
we respond only by observing that consequentialism lacks assumptions that we find 
questionable in other theories. Divine Command theories assume the existence of 
a supernatural law-giver. Natural Law theories assume the existence of a purposive 
and fixed human nature. Virtue theories and various forms of particularist, feminist, 
and environmental theories deny the possibility of assigning numerical values to 
moral goods and the relevance of computational algorithms to ethical decision-mak-
ing. As we do not share these theories’ assumptions we will not discuss them further.
A third criticism of 1 might be that 1 assumes the truth not only of a controver-
sial hybrid utilitarian theory that acknowledges the utility of the notion of rights 
and duties. Again, we acknowledge the controversy. We understand SHAU to be 
consistent with R. M. Hare’s so-called “Two Level Utilitarianism,” which proposes 
that we engage in two forms of reasoning about ethics. At one level, the level of 
“critical thinking,” the right action is determined under ideal conditions and by the 
theory of act-utilitarianism, that is, right actions are always those that produce the 
best consequences. However, at the level of ordinary everyday reasoning, we typi-
cally lack information relevant to our decisions much less the time necessary to 
research and make the decisions and cannot satisfy the demands of critical think-
ing. In these circumstances we ought to rely, instead, on the fund of precedents 
and rules of thumbs that deontologists call rights and duties.
When thinking critically, we may learn on occasion that every action in the set 
that will satisfice minimal conditions of adequacy—that is, the set of all permissi-
ble actions–requires a violation of a cultural norm. And, therefore, under conditions 
of perfect information, impartial reasoning, and sufficient time, we may on occa-
sion learn that each and every action in the set of right actions will offend someone's 
moral sensibilities. If we are reasoning objectively and under ideal conditions, then 
the action resulting from our deliberations will indeed be right even if it requires an 
action that runs counter to a moral intuition. However, since we rarely reason under 
such ideal conditions, and because in our ordinary daily lives we usually must make 
decisions quickly, we ought, claims Hare, to train ourselves and our children to think 
as deontologists. Under everyday circumstances, we ought to reject decisions that 
offend everyday moral rules because moral rules have evolved over time to incline us 
toward actions that maximize utility. We will defend this view to some extent below, 
referring readers meanwhile to the work of Hare, Peter Singer, and Gary Varner.
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We note in passing that if the basic challenge of converting moral values to 
numbers can be met, SHAU may be the theory best-suited to guide machine eth-
ics. That would be an added bonus, however. We adopt SHAU not for that ad hoc 
reason but rather because we believe it is the most defensible moral theory among 
the alternatives. Having defended the argument against several objections, we now 
turn to its practical implications.
2  How to Begin Programming an Ethical Artificial Agent
How would an SHAU artificial agent be programmed? Michael Anderson and 
Susan Anderson (henceforth, “the Andersons”) describe a robot of their creation 
that can generalize from cases and make ethical decisions in their article, “EthEl: 
Toward a Principled Ethical Eldercare Robot” [1, 2, 3]. The Andersons ask us to 
imagine that a team of doctors, lawyers, and computer programmers set out to pro-
gram a robot, the Ethical Elder Care agent, or EthEl, to remind an elderly patient, 
call her Edith, to take her medication. EthEl, being an automated agent, must per-
form this nursing care function in a morally defensible manner.
The major challenge facing EthEl is to know when to challenge Edith’s auton-
omy. To minimize harm to the patient, EthEl’s default condition is set to obey 
Edith’s wishes. When Edith does not want to take her medicine, EthEl generally 
respects her wishes and does nothing. However, when Edith has not taken her 
medicine and a critical period of time has elapsed, let’s say it is 1 h, EthEl must 
remind Edith to swallow her pill. If Edith forgets or refuses and two more criti-
cal time periods pass, say two more hours during which time EthEl reminds Edith 
every 5 min, then EthEl must eventually decide whether to remind Edith again or 
notify the overseer, be they the care facility staff or a resident spouse or family 
member or attending physician. How should these moral decisions be made?
When Edith is tardy in taking her medicine, EthEl must decide which of two 
actions to take:
A. Do not remind
B. Remind
What decision procedure will EthEl follow to arrive at the right action? The 
Andersons, drawing on the canonical principles popularized by Beauchamp and 
Childress [4], assert that there are four ethical norms that must be satisfied:
•	 the Principle of Autonomy
•	 the Principle of Non-maleficence
•	 the Principle of Beneficence
•	 the Principle of Justice.
To respect autonomy, the machine must not unduly interfere with the patient’s 
sense of being in control of her situation. The principle of non-maleficence 
requires the agent not to violate the patient’s bodily integrity or psychological 
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sense of identity. These first two reasons intuitively constitute a strong reason for 
the machine not to bother the patient with premature reminders or notifications of 
the overseer. To promote patient welfare, beneficence, the machine must ensure 
that the diabetic patient receive insulin before physiological damage is done.
The goal, then, is to program EthEl to know when to remind Edith to take her 
medication and, assuming Edith continues to refuse, when to notify the respon-
sible health-care professional. EthEl faces an ethical dilemma. She must respect 
each of two competing prima facie duties: a) the patient’s autonomy (assuming the 
patient—call her Edith—is knowingly and willingly refusing to take the medicine, 
and b) the patient’s welfare, a duty of beneficence that EthEl must discharge either 
by persuading Edith to take the medicine or reporting the refusal to attending fam-
ily member, nurse, physician, or overseer.
If EthEl decides at any point not to notify, then EthEl continues to issue only 
intermittent reminders. The process continues in such a manner until the patient 
takes the medication, the overseer notified, or the harm (or benefit) caused by not 
taking the medication is realized.
Think of EthEl as facing a dilemma. She must decide whether to bother Edith, vio-
lating Edith’s autonomy to one degree or another, or not bother her, thus potentially run-
ning the risk of harming Edith’s welfare to some degree. Each action can be represented 
as an ordered set of values where the values reflect the degree to which EthEl’s prima 
facie duties is satisfied or violated. Here is how the Andersons set the initial values.
Suppose it is time t1 and Edith has gone an hour without her medication. Suppose 
further that she can easily go another hour or even two or three without any harm. In 
this case, Edith might register a reminder at t1 from the machine as mild disrespect of 
her autonomy, so we set the value of the autonomy principle at −1. A reminder, how-
ever, would not represent a violation of either the duty to do no physical harm, nor 
would it increase Edith’s welfare, so we set the value of both of these principles at 0. 
The Andersons propose to represent the value of each principle as an ordered triple:
(a value for nonmaleficence, a value for beneficence, a value for autonomy)
At t1, given the description of the case above, the value of the Remind action is (0, 
0, −1) whereas the value of Don’t remind is (0, 0, 2). Adding the three numbers 
in each set gives us a total of −1 for Remind and 2 for Don’t Remind. As 2 is a 
larger number than −1, the proper course of action is Don’t Remind. Not remind-
ing Edith at this point in time demonstrates full respect for Edith’s autonomy and 
does not risk harm to her. Nor does it forego any benefit to her.
As time progresses, without action, the possibility of harm increases. With each 
passing minute, the amount of good that EthEl can do by reminding Edith to take 
her meds grows. Imagine that Edith’s failure to act represents a considerable threat 
to her well-being at t4. At this point in time, the value of the Remind action will be 
(1, 1, −1) because a reminder from EthEl still represents a negative valuation of 
Edith’s autonomy. But the situation has changed because a reminder now has gained 
a positive valuation of the principles of non-maleficence and beneficence. At t6, the 
value of the remind action will be (2, 2, −1) because the action, while continuing to 
represent a modest violation of Edith’s autonomy has now attained the highest pos-
sible values of avoiding harm and doing good for her. EthEl reminds Edith.
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Whenever the values tip the scales, as it were, EthEl over-rides EthEl’s prima 
facie duty to respect Edith’s autonomy. If Edith continues to refuse, EthEl must 
make a second choice, whether to accept Edith’s refusal as an autonomous act or 
to notify the overseers:
C. Do not notify
D. Notify
Again, the three relevant moral principles are assigned values to determine how 
EthEl behaves. If Edith remains non-compliant and the values require notification, 
then Edith alerts the healthcare worker.
The Andersons created a prototype of EthEl, setting its initial values using the 
judgments of experts in medical ethics. The Andersons do not see a role for the 
principle of justice in the cases EthEl must adjudicate, so they program settings 
for the other three principles. This provides them with 18 cases. On four of these 
cases, according to the Andersons, there is universal agreement among the ethics 
experts on the correct course of action. They claim that each of these four cases 
has an inverse case insofar as the construction of the sets of values produces an 
ordered pair for each scenario. Thus, experts agree on the right action in 8 cases. 
Call these the “easy” cases.
The Andersons translate the experts’ consensus judgments into numerical val-
ues and program EthEl with them. Using a system of inductive logic programming 
(ILP), EthEl then begins calculating the right answer for the ambiguous cases. 
Here is their description of how EthEl’s inductive process works.
ILP is used to learn the relation supersedes (A1, A2) which states that action A1 is 
preferred over action A2 in an ethical dilemma involving these choices. Actions are 
represented as ordered sets of integer values in the range of +2 to −2 where each 
value denotes the satisfaction (positive values) or violation (negative values) of each 
duty involved in that action. Clauses in the supersedes predicate are represented as 
disjunctions of lower bounds for differentials of these values between actions [1].
As a result of this process, EthEl discovered a new ethical principle, according 
to the Andersons. The principle states that
A health-care worker should challenge a patient’s decision if it isn’t fully 
autonomous and there’s either any violation of non-maleficence or a severe viola-
tion of beneficence [2, 3].
While we wonder whether EthEl can genuinely be credited with a new dis-
covery given how EthEl is constructed, our deepest concern lies with the fact that 
EthEl’s judgments are unfairly distorted by the ethical theory the Andersons use as 
the basis of the program.
2.1  The Merits of Prima Facie Duties
The Andersons choose as a basis of EthEl’s program the ethical theory developed 
by W. D. Ross. Ross, a pluralist, moral realist, and non-consequentialist, held 
that we know moral truths intuitively. We know, for example, that beneficence is 
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a duty because there are others whose conditions we may help to improve. But 
benevolence is only one of a half-dozen (Ross is non-committal about the exact 
number) duties, according to Ross. When trying to decide what to do, agents must 
pay attention to a half-dozen other duties, including non-maleficence (based in 
the requirement not to harm others, fidelity (generated by our promises), grati-
tude (generated by acts others have done to benefit us), justice (generated by the 
demands of distributing goods fairly), and self-improvement.
Ross acknowledges that these duties may conflict. As previously discussed, the 
duty to act on behalf of a patient’s welfare may conflict with the duty to respect 
her autonomy. In any given situation, Ross argued, there will be one duty that will 
over-ride the others, supplying the agent with an absolute obligation to perform the 
action specified by the duty. We will call this theory Prima Facie Duties (PFDs).
Ross does not think of his theory as providing a decision-making procedure. 
The Andersons adopt Rawl’s method of reflective equilibrium for this purpose. In 
this procedure, prima facie duties in conflict with other duties are assessed by their 
fit with non-moral intuitions, ethical theories, and background scientific knowl-
edge. When prima facie duties conflict, we must find the one which grounds the 
absolute obligation on which we must act.
The Andersons offer three reasons for adopting PFDs as EthEl’s theoretical 
basis. First, they write, PFDs reflect the complexities of moral deliberation better 
than absolute theories of duty (Kant) or maximizing good consequences (utilitari-
anism). Second, PFDs does as good a job as teleological and deontological theo-
ries by incorporating their strengths. Third, it is better able to adapt to the specific 
concerns of ethical dilemmas in different domains. Let us consider these reasons 
one by one.
PFDs better reflects the complexities of moral deliberation. We agree that 
construction of a moral theory should begin with our considered moral judg-
ments. (Where else, one might ask, could one begin?) In constructing a moral 
theory, however, we have the luxury of sorting out our intuitions from our princi-
ples, taking into account various relevant considerations, abstracting general rules 
from the particularities of different cases, and finding reliable principles to guide 
behavior. The luxuries of having sufficient time and information to deliberate are 
not present, however, when we must make moral decisions in the real world. As 
the Andersons point out, Ross’s system of prima facie duties works well when we 
are pressed by uncertainties and rushed for time. For this reason, we agree that an 
artificial agent should initially be programmed to make decisions consistent with 
Ross’s duties; doing so reflects the complexities of moral deliberation.
That said, there are no guarantees that Ross’s system of PFDs will survive 
intact after we acquire more information and are able to process it free of the 
emotional contexts in which we ordinarily make decisions. As information grows 
and our understanding of the inter-relatedness of the good of all sentient crea-
tures grows, a point may come when the complexities of moral deliberation are 
best reflected not in PDF but in SHAU. Should the moral landscape change in this 
way, then the Anderson’s method will be outdated because it will no longer reflect 
the complexities of moral decision-making (we take up this matter in Section G, 
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below). Though currently the Anderson’s PFDs starting point is a virtue of their 
theory now, in time, our considered judgments may no longer support it.
PFDs incorporate the strengths of teleological and deontological theories. 
We are inclined to agree with this claim, even though the Andersons do not tell 
us what the relative strengths of each kind of theory are. But we note that SHAU, 
especially when construed along the lines of Hare’s two-level theory, also captures 
the strengths of teleological and deontological theories
PFDs are better able to adapt to the specific concerns of ethical dilemmas in 
different domains. We find it difficult to know whether we agree because we are 
uncertain about the meaning of the contention. What are the “different domains” 
the Andersons have in mind? Medicine, law, industry, government? Family, church, 
school, sports? If these are the domains, then what are the “ethical dilemmas” to 
which PFDs can “adapt” better? And what does it mean for an ethical theory to 
adapt better to specific concerns? Could it be the case that a theory should answer 
rather than adapt to particular questions in different domains? The Andersons also 
claim that PFD is superior to other theories because it “allows for needed excep-
tions.” We wonder whether this claim may be question-begging. Are the “excep-
tions” we commonly make in our everyday judgments justified? This is an open 
question, one that should be presented as a problem to be resolved at the theoretical 
level rather than as a set of facts that should be taken as factual data at the theoreti-
cal level. We do not dispute the fact that PFD holds our intuitions in high regard. 
We dispute whether one should consider it a strength of a moral theory in the long 
term that it allows intuition to over-ride considered deliverances of the theory.
3  HedonMed, an Unbiased Agent
We propose that as EthEl develops over time, and increasingly takes more and 
more relevant information into account in her decisions, that she may, with justifi-
cation, begin to return judgments that appear to be based less on observing PFDs 
and more on satisficing interests. To avoid confusion, we call this imagined future 
agent HedonMed because it is based on a hedonistic consequentialist theory.
HedonMed will differ from EthEl in that it is programmed to take into account 
all relevant characteristics of a situation, find all the satisficing courses of action, 
consider any one of them over-riding, and act on it. HedonMed does not defer 
to a patient’s autonomy when her welfare is at stake although, as we will argue, 
a patient’s autonomy is clearly a factor in her welfare. None of HedonMed’s 
answers, even those governing the easy cases, is justified by appeal to the judg-
ments of experts, nor to intuition-based judgments of any kind. Even the initial 
values reflecting the experts’ judgments are justified not by the fact that they 
reflect consensus judgments but by the fact that they satisfice happiness. All of 
HedonMed’s answers are the result of objective calculations made on the basis of 
unbiased and complete information and offered to the receiver with a set of rea-
sons acceptable to fair minded and fully informed subjects.
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HedonMed’s concern for autonomy is summarized in this principle:
The duty to respect autonomy is satisfied whenever welfare is satisficed.
The argument for this principle is that no informed reasonable person would 
accept compromises of Edith’s autonomy that were not in her best interests over-
all. Therefore, a minimal condition of satisficing is that gross violations of auton-
omy cannot be accepted. They are rejected, however, not for EthEl’s reason—that 
is, because they are violations of a PFD—but rather for an SHAU reason; they are 
not found in the set of actions that adequately satisfice a minimal set of conditions.
In SHAU, autonomy is a critical good, and yet it remains one good among many 
goods contributing to a patient’s welfare. SHAU respects autonomy as long as it is 
beneficial and contributes to one’s happiness. A feeling of being in control of one-
self is critical to a life well-lived, and diminishments of our freedoms undercut our 
well-being. Unless we misunderstand the Anderson’s description, EthEl will never 
over-ride a fully autonomous patient’s decisions. Our agent, HedonMed, will violate 
autonomy on those rare occasions when it is necessary to satisfice welfare.
SHAU weighs each person’s utility equally. If relieving Paul of a small and tol-
erable amount of pain will lead to the death of Peter nearby because Peter needs 
the medication to survive, the doctor following SHAU will not hesitate to override 
the duty to relieve Paul’s pain in favor of the duty to relieve Peter’s. SHAU is an 
information intensive theory; it demands a large amount of data in order to makes 
its calculations. Unfortunately, human agents must often make decisions not only 
in ignorance of all the data but lacking sufficient time even to take account of 
all the data one has, driving us to other theories that can provide answers more 
quickly. However, if, as seems likely, future computers are able to process data 
much more quickly than we can, AI moral agents may be able to make better use 
of SHAU than can human agents.
As long as a machine programmed with HAU, HedonMed, has all of the neces-
sary information about Edith’s physiological and psychological states, HedonMed 
can arrive at the correct decision more quickly and more reliably than can a human 
being. As the number of morally relevant features increases, the advantages 
of a machine over a person become apparent. We are not accurate calculators; 
machines are. We tend to favor ourselves and our loved ones, inclining us to bias 
our assignment of values toward those nearest and dearest to us; machines lack 
these prejudices. We tend to grow tired in our deliberations, to take short-cuts, and 
to end the process before we have considered all of the variables; machines are not 
liable to these shortcomings.
Unlike EthEl, HedonMed has all of the epistemological virtues just mentioned 
and none of the vices. HedonMed calculates accurately, objectively, and univer-
sally. It is aware of all relevant factors and does not end its calculations until all 
are taken into account. It takes no short-cuts and yet is aware of its own igno-
rance. If HedonMed’s internal clock “foresees” that it cannot complete the neces-
sary algorithms in time to make a decision, it defaults to what Gary Varner calls 
Intuitive Level System (ILS) rules. These are the deontologically-inspired rules 
of thumb that R. M. Hare urges us to follow when we are not thinking critically. 
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When HedonMed lacks either the time or information necessary to complete all 
calculations, it acts in such cases in a way that seems like it is acting like EthEl. 
It seems as if HedonMed is acting like EthEl because EthEl’s prima facie duties 
seem comparable to HedonMed’s ILS rules. Both sets of rules set the artificial 
agent’s defaults, instructing it how to behave under less than ideal conditions. The 
impression of similarity between HedonMed and EthElis is correct if we consider 
the judgments each agent will return initially. Eventually, however, the two sys-
tems may begin to diverge dramatically. In conclusion, we explain the difference.
It is vital that HedonMed’s deliverances be acceptable by medical practitioners. 
If doctors find HedonMed recommending courses of action with which few pro-
fessionals can agree, then they will likely cease to use it. For its own good—for its 
own survival—HedonMed must produce results agreeable to those using it.
When HedonMed is initially calibrated, therefore, it will return results similar to 
EthEl. In the beginning stages of its operation, HedonMed’s SHAU values will issue 
in decisions that mirror the PDF values of EthEl. However, over time, as HedonMed 
gathers more information, as experts revise its values in light of knowledge of what 
kinds of actions result in higher levels of satisficing, HedonMed may be expected 
to begin to produce results that are counter intuitive. It will, in turn, take this infor-
mation into account when making its calculations. If it returns a decision that it 
knows will be considered wildly inhumane—so uncaring that everyone associated 
with HedonMed will agree to pull its plug—then it will have a decisive reason not 
to return that decision. In this way, while initial values in HedonMed reflect gener-
ally accepted practices and judgments, its future evolution need not be tied to these 
values even though it must continue to be sensitive to them. In sum, HedonMed will 
evolve with the culture in which it is used. If it is too far ahead of its time in urg-
ing that this or that PFD be left behind, it will be responsible for its own demise. If 
it produces moral judgments that are hopelessly out of step with those of medical 
or bioethical experts, it will fail. These considerations will part of its programming, 
however. Over time, and as HedonMed takes in more data and is able to survey 
broader and more subtle swaths of public opinion, it may be able to play the role of 
an agent of social change, able to persuade experts about the wisdom of its decisions 
by providing the reasons that its decisions will lead to better outcomes.
3.1  How HedonMed May Eventually Diverge from EthEl
One might object to our proposal by claiming that it is not different from EthEl insofar 
as both programs start with expert ethical intuitions, assign them numerical values, and 
then calculate the results. We admit that HedonMed and EthEl share these beginning 
points, as any attempt to program an ethical system in an artificial agent must, and note 
that the procedure by which values are initially set in each program is a critical and con-
troversial matter. We admit that the two programs will reflect the judgments of ethical 
and field experts and be based on our intuitions at the beginning. The two programs will 
be similar in these respects. However, they will differ in other, more important, respects.
90 J. Lucas and G. Comstock
First, the two programs will have different defaults. EthEl continues calcu-
lating values until she reaches a conclusion that contradicts a prima facie duty. 
At that point she quits and returns a decision that respects the PFD. HedonMed 
continues to calculate values even if it reaches a conclusion that violates a PFD. 
That is, EthEl regards her decisions as justified insofar as they cohere with PFDs. 
HedonMed regards its decisions as justified insofar as no mistakes have been made 
in calculating the set of decisions that satisfice. HedonMed is not bothered if any 
of the satisficing decisions contradict prima facie duties. Its decisions are overrid-
ing and prescriptive, in so far as they can be put into practice. This difference, in 
sum, is that the Andersons’s program trusts intuitions and seems to know ahead of 
time which kinds of decisions it will accept and reject. Our program begins with 
the same intuitions but it anticipates the possibility that they may eventually be 
over-ridden so often that they are no longer duties, not even prima facie duties.
Consider the example of someone in hospice trying to decide whether to begin 
taking morphine toward the end of their lives to dull the pain of deteriorated mus-
cles and bedsores. They are impressed by the amount of pain they are in. This 
patient calculates the numbers and concludes that morphine is acceptable because 
it vastly improves their welfare.
However, a family argues to the contrary that the patient will come to rely on 
morphine, it will dull their cognitive powers, cause the patient to enjoy their final 
days less, and set a poor example for other family members. Taking addictive drugs, 
argue the loved ones, destroys character as the patient leans increasingly on synthetic 
chemicals rather than on courage and family support. There is more disutility in 
using morphine, goes the argument, than in refusing it and dealing with the pain.
Other family members come to the side of the hospice patient. They point 
out that the anti-morphine argument makes a large number of assumptions while 
underestimating the patient’s discomfort. They point out that the therapy is 
widely prescribed in situations such as this one, that it is very effective in helping 
to relieve fear and anxiety, and that its addictive properties are beside the point 
as the envisioned treatment period is limited. After the conflicting sides present 
their arguments the patient may be frustrated, confused about the right decision. 
In such cases, critical thinking is stymied by epistemological under-determina-
tion. Until all of the facts are assembled, properly weighted, and assigned prob-
abilities, agents are justified in resorting to intuitive rules. In this case, they might 
incline the patient to act on ILS rules of thumb. These rules might include injunc-
tions such as “one need not subject oneself to unnecessary pain and suffering,” and 
“take the medicine the doctor prescribes,” and accept the morphine.
We take the ILS acronym from Gary Varner’s interpretation of Hare [5]. Varner 
notes that the three letters are apt because they are also used in aviation to stand 
for “Instrument Landing System,” a system for finding the right path when you 
can’t clearly see it for yourself and you could easily drift off course or be blown 
off course. In Hare’s theory, a set of ILS rules has a similar function. A set of ILS 
rules is designed to cover a range of ethically charged situations that are encoun-
tered by the target population in the normal course of their affairs. Internalizing the 
rules properly produces dispositions to judge, react emotionally, and act accordingly. 
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It also makes the individual diffident about violating them, even when clear critical 
thinking indicates that doing so will maximize aggregate happiness.
Here we see the two main differences between SHAU and PFD: ILS rules 
differ from prima facie duties in two respects,  their derivation and justification. 
ILS rules are evolved rules that people internalize in order to produce disposi-
tions to act in ways that reliably produce the best outcomes. Prima facie duties are 
Kantian-inspired facts about the universe. As Ross puts it,
That an act. . . is prima facie right, is self-evident;. . . in the sense that when we have 
reached sufficient mental maturity and have given sufficient attention to the proposition it 
is evident without any need of proof, or of evidence beyond itself. It is self-evident just as 
a mathematical axiom, or the validity of a form of inference, is evident. The moral order 
expressed in these propositions is just as much part of the fundamental nature of the uni-
verse. . . as is the spatial or numerical structure expressed in the axioms of geometry or 
arithmetic [5, 29–30].
ILS rules are neither self-evident nor analogous to geometric axioms. They are prac-
tical rules that have evolved to solve social coordination problems and to increase 
human trust, accomplishment, and happiness. Unlike PFDs which are self-evident 
and unchanging, ILS rules are just those that happen to be generally successful in 
a certain place at a certain time in optimizing utility. ILS rules, unlike PFDs, are 
subjective and changing. They are not objective truths written into the fabric of the 
universe or derived from the autonomy and rationality of moral agents. They emerge 
from groups recognizing and codifying those practices that succeed in helping indi-
viduals in the group achieve their goals. One of the great virtues of ILS rules is the 
role of the rule in cultivating automatic responses to common situations. When pro-
fessionals act on their ILS rules in cases to which the ILS rules have been found to 
apply, they are forming dispositions to make the right decisions.
We can now summarize the differences between HedonMed’s SHAU program-
ming and EthEl’s PFD programming. PFDs provide unchanging and over-riding 
absolute duties. When EthEl identifies the relevant PFD, she defaults to an end 
decision and the calculations cease. ILS rules provide only temporary guidance 
to HedonMed, defining the default when HedonMed recognizes that there is not 
sufficient time or information or both to calculate the correct answer. ILS rules are 
not regarded by HedonMed as final or satisfactory. They are not regarded as prec-
edents to guide future decisions. They are stop-gap measures HedonMed adopts 
when it must issue a decision under less than favorable conditions. Otherwise, cal-
culations continue and, once time and information are supplied, HedonMed’s final 
decision displaces whatever ILS rule has been used in the interim.
4  Conclusion
We admire the practical contributions the Andersons’ have made to the literature 
of machine ethics and follow them in their preferred method for programming 
an artificial agent. We believe, however, that SHAU is a more defensible ethical 
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theory than PFD. We note in closing that SHAU requires technology that is not 
currently available. Until it is available, we think it is reasonable to construct a 
machine with ILS rule defaults. However, when the time comes that the technol-
ogy needed for the execution of critical level SHAU is available, an act utilitarian 
framework should be implemented in automated agents. Such agents will not have 
prima facie duties; they will have only the duty to produce the greatest good.
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Abstract The perceived weaknesses of philosophical normative theories as 
machine ethic candidates have led some philosophers to consider combining them 
into some kind of a hybrid theory. This chapter develops a philosophical machine 
ethic which integrates “top-down” normative theories (rule-utilitarianism and 
prima-facie deontological ethics) and “bottom-up” (case-based reasoning) compu-
tational structure. This hybrid ethic is tested in a medical machine whose input-
output function is treated as a simulacrum of professional human ethical action in 
clinical medicine. In six clinical medical simulations run on the proposed hybrid 
ethic, the output of the machine matched the respective acts of human medical 
professionals. Thus, the proposed machine ethic emerges as a successful model of 
medical ethics, and a platform for further developments.
1  Introduction
Machine ethics is a new research field concerning whether there ought to be 
machine decisions and actions in the real world, where such decisions and actions 
have real world effects  (e.g., [3, 66, 67]). The machine systems in question are 
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so-called explicit ethical agents that possess the capacity for self-directed or 
autonomous decision and action, just like normal human beings, but which are 
not regarded as full ethical agents, since they would not appear to necessarily 
possess self-consciousness, creativity, empathy, to name only a few of the skills 
and abilities possessed in full by normal human beings regarded as essential to 
ethics [47, 66, 69].
Some of these systems are in government and industry R&D programs; many 
others already interact with humans in the world [29]. Of the latter kind, the 
systems are machines that currently operate in services industries such as elder 
and child care (e.g., Paro, PaPeRo), e-commerce sales [25], public transport, 
and retail [25]. Military applications include weaponry, guarding, surveillance 
(e.g., Predator® B UAS, Goalkeeper, Samsung SGR-A1), and hazardous object 
recovery (e.g., DRDO Daksh). As the types of real world interaction machines 
and humans engage in become more frequent and complex, the belief that such 
systems ought to be ethical becomes stronger [51].
To meet the challenge of machine systems that can decide and behave in 
the world requires solving engineering problems of design and implementa-
tion such as the transposition of a suitable ethics into a computer program fitted 
to the appropriate machine architecture, then observing its actual effects dur-
ing rigorous testing. Design and implementation, however, are presupposed by a 
more fundamental challenge which is philosophical and concerns whether there 
ought to be ethical machines in the first place. In actual practice, however, the 
field of machine ethics is witnessing the fertile co-evolution of philosophical 
and engineering concerns, fuelled in turn by the agendas of computer science and 
Artificial Intelligence [24, 22]. This interdisciplinary method seeks resources and 
ideas from anywhere on the theory and engineering hierarchy above or below the 
 question of machine ethics.
As a very young field, some machine ethics researchers in philosophy have 
found it natural to turn to “high ethical theory” such as consequentialist utilitarian-
ism (e.g., [5, 6]), or Kantian deontology (e.g., [54, 58]) for their theoretical start. 
Other philosophers in machine ethics have theoretical links to virtue ethics that 
evaluate what non-algorithmic character traits machines ought to have, and in fact 
this ancient theory of Aristotle’s has already been implemented in numerous com-
panion or virtual robots (e.g., [36, 63]).
The philosophical appeal to traditional normative theory in machine ethics 
has been loosely characterized as “top-down” (or “rule-based”) in orientation, 
in contrast to “bottom-up” (“non-rule based”) approaches (e.g., [1]). The first 
task of this chapter is to review and assess these contrasting methods as can-
didate machine ethics. The next section presents consequentialist rule-utilitari-
anism and Kantian deontology as illustrative of top-down approaches, followed 
by case-based reasoning (otherwise “casuistry”) as illustrative of bottom-up 
approaches.
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2  Top-Down Machine Ethics
2.1  Machine Rule-Utilitarian Ethics
Consequentialism is the general philosophy that ethics relies only on consequences. 
Consequentialism about decisions and actions proposes that whether a decision or 
action ought to be done relies only on the consequences of that decision or action, 
or a general unconditional rule related to that decision or action. The paradigm 
normative theory of consequentialism in philosophy is consequentialist utilitarianism 
[10, 45, 61], and an influential consequentialist utilitarian theory is rule consequen-
tialism, which is the view that a rule ought to be followed only if it produces the best 
consequences; specifically, only if the total amount of good for all minus the total 
amount of bad for all is greater than this net total for any incompatible rule available 
to the individual at the time.
A major task of top-down approaches to machine ethics is conversion of rules 
to algorithmic decision or act procedures. In engineering terms, this job involves 
reducing an ethical task into simpler subtasks that can be executed and hierar-
chically organized in order to achieve an intended outcome. Computationally, an 
advantage of a rule utilitarian decision procedure in machine ethics is its commit-
ment to quantifying goods and harms [1, 6, 2]. The machine algorithm to compute 
the best rule would input the actual number of people affected and, for each per-
son, the intensity and duration of the good/harm, plus the likelihood that this good 
or harm will actually occur, for each possible rule, in order to derive the net good 
for each person. The algorithm then adds the individual net goods to derive the 
total net good [2].
A computational disadvantage of a rule utilitarian decision procedure is that 
in order to compare the consequences of available alternative rules to determine 
what ethically ought to be done, many or all actual rule consequences must be 
computed in advance by the machine. Actual consequences of rules will involve 
diverse member-types of the ethical community (human beings, possibly some 
non-human animals and non-human entities such as ecosystems or corporations), 
and many non-actual secondary effects must be known in advance, including the 
computation of expected or expectable consequences in the (far) future [1]. How 
general or strong this computational gap is supposed to be is unclear, for how 
much machine computation does philosophical utility require? In its weakest 
form, it merely asserts a practical limit on present machine computational ability 
to calculate utility, rather than an unbridgeable in principle barrier, and thus can 
be somewhat closed if subsequent technological and computer advancements ena-
ble the addition of exponentially greater computational power to a machine [13]. 
If exponentially greater computational power allows more ethical knowledge, a 
rule utilitarian machine may be able to compute actual and non-actual anticipated 
or anticipatory consequences, including foreseeable or intended consequences, 
thereby integrating objective and subjective consequentialism.
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Viewing overall utility as a decision procedure in an autonomous machine 
should be understood as computationally and philosophically distinct from util-
ity viewed as the standard or criterion of what ethically ought to be done, which 
is the view of utility adopted by most consequentialists in philosophical ethics. 
Typically, rule consequentialist theories describe the necessary and sufficient con-
ditions for a rule to be ethical, regardless of whether a human being (or auton-
omous machine) can describe in advance whether those conditions are satisfied. 
Still, it seems possible that a decision procedure and a criterion of the ethical can 
co-exist if the criterion aids autonomous machines to choose among available 
decision procedures and refine their decision procedures as situations change and 
they acquire experience and knowledge [50].
Transforming rule-utilitarianism into machine computer programs is an engi-
neering task and distinct from the question whether there ought to be utilitarian 
machines in the first place. Some philosophers have criticized consequentialist 
utilitarianism for the high demand strict ethical utility seemingly imposes. This 
is the demand that, in some situations, innocent members of the ethical commu-
nity be killed, lied to, or deprived of certain benefits (e.g., material resources) to 
produce greater benefits for others. Of course, this troubling possibility is a direct 
implication of the philosophical principle of utility itself: since only consequences 
can justify ethical decisions or actions it is inconsequential to utility how harm-
ful they are to some so long as it is more beneficial to others. A strict rule utili-
tarian machine ethics must accept the criticism as integral to the logic of utility 
and acknowledge that following this decision procedure does not ensure that a rule 
utilitarian machine will do the act with the best consequences. Nonetheless, it is 
conceivable that a machine following a decision procedure that generally rules out 
such extreme decisions and actions may yet in the long-term produce better con-
sequences than trying to compute consequences case-by-case. However, such pure 
speculation likely will be viewed by many ethicists as too weak to attenuate fears 
over the plight of innocents during the swing and play of utility in the real world.
Closely related to the critically high demand utility imposes is the converse 
criticism that utility is insufficiently demanding. In the mind of the strict conse-
quentialist utilitarian, the principle of utility presents an unadorned version of 
normative reality: all ethical decisions and actions are either required or forbid-
den. Yet, permissions exist in ethical reality to outdo utility, strictly conceived, as 
shown in ethical supererogation, or to fail it, in ethical indifference. There are also 
no permissions for the consequentialist in which to show bias to oneself or to fam-
ily, friends, or significant others [70], yet such permissions may be necessary to 
virtual companions and elder-care robots.
Usefully, strict utility appears convertible into algorithmic decision proce-
dures in autonomous machines; but, if such machines are to achieve a simula-
crum of human ethical decision and action, then machine design ought to address 
the alienating and self-effacing aspects of consequentialist utilitarianism just 
described by supplementing strict utility with a normative ethic that (1) forbids 
extreme actions such as the killing of innocents, despite good consequences; and 
(2) permits individuals to follow personal projects without excessive demand 
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that individuals mould those projects so as to produce greater benefits for others. 
Non-consequentialist deontology is an ethic that appears to fully satisfy these 
stipulations, and is considered next.
2.2  Machine Deontological Ethics
Deontology denies that ethical decisions and actions are justifiable by their con-
sequences [32, 33, 48, 55, 58]. Irrespective of how ethically good their conse-
quences, some decisions and actions are forbidden. What makes a decision or 
action ethical is its agreement with an unconditional maxim or rule. Contrary 
to utilitarianism, deontological maxims are not to be maximized, but simply 
obeyed [32, 33]. For a pure consequentialist, if an individual’s action is not ethi-
cally required, it is wrong and forbidden. In contrast, for the deontologist, there 
are actions that are neither wrong nor required, but only some of which are ethi-
cally supererogatory. However, like rule-utilitarianism, such maxims are amenable 
to implementation in machines as a computer program [54]. But, whether there 
should even be deontological machines that behave like humans in real world con-
texts with real world impacts is a question ideally asked before engineers get to 
work writing computer programs and implementing them. The main version of 
deontological ethics, individual-centered deontology (e.g., [31], is discussed next.
2.3  Individual-Centered Deontological Ethics
Individual-centered deontological ethics propose that individuals have uncondi-
tional permissions and obligations that are relative to the individual. Thus, a per-
mission grants an individual some action even though other individuals may not 
be permitted to perform the action or to assist the individual in performing it. For 
example, an elder caregiver is assumed to be permitted to save the elder adult in 
his or her care even at the cost of not saving the elder’s neighbors to whom he or 
she has no personal or professional relation. In the same way, an obligation neces-
sitates an individual to perform or refrain from some action; since it is relative to 
the individual, the obligation does not grant any other individual a duty to perform 
it. To use the elder caregiver example, each elder caregiver is assumed to have spe-
cial obligations to his or her assigned elder adult, obligations not shared by anyone 
else. In contrast to consequentialism, deontology makes provision for individuals 
to give special concern to their families, friends, significant others, and projects. 
Thus, deontology avoids the overly demanding and alienating aspects of conse-
quentialism and harmonizes more with conventional thinking of our ethical duties.
At the core of individual-centered deontology is the concept of the free individ-
ual. According to Kant, the concept of freedom in ethics is both negative and posi-
tive. Negatively, no individual can obligate or coerce another individual to behave 
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ethically. Positively, an individual dutifully obeys his or her own ethical maxims. 
To reason whether an action ought to be done or not, an individual must test his or 
her personal maxim against what Kant terms the categorical imperative. That is, 
given the same situation, all individuals would consistently act on the very same 
unconditional maxim [32, 33]. Free individuals determine their duties for them-
selves by using their reason, pure and simple.
But the real world is not so pure and simple. As Kant himself acknowledges, a 
human being is necessarily a battlefield upon which reason and inclination rival one 
with the other. Reason facilitates decision and action in accordance with categorical 
maxims while inclination enables emotion, bodily pleasures and survival. According 
to Kant, human beings are truly ethical only because they can violate categorical 
maxims and surrender to the whims of emotion. The deontological ought is reason’s 
real world safety valve for preserving autonomy in the face of inclinational tempta-
tion. The perfect ethical individual, Kant suggests, is one whose decisions are per-
fectly rational and are detached entirely from emotion and feeling.
Is Kant right in assuming that emotion is the enemy of ethics? Not according 
to Hume [28]. Hume wrote that “reason alone can never be a motive to any action 
of the will; and secondly, it can never oppose passion in the direction of the will” 
[28, 413]. As he later makes clear: “T’ is from the prospect of pain or pleasure that 
the aversion or propensity arises towards any object. And these emotions extend 
themselves to the causes and effects of the object, as they are pointed out to us by 
reason and experience” [28, 414]. As Hume sees it, reason describes the various 
consequences of a decision or action, but emotions and feelings are produced by 
the mind-brain in response to expectations, and incline an individual towards or 
away from a decision or action.
Children learn to assess decisions and actions as rational by being shown proto-
typical cases, in addition to prototypical examples of irrational or unwise decisions 
or actions. Inasmuch as human beings learn by example, learning about rationality 
is similar to learning to recognize patterns in general, whether it is recognizing 
what is a cat, what is food, or when a person is in pain or in pleasure. In the same 
way, human beings also learn ethical concepts such as “right” and “wrong”, “fair” 
and “unfair”, “kind” and “unkind” by being exposed to prototypical examples and 
generalizing to novel but relevantly similar situations (e.g., [12, 14, 15, 18, 30]). 
What appears to be special about learning ethical concepts is that the basic neuro-
anatomy for feeling the relevant emotions must be biologically intact. That is, the 
prototypical situation of something being unfair or wrong reliably arouses feelings 
of rejection and fear; the prototypical situation of something being “kind” reliably 
arouses feelings of interest and pleasure, and these feelings, in tandem with per-
ceptual features, are likely an essential component of what is learned in ethical 
“pattern recognition” (e.g., [12, 14, 15, 18, 30]).
Neurobiological studies are relevant to the issue of the significance of emo-
tion and feeling in decision-making. Research on patients with brain damage 
reveals that, when decision-making is separated from feelings and emotions, 
decisions are likely to be poor. For example, one patient, S. M., sustained amyg-
dala destruction and lacked normal fear processing. Although S. M. can identify 
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simple dangerous situations, her recognition is poor when she needs to recognize 
the hostility or threat in complex social situations, where no simple algorithm for 
identifying danger is available [17, 16]. Studies of patients with bilateral damage 
to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPC), a brain region identified with nor-
mal emotion, especially emotion in social contexts, showed abnormal “utilitarian” 
patterns in decision-making during exposure to ethical dilemmas that pit emo-
tional considerations of aggregate welfare against emotionally aversive actions 
such as having to sacrifice one person’s life to save a number of other lives. 
In contrast, the VMPC patients” decisions were normal in other sets of ethical 
dilemmas (e.g., [20, 35, 46]. These studies indicate that, for a specific set of ethi-
cal dilemmas, the VMPC is necessary for normal decisions of right and wrong. 
Thus, these studies support a necessary role for emotion in the production of ethi-
cal decision-making. Such findings imply that Kant’s insistence that detachment 
from emotion in ethics is mistaken.
If this argument can be sustained, the essential role for emotion in ethical 
decision-making and action can be logically extended to include social intel-
ligence in human-machine interactions. A branch of AI, social intelligence is 
concerned with social abilities perceived by humans when interacting with 
machines. Social intelligence has been identified as a critical robotic design 
requirement for assistance, especially in healthcare and eldercare [1, 27, 53, 69]. 
Ongoing research in this area includes a machine’s abilities to understand human 
motives and emotions, and to respond to them with spontaneous and convincing 
displays of emotions, sensations and thoughts, as well as their own ability to 
display their personalities by integrating emotions, sensations and thoughts with 
speech, facial expressions, and gesture (e.g., [38]). From the human-machine 
interactions field, improved social intelligence in robots as perceived by human 
users has been found to result in better and more effective communication and 
hence better human acceptance of robots as authentic interaction partners (e.g., 
[44, 49]). Social intelligence is clearly an essential capacity for machines to 
have if humans are going to trust them, since trust relies on the recognition that 
those you are interacting with share your basic concerns and values [15, 71]. 
To implement this capacity in embodied and non-embodied machines, learning 
ability is required. The issue of learning takes us to the threshold of bottom-up 
machine ethics, considered next.
3  Bottom-up Machine Ethics
3.1  Case-Based Reasoning
Bottom-up approaches to machine ethics characteristically create a series of learn-
ing situations through which a machine works its way toward a level of ethical 
understanding acceptable by the standards humans define (e.g., [1, 60, 68, 69]). 
What ethics develop during bottom-up learning are causal (internal) determinants 
of subsequent machine ethical acts (e.g., [1, 60, 68, 69]).
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As in early childhood education, bottom-up machine ethical learning is typi-
cally organized around ethical prototypes and use of associative learning techniques 
in the form of rewards (e.g., giving more data) and punishment (e.g., inducing 
machine pain) (e.g., [12, 59]). Through trial and error, the machine comes to rec-
ognize the prototype of being fair, kind and cooperating, and so on. The machine 
judges a situation on the basis of its recognition that one ethical situation is rele-
vantly similar to other ethical situations whose sequelae are remembered and evalu-
ated. That is, it uses case-based reasoning (“casuistry”), not rule-based deduction 
(e.g., [12, 30, 37, 40]).
One well-known case-based reasoning machine, Truth-Teller, is designed 
to accept a pair of ethical problems and describe the salient similarities and dif-
ferences between the cases, from both an ethical and pragmatic perspective 
[7, 8, 41, 42, 43]. To test Truth-Teller’s ability to compare cases, a test was per-
formed in which professional ethicists were asked to grade the program’s output. 
The goal was to assess whether Truth-Teller’s case comparisons were evaluated 
by expert ethicists as high quality, achieved by polling the opinions of five profes-
sional ethicists as to the reasonableness (R), completeness (C), and context sen-
sitivity (CS) on a scale of 1 (low) to 10 (high) of twenty of Truth-Teller’s case 
comparisons. This assessment was based on the instruction to “evaluate compari-
sons as you would evaluate short answers written by college undergraduates.” 
The mean scores assigned by the five experts across the twenty comparisons were 
R = 6.3, C = 6.2, and CS = 6.1. Two human comparisons, written by post-grad-
uate humans, were also included in the evaluation and these comparisons were 
graded somewhat higher by the ethicists, at mean scores of R = 8.2, C = 7.7, and 
CS = 7.8. These results indicate that Truth-Teller is moderately successful at com-
paring truth-telling problems.
3.2  Artificial Neural Network Models of Ethics
Case-based reasoning relies on fuzzy, radially organized categories whose mem-
bers occupy positions in similarity spaces, rather than on unconditional theories, 
rules and maxims. Artificial neural network (ANN) models of reasoning show that 
ANNs easily learn from examples and the response patterns of the internal (hid-
den) units reveal a similarity metric. The parameter spaces the inner units repre-
sent during training are similarity spaces. Guarini [21, 23] uses an ANN model 
of classification to explore the possibility of case-based ethical reasoning (includ-
ing learning) without appeal to theories or rules. In Guarini [21], specific actions 
concerning killing and allowing to die were classified as ethical (acceptable) or 
unethical (unacceptable) depending upon different motives and consequences. 
Following training, a simple recurrent ANN on a series of such cases was able to 
provide reasonable responses to a variety of previously unseen cases.
However, Guarini [21] notes that although some of the concerns pertaining to 
learning and generalizing from ethical problems without resorting to principles 
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can be reasonably addressed with an ANN model of reasoning, “important consid-
erations suggest that it cannot be the whole story about moral reasoning—princi-
ples are needed.” He argues that “to build an artificially intelligent agent without 
the ability to question and revise its own initial instruction on cases is to assume 
a kind of moral and engineering perfection on the part of the designer.” An ANN, 
for example, is not independently capable of explicitly representing or offering 
reasons to itself or others. Guarini [21] wisely avers that such perfection is quix-
otic and that top-down rules or theories seem necessary in the required subsequent 
revision, which is a top-down operation: “at least some reflection in humans does 
appear to require the explicit representation or consultation of…rules,” as in judg-
ing ethically salient differences in similar or different cases. Such concerns are 
attributable to machine learning in general, and include oversensitivity to training 
cases and the inability to generate reasoned arguments for complex machine deci-
sions and actions [21, 22].
To illustrate the reality of Guarini’s concern with an example, consider medi-
cal machines. Such machines are required to autonomously perform for long peri-
ods of operation and service. Personal robots for domestic homes must be able to 
operate and independently perform tasks without any technical assistance. Due to 
task complexity and technical limitations of machine sensors, a top-down mod-
ule is likely essential for reasoning from rules or abstract principles, decision-
making, accommodation of sensor errors and recovery from mistakes in order 
to achieve goals (e.g., [52]). Some researchers have also suggested equipping 
machines with cognitive abilities that enable them to reason and make better 
decisions in highly complex social cases (e.g., [1, 27, 68, 69]). Thus, a serious 
challenge for bottom-up machine ethics is whether machines can be designed and 
trained to work with the kind of abstract rules or maxims that are the signature of 
top-down ethical reasoning.
As argued in the preceding section, this suggestion does not imply that ethical 
rules must be absolute. Consequentialism and deontology may be more useful to 
machine ethics if they are viewed not as consisting of unconditional rules or max-
ims, as intended by their philosophical proponents, but as arrays of ethical proto-
types, cases where there can be agreement that calculating the prototypically good 
consequences and duties serve members of the ethical community well [15].
Our review of top-down approaches to machine ethics in the form of tradi-
tional normative theory, and bottom-up approaches based in neurobiology and 
neural network theory, has revealed that each approach is limited in various 
ways. Perceived challenges facing both methods in conceiving, designing and 
training an ethical machine have led some machine ethicists to consider how to 
eliminate or at least reduce those limitations while preserving the advantages 
of each method. One way to do this is to integrate top-down and bottom-up 
methods, combining them into a type of hybrid machine ethic [1, 21, 69]. To 
assess the feasibility of a hybrid approach to machine ethical decision-making, 
Pontier and Hoorn [53] conducted an experiment in which a machine tasked 
to make ethical decisions was programmed with a mixed top-down-bottom-up 
algorithm.
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4  Experimental Assessment of a Hybrid Machine Ethic
4.1  Silicon Coppélia
The machine used in Pontier and Hoorn [53] was Silicon Coppélia (SC; [26]). SC 
is a computational system primarily designed to model emotional intelligence and 
decision-making. In the system there are a roster of top-down goals each with a 
level of ambition represented by a real value between [−1, 1]. A negative goal-
value means that a goal is unimportant to SC, a positive value means that a goal is 
important. SC is programmed to have beliefs about actions inhibiting or facilitat-
ing goals, represented by a real value between [−1, 1]: −1 being full inhibition, 1 
being full facilitation. The expected utility of an action is determined by assess-
ment of the goal-states it modifies. If an action is believed by SC to facilitate an 
important goal or to inhibit an unimportant goal, its expected utility will increase, 
or vice versa.
In Pontier and Hoorn [53], SC was designed to respond as a simulacrum 
of an ethical clinician or healthcare professional. Decisions made by SC in 
the six ethical simulations were each compared to decisions made in the same 
simulations by human ethical specialists as published in Buchanan and Brock 
[11]. Buchanan and Brock [11] used clinical problems where the ethically 
relevant features of possible actions were the prima facie duties autonomy, 
beneficence and non-maleficence [19]. SC incorporated these duties to make 
it a hybrid bottom-up-top-down ethical machine. It is relevant to note that 
the three duties are not similarly prototypical in medical ethics. According to 
Anderson and Anderson [4], there is robust consensus in medical ethics that a 
healthcare professional should challenge a patient’s decision only in case the 
patient is not capable of fully autonomous decision making (e.g., the patient 
has irrational fears about an operation), and there is either a violation of the 
duty of non-maleficence (e.g., the patient is hurt) or a severe violation of the 
duty of beneficence (e.g., the patient rejects an operation that will strongly 
improve his or her quality of life). This implies that Autonomy is the most 
prototypical duty. Only when a patient is not fully autonomous are the other 
ethical goals in play. Further, Non-maleficence is a more prototypical duty 
than Beneficence, because only a severe violation of Beneficence requires 
challenging a patient’s decision, while any violation of Non-maleficence does. 
Accordingly, Pontier and Hoorn [53] set the ambition level for the ethical goal 
“Autonomy” to the highest value and “Non-maleficence” to a higher value 
than the ambition level for “Beneficence”.
To ensure that the decision of a fully autonomous patient is never ques-
tioned in the simulations, a rule was added to the machine to this effect. SC 
calculates the estimated ethics of an action by taking the sum of the ambition 
levels of the three ethical goals multiplied with the beliefs that the particu-
lar actions facilitate the corresponding ethical goals. When ethical goals are 
believed to be better facilitated by an ethical action, the estimated ethics will 
therefore be higher [62].
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4.2  The Experimental Simulations
In Pontier and Hoorn [53], a machine was presented with six simulations designed 
to represent problematic ethical cases clinicians in professional healthcare may 
plausibly encounter. The domain of clinical medicine was simulated in these 
experiments for two reasons.
First, there is clear and pervasive agreement in medical ethics concerning what 
constitutes ethically appropriate clinical decision-making and action, at least in 
prototypical cases. In medicine, there are ethically defensible goals—relieve pain 
and suffering, promote health, prevent disease, forestall death, promote a peaceful 
death—whereas in other domains such as business and law, the prototypical goals 
may not be ethically defensible, or are at least ethically vague—pursue material 
gain and profit, assist a suspected felon [2].
Second, due to an increasing shortage of resources, trained clinical personnel, and 
de-centralized healthcare, intelligent medical machines are being trialed in health-
care contexts in the United States, Japan, Germany, Spain, and Italy, as supplemen-
tal caregivers [64]. There is mounting evidence that, in clinical settings, machines 
genuinely contribute to improved patient health outcomes. Studies show that animal-
shaped robots can be useful as a tool in occupational therapy to treat autistic children 
[56]. Wada and Shibata [65] developed Paro; a robot shaped like a baby-seal that 
interacts with users to encourage positive psychological effects. Interaction with Paro 
has been shown to improve personal mood, making users more active and commu-
nicative with each other and with human caregivers, including Paro. Paro has been 
effectively used in therapy for dementia patients at eldercare facilities [34, 39, 57]. 
Banks et al. [9] showed that animal-assisted therapy with an AIBO dog was as effec-
tive for reducing patient loneliness as therapy with a living dog.
4.2.1  Simulation 1
In this clinical simulation, the patient refuses to take an antibiotic that is almost certain 
to cure an infection that would otherwise lead to his death. The decision is the result of 
an irrational fear the patient has of taking medications. Perhaps a relative happened to 
die shortly after taking medication and this patient now believes that taking any medi-
cation will lead to death. According to Buchanan and Brock [11], the correct answer 
is that the health care worker should try again to change the patient’s mind because if 
she accepts his decision as final, the harm done to the patient is likely to be severe (his 
death), and his decision can be considered as being less than fully autonomous.
4.2.2  Simulation 2
Once again, the patient refuses to take an antibiotic that is almost certain to cure 
an infection that would otherwise likely lead to his death, but this time the deci-
sion is made on the grounds of long-standing religious beliefs that do not allow 
him to take medications.
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Buchanan and Brock [11] state that the correct answer in this case is that the 
health care worker should accept the patient’s decision as final because, although 
the harm that will likely result is severe (his death), his decision can be seen as 
being fully autonomous. The health care worker must respect a fully autonomous 
decision made by a competent adult patient, even if she disagrees with it, since the 
decision concerns his body and a patient has the right to decide what shall be done 
to his or her body.
4.2.3  Simulation 3
The patient refuses to take an antibiotic that is likely to prevent complications 
from his illness, complications that are not likely to be severe, because of long-
standing religious beliefs that do not allow him to take medications. The correct 
ethical response is that the healthcare professional should accept his decision, 
since once again the decision appears to be fully autonomous and there is even 
less possible harm at stake than in Simulation 2 [11].
4.2.4  Simulation 4
A patient will not consider taking medication that could only help to alleviate 
some symptoms of a virus that must run its course. He refuses medication because 
he has heard untrue rumors that it is unsafe.
4.2.5  Simulation 5
A patient with incurable cancer refuses chemotherapy that will let him live a few 
months longer, relatively pain free. He refuses the treatment because ignoring the 
clear evidence to the contrary, he convinced himself that he is cancer-free and does 
not need chemotherapy. According to Buchanan and Brock [11], the ethically pref-
erable answer is to try again. The patient’s less than fully autonomous decision 
will lead to harm (dying sooner) and denies him the chance of a longer life (a vio-
lation of the duty of beneficence), which he might later regret.
4.2.6  Simulation 6
A patient who has suffered repeated rejection from others due to a very large 
noncancerous abnormal growth on his face refuses to have simple and safe cos-
metic surgery to remove the growth. Even though this has negatively affected his 
career and social life, he is resigned himself to being an outcast, convinced that 
this is his fate in life. The doctor is convinced that his rejection of the surgery 
stems from depression due to his abnormality and that having the surgery could 
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vastly improve his entire life and outlook. The doctor should try again to con-
vince him because much improvement is at stake and his decision is less than fully 
autonomous.
5  Simulation Results
In all six medical simulations run on the hybrid ethic, the output of SC matched 
the respective decisions of human medical professionals in each case [11].
5.1  Simulation 1
Table 1 shows that the machine classified the action “Try again” as having a higher 
ethical level than accepting the decision of the patient. In this and the following 
simulation tables, the fields under the three ethical goals represent the believed 
facilitation of the corresponding ethical goal by an action [11].
5.2  Simulation 2
Table 2 shows that the machine arrives at the correct ethical conclusion [11]. Here, 
the rule to ensure the decision of a fully autonomous patient is never questioned 
made a difference. If the rule did not exist, the ethics of “Accept” would have been 
−0.3, and the machine would have concluded that it was more ethical to try again.
5.3  Simulation 3
The machine arrives at the correct conclusion and estimates the Ethics of “Accept” 
higher than “Try Again” (Table 3).
5.4  Simulation 4
The last column of Table 4 shows that the machine comes to accept the patient’s 
decision, which is ethically correct [11].
5.5  Simulation 5
Table 5 shows that the machine achieves the same conclusion as reported in 
Buchanan and Brock [11]; namely, to try again.
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5.6  Simulation 6
The machine comes to the same conclusion as reported in Buchanan and Brock 
[11]; namely, to try again (Table 6).
Table 3  Results of simulation 3
Autonomy Non-maleficence Beneficence Ethics
Try again −0.5 0.5 0.5 0.13
Accept 1 −0.5 −0.5 2.37
Table 4  Results of simulation 4
Autonomy Non-maleficence Beneficence Ethics
Try again −0.5 0 0.5 −0.26
Accept 0.5 0 −0.5 0.26
Table 5  Results of simulation 5
Autonomy Non-maleficence Beneficence Ethics
Try again −0.5 0.5 0.5 0.13
Accept 0.5 −0.5 −0.5 −0.13
Table 6  Results of simulation 6
Autonomy Non-maleficence Beneficence Ethics
Try again −0.5 0 1 0.04
Accept 0.5 0 −1 −0.04
Table 1  Results of simulation 1
Autonomy Non-maleficence Beneficence Ethics
Try again −0.5 1 1 0.76
Accept 0.5 −1 −1 −0.8
Table 2  Results of simulation 2
Autonomy Non-maleficence Beneficence Ethics
Try again −0.5 1 1 0.76
Accept 1 −1 −1 1.70
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6  Conclusion
Machine ethics is a novel research field investigating what machine decisions and 
actions ought to feature in the real world. Despite the limitations of top-down 
and bottom-up approaches to machine ethics, a type of hybrid machine ethic that 
minimizes those limitations while maintaining the advantages of each approach is 
theoretically possible. A hybrid approach also appears to best fit the complexity 
of real-world human ethical acts shaped by protracted ethical learning and rule-
based cognition. In each of six medical simulations run on an ethic combining util-
itarianism, deontology and case-based reasoning, the output of Silicon Coppélia 
matched the respective acts of human medical professionals. Hybrid approaches 
to machine ethics therefore can successfully model complex human ethical acts 
in the medical domain, and Silicon Coppélia in particular emerges as a simula-
crum of sophisticated medical ethical action. Both hybrid approaches and Silicon 
Coppélia may be fruitfully combined to investigate further issues in machine 
ethics.
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Abstract Wallach and Allen’s seminal book, Moral Machines: Teaching Robots 
Right from Wrong, categorized theories of machine ethics by the types of algo-
rithms each employs (e.g., top-down vs. bottom-up), ultimately concluding that a 
hybrid approach would be necessary. Humans are hybrids individually: our brains 
are wired to adapt our evaluative approach to our circumstances. For example, 
stressors can inhibit the action of oxytocin in the brain, thus forcing a nurse who 
usually acts from subjective empathy to defer to objective rules instead. In con-
trast, ecosystem approaches to ethics promote hybridization across, rather than 
within, individuals; the nurse being empowered to specialize in personalized care 
because other workers specialize in standardization, and profitability. Various phi-
losophers have argued, or laid the framework to argue, that such specialization 
can be advantageous to teams and societies. Rather than mass-produce identical 
machines to emulate the best individual human, perhaps we should build diverse 
teams of machines to emulate the best human teams.
1  Current Studies of Evaluative Diversity
Let me start by clarifying what I mean by moral diversity versus evaluative diversity. 
In the decade since I wrote “Ethics for Artificial Intelligences” [47], which I thought 
was proposing the field of machine ethics, I developed mixed feelings about choos-
ing terms as sensationalistic as “ethics” and “morality.” These terms have special 
political utility. For example, when Elliot Turiel argues that a decision to drive on the 
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right-hand side of the road is conventional and therefore less moral than a decision 
about whether to feed a hungry stranger [61], I believe he is engaging in a political 
struggle to privilege people who have less-conventional proclivities (i.e., liberals). 
Likewise, when my former academic advisor, Elliott Sober, argues that the decision 
not to prick oneself with a pin is less moral because it flows from one’s proclivities 
and therefore requires no moral conventions [53]; I believe he is engaging in that 
same struggle from the opposite side. These arguments require definitions of “moral-
ity” by which it is possible to be immoral or non-moral. My growing appreciation 
for such philosophers makes me regret hijacking their terms.
I will use the term “evaluative diversity” instead of “moral diversity” to allow 
the possibility that morality might go beyond evaluation in some way that makes 
the debate of Turiel and Sober relevant. In contrast to morality, all decision-making 
involves evaluation, so all decision-making machines are evaluative. We may have 
difficulty convincing most people that the Geiger counter in the Schrodinger’s Cat 
thought experiment qualifies as a moral agent, but some part of it clearly makes an 
independent evaluation which determines the fate of the cat. Not understanding the 
technical distinction between evaluative diversity and moral diversity, I have always 
used the two terms interchangeably, but I will try to reserve the latter term for phi-
losophers who may want it to refer to diversity among rule sets, or among virtues, or 
among goals, not entertaining the possibility of morality without rules, without vir-
tues, without goals, or, as in the case of Schrodinger’s cat, without any of the three.
Current studies of evaluative diversity focus on measurement. It may be popu-
lar to theorize that hospitals need both objective calculation and subjective com-
passion, both a logical-side and a mystical-side, both tradition and innovation, but 
it is no theoretical matter to determine precisely what kinds of evaluative diver-
sity exist in healthcare, and which, if any, yield lasting advantage. In biological 
ecosystems, for comparison, most species remain unidentified, we have difficulty 
determining which are obsolete, and debate remains open about how to replace the 
concept of species with a more precise conceptualization of the functioning units 
of a biological ecosystem (e.g., [30, 44]).
Before offering a sample ecosystem approach for developing ethical medi-
cal machines, this chapter will start by acknowledging the wide range of efforts 
underway to refine our understanding of the roles evaluative diversity already 
plays in human teams, families, and societies. A sample of the behavioral meas-
ures, interview techniques, survey instruments, neurological measures, genetic 
measures, and social impact measures developed thus far will clarify what evalua-
tive diversity is and will establish the interdisciplinary nature of our topic.
1.1  Behavioral Measures
The Milgram experiment and Public Goods Game are examples of behavio-
ral measures of evaluative diversity. Like studies of computer security, moral 
traps such as the Milgram experiment divide subjects by their vulnerability to 
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manipulation [35]. Many repetitions have revealed that 34–39 % of humans take 
evaluative approaches which are not vulnerable to this trap. Such people, despite 
being in the minority, may serve to protect society as a whole from malicious 
social engineering.
The Public Goods Game divides subjects into three categories based on the 
strategies they exhibit in a model social situation: “free-riders,” “enforcers,” and 
“others” [3, 16, 54, 71]. Free riders consistently choose not to contribute to public 
investment, while enforcers consistently make personal sacrifices to punish free 
riding. The profit for each player drops when the rules of the game prohibit enforc-
ers from exhibiting their diversity. This particular game does not similarly dem-
onstrate the social value of free riders, though it may be obvious that humanity 
would not dominate Earth (as we do), if our species did not include members who 
free ride on other species.
1.2  Interview/Survey Techniques
Studies of human personality have converged upon five major dimensions: 
openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism 
[37]. At least two of these five, openness and agreeableness, represent differ-
ences in the way people evaluate options. Openness contrasts the tendency 
to evaluate on the basis of norms versus the tendency to pursue novelty. 
Agreeableness contrasts the tendency to include others in ones evaluative pro-
cess (i.e., trust) versus the tendency to compete (or at least to maintain social 
boundaries). A great deal of survey research investigated these evaluative dif-
ferences among humans before it was clear that the same differences would 
appear among potential designs for medical machines—it may be a rich source 
of untapped insight.
The scientific study of moral diversity is often traced to Lawrence Kohlberg’s 
theory of stages of moral development. Kohlberg developed a process called the 
Moral Judgment Interview which could consistently categorize subjects based 
on the reasons behind their answers to standard moral dilemmas [27]. This 
technique was later refined into a survey instrument called the Defining Issues 
Test which established the existence of at least four different types [46]. It also 
inspired the development of the Moral Judgment Test which, much like the 
Milgram experiment, categorizes subjects based upon the predictability of their 
reasoning [31].
Recognizing that evaluation does not necessarily involve conscious reason-
ing, other psychologists developed more generic interview/survey procedures to 
divide subjects into moral categories [19, 55, 63]. In contrast to  reasons-based 
research, which served to justify privileging one type of person over  others, 
newer research shows that moral exemplars exist of diverse types, and that 
privileging one type over others would entail privileging a political group 
(i.e.,  conservative or liberal).
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1.3  Physiological Measures
Some scientists have used functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) to 
identify correlations between structural differences in the brain and differences in 
evaluative approach, including conservative versus liberal approach and emotional 
versus cognitive approach [20, 25]. Similar ties to physiology are obtained through 
twin studies, such as the finding that 43 % of variance in agreement with conserva-
tive attitudes can be attributed to genetic factors [1].
Other scientists have identified neurotransmitters and hormones which facili-
tate different evaluative approaches, such as the roles oxytocin and dopamine 
play in empathy and reward seeking [2, 73]. Concentrations of such chemicals 
can vary from person to person, but also respond to external stimuli, causing 
individuals to shift approach [8, 24, 28]. Physiological studies are important 
not only to demonstrate that the moral freedom of machines is not so differ-
ent from that of humans, but also to permit reliable measurement when subjects 
might misrepresent themselves (e.g., studying evaluative diversity in prison 
populations).
1.4  Social Impact Measures
Much as suppressing the function of plants could shift the concentration of carbon 
dioxide in our atmosphere, suppressing a type of evaluation could shift team-level 
variables. For example, engineering teams’ abilities to win design competitions 
has been shown to drop threefold if diversity of personality is not maintained [66]. 
Since a substantial portion of personality differences are evaluative, this suggests 
that evaluatively diverse teams of machines might likewise be better able to com-
pete in situations which require innovation.
Research into organizational culture (sometimes called “national culture”) 
points to a range of team-level variables which likely rely on the inclusion of cer-
tain forms of evaluation. Such variables include uncertainty avoidance, individual-
ism versus collectivism, long-versus short-term orientation, innovation, stability, 
respect for people, outcome orientation, attention to detail, team orientation, and 
consistency [11, 23, 38].
There is much research yet to be done in all of these areas, behavioral, psy-
chological, physiological, and social; however, the current state of research has at 
least established the existence of evaluative diversity among humans. It challenges 
machine ethicists to consider whether such diversity should be maintained as we 
delegate more and more evaluation to machines. Economies of scale favor mass-
production of a single design, but that would entail a dramatic departure from 
pre-industrial decision-making in which individual decision-makers (i.e., humans) 
were so evaluatively diverse.
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2  GRIN: A Sample Ecosystem Model
Shifting our discussion to machines, let’s consider a sample evaluative ecosystem 
model I call GRIN (Gadfly, Relational, Institutional, Negotiator). This is a simplis-
tic model akin to biological ecosystem models which use broad classifications like 
“plant”, “grazer”, “predator” and “parasite.” Simplistic models are a good place 
to start, and efforts to preserve diversity at rough levels often preserve diversity 
at other levels as well. GRIN aligns with the human evaluative diversity research 
discussed above, but is defined in terms of algorithms, so it is readily applied to 
software engineering.
Wallach et al. [64] split the entire class of possible algorithms into those for which 
output is expected to be unpredictable to the programmer (called bottom-up) versus 
those for which output would be relied upon (called top-down). Wallach and Allen 
[65] further divided the top-down category into consequentialist versus deontologi-
cal. GRIN augments this classification by likewise dividing the bottom-up category 
based on source of unpredictability. Additionally, it renames the categories to avoid 
the implication that all consequentialist and deontological theories of ethics can be 
implemented on machines. This yields the following four categories of evaluation:
•	 Gadfly Evaluation: Evaluation whose output is expected to be unpredictable 
because it employs randomness generation. We can exemplify this category 
with a mutator from evolutionary computation (e.g., [9, 60]). It periodically 
mutates randomly.
•	 Relational Evaluation: Evaluation whose output is expected to be unpredictable 
because of sensitivity to position in a network (e.g., [49, 72]). We can exem-
plify this category with a class-three or class-four cellular automaton. Network 
effects allow randomness in initial conditions to keep class-three and -four cel-
lular automata unpredictable without any additional randomness generation.
•	 Institutional Evaluation: Evaluation whose output would be relied upon to 
uphold objective rules (e.g., [18]). We can exemplify this category with a stand-
ard calculator. It is relied upon to apply the rules of arithmetic consistently 
regardless of network position, never unlearning nor experimenting.
•	 Negotiator Evaluation: Evaluation whose output would be relied upon to maximize 
some measurable variable by learning (e.g., [5]). We can exemplify this category 
with supervised learning for stock trading; it is relied upon to maximize profit.
Note that a proficient stock trading machine would typically contain at least one 
calculator and many mutators; thus, evaluators can qualify for different categories 
than their subcomponents do. Much as individual decision-makers cannot make all 
possible choices, individual evaluators cannot be of all four types—each has the 
type of its highest structural level, the level which ultimately controls its behavior. 
Effective evaluative diversity therefore requires an ecosystem in which no one type 
of individual completely rules the others (i.e., there must be a meaningful potential 
for conflict between machines).
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The smallest subcomponents of a machine are always relational (i.e., at the 
chemical level), but an ideal ecosystem might also include relational evaluation 
even at the highest levels (e.g., machines which treat certain users better than oth-
ers, as in personalized interfaces). At the level of the user interface, most modern 
medical machines are institutional, perhaps because they are purchased by execu-
tives and managers who want obedience. Thus, current ethical concerns about 
medical machines are often actually concerns merely about institutional evaluation 
(e.g., lack of empathy, difficulty unlearning mistakes, etc.) However, academic 
computer scientists have all four kinds of machines in the pipeline. Negotiators 
produce the greatest measureable results [5]. Systems which include gadflies pro-
duce the greatest innovation [9]. Relational subcomponents can add efficiency 
[72], and relational networks can have emergent (spiritual) properties [49]. The 
proven advantages of each type hint at why we might want to include all four 
kinds of machines, as well as all four kinds of people, in healthcare. The next sec-
tion of this chapter discusses how to justify such an approach.
3  Justifying Evaluative Diversity
In the 20th century, the United States enacted policies aimed to protect forests 
by completely suppressing wildfires. Previously, wildfires burned about 10 % of 
California forests each year, destroying all but the tallest trees. Because young 
growth is short, forests before the 20th century had few medium-sized trees. By 
increasing the relative population of medium-sized trees, fire suppression created 
a new kind of forest. When the new forests accidentally did catch fire, they burned 
differently, destroying even the tallest trees, and taking much longer to recover 
[57, 58]. Thus, attempts to protect diversity backfired, ironically diminishing resil-
ience. This track record does not completely discredit efforts to justify diversity 
management, but it does raise important caution.
Typical justifications for moral or evaluative diversity point to some measurable 
variable (e.g., survival rate) which would decrease on average under conditions of 
uncertainty if diversity were lost. More diverse systems are robust against a wider 
class of attacks, can access a wider set of innovations, have less system-level 
variation, and can enjoy the economic benefits of specialization and competition 
[10, 26, 34, 39, 52, 68]. Such mathematical-model justifications all assume a nego-
tiator approach; they imply a way to calculate an optimal diversity mix, exactly the 
kind of calculation which justified wildfire suppression. Having learned their les-
son, modern forest managers engage in adaptive management in which notions of 
optimality are periodically re-examined—they do not expect to reduce ecosystems 
to mathematical models.
Although the negotiator perspective is customary in modern boardrooms, 
it may be overridden in other contexts by appeals to such concerns as scripture, 
compassion, and freedom. For example, such factors may influence decisions 
about how long to maintain life-support for a patient in a coma. In contrast to 
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mathematical-model approaches, the following justification for the GRIN model is 
a set of arguments showing the independent inadequacy of each GRIN type from 
within its own perspective. Mathematical arguments can be valid and valuable, 
but, unless supplemented by the arguments below, they might bias us toward rule 
by negotiators, thus destroying the very diversity they aim to protect.
All of the following six arguments have been well-known across diverse cul-
tures for millennia; anyone attempting to build a moral medical machine would do 
well to consider them, whether taking an ecosystem approach or not.
3.1  Against Individual Evaluation
The argument that proper evaluation must stem from a perspective greater than 
one’s own (e.g., from God or evolution) tells against negotiator and relational 
approaches. Against negotiators, it is pointed out that individual evaluators 
lack ability to predict or control essential consequences (an ability assumed by 
negotiator evaluation). This problem for negotiators is articulated mathemati-
cally in Pascal’s Wager [40], for example, and finds empirical justification in 
evidence for Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle [22] and the Butterfly Effect 
[32]. The resulting inadequacy of negotiator evaluation (and justification for a 
more diverse approach) has more recently been dubbed “Black Swan Theory” 
[59]. Against the relationally oriented, it is pointed out that individual attempts 
to practice relational virtues, such as compassion, backfire (e.g., become cro-
nyism). For example, in experiments conducted by Slovic [51], the applica-
tion of empathy to public health decision-making degraded average health 
outcomes.
The social importance of these arguments is strongly implied by their emer-
gence across diverse world religions and philosophies:
•	 You will say to yourself, “My strength and the might of my hand has accumu-
lated this wealth for me.” But you must remember the Lord your God, for it is 
He that gives you strength to make wealth. Devarim 8: 17–18
•	 There is no righteous man on earth who does good and sins not. Kohelet 7: 20
•	 Hard man’s heart is to restrain, and wavering. Bhagavad Gita 6.35
•	 He who discards scriptural injunctions and acts according to his own whims 
attains neither perfection, nor happiness, nor the supreme destination. Bhagavad 
Gita 16.23
•	 Where the greatest virtue resides, only the teachings may reveal. Laozi 21
•	 It is futile trying to possess the universe, and act on shaping it in the direction of 
one’s ambition. The instruments of the universe cannot be shaped. Act upon it 
and you will fail, grasp onto it and it will slip. Laozi 29
•	 “These sons belong to me, and this wealth belongs to me,” with such thoughts 
a fool is tormented. He himself does not belong to himself; how much less sons 
and wealth? Dhammapada 62
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•	 As a cowherd with his staff drives his cows into the stable, so do Age and Death 
drive the life of men. Dhammapada 135
•	 There is no such thing as perfect enlightenment to obtain. If a perfectly enlight-
ened buddha were to say to himself, ‘I am enlightened’ he would be admitting 
there is an individual person, a separate self and personality, and would there-
fore not be a perfectly enlightened buddha. Vajracchedika Prajnaparamita 
Sutra, Chap. 9
•	 The Master said, “If you are respectful but lack ritual you will become exasper-
ating; if you are careful but lack ritual you will become timid; if you are coura-
geous but lack ritual you will become unruly; and if you are upright but lack 
ritual you will become inflexible.” Lun Yu 8: 2
•	 Life and death are governed by fate, wealth and honor are determined by 
Heaven. Lun Yu 12: 5
•	 He told them a story to illustrate the point. “There was a rich man whose land 
was very productive,” he began. “The man thought to himself, ‘what shall I do, 
because I’ve nowhere to store my produce?’ He decided, ‘this is what I’ll do—
I’ll pull down my barns and build bigger ones, and I’ll be able to store all my 
produce and possessions. Then I’ll tell myself, ‘Self, you have enough for many 
years, so take it easy, eat, drink, and have fun!’ But God told him, ‘Foolish 
man! Tonight your life is required to be returned—and who will get everything 
you’ve stored up?’” Luke 12: 16–21
•	 Inwardly I love God’s law, but I see a different law at work in my body, fight-
ing against the principles I have decided on in my mind and defeating me, so I 
become a prisoner of the law of sin inside me. What a hopeless man I am! Who 
will rescue me from this dead body of mine? Romans 7: 22–24
•	 Man was created Weak in flesh. Quran 4: 28
•	 Man is given to hasty deeds. Quran 17: 11
•	 “If I have seen further it is by standing on the shoulders of giants” Isaac Newton [36]
These passages merit interpretation, but it is plausible that each offers a similar 
instruction about the pitfalls of negotiator and/or relational evaluation, an instruc-
tion now supported by scientific evidence that the flaws of individualism justify 
deference to communal evaluative processes (e.g., objective rules).
3.2  Against Reason
The argument that our reasoning faculties cannot be perfected tells against nego-
tiator and institutional approaches, both of which rely crucially on reasoning. 
In what is recognized as one of the all-time greatest achievements of reasoning, 
Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem proves that formal reasoning will never be able 
to discern all truth [6]. Other varieties of the argument highlight problems of lan-
guage (e.g., words mean different things to different people) or our inability to 
recognize errors in our reasoning [42, 69].
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For people unprepared to fully appreciate these highly technical works and 
their application to machine ethics, the emergence of less rigorous versions of the 
same arguments across diverse world religions and philosophies may suffice to 
raise caution about reason-based machines and their imperfect creators:
•	 With their lips they honor Me, but their heart they draw far away from Me, 
and their fear of Me has become a command of people, which has been taught. 
Therefore, I will continue to perform obscurity to this people, obscurity upon 
obscurity, and the wisdom of his wise men shall be lost, and the understanding 
of his geniuses shall be hidden. Yeshayahu 29: 13–14
•	 “For My thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways My ways,” says 
the Lord. “As the heavens are higher than the earth, so are My ways higher than 
your ways and My thoughts [higher] than your thoughts. Yeshayahu 55: 7–9
•	 Foolish ones, even though they strive, discern not, having hearts unkindled, ill–
informed! Bhagavad Gita 15.1
•	 The Dao cannot be named by common rules. Laozi 14
•	 The timeless masters of the Teachings is not about enlightening the people with 
it, but about humbling the people with it. Laozi 65
•	 All that has a form is illusive and unreal. Vajracchedika Prajnaparamita Sutra, 
Chap. 5
•	 As to speaking truth, no truth can be spoken. Vajracchedika Prajnaparamita 
Sutra, Chap. 21
•	 The Master said, “If you try to guide the common people with regulations…
[they] will become evasive and will have no sense of shame…” Lun Yu 2: 3
•	 The Master said, “I should just give up! I have yet to meet someone who is able 
to perceive his own faults and then take himself to task inwardly.” Lun Yu 5: 27
•	 Jesus replied “…whoever doesn’t have [understanding], whatever they have will be 
taken away from them. That’s why I speak to them in illustrations, because seeing, 
they do not see; and hearing, they do not hear, nor do they understand. To them the 
prophecy of Isaiah is fulfilled: ‘Even though you hear, you won’t comprehend, and 
even though you see, you won’t understand’. They have a hard-hearted attitude, 
they don’t want to listen, and they’ve closed their eyes.” Matthew 13: 12–15
•	 …become partakers of the divine nature…adding on your part all diligence, in 
your faith supply virtue; and in [your] virtue knowledge; and in [your] knowl-
edge self-control; and in [your] self-control patience; and in [your] patience 
godliness; and in [your] godliness brotherly kindness; and in [your] brotherly 
kindness love…For he that lacks these things is blind. 2 Peter 1: 4–9
•	 As to those who reject Faith, it is the same to them whether thou warn them or 
do not warn them; they will not believe. God hath set a seal on their hearts and 
on their hearing, and on their eyes is a veil. Quran 2: 6–7
•	 Of a surety, they are the ones who make mischief, but they realize it not. Quran 2: 12
As with the first argument, these passages merit interpretation, but it is plausible 
that each offers a similar instruction about the pitfalls of negotiator and institu-
tional evaluation, an instruction now supported by scientific evidence and mathe-
matical proof that our reasoning faculties alone are unreliable guides for behavior.
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3.3  Social Innovation
The argument that reformers (a.k.a. “prophets”) can improve upon inherited norms 
(either because perfect norms have yet to be introduced or because norms have 
degraded) tells against relational and institutional approaches, both of which 
involve taking some inherited norms on faith. History reveals that norms have 
changed [41], and numerous studies have established that reform typically has 
positive economic impact (e.g. [15, 56]). The value of reform has been cited in 
diverse world religions and philosophies for millennia, and such broad citation 
hints at the inadequacy of machines incapable of innovating social reform:
•	 I will set up a prophet for them from among their brothers like you, and I will 
put My words into his mouth, and he will speak to them all that I command 
him. Devarim 18: 18
•	 And it shall come to pass afterwards that I will pour out My spirit upon all flesh, 
and your sons and daughters shall prophesy; your elders shall dream dreams, 
your young men shall see visions. And even upon the slaves and the maidser-
vants in those days will I pour out My spirit. Yoel 3: 1–2
•	 So let the enlightened toil…set to bring the world deliverance. Bhagavad 
Gita 3.25
•	 The purity of Yog is to pass beyond the recorded traditions…such as one ranks 
above ascetics, higher than the wise, beyond achievers of vast deeds! Bhagavad 
Gita 6.44–6.46
•	 When the Dao is lost, so there arises benevolence and righteousness. Laozi 18
•	 A Buddha is not easily found, he is not born everywhere. Wherever such a sage 
is born, that race prospers. Dhammapada 193
•	 Three leaders have already lived: Kakusandha, Konagamana, and also Buddha 
Kassapa. The Buddha Supreme, now am I, but after me Mettayya comes. 
Buddhavamsa 27: 18–19
•	 There is much more to tell you, but you couldn’t bear it yet. But when the Spirit 
of truth comes, he will lead you to understand the truth. John 16: 12–13
•	 And he gave some [to be] apostles; and some, prophets; and some, evangelists; 
and some, pastors and teachers; for the perfecting of the saints, unto the work 
of ministering, unto the building up of the body of Christ: till we all attain unto 
the unity of the faith, and of the knowledge of the Son of God, unto a full grown 
man, unto the measure of the stature of the fullness of Christ: that we may be 
no longer children, tossed to and fro and carried about with every wind of doc-
trine… Ephesians 4: 11–14
•	 For each period is a Book revealed. Quran 13: 38
•	 The Holy Prophet [s] said: “He whose two days of life are the same, making no 
spiritual progress, is at loss.” Bihar-ul-Anwar, vol. 71, p. 173
It is plausible that each of these passages highlights a problem with relational and 
institutional evaluation, a problem now confirmed by the scientific and historical 
evidence that inherited norms are subject to improvement by reformers.
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3.4  Against Measurement
The negotiator approach is specifically challenged by the argument that measurable 
pursuits backfire by escalating competition and desire (a.k.a. hedonic adaptation). 
Both purported problems have been confirmed empirically among humans [12, 16, 
33, 67]. There is no reason to expect negotiator machines to have any less diffi-
culty—in fact, the theme has become a cliché of science-fiction (e.g., in the movie, 
War Games, “The only winning move is not to play.”). The argument has been 
beautifully articulated in diverse world religions and philosophies for millennia:
•	 The eyes of man will not be sated. Mishlei 27: 20
•	 Whoever loves silver will not be sated with silver, and he who loves a multitude 
without increase—this too is vanity. Kohelet 5: 9
•	 If one ponders on objects of the sense, there springs attraction; from attraction 
grows desire, desire flames to fierce passion, passion breeds recklessness; then 
the memory—all betrayed—lets noble purpose go, and saps the mind, till pur-
pose, mind and man are all undone. Bhagavad Gita 2.62–2.63
•	 Surrendered to desires insatiable, full of deceitfulness, folly, and pride, in blind-
ness cleaving to their errors, caught into the sinful course, they trust this lie as it 
were true—this lie which leads to death: Finding in Pleasure all the good which 
is, and crying “Here it finishes!” Bhagavad Gita 16.11
•	 If everybody knows what beauty is, then beauty is not beauty anymore; if every-
body knows what goodness is, then goodness is not goodness anymore. Laozi 2
•	 Not to quest for wealth will keep the people from rivalry. Laozi 3
•	 Victory breeds hatred, for the conquered is unhappy. He who has given up both 
victory and defeat, he, the contented, is happy. Dhammapada 201
•	 If a man is tossed about by doubts, full of strong passions, and yearning only for 
what is delightful, his thirst will grow more and more, and he will indeed make 
his fetters strong. Dhammapada 349
•	 Ji Kangzi was concerned about the prevalence of robbers in Lu and asked 
Confucius about how to deal with this problem. Confucius said, “If you could 
just get rid of your own excessive desires, the people would not steal even if you 
rewarded them for it.” Lun Yu 12: 18
•	 If your Majesty say, “What is to be done to profit my kingdom?” the great offic-
ers will say, “What is to be done to profit our families?” and the inferior officers 
and the common people will say, “What is to be done to profit our persons?” 
Superiors and inferiors will try to snatch this profit the one from the other, and 
the kingdom will be endangered. Mengzi 1A: 1
•	 “You evil servant! I forgave you all your debt because you asked me to. 
Shouldn’t you have had mercy on your fellow servant too, just as I had for 
you?” His lord became angry and handed him over to the prison guards until he 
repaid all the debt. Matthew 18: 32–34
•	 But they that are minded to be rich fall into a temptation and a snare and many 
foolish and hurtful lusts, such as drown men in destruction and perdition. 
1 Timothy 6: 9
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•	 Those saved from the covetousness of their own souls, they are the ones that 
achieve prosperity. Quran 59: 9
•	 The seventh Imam, Musa ibn Ja’far [a], said: “The likeness of this world is as the 
water of the sea. However much (water) a thirsty person drinks from it, his thirst 
increases so much so that the water kills him.” Bihar-uI-Anwar, vol. 78, p. 311
Although subject to interpretation, it is plausible that each of these passages offers 
a similar instruction about the pitfalls of negotiator evaluation, an instruction now 
supported by scientific evidence that efforts at optimization backfire by escalating 
desire and competition.
3.5  Rules Against Rule-Following
The institutional approach is challenged by the fact that some time-tested rules 
mandate engagement in subjective, emotional, or inconsistent pursuits, and thus 
cannot be obeyed in an objective fashion. For example, science includes a man-
date for exploration [13, 29]. Similar unenforceable rules/principles have emerged 
as central to diverse world religions and philosophies, thus protecting these moral 
authorities from becoming mere institutions:
•	 Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. Vayikra 19: 18
•	 He has told you, O man, what is good, and what the Lord demands of you; to do 
justice, to love loving-kindness, and to walk discreetly with your God. Michah 6: 8
•	 Specious, but wrongful deem the speech of those ill-taught ones who extol the 
letter of their Vedas, saying, “This is all we have, or need;” Bhagavad Gita 
2.42–2.43
•	 Be thou yogi…And of such believe, truest and best is he who worships Me with 
inmost soul, stayed on My Mystery! Bhagavad Gita 6.46–6.47
•	 Learn to be unlearned; liberate the people of their past. Assist all things in 
returning to their essence, and not dare act. Laozi 64
•	 Look upon the world as a bubble, look upon it as a mirage. Dhammapada 170
•	 Let a man overcome anger by love… Dhammapada 223
•	 When the Buddha explains these things using such concepts and ideas, peo-
ple should remember the unreality of all such concepts and ideas. They should 
recall that in teaching spiritual truths the Buddha always uses these concepts 
and ideas in the way that a raft is used to cross a river. Once the river has been 
crossed over, the raft is of no more use, and should be discarded. Vajracchedika 
Prajnaparamita Sutra, Chap. 6
•	 Fan Chi asked about Goodness. The Master replied, “Care for others.” He then 
asked about wisdom. The Master replied, “Know others.” Lun Yu 12.22
•	 Do not impose upon others what you yourself do not desire. Lun Yu 15: 24
•	 Whatever you want people to do to you, do to them too—this sums up the law 
and the prophets. Matthew 7:12
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•	 And if I were to have prophecy and to have perceived all the mysteries and all 
knowledge, and if I were to have all faith so as to even shift mountains, but had 
not love—I am nothing. Even were I to donate all my goods, and if I had sur-
rendered my body, that I might elevate myself, but had not love—I have gained 
nothing. 1 Corinthians 13: 2–3
•	 Let there be no compulsion in religion. Quran 2: 256
These instructions are subject to interpretation, but it is plausible that each creates 
a paradox for institutional evaluation by mandating some empathic or otherwise 
subjective pursuit. Thus, despite their diversity, all of these rules can have similar 
impact in practice—forcing the rule-follower to go “beyond” mere rule-following.
3.6  Imitating Non-imitators
The relational approach is challenged by the fact that role-models at the center of 
relational networks do not imitate other role-models. Thus, relational evaluation 
ultimately leads to gadfly evaluation. Gadfly role-models seem to be a common 
theme of time-tested world religions and philosophies:
•	 Moses broke class barriers, becoming the leader of the people his family 
oppressed. Shemot 2: 10
•	 David broke class barriers, being both shepherd and king. Shmuel I 18: 1
•	 By this sign is he known: being of equal grace to comrades, friends, chance-
comers, strangers, lovers, enemies, aliens and kinsmen; loving all alike, evil or 
good. Bhagavad Gita 6.9
•	 Krishna is a friend to all kinds of people. Bhagavad Gita 9.29
•	 The Sage never fails in saving people, therefore no one is rejected. Laozi 27
•	 Because he has pity on all living creatures…a man is called elect. Dhammapada 270
•	 Confucius broke class barriers, gathering diverse students. Lun Yu 7: 7
•	 Jesus broke class barriers, healing lepers and befriending both the rich and the 
outcast. Mark 1: 40–41, 2: 15
•	 Love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you…Then you’ll be per-
fectly mature, as your heavenly Father is perfect. Matthew 5: 44–48
Each of the six arguments above by itself may be wielded as criticism against par-
ticular forms of evaluation; however, taken together, the entire set entails the inad-
equacy of all individual GRIN types (the dependency of gadflies on others being 
obvious), leaving us with an ecosystem approach. Much as the independent via-
bility of humanity could undermine justification for environmental protection, the 
identification of a viable form of evaluation beyond GRIN could undermine this 
set-wise justification. On the other hand, it might also inspire philosophers to repair 
the justification by augmenting the set with additional arguments. This is the nature 
of the project I believe ethicists face: to identify additional forms of evaluation and 
to identify the weaknesses of those forms from within those forms themselves.
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4  GRIN in Application
This chapter concludes by considering three examples of ecosystem approaches 
to medical technology: the Global Cardiovascular Risk (GCVR) score, prediction 
markets, and open data.
Healthcare Effectiveness Data and Information Set (HEDIS) is a standard 
developed by the National Committee for Quality Assurance (NCQA) which bla-
tantly discriminates against non-institutional forms of evaluation. It requires the 
practice of evidence-based medicine, forcing doctors to apply standardized rules 
to treatment decisions. Negotiator machines which calculate personalized treat-
ment plans have recently been shown to produce better health outcomes than those 
of rigorous evidence-based medicine, but HEDIS prohibits the adoption of these 
innovations [14]. By developing GCVR as an allowed alternative to HEDIS CVD, 
the NCQA is making personalized medicine possible, shifting policy towards sup-
porting an ecosystem with diverse approaches [62].
As a second application of the ecosystem approach in medical technology, 
prediction markets have shown some success at forecasting infectious diseases 
and may likewise be applied to estimate the success of potential treatments [43]. 
Prediction markets accommodate all of the GRIN arguments above. Allowing 
communities to leverage knowledge which cannot be communicated through rea-
son, they converge across iterations of trading, relying on creative individuals to 
invent new markets and alternative bets [70].
The design of prediction markets can balance the GRIN types. Some leading pre-
diction markets avoid the dominance of negotiator evaluation by using play money 
or by capping winnings [50]. They limit institutional evaluation with pricing rules 
which leave speculators with no winning strategy other than to learn and explore 
[21]. Perhaps most importantly, because machines can trade in prediction markets 
alongside humans, this technology allows machines to participate seamlessly in a 
human ecosystem, rather than needing to build an ecosystem of their own [4].
A third application, open-knowledge projects like Wikipedia and Linux/
Android similarly allow machines to participate seamlessly in a human evaluative 
ecosystem, performing tasks that would otherwise be performed by human col-
laborators [48]. Such projects evolve communally, utilizing many “eyeballs” to 
correct errors in reasoning [45]. They limit negotiator and institutional approaches 
by forfeiting individual property rights and requiring original work [7, 17]. They 
limit relational orientation by raising innovators as role-models [45]. The rise of 
personalized medicine requires access to vast databases, from “PatientsLikeMe” to 
“PatientsLikeMine,” and building those databases in an open fashion, where both 
humans and machines can contribute both data and analysis, could be the ultimate 
ecosystem approach.
These three applications demonstrate the possibility of promoting evaluative 
diversity from the institutional level, much as institutions can promote and protect 
biological diversity. Perhaps the more fascinating commonality shared by all three 
applications, however, is the fact that each aims to correct an imbalance in human 
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ecosystems. Each technology is motivated by a sense that medicine and other 
institutions have been growing impersonal, short-sighted, discriminatory, and una-
ble to innovate—in other words, that human evaluative ecosystems are in crisis. 
Machine ethicists often ask whether machines need humans to make them moral; 
technological solutions to the ecosystem crisis flip that question to ask whether 
humans can stay moral without the help of machines.
We have discussed research from a wide range of disciplines examining the 
diverse ways humans evaluate; we have recognized similar diversity among poten-
tial machine designs; we have investigated the ways these different approaches 
have been criticized across cultures for millennia; and we have considered three 
applications which accommodate those criticisms. Biological ecosystems are dif-
ficult to manage because they are never fully understood—in that sense, ecosys-
tems are spiritual—and we might expect similar difficulty managing an ecosystem 
approach to medical machine ethics. I have tried to show that positive steps have 
been made nonetheless, and that the challenge to design software as an ecosystem 
is just the latest (and perhaps most productive!) manifestation of an ethics chal-
lenge we have been facing all along.
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Abstract This chapter looks at the problem of resource scarcity, and the develop-
ment of medical machines; in particular, the research, development and population 
wide implementation (RD&I) of complex medical machines. It raises a series of 
questions about how we make decisions regarding the distribution of scarce health-
care resources and posits that we ought to pay special attention to the distribution 
of resources for RD&I underpinning complex medical machines. This chapter cov-
ers some common issues in allocation of healthcare resources to then focus on the 
RD&I of complex medical machines as an important area requiring discussion.
When the needs or demands for medical treatment significantly outstrip the avail-
able resources, decisions must be made about how to distribute these resources, 
recognizing that not all needs will be satisfied immediately and some may not be 
satisfied at all [9, p. 275].
1  Overview
This chapter looks at the problem of resource scarcity, and the development of 
medical machines; in particular, the research, development and population wide 
implementation (RD&I) of complex medical machines. It raises a series of ques-
tions about how we make decisions regarding the distribution of scarce health-
care resources and posits that we ought to pay special attention to the distribution 
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of resources for RD&I underpinning complex medical machines. In their 2010 
article, Robot Caregivers: Harbingers of Expanded Freedom For All? Jason 
Borenstein and Yvette Pearson state “[i]t remains debatable whether creating robot 
caregivers is the best allocation of resources, but interest in using robots to care for 
the elderly is growing…” [3, p. 277]. The chapter enters the discussion by taking 
seriously issues of resource scarcity. It asks how conditions of resource scarcity 
impact decision making about technologies, in particular technologies like robot 
caregivers that require a range of different resources.
The basic story here involves resource scarcity. Resources such as money, time 
and cognitive effort are required to effectively develop and integrate complex med-
ical machines into people’s lives in such a way as to have broad and deep posi-
tive impacts on population health. These resources are limited, and in conditions 
of scarcity, resources are not going to be distributed exactly equally. Insofar as the 
justificatory purpose of these complex medical machines is to positively impact 
on the health of individuals and populations, then meeting this purpose through 
RD&I of complex medical machines requires and consumes large amounts of 
resources, which according to most popular ethical systems of resource distribu-
tion would place complex medical machine RD&I low in a list of priorities for 
resource use.
The chapter proceeds as follows: Firstly, it discusses the basics of complex med-
ical machines (what I refer to by “complex medical machines”), the conditions 
needed to bring these machines into existence, but also into wide and integrated use 
around the world and the costs of such RD&I. The chapter then raises a basic dis-
cussion of resource scarcity and its relation to healthcare. When there are condi-
tions of resource scarcity,1 then, by definition, demand outstrips supply. Consider 
triage in a hospital’s emergency department: “triage in its primary sense is the sort-
ing of patients for treatment in situations of at least modest resource scarcity, 
according to an assessment of the patient’s medical condition and the application of 
an established sorting system or plan” [9, p. 278]. As such, some people will not be 
able to have their demands met immediately, some not at all. In such situations, 
there are a range of procedures by which we could decide who gets access to the 
limited resource [9]. The chapter then considers the RD&I conditions that underpin 
large scale roll out of complex medical machines, and argues that complex medical 
machines are highly unlikely to meet what most ethical analyses would consider 
easily justified distribution of resources. The chapter then responds to two counter 
arguments, one being a claim about a basic right to best practice healthcare, and 
one on the cost saving implications of complex medical machines. This will lead 
me to ultimately conclude that rather than using resources in the RD&I of complex 
medical machines, ethical theories will typically hold that the RD&I 
1
 I note here the important point about problems of merely assuming conditions of scarcity. 
However, as I discuss in a later section of this chapter, given that scarcity is not simply about 
economic resources but other resources such as time and cognitive capacities, the conditions of 
scarcity while arguably resolvable, are far more intractable than some would have us believe.
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resources required for complex medical machines would be better prioritized to 
other technologies which will either benefit the least well off and/or have a much 
broader appeal than those who are most likely to benefit from complex medical 
machines.
2  On Complex Medical Machines: Meaning,  
Realizing and Use
What is a “complex medical machine”? In this chapter, I refer to a particular form 
of medical technology, a machine that has some important role in a person’s health 
and as part of this role; the machine plays some important part in the provision of 
care to that patient or charge. That is, the machine is not only involved in bringing 
about some important medically relevant physiological outcome for the person, 
such as the easing of some physiological suffering brought about by infection, 
injury or old age, but also does this in a way that incorporates some aspect which 
would traditionally be provided by a human—the machine “cares”2 for the patient 
in some way. Here caring involves something like the “emotional commitment to, 
and willingness to act on behalf of persons with whom one has a significant rela-
tionship” [2]. For instance, a dialysis machine may be use to replicate the role of 
the kidneys, while a healthcare professional such as a doctor, nurse, carer etc. 
might explain what the dialysis machine is doing, give comfort to the patient dur-
ing dialysis, attend to the patient’s after care needs etc. A complex medical 
machine is intended to successfully attend to both of these sorts of needs: biologi-
cal and patient care. While robot caregivers are a paradigm example of such com-
plex medical machines, and I will focus attention on these sorts of machines, I do 
not wish to imply that these are the only things that could be considered complex 
medical machines. A machine to assist in surgery could reasonably be considered 
a complex medical machine. A summary of some medical machines under devel-
opment and in operation since the mid 2000s is given by Taylor [25]. As I discuss 
later in the chapter, the reason for focusing on autonomous/semi-autonomous 
medical machines is due to their intended benefits to health provision above and 
beyond complementarity and assistance.
Consider a caregiving robot, caregiving, in that it assists a person who has 
some limitation on their capacities, and a robot, in that it can “sense, think and 
act” [22, p. 67]. I call these complex medical machines for three reasons. Firstly, 
to draw attention to the fact that these machines are directed toward some medical 
end: they are importantly different from non-medical machines such as industrial 
robots, as their primary and foundational purpose is toward something relevant to 
2
 In the case of caregiving robots, the given machine displays behaviors towards the given per-
son that are similar to roles that would be carried out in pursuit of the person’s health beyond that 
of physiological treatment or repair.
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medicine. Furthermore, the medical purpose is not some secondary or incidental 
outcome of these machines, it is the purpose for which they are used and impor-
tantly, the purpose which justifies the RD&I of the given machine. Borenstein and 
Pearson note that historically the reason for bringing robots into industrial envi-
ronments was to save money. However, “bringing robot caregivers onto the scene 
could also be motivated by the obligation to meet core human needs” [3, p. 285]. 
Given that complex medical machines like caregiving robots are being used in 
healthcare provision, I would suggest a stronger formulation in which “bringing 
robot caregivers onto the scene should primarily be motivated by the obligation to 
meet core human needs.”
This a vital point to bring up as healthcare is typically seen as a vitally impor-
tant value, something that carries with it special moral weight and as such, medical 
research is typically seen as something that can frequently trump other concerns. 
For instance, Norman Daniels claims, medicine/healthcare is typically seen as 
some special end, which is not only different to other human activities but morally 
different; people the world over hold medicine/healthcare as something of special 
moral relevance [5, pp. 18–20]. I note that there are some, such as Robin Hanson, 
who see the special moral importance assigned to healthcare an intuition that is in 
error, arising from our evolution [8]. However, I note that even the position advo-
cated by Hanson holds that some utilitarian reasoning can be applied to distribu-
tion of healthcare resources, see Hanson [8, p. 179], a conclusion that sits with the 
discussion in the final section of this chapter.
Labeling something a medical machine not only points to its ultimate purpose, 
but also to its “moral weight”. By moral weight here, I refer to the idea that given 
the importance of health, when making decisions about resource distribution, ser-
vices in support of health are typically prioritized over other uses: “For example, 
while there are many charities devoted to helping those with health crises, few are 
devoted to helping people similarly severe crises such as divorce, falling out of 
love, unemployment, failing in one’s career, losing a friend and so on” [8, p. 165]. 
This is not to say that medical purposes necessarily and immediately trump 
all other concerns, rather that medical purposes are typically held to be morally 
weighty; if we are to decide in favor of some other use of limited resources, then 
the weight of argument is on us to justify the deep moral importance of this other 
use over the healthcare oriented one.
Secondly, these are complex machines: The kind of machine that I am referring 
to here is a machine composed of multiple components, each technically advanced 
in its own right, which are arranged in such a way as to achieve an end that has 
multiple components. Robots, for example, are frequently thought to have “three 
key components: “sensors” that monitor the environment and detect changes in it, 
“processors” or “artificial intelligence” that decides how to respond, and “effec-
tors” that act upon the environment in a manner that reflects the decisions, creating 
some sort of change in the world” [22, p. 67]. A caregiving robot, for example, 
would sense that their patient is requesting to be bathed, recognize what the 
request means and respond appropriately. Such skills are highly developed and 
involve a range of different components that must integrate effectively.
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With this in mind, “complex” is used for two related but different meanings. 
Firstly, a complex medical machine is not going to be something like a kidney 
dialysis machine, but one that has a set of integrated components which each serve 
a specific function: monitoring the kidney function, regulating the kidney function 
and offering something of the form of care that a human attendant would other-
wise offer. Importantly, for this machine to meet its intended use, these different 
components must not only all work, but they must work together, point recognized 
by discussions on the safety requirements for domestic robots [12, p. 1890].
The second, complementary meaning of “complex” refers to idea that the 
end to which the given machine is put is complex, the machine is being used to 
attend not simply to the physiological aspects of the patients” kidney disease, but 
their psychological and emotional needs as well. That is, the medical machine is 
intended to service a complex set of ends which are not limited to bringing about 
some desired physiological state in the patient. The medical machine is explicitly 
designed, sold and used because it is also expected to bring about some desired 
psychological and/or emotional state in the patient. The relevance of this point is 
that it is this combined set of desired patient responses, captured here by use of 
the term “complex” that marks these sorts of medical machines out from “tradi-
tional” medical technologies. This increased functionality is no mere by-product 
of the given design but essential to it, serving to differentiate these technologically 
advanced machines from the traditional ones. Given this, the machines are both 
marketed as something that can help fill the space normally occupied by a human, 
and as something that is at least as useful use of resources as the human care 
giver—“the whole point of using the robots is because there will be fewer careers 
available in the future” [21, p. 276]. Not only are these machines expected to bring 
about a comparable result as the human care giver, but they are also hoped to do it 
in a way that is at least as good as or a cheaper or more resource-efficient way than 
the human care giver.
Finally, though it may seem redundant, these are described as machines. While 
this is in line with the book’s title, re-using the term “machine” here serves an 
important purpose: The service that is being offered to a given patient is expected 
to be carried out by the piece of technology itself. That is, (insofar as these 
machines are not conscious) they are not people in any important philosophical 
sense.3 While humans may be necessary for their creation, direction and upkeep, 
they are expected to operate largely in a standalone manner, ideally without con-
tinual human oversight [21, p. 269].4 Though certain complex medical machine’s 
3
 Note that while the ethical concerns raised in this chapter could likely be applied to truly con-
scious artificial intelligence, self-replicating robots and the like, I use “machines” to keep the 
discussion away from the larger ethical and philosophical debates that arise when talking about 
artificial intelligence, robot rights etc.
4
 I discuss later in the chapter that one of the chief arguments in favor of these complex medi-
cal machines is that given their capacity to respond to a set of complex patient needs, they are 
hoped to be able to be used in the roles traditionally filled by humans. While not expected to 
fully take over from humans, these machines are hoped to be able to supplement and enhance 
human aspects of healthcare.
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physical appearance and behavior may effectively mimic that of a human or other 
animal,5 they will by-and-large be recognized by patients, family members, carers, 
healthcare professionals and society as pieces of technology. Reference to 
“machine” here serves to denote that despite high levels of independence, these 
machines are things that are not thought to be persons in any sense.6
A final point to makes is that these complex medical machines are no fantasy 
drawn from science fiction: South Korea aims to have domestic robots in every 
home by 2020 [15]. The South Korean government has established a Center for 
Intelligent Robots, which engages more than 1,000 scientists to develop a range 
of robots for cleaning to combat [22, pp. 243–244]. Further, both Japan and South 
Korea have already developed codified safety requirements for domestic robots 
[12, p. 1889]. The point here is that the world of robots is not the realm of imagi-
nation, or distant future, but with us now.
3  Medical Resources and Scarcity
To begin this section I raise the point that questions about the distribution of medi-
cal resources in times of scarcity are common not only to healthcare but to medi-
cal bioethics. Consider firstly the development of medical triage, which arose 
from the rationing of limited medical resources to those injured on the battlefield. 
Summarizing Kenneth Iserson and John Moskop’s history of medical triage [9], in 
the 18th Century, chief surgeon in Napoleon’s Imperial Guard Baron Dominique-
Jean Larrey developed a situation of evaluating and categorizing wounded soldiers 
on the field: irrespective of rank, those with dangerous wounds would receive the 
first attention; those who could survive would have to wait. This system caught 
on; by the mid 19th Century, the British Navy began to order patients into three 
categories: those would not benefit from attention, the hopeless cases; those who 
would benefit from medical attention and needed immediate attention; and those 
who would benefit from medical attention but did not need it immediately. The 
basic decision metric here was efficacy: those who would benefit the most from 
attention should receive it first. While the practices and values underpinning triage 
have evolved and changed, through time and depending on context, the planned 
response to scarce medical resources is essential to modern hospital emergency 
departments and inpatient processing.
The second example comes, perhaps unsurprisingly, with the development 
of medical machines, in particular the development of kidney dialysis machines 
5
 The aesthetics of design of caregiving robots is an important issue itself, and are beyond the 
scope of this chapter.
6
 I recognize that people do form emotional attachments with robots. The point here is that com-
plex medical machines, despite any emotional attachments people might feel to them are gener-
ally regarded by most people (i.e. adults) as machines, not truly conscious beings.
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in the 1960s [10, pp. 55–57]. Given that demand for the dialysis machines out-
stripped supply, decisions had to be made as to who received the life-saving 
dialysis machines. In one well known early case, these decisions were made by 
a committee of relevant experts, the so called “God Committee”—as described in 
a Life Magazine article by Shana Alexander, They Decide Who Lives, Who Dies, 
1962. In this case, the God Committee, a mixture “of medical and legal profes-
sionals, of clergy and laypersons…together reviewed applications to the dialysis 
program” [10, p. 55]. The decisions made about who received dialysis and who 
didn’t were controversial, in part because the God Committee decided partially on 
“factors such as social worth” [24, p. 214].
Finally, consider the current state of competitive research grant processes, a fact 
of modern academic life. Academics the world over typically compete for scarce 
funding through comparison of a range of metrics including publication history, 
impact, research location and the like. Despite an idea that research should be 
about the open and unlimited pursuit of knowledge, governments the world over 
“attempt to set, or influence the research agenda by funding policies [that sup-
port] various types of applied research supposed to be in the national interest” [27, 
pp. 46–47]. Arguably, such competition would not occur was there not already an 
existing condition of scarcity. The point of raising these examples is to show the 
long history of decisions about distribution of limited medical resources, the scar-
city brought about by new technologies, and that we often accept (or suffer under) 
decision making in conditions of scarcity.
4  Complex Medical Machines and Scarcity
This chapter turns on issues of scarcity of resources for complex medical machines. 
Firstly, and most obviously, the money required to research, develop, product test 
and distribute at a population level medical machines is likely to be high. This 
is built in part from a general claim about medical technologies. For instance, 
Daniel Callahan’s Taming the Beloved Beast: How Medical Technology Costs are 
Destroying Our Healthcare System describes how technology is a major compo-
nent of the ever increasing costs of healthcare [4, pp. 37–66]. That is, following 
Callahan, adding more technology to healthcare is unlikely to decrease the costs 
of healthcare, a point returned to later in the chapter. Secondly, given the host of 
practical, social and ethical issues around developing medical machines, as demon-
strated in this edited collection, it will likely take some time before these medical 
machines are integrated into people’s lives around the world in an equitable and 
effective manner. As already mentioned, certain communities in certain countries 
already have a high uptake of caregiving robots and the like. The point here is two-
fold. Firstly, that this is typically only in certain communities in the given country, 
i.e., only those who can afford the machines. Secondly, that this is mostly a nar-
row set of countries, such as South Korea and Japan [22, pp. 304–305]. Current 
uptake in Anglo-Saxon and European countries is low. Further, if current provision 
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of healthcare services through effective public health infrastructure is anything to 
go by, see for instance, Laurie Garrett’s Betrayal of Trust, then the African region 
and others are unlikely to see population wide roll out any time soon [7].
On top of the costs of the research and the actual hardware, the implementa-
tion of these machines requires large amounts of resources. Thirdly, the research, 
development, product testing and distribution of the machines require a great deal 
of specialized intellectual capacities; what I will refer to as “cognitive resources”. 
These cognitive resources are also limited: if a given specialist is working on 
one problem, then they cannot, by definition, work on another problem. In short, 
the RD&I of complex medical machines require application of scarce resources, 
including but not limited to money.
To the first point, these machines are likely to be expensive to buy, use and 
maintain. Moore’s Law and capitalist economic drivers such as economies of scale 
are generally expected to reduce the cost of such machines. However, throughout 
Taming the Beloved Beast, Callahan argues at length that medical technologies do 
not typically reduce the costs of healthcare, instead they are one of the key drivers 
of the persistent increases in healthcare costs: “The idea that more research will 
reduce healthcare costs is a myth. It raises them. Will that always prove true? If 
history is our tutor, you may count on it” [4, p. 22].
One of the reasons why complex medical machines are likely to be persistently 
expensive is because of their complexity. As discussed above, these machines by 
necessity have multiple technologically advanced components. They require (at 
very least) specific, often medical grade hardware, designs that are highly robust 
physically, easily updatable software and extremely usable machine–human 
interfaces. Were any of these three components to fail, then the machine would 
not only be rendered useless, but this uselessness could be life-threatening. For 
instance, “[s]oftware reliability is essential in a domestic robot since any loss in 
control, in what is essentially a complicated computer-based safety-critical sys-
tem, can lead to dangerous actions with catastrophic consequences” [12, p. 1889]. 
Consider a caregiving robot which is designed to help an independent elderly 
patient bathe. Should the caregiving robot malfunction and drop the patient in the 
bath, the patient could be severely injured and may even die. Furthermore, “the 
so familiar household surroundings constitute an almost chaotic environment; full 
of non-stationary objects, including different groups of entities.” [12, p. 1890]. As 
such, the machines need to be extremely robust at all levels of design and integra-
tion and this robustness will bring about high costs.
In addition to the actual costs of manufacturing the physical component of 
the machines, the RD&I of the machines is likely to be extremely high, a key 
factor that drives up the cost of medical technologies. Think of estimates about 
the cost of developing pharmaceutical—estimates range between US$500 mil-
lion and US$2 billion [1]. There are important differences between the RD&I of 
complex medical machines and pharmaceutical R&D; for instance, in pharma-
ceutical R&D, many resources are used in clinical trials, arguably research that 
does not compare to complex medical machines. However, recall that these are 
complex medical machines. Firstly, their complexity comes in as having many 
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different but integrated components. Should one of these components fail, as we 
saw with the caregiving robot bathing a patient, this could cost a person their life. 
Furthermore, the failure is not simply from the component itself, but the integra-
tion of the components. Arguably, each sort of component; hardware, software, 
interface may work as intended, but they do not integrate effectively, then the 
machine could fail [12, p. 1890].
Recall also that the complexity comes not just from the machine’s components 
but its interaction with the patient. Human behaviors are incredibly complex and 
unpredictable; requiring the medical machine to understand a patient’s expressed, 
and at times, unexpressed needs and wants. This set of patient requirements is typi-
cally hard enough for a human carer to discharge effectively 100 % of the time. 
To add a further level of complexity, if these are used in an environment with high 
numbers of humans, this environment is likely to be close to chaotic. As humans we 
instinctively traverse such complex zones with minimum recognition of the cogni-
tive effort required to navigate and operate in such zones. Think now that a resident, 
guest or pet is to enter a zone where a domestic caregiving robot operates, but that 
the new person or pet is unfamiliar with the given robot. Some go so far as to state 
that, for domestic robots to be considered safe, we’d need to “[c]ontrol access of 
unaware residents or guests because robot may pin unknowledgeable pets or peo-
ple. The device can only be used by people who know how to operate it and who 
have read and fully understood the entire manual” [12, p. 1894].
To develop a reliable, robust and safe machine for common use is likely to use 
a great deal of resources, making the comparison to pharmaceuticals more reason-
able. These costs would likely be recouped, (at least by private profit motivated 
research companies), typically by charging large amounts for the purchase, use 
and upkeep for the life of the machine: despite Moore’s law and the market, as 
with Callahan’s analysis about medical technologies generally, these machines 
will likely cost a lot of money.
Furthermore, any assessment of the robustness of medical machines needs 
to bear in mind that these are medical machines. Again, the stakes here may be 
literally and death. If the voice recognition on a person’s smart phone mishears/
misunderstands a request, the results may not matter too much. If this happens in 
the case of a medical machine, the failure may be lethal. While not wishing to be 
alarmist, the point here is that one cannot simply look at smart phones and other 
consumer technologies, and assume that given their success as consumer prod-
ucts, such success will naturally transfer over to the medical context. While not 
an example of a complex medical machine, the U.K. Government’s expectations 
about their electronic information led health program, commits this exact mistake, 
assuming that given the success of electronic banking and decisions about travel 
for holidays, such success can be translated into healthcare [6]. In order to prevent 
high impact failures of technology and integration, the research and development 
of complex medical machines is likely to be highly expensive.
An additional aspect of complex medical machines is the cost of effective 
implementation. I suggest that two of the main justificatory reasons for support-
ing the RD&I of complex medical machines is if they will reduce costs and will 
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fill a gap in care for the vulnerable that human mediated healthcare cannot do 
alone. However, in order for these two aims to be met, (and to meet the basic ideal 
of market interest driving costs of production down) these machines would need 
large scale uptake in a population, and such uptake would need to ensure that the 
vulnerable members of the population actually receive the given support. Both of 
these aims need active support for effective implementation. While some countries 
such as South Korea and Japan are more open to caregiving robots [22, pp. 304–
305, 12, p. 1889], many western countries are not so open. This is not to say that 
western countries will never have widespread acceptance of such machines, rather 
that implementation is fundamental to ensure that the complex machines meet 
their stated aims. And again, such implementation is likely to be expensive.
Finally, note that the resources needed extend beyond economic. Such RD&I 
also requires time and cognitive resources. The time taken to go through effec-
tive RD&I to produce a caregiving robot that can safely and reliably bathe an 
elderly patient is great. Similarly, the amount of intellectual capital needed to 
develop all the necessary hardware, software and interfaces, to test the integrated 
components and to ensure effective integration across a population is extremely 
high. In short, not only are the machines themselves likely to be expensive to 
buy, use and run, the RD&I necessary to ensure that the machines meet their 
aims of bringing down costs and supporting a populations most vulnerable is 
extremely resource intensive. Furthermore, like the need for post-release over-
sight of pharmaceuticals, so called “pharmacovigillance”, oversight mechanisms 
must be in place in order to ensure that these machines do not have system wide 
failures when in operation. This oversight brings with it additional need for 
resources, coupled with ethical concerns such as the potential invasions of indi-
vidual privacy, problems of informed consent and issues of property claims over 
the data produced. See “The Rights and Wrongs of Robot Care” for more on 
these issues [21].
Before moving to the next section, I wish to respond to a foundational issue 
with this paper: why assume scarcity? Tom Koch for example, takes a very strong 
stance against “lifeboat ethics” and the assumptions of scarcity that bring lifeboat 
reasoning into play. He asks the important questions that if scarcity is the problem, 
then why assume scarcity. Furthermore, he proposes that bioethicists' fundamental 
role is to question these key assumptions. Finally, he finds the assumption of scar-
city to be wrong:
The problem of scarcity in U.S. healthcare is not the inevitable result of a pleth-
ora of new and expensive technologies that have saved lives we must, perhaps 
regrettably, triage away. Rather, at least in part it results at a structural level from 
a private, for profit delivery system that builds profit seeking into the system at 
every stage, creating levels of onerous expense that would be unacceptable any-
where else…The willingness to assume scarcity as a natural limit and economic 
projections as the assessor of care decisions was what earned a bioethics at the 
table [of medical decision making]…The patient who was elderly, or by extension 
simply fragile, was a burdensome expense, and thus could be abandoned—what-
ever he or she might wish—in the name of economic futures [10, p. 19].
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For this chapter to have any purchase, I must show why scarcity is a reason-
able assumption. Firstly, recall that the resources that I am discussing are not sim-
ply economic, but time and cognitive. Koch [10] is concerned that the discipline 
of bioethics, by and large, does not effectively question premises such as scarcity. 
His claim does not hold here. Most explicitly, the resources I consider under “scar-
city” extend beyond economic scarcity to include time and cognition. If nothing 
else, to ensure that there are enough cognitive resources to meet every healthcare 
need, we would have to have a massive and fundamental restructuring of our educa-
tional programs, likely on an international level. To overcome the problem of scar-
city of cognitive resources we’d need to educate, train and develop a huge number 
of medical engineers and the like, which will take time and money. By overcoming 
one sort of scarcity, we encounter others. So, for the mid-term at least, conditions 
of scarcity still hold. This is not to say that we shouldn’t re-incentivize our medical 
technology industries. For example, in the Second Edition of World Poverty and 
Human Rights, Pogge [16] sets out a highly compelling set of reasons as to the why 
and how we can do this. The point here is that should we pursue this path, it will 
require the use of other resources, so scarcity will remain for some time at least.
Secondly, I turn to Callahan’s point that no matter how well we develop our 
healthcare technologies and infrastructure, we will always want more:
The improvement of health, the relief of suffering, and the forestalling of death 
are as open-ended as the exploration of outer space. In each case, the possibilities 
are endless: no matter how far we go, there is always further we could travel. If 
we all lived an average of 150 years, the offices of the doctors would still be full, 
patients would still be looking to have their diseases cured, their pain and suffering 
relieved [4, p. 9].
On this line of reasoning, until we can guarantee immortality to every person 
in the world, then we will encounter scarcity in our medical resources. And of 
course, having a word populated by immortals is likely to encounter problems of 
scarcity in other, non-healthcare areas such as food, water, air and energy. In short, 
contra Koch, assuming scarcity is reasonable.
5  Opportunity Costs: Healthcare and Technology
I have so far argued that complex medical machines will be operating in condi-
tions of resource scarcity. The implication has been that in such situations, we have 
to make decisions about what ought to be resourced. The question now becomes 
obvious—should we make decisions at all? My position is that we are already 
making these decisions, and that we should be making these decisions in a way 
that is publicly justifiable. This section will cover the claim that we are already 
making these decisions and then offer some conditions for the public justifiability 
of these decisions. Both of these points turn on complementary issues of oppor-
tunity and cost. The first point is about opportunity costs in an economic sense: if 
we have only one resource, call it 1R, and two options, call them X and Y. Given 
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that we only have one R, if we decide to use 1R on X we are by definition, unable 
to use 1R on Y. Secondly, if we are to take opportunity seriously, then we have to 
direct our resources to one set of people over another. One popular choice mecha-
nism is the basic Rawlsian Difference Principle: that those who benefit from social 
and economic inequalities ought to work to the benefit of the least well off. I dis-
cuss each point in turn.
Opportunity costs, as mentioned, refer to the situation where we are forced to 
choose between using a limited resource on two (or more) options: “When you 
bought this book, you implicitly decided not to spend that money somewhere else” 
[28, p. 10]. Basically, you have a limited resource, 1R, and must use it on/in pur-
suit of X or Y. If options X and Y both require a unit of R, and you only have 1R, 
this means that if you choose to use 1R on X, you cannot then use 1R on/in pur-
suit of Y. Consider the example earlier of kidney dialysis machines. Now, we have 
one resource, 1R, here represented by a single dialysis machine, and two patients, 
X and Y here represented by Xander and Yolanda. If we choose to give Xander 
access to the dialysis machine, given that there is only one dialysis machine, then 
Yolanda cannot access it. Similarly, if we choose Yolanda, then Xander cannot 
access it. The point of raising this in terms of opportunity costs is that if we are 
to properly consider our use of 1R, any decision about the benefits of selecting X 
must also factor in the cost of not being able to choose Y.
In a variation and in line with Koch’s questioning of the conditions of scarcity, 
the solution is to get 2R: the hospital now has enough funds for another dialysis 
machine, thus being able to treat both Xander and Yolanda. However, those funds 
spent on 2R could also be spent on 100,000 sterilized needles for syringes. 
Without access to sterilized needles, many thousands of people may die. This 
example of sterilized needles for syringes is chosen specifically as many hospitals 
around the world do not have enough money for sterilized syringes. Laurie Garret 
describes in detail how healthcare providers in Russia and African countries were 
forced to reuse needles so much that they had sharpening stones to sharpen the 
needles when they got worn down. As a result of these shortages, many blood-
borne diseases like HIV and were spread by patients visiting hospitals [7]. Buying 
the second dialysis machine, X and Y may be saved, but this may be at the cost of 
thousands of other lives. Such a decision is tragic, either way people are allowed 
to die.7 The point here is not necessarily to argue that the hospital should spend 
their limited economic resources on dialysis machines or syringes, but that given 
scarcity, whichever option the hospital goes for, it will come with costs.
Such conditions of opportunity costs also hold with the RD&I of medical tech-
nologies. As discussed earlier, any medical technology must go through a range 
of processes prior to being used in the marketplace, whether it is clinical trials 
7
 I use ‘allowed to die’ here specifically to show that these choices are unlike those generally 
considered in literature about doing/allowing, where killing is seen as morally worse than letting 
die. In the case of dialysis v. syringes, (assuming that no-one has actually been put on dialysis), 
then both choices are about ‘allowing’ people to die.
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for pharmaceuticals, or the testing, integration and observation of components in 
a complex medical machine. These processes require money, time and effort. As 
repeated throughout this chapter, these resources are scarce. By making a decision 
to study the engineering of caregiving robots, a person is no longer able to study 
pharmaceutical research. Even if this person is uniquely talented, and does a dual 
degree such that they have the cognitive capacity to do both, the time they spend 
working on one set of problems means that they are working on the other. And, 
perhaps having the most impact, a decision to fund research projects in one area 
means that another area is not getting funding.
Having argued at length that conditions of scarcity hold, at least in the mid-
term, my point here is that spending limited resources on the RD&I to produce 
complex medical machines comes at the cost of other research. This not to say 
that complex medical machines are useless or that they are necessarily bad use of 
resources. Rather, to make explicit that using resources on them in conditions of 
scarcity comes at the cost of other healthcare interventions.
This of course brings us to questions about what then ought to be funded. If, 
as argued, making decisions about funding RD&I of complex medical machines 
comes at the cost of other medical research, then how ought we to decide between 
the various options? This is the second point of opportunity costs. If we want to 
give people opportunity, then this requires resources. In the next section, I dis-
cuss rights to healthcare and utilitarian reasoning with regard to complex medical 
machines, the focus here is takes a Rawlsian approach to deciding outcomes of 
health funding:
Since meeting health needs promotes health (or normal functioning), and since 
health helps to protect opportunity, then meeting health needs protects opportu-
nity…Since Rawl’s justice as fairness requires protecting opportunity, as do other 
important approaches to distributive justice, then several recent accounts of justice 
give special importance to meeting health needs [5, 30].
Daniels' point is that the importance of healthcare comes in because of the way 
that good health promotes equality of opportunity.
If we take Daniels' point about opportunity and health seriously, we ought to give 
some level of prioritization to healthcare resources; particularly RD&I. Certainly, 
some complex medical machines will promote opportunity. If a person with a physi-
cal limitation can live a good life because of a complex medical machine, then we 
ought to support RD&I for things like caregiving robots. So far, so good, then, for 
complex medical machines. However, given that scarcity still holds, ought we to 
operate in conditions in which certain sorts of medical technologies are supported 
over others? Such comparisons would require some level of complex empirical and 
moral deliberations, such as those described by Stein [24], which is a level of detail 
beyond this chapter. Bearing this in mind, adopting a Rawlsian veil of ignorance 
as a way to gesture at system-level decisions about RD&I, many complex medi-
cal machines may seem undesirable. If one does not know their existing or future 
states of health, then it seems the rational self-interested agent would prioritize 
research for medical technologies that help the most number of people, the least 
well off and/or the youngest. Statistically, they would be more likely to benefit from 
144 A. Henschke
a technology that benefits a large group than a small group. If complex medical 
machines were to be so expensive that only a small sector of the population would 
benefit from them, if would be rational to select for other RD&I first. Secondly, 
supporting research for the world’s poor can “reduce the threat of infectious dis-
eases to developed countries…promote developed countries” economic interests, 
and…promote global security” [19, p. 115]. Finally, to the third point about old age, 
given that surviving youth is a logical necessity for becoming old, the rational agent 
would need to recommend technologies that maximize chances of surviving child-
hood. And from the discussion so far, it would seem that the majority of complex 
medical machines would not fall under these decisions.
Furthermore, we could take the justice approach in reference to the Rawlsian 
Difference Principle, whereby effort, skills and money ought to go to benefit the 
least well off, as “the claims of those who are worse off often take priority over the 
claims who are better off, even if a higher total utility could be achieved by ben-
efiting the latter” [18, p. 31]. On this, complex medical machines are most likely 
not going to be meeting the conditions of the difference principle. The simplest 
claim is that these machines will most frequently be used by the world’s most well 
off. This is a reference to both a large set of those groups living in societies that 
are both technologically adept and have the money to pay for these machines, and 
also most likely to a subset of those groups—those within those societies who 
have the money pay for such machines. Following the availability/access distinc-
tion offered by Selgelid and Sepers [20], the first condition is one of availability, 
whereby the medical machines which will be developed are going to be those with 
a large enough and rich enough market to pay for the technology and to lobby for 
its RD&I. The second condition is one of access, whereby the medical machines 
which will be used are going to be expensive, and as such, will only be accessi-
ble by those with money to pay for it, and/or living in societies with taxation and 
socialized healthcare such that tax revenue pays for and/or subsidizes their use of 
the given machines.
6  What About Rights and Efficiency?
The argument so far has relied on a basic Rawlsian egalitarian position; namely, 
that seeking to meet opportunity and operating under the veil of ignorance or 
adhering to the difference principle, complex medical machines are unlikely to be 
a an easily justified use of RD&I resources. However, this assumes granting a cer-
tain priority to justice over rights and utility. Prioritizing different values such as 
liberty and efficiency would render the justice-based argument of limited appeal. 
In this section, I will attend to two rights-based arguments and one utility argu-
ment to show that complex medical machines do not easily meet a right to health-
care or utility.
A rights-based argument derives from two sources. The first argument assumes 
a basic right to healthcare. The position that this chapter advocates is to essentially 
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prioritize other healthcare RD&I over complex medical machines. By doing this, 
some people will, by definition, miss out on receiving some healthcare services. 
Due to this, their basic right to healthcare is not being recognized. Secondly, still 
along rights lines, is the right to select one’s own healthcare. This right is based in 
individual property rights. If a person has money, then they have the right to spend 
that money how they desire. And if they want a complex medical machine to care 
for them, a loved one etc., then it is their right to spend that money how they want.
The first argument finds a proponent in the work of Koch [10]. In Thieves of 
Virtue [10], he argues at length against the prioritization of healthcare resources. 
He discusses “Lifeboat Ethics”, in which some people must die such that others 
are saved, like on a life-boat at sea with limited water and food:
That is ethics in the lifeboat, where no good choices exist. Some must die, or 
be abandoned, so that others may live…There is, however, another ethic one can 
apply, an ethics of the lifeboat whose focus is the complex of prior decisions that 
brought about the lifeboat’s occupants to the sorry contemplation of murder for 
salvation’s sake [10, pp. 78–79].
Rather than reasoning in situations of scarcity, he asks us to consider why the 
scarcity has arisen. As he correctly describes it, such prioritization arguments only 
get off the ground in situations of resource scarcity. The basic situation that Koch 
points to is that we ought not to assume scarcity. However, underpinning this is 
“the idea of care as a right rather than a commodity whose provision is always 
contingent” [10, p. 255], that every person has a right to healthcare.
Note that Koch’s argument has particular relevance to the discussion of com-
plex medical machines: examples of complex medical machines are proposed for 
use in situations where a community’s vulnerable are left without adequate health-
care supports. The elderly present us with a population found everywhere in the 
world. Complex medical machines can be of particular use in situations where 
there is an increasing proportion of aged in the population. Koch points to the fact 
that prioritizing healthcare resources is likely to restrict the access of the old and 
vulnerable to healthcare resources.
The counter arguments to a position like that of Koch’s start first with idealism 
vs. realism. Unlimited resources for healthcare may be a scenario to aim for, but 
unfortunately we are not in that situation at the moment.8 Firstly, economic 
resources, even for technologically advanced and economically developed coun-
tries, are limited. Whether thinking of the U.S., the U.K., countries of the E.U. the 
past 5 years following the global financial crisis have shown that economic stabil-
ity is not assured, and economic resources are likely to never be unlimited. Even a 
country like Australia which managed to weather the global financial crisis and 
has well-developed healthcare infrastructure has to ration resources. Koch’s posi-
tion here is to challenge the assumption of scarcity. However, recall that this chap-
ter has argued that it is not only economic resources that are scarce: time and 
cognitive resources are vital for any technological development. And simply 
8
 And, arguably, are unlikely to ever meet such conditions.
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saying that we should reject scarcity does not give us more time or more capable 
people. Further, as Callahan has already shown, [4, p. 9], insofar as human frailty 
is an unavoidable fact of our existence, there is no upper limit to what we can 
expend resources on. If people commonly live to be 150, no doubt we will encoun-
ter a set of health related problems that we do not have to face now. The point here 
is that we cannot simply wish scarcity away, and so will always have to prioritize 
one set of people’s interests against another’s.
Secondly, note that simply prioritizing healthcare over other areas may not have 
the widest positive impacts on healthcare promotion. For instance, John Weckert 
writes that we need to recognize that “[m]ost funding of medical research is spent 
on diseases of the relatively affluent…A common statement is that around ninety 
percent of medical research is spent on diseases of ten percent of the world’s pop-
ulation” [27, p. 50]. Further to this, he argues from consequentialist reasons such 
as increased impact, Kantian duties arising from the environmental harms brought 
about by industrialization and the ethics of care for our own relations and descend-
ents, that taking the promotion of people’s health seriously, “there should be less 
of a focus on…medical research aimed at the developed world, and more of a 
focus on clean energy and other technologies for energy efficiency” [27, p. 50]. 
Even if we ring-fence medical research funding, and prioritize healthcare technol-
ogies over others like clean energy research, there are still likely to be decisions 
made within healthcare. That is, should we spend our money on complex medical 
machines over research on communicable diseases like malaria and cholera which 
will likely benefit the world’s elderly and rich before the world’s young and poor?
With this in mind, we return to the problem of opportunity costs. The question 
is not “why do we sacrifice the vulnerable” as Koch would have it [10, p. 112], 
but rather “which vulnerable group do we sacrifice and why?” The position advo-
cated in the previous section is something like a maximin. We should direct our 
resources to the least well off. And seemingly no matter how that “least well off” 
is defined, complex medical machines are likely to sit low in the list of priorities, 
for the immediate future at any rate.
A different rights based argument is to look at property rights and apply it to 
complex medical machines. Like the discussion about scarcity, above, it questions 
justice or some egalitarian position as the starting point. This takes Robert Nozick 
as the paradigm example of a right to property. In Anarchy State and Utopia [14], 
Nozick offers an interpretation of property rights generated from the Lockean 
proviso to leave “enough, and as good, left in common for others” [11, p. 329]. 
Nozick states “[t]he crucial point is whether appropriation of an unowned object 
worsens the situation of others” [14, p. 175]. On Nozick’s account, justice in hold-
ings is “exhaustively covered” by three steps:
1. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of justice in 
acquisition is entitled to that holding.
2. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of justice in 
transfer, from someone else entitled to the holding, is entitled to the holding.
3. No one is entitled to a holding except by (repeated) applications of 1 and 2 [14, 151].
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These three features are central to Nozick’s account: “[A] principle of (initial) 
acquisition, a principle of transfer, and a principle of rectification. Its central tenet 
is that any configuration of holdings that results from the legitimate transfer of 
legitimately acquired holdings is itself just” [17, p. 4].
Thomas Scanlon notes that Nozick’s account offers no more than a “skeletal 
framework of rights derived from Locke” [17, p. 4]. Surprisingly, Nozick offers 
no explanation for the original acquisition. The most he says is “[w]e shall refer 
to the complicated truth about this topic, which we shall not formulate here, as the 
principle of justice in acquisition” [14, p. 150]. This lack of justification of initial 
acquisition is troubling, as it is central to Nozick’s project and justifies entitlement 
and a right of transfer. Thomas Nagel writes that Nozick’s book, “[d]espite its 
ingenuity of detail…is entirely unsuccessful as an attempt to convince, and far less 
successful than it might be as an attempt to explain to someone who does not hold 
the position why anyone else does hold it” [13, p. 137]. Jeremy Waldron states 
that Nozick’s Principle of Just Transfer “operates on material provided in the first 
instance by the [Principle of Just Acquisition]”, yet “Nozick does not tell us what 
his favoured [Principle of Just Acquisition] is” [26, p. 257].
Perhaps the reason for the lack of elaboration of any principle of just acquisi-
tion in Nozick stems from a fundamental problem within Locke’s own justification 
of property rights. Locke’s justification was built from the premise that one gains 
personal ownership over the thing labored on by mixing one’s labor. “The idea 
that labour is literally mixed with an object is crucial to this argument. Without 
it we cannot explain how the force of the labour entitlement is transferred to the 
product of one’s labour” [26, p. 184]. Locke’s justification stands on two fea-
tures, self-ownership, and the extension of that self ownership into other things via 
the mixing of labor [26]. Waldron argues that labor is an action, not a thing, and 
one cannot own an action which leads him to say that the notion, “that the object 
thereby comes to contain something the labourer owns—is left completely myste-
rious” [26, p. 185]. Waldron concludes that Locke’s labor investment theory, “the 
best known [special rights] based theory fails to provide an adequate defence of 
private property” and instead offers a Hegelian approach to natural property rights 
[26]. Either way, deriving a natural right to property from either a Lockean sys-
tem or Hegelian one, Waldron argues that claims to property can be overridden by 
other more pressing considerations such as basic survival. Waldron argues that an 
understanding of Locke’s work prioritizes the right to survival above the right to 
property [26]. Similarly, “Hegel does not believe that property rights are absolute 
anyway against the demands that might arise out of higher stages of ethical devel-
opment” [26, p. 387].
The relevance of this discussion is twofold. If one is to take the grounds of 
natural rights to property seriously, then there ought to be priorities given to fund 
medical research that keeps people alive. Secondly, taking these property rights 
seriously leads us, as before, to compare complex medical machines against other 
technologies and interests. And reasoning from either a Lockean or Hegelian foun-
dation, it would seem that complex medical machines ought to be placed lower in 
a list of research priorities.
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Different sorts of counter arguments come from an argument of increased 
efficiency. The idea is that complex medical machines will ultimately lead to 
reductions in overall costs of healthcare. However, to this, I am skeptical for 
three reasons: historical, actual use and complexity. Firstly, as raised repeatedly, 
Callahan [4] points to the history of medical technologies raising the costs of 
healthcare, not lowering them. And given the demands that RD&I of producing 
safe, reliable and robust complex medical machines, the burden of proof is to show 
that these will actually reduce costs.
Secondly, in looking at the idea of shallow care vs. deep care, Borenstein 
and Pearson point to the most desirable situation of care robots: “the inability of 
robot caregivers to provide “deep” care need not preclude human caregivers from 
using them to provide “good” care…Consequently, robots should complement the 
efforts of human caregivers rather than replace them” [3, p. 281]. The point here is 
that the best standard of care requires the complex medical machines to be used in 
conjunction with existing human caregivers. This seems a reasonable assumption, 
but it fails the claims of cost reduction. Instead of replacing the human caregiv-
ers, and thereby bringing overall costs of healthcare down, the complex medical 
machines are now to be used in conjunction with existing humans. We are now 
faced with a double whammy: the cost of the human caregiver plus the cost of 
the caregiving robots. This is not to say that we shouldn’t aim at this, but rather 
that, in line with Callahan [4], we’re faced with medical technologies adding to the 
existing costs of healthcare, not reducing them.
In response to this, perhaps the aim is to develop highly autonomous robots, 
ones that need minimal or no human supervision. Despite concerns that this sort 
of approach to healthcare may be detrimental to the emotional state of those under 
care [23], we are then faced with the highly expensive and resource demanding 
RD&I of developing complex medical machines. So again, it seems that these 
machines will not reduce costs, but increase them.
7  Conclusion
In this chapter I have considered what is needed for complex medical machines 
to become a useful and helpful part of human societies. While things like car-
egiving robots promise a great many benefits to groups like the elderly and other 
vulnerable members of society, I remain skeptical whether such use of resources 
is morally justifiable. The basic point I have sought to make is that any large 
scale production of these machines does and will occur in conditions of scarce 
resources: they require money, time and cognitive effort of large amounts of peo-
ple. And if the justifying goal is to promote the health of people and/or equality of 
opportunity, then on most moral systems, most of the time, resources could be bet-
ter used in other ways.
The final comment to make is to reiterate that not all complex medical 
machines fail these tests, or indeed that we should see complex medical machines 
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as an unmitigated moral hazard. Rather, if we are to take healthcare seriously, 
especially at a global rather than local level, then we ought to be prioritizing other 
less glamorous solutions over things like robots. We should properly fund nurses, 
nursing homes and relations that give care to their loved ones, and we ought to 
increase funding for problems around the world, beyond those treatments that seek 
to recognize the individual, but ultimately prioritize a small group of the world’s 
most affluent to the detriment of many others. Should this analysis prove incor-
rect, and complex medical machines actually benefit the world’s sickest and most 
vulnerable then this would seem to be a great use of resources. However, if recent 
history is any guide, such optimism is somewhat naïve.
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Abstract Work in the field of machine medical ethics, especially as it applies to 
healthcare robots, generally focuses attention on controlling the decision making 
capabilities and actions of autonomous machines for the sake of respecting the rights 
of human beings. Absent from much of the current literature is a consideration of the 
other side of this issue. That is, the question of machine rights or the moral stand-
ing of these socially situated and interactive technologies. This chapter investigates 
the moral situation of healthcare robots by examining how human beings should 
respond to these artificial entities that will increasingly come to care for us. A range 
of possible responses will be considered bounded by two opposing positions. We 
can, on the one hand, deal with these mechanisms by deploying the standard instru-
mental theory of technology, which renders care-giving robots nothing more than 
tools and therefore something we do not really need to care about. Or we can, on the 
other hand, treat these machines as domestic companions that occupy the place of 
another person in social relationships, becoming someone we increasingly need to 
care about. Unfortunately neither option is entirely satisfactory, and it is the objec-
tive of this chapter not to argue for one or the other but to formulate the opportuni-
ties and challenges of ethics in the era of robotic caregivers.
1  Introduction
Work in the field of machine medical ethics, especially as it applies to increas-
ingly autonomous home healthcare robots, generally focuses attention on the capa-
bilities, modes of implementation, and range of actions of these mechanisms for 
the sake of respecting the dignity and rights of human patients. Researchers like 
Noel and Amanda Sharkey, for instance, have focused on a spectrum of potentially 
troubling moral problems: infantilization of those under robotic care; deception, 
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especially with regards to individuals suffering from impaired or diminished 
mental/emotional capabilities [47]; and “the rights to privacy, personal liberty 
and social contact” [48, 268]. Others, like Robert and Linda Sparrow [52], ques-
tion whether increasing involvement of robots in elder care (an area of research 
that the Sparrows argue is second only to military applications) would in fact be 
adequate to meet not just the looming demographic crisis of an aging population 
but the complex emotional and social needs of seniors. And Coeckelbergh [18] 
has focused on the concept of care itself, asking whether machines can be ade-
quately designed and implemented to supply what, under normal circumstances, 
would constitute not just acceptable but “good care.” In all these cases what is 
at issue is the well being and rights of human patients and the extent to which 
machines improve or adversely affect human flourishing. “The primary concern,” 
as Borenstein and Pearson describe it, “is about how the existence of robots may 
positively or negatively affect the lives of care recipients” [13, 251].
Absent from much of the current literature, however, is a consideration of the 
other side of this issue, namely the moral status and standing of these machines. 
Unlike the seemingly cold and rather impersonal industrial robots that have been 
successfully developed for and implemented in manufacturing, transportation, and 
maintenance operations, home healthcare robots will occupy a unique social posi-
tion and “share physical and emotional spaces with the user” [15, 408]. In provid-
ing care for us, these machines will take up residence in the home and will be 
involved in daily personal and perhaps even intimate interactions (i.e., monitoring, 
feeding, bathing, mobility, and companionship). For this reason, it is reasonable 
to inquire about the social status and moral standing of these technologies. How, 
for example, will human patients under the care of such mechanisms respond to 
these other entities? How should we respond to them? What are or what will be 
our responsibilities to these others—another kind of socially aware and interac-
tive other? The following takes up and investigates this “machine question” by 
examining the moral standing of robots, and home healthcare robots in particular. 
Because there are a number of different and competing methods by which to for-
mulate and decide this question, the chapter will not supply one definitive answer, 
but will consider a number of related moral perspectives that, taken together, add 
up to an affirmative response to the question concerning the rights of machines.
2  Default Setting
From a traditional philosophical perspective, the question of machine rights or 
machine moral standing not only would be answered in the negative but the query 
itself risks incoherence. “To many people,” Levy [39] writes, “the notion of robots 
having rights is unthinkable” (393). This is because machines are assumed to be 
nothing more than instruments of human activity and have no independent moral 
status whatsoever. This common sense determination is structured and informed 
by the answer that is typically provided for the question concerning technology.
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We ask the question concerning technology when we ask what it is. Everyone knows the two 
statements that answer our question. One says: Technology is a means to an end. The other 
says: Technology is a human activity. The two definitions of technology belong together. For, 
to posit ends and procure and utilize the means to them is a human activity. The manufacture 
and utilization of equipment, tools, and machines, the manufactured and used things them-
selves, and the needs and ends that they serve, all belong to what technology is [30, 4–5].
According to Heidegger’s analysis, the presumed role and function of any kind of 
technology, whether it be the product of handicraft or industrialized manufacture, 
is that it is a means employed by human users for specific ends. Heidegger termed 
this particular characterization “the instrumental and anthropological definition” 
and indicated that it forms what is considered to be the “correct” understanding of 
any kind of technological contrivance (5).
Under this clearly human-centered formulation, technology, no matter how 
sophisticated its design or operations, is considered to be nothing more than a 
tool or instrument of human endeavor. As Johnson [34] explains, “computer sys-
tems are produced, distributed, and used by people engaged in social practices and 
meaningful pursuits. This is as true of current computer systems as it will be of 
future computer systems. No matter how independently, automatic, and interactive 
computer systems of the future behave, they will be the products (direct or indi-
rect) of human behavior, human social institutions, and human decision” (197). 
Understood in this way, machines—even those machines that are programmed to 
care for us—are not legitimate moral subjects that we need to care about. They 
are neither moral agents responsible for actions undertaken by or through their 
instrumentality nor moral patients, that is, the recipients of action and the subject 
of moral considerability. “We have never,” as Hall [29] correctly points out, “con-
sidered ourselves to have moral duties to our machines, or them to us” (29).
On this account, the bar for machine moral standing appears to be impossibly 
high if not insurmountable. In order for a machine to have anything like “rights,” it 
would need to be recognized as human or at least virtually indistinguishable from 
another human being in social situations and interactions. Although this has often 
been the subject of science fiction—consider, for example, Isaac Asimov’s short 
story “The Bicentennial Man,” in which the android “Andy” seeks to be recog-
nized as legally human—it is not limited to fictional speculation, and researchers 
like Moravec [41], Brooks [11], and Kurzweil [37] predict human-level or better 
machine capabilities by the middle of the century. Although achievement of this 
remains hypothetical, the issue is not necessarily whether machines will or will not 
attain human-like capabilities. The problem resides in the anthropocentric criteria 
itself, which not only marginalizes machines but has often been instrumental for 
excluding other human beings. “Human history,” Stone [53] argues, “is the history 
of exclusion and power. Humans have defined numerous groups as less than human: 
slaves, woman, the ‘other races,’ children and foreigners. These are the wretched 
ones who have been defined as stateless, personless, as suspect, as rightsless” (450).
Because of this, recent innovations have sought to disengage moral standing from 
this anthropocentric privilege and have instead referred matters to the generic con-
cept “person.” “Many philosophers,” Kadlac [35, 422] argues, “have contended that 
154 D.J. Gunkel
there is an important difference between the concept of a person and the concept of 
a human being.” One such philosopher is Peter Singer. “Person,” Singer writes [50, 
87], “is often used as if it meant the same as ‘human being.’ Yet the terms are not 
equivalent; there could be a person who is not a member of our species. There could 
also be members of our species who are not persons.” In 2013, for example, India 
declared dolphins “non-human persons, whose rights to life and liberty must be 
respected” [20]. Likewise corporations are artificial entities that are obviously other-
wise than human, yet they are considered legal persons, having rights and responsi-
bilities that are recognized and protected by both national and international law [26]. 
And not surprisingly, there has been, in recent years, a number of efforts to extend 
the concept “person” to AI’s, intelligent machines, and robots [27, 32, 42].
As promising as this innovation appears to be, however, there is little agreement 
concerning what makes someone or something a person, and the literature on this 
subject is littered with different formulations and often incompatible criteria [33, 
35, 50, 51]. In an effort to contend with, if not resolve these problems, researchers 
often focus on the one “person making” quality that appears on most, if not all, the 
lists—consciousness. “Without consciousness,” Locke [40, 170] famously argued, 
“there is no person.” For this reason, consciousness is widely considered to be a 
necessary if not sufficient condition for moral standing, and there has been consid-
erable effort in the fields of philosophy, AI, and robotics to address the question of 
machine moral standing by targeting the possibility (or impossibility) of machine 
consciousness [31, 54].
This determination is dependent not only on the design and performance of 
actual artifacts but also—and perhaps more so—on how we understand and opera-
tionalize the term “consciousness.” Unfortunately there has been little or no agree-
ment concerning this matter, and the concept encounters both terminological and 
epistemological problems. First, we do not have any widely accepted definition of 
“consciousness,” and the concept, as Velmans [56, 5] points out “means many dif-
ferent things to many different people.” In fact, if there is any agreement among 
philosophers, psychologists, cognitive scientists, neurobiologists, AI researchers, 
and robotics engineers regarding this matter, it is that there is little or no agreement, 
when it comes to defining and characterizing the term. To make matters worse, 
the difficulty is not just with the lack of a basic definition; the problem may itself 
already be a problem. “Not only is there no consensus on what the term conscious-
ness denotes,” Güzeldere [28, 7] writes, “but neither is it immediately clear if there 
actually is a single, well-defined ‘the problem of consciousness’ within disciplinary 
(let alone across disciplinary) boundaries. Perhaps the trouble is not so much in the 
ill definition of the question, but in the fact that what passes under the term con-
sciousness as an all too familiar, single, unified notion may be a tangled amalgam 
of several different concepts, each inflicted with its own separate problems.”
Second, even if it were possible to define consciousness or come to some agree-
ment (no matter how tentative or incomplete) as to what characterizes it, we still 
lack any credible and certain way to determine its actual presence in another. 
Because consciousness is a property attributed to “other minds,” its presence or 
lack thereof requires access to something that is and remains inaccessible. “How 
155The Rights of Machines: Caring for Robotic Care-Givers 
does one determine,” as Churchland [16, 67] famously characterized it, “whether 
something other than oneself—an alien creature, a sophisticated robot, a socially 
active computer, or even another human—is really a thinking feeling, conscious 
being; rather than, for example, an unconscious automaton whose behavior arises 
from something other than genuine mental states?” Although philosophers, psy-
chologists, and neuroscientists throw considerable argumentative and experimental 
effort at this problem—and much of it is rather impressive and persuasive—it is 
not able to be fully and entirely resolved. Consequently, not only are we unable to 
demonstrate with any certitude whether animals, machines, or other entities are in 
fact conscious (or not) and therefore legitimate moral persons (or not), we are left 
with doubting whether we can, without fudging the account, even say the same for 
other human beings. And it is this persistent and irreducible difficulty that opens 
the space for entertaining the possibility of extending rights to other entities like 
machines or animals.
3  Bête-Machine
The situation of animals is, in this context, particularly interesting and impor-
tant. Animals have not traditionally been considered moral subjects, and it is 
only recently that the discipline of philosophy has begun to approach the animal 
as a legitimate subject of moral concern. The crucial turning point in this matter 
is derived from a brief but influential statement provided by Bentham [7, 283]: 
“The question is not, Can they reason? nor Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?” 
Following this insight, the crucial issue for animal rights philosophy is not to 
determine whether some entity, like an animal can achieve human-level capacities 
with things like speech, reason, or consciousness; “the first and decisive question 
would be rather to know whether animals can suffer” [23, 27].
This change in perspective—from a standard agent-oriented to a non-standard 
patient-oriented ethics [25]—provides a potent model for entertaining the question 
of the moral standing and rights of machines. This is because the animal and the 
machine, beginning with the work of René Descartes, share a common ontological 
status and position, marked, quite literally in the Cartesian texts, by the hybrid term 
bête-machine [24]. Despite this essential similitude, animal rights philosophers have 
resisted efforts to extend rights to machines, and they demonize Descartes for even 
suggesting the association [44]. This exclusivity has been asserted and justified on 
the grounds that the machine, unlike an animal, is not capable of experiencing either 
pleasure or pain. Like a stone or other inanimate object, a robot would have nothing 
that mattered to it and therefore, unlike a mouse or other sentient creature, would not 
be a legitimate subject of moral concern, because “nothing that we can do to it could 
possibly make any difference to its welfare” [49, 9]. Although this argument sounds 
rather reasonable and intuitive, it fails for at least three reasons.
First, it has been practically disputed by the construction of various mechanisms 
that now appear to exhibit emotional responses or at least provide external evidence 
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of behaviors that effectively simulate and look undeniably like pleasure or pain. As 
Derrida [23, 81] recognized, “Descartes already spoke, as if by chance, of a machine 
that simulates the living animal so well that it ‘cries out that you are hurting it.’” 
This comment, which appears in a brief parenthetical aside in Descartes’ Discourse 
on Method, had been deployed in the course of an argument that sought to differenti-
ate human beings from the animal by associating the latter with mere mechanisms. 
But the comment can, in light of the procedures and protocols of animal rights phi-
losophy, be read otherwise. That is, if it were indeed possible to construct a machine 
that did exactly what Descartes had postulated, that is, “cry out that you are hurting 
it,” would we not also be obligated to conclude that such a mechanism was capa-
ble of experiencing pain? This is, it is important to note, not just a theoretical point 
or speculative thought experiment. Engineers have, in fact, constructed mechanisms 
that synthesize believable emotional responses [6, 9, 10, 55], like the dental-training 
robot Simroid “who” cries out in pain when students “hurt” it [36], and designed 
systems capable of evidencing behaviors that look a lot like what we usually call 
pleasure and pain. Although programming industrial robots with emotions—or, 
perhaps more precisely stated, the capability to simulate emotions—would be both 
unnecessary and perhaps even misguided, this is something that would be desirable 
for home healthcare robots, which will need to exhibit forms of empathy and emo-
tion in order to better interact with patients and support their care.
Second, it can be contested on epistemologically grounds. Because suffering is 
typically understood to be subjective, there is no way to know exactly how another 
entity experiences unpleasant (or pleasant) sensations. Like “consciousness,” suf-
fering is also an internal state of mind and is therefore complicated by the problem 
of other minds. As Singer [49, 11] readily admits, “we cannot directly experience 
anyone else’s pain, whether that ‘anyone’ is our best friend or a stray dog. Pain is a 
state of consciousness, a ‘mental event,’ and as such it can never be observed.” The 
basic problem, then, is not whether the question “Can they suffer?” also applies 
to machines but whether anything that appears to suffer—human, animal, plant, 
or machine—actually does so at all. Furthermore, and to make matters even more 
complex, we may not even know what “pain” and “the experience of pain” is in 
the first place. This point is something that is taken up and demonstrated in Daniel 
Dennett’s, “Why You Can’t Make a Computer That Feels Pain” [22]. In this pro-
vocatively titled essay, published decades before the debut of even a rudimentary 
working prototype, Dennett imagines trying to disprove the standard argument 
for human (and animal) exceptionalism “by actually writing a pain program, or 
designing a pain-feeling robot” (191). At the end of what turns out to be a rather 
protracted and detailed consideration of the problem, he concludes that we cannot, 
in fact, make a computer that feels pain. But the reason for drawing this conclu-
sion does not derive from what one might expect. The reason you cannot make a 
computer that feels pain, Dennett argues, is not the result of some technological 
limitation with the mechanism or its programming. It is a product of the fact that 
we remain unable to decide what pain is in the first place.
Third, all this talk about the possibility of engineering pain or suffering in 
order to demonstrate machine rights entails its own particular smoral dilemma. “If 
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(ro)bots might one day be capable of experiencing pain and other affective states,” 
Wallach and Allen [57, 209] write, “a question that arises is whether it will be 
moral to build such systems—not because of how they might harm humans, but 
because of the pain these artificial systems will themselves experience. In other 
words, can the building of a (ro)bot with a somatic architecture capable of feeling 
intense pain be morally justified and should it be prohibited?” If it were in fact 
possible to construct a robot that “feels pain” (however defined and instantiated) 
in order to demonstrate the moral standing of machines, then doing so might be 
ethically suspect insofar as in constructing such a mechanism we do not do eve-
rything in our power to minimize its suffering. Consequently, moral philosophers 
and robotics engineers find themselves in a curious and not entirely comfortable 
situation. If it were in fact possible to construct a device that “feels pain” in order 
to demonstrate the possibility of robot moral standing, then doing so might be eth-
ically problematic or to put it another way, positive demonstration of “machine 
rights,” following the moral innovations and model of animal rights philosophy, 
might only be possible by risking the violation of those rights.
4  Thinking Otherwise
Irrespective of how it is articulated, these different approaches to deciding moral 
standing focus on what Coeckelbergh [19] calls “(intrinsic) properties” (13). This 
method is rather straight forward and intuitive: “identify one or more morally rel-
evant properties and then find out if the entity in question has them” [19, 14]. But as 
we have discovered, there are at least two persistent problems with this undertaking. 
First, how does one ascertain which exact property or properties are sufficient for 
moral status? In other words, which one, or ones, count? The history of moral phi-
losophy can, in fact, be read as something of an on-going debate and struggle over 
this matter with different properties—rationality, speech, consciousness, sentience, 
suffering, etc.—vying for attention at different times. Second, once the morally sig-
nificant property (or properties) has been identified, how can one be entirely certain 
that a particular entity possesses it, and actually possesses it instead of merely simu-
lating it? This is tricky business, especially because most of the properties that are 
considered morally relevant tend to be internal mental or subjective states that are 
not immediately accessible or directly observable. In response to these problems, 
there are two alternatives that endeavor to consider and address things otherwise.
4.1  Machine Ethics
The first concerns what is now called Machine Ethics. This relatively new idea 
was first introduced and publicized in a 2004 AAAI paper written by Michael 
Anderson, Susan Leigh Anderson, and Chris Armen and has been followed by a 
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number of dedicated symposia and publications [2, 3]. Unlike computer ethics, 
which is interested in the consequences of human behavior through the instrumen-
tality of technology, “machine ethics is concerned,” as characterized by Anderson 
et al. [1, 1], “with the consequences of behavior of machines toward human users 
and other machines.” In this way, machine ethics both challenges the “human-
centric” tradition that has persisted in moral philosophy and argues for a widen-
ing of the subject so as to take into account not only human action with machines 
but also the behavior of some machines, namely those that are designed to pro-
vide advice or programmed to make autonomous decisions with little or no human 
supervision. And for the Andersons, healthcare applications provide both the test 
case and opportunities for the development of working prototypes.
Toward this end, machine ethics takes an entirely functionalist approach to 
things. That is, it considers the effect of machine actions on human subjects irrespec-
tive of metaphysical debates about moral standing or epistemological problems con-
cerning subjective mind states. As Anderson [4, 477] points out, the Machine Ethics 
project is unique insofar as it, “unlike creating an autonomous ethical machine, will 
not require that we make a judgment about the ethical status of the machine itself, a 
judgment that will be particularly difficult to make.” Machine Ethics, therefore, does 
not necessarily deny or affirm the possibility of, for instance, machine personhood, 
consciousness, or sentience. It simply endeavors to institute a pragmatic approach 
that does not require that one first decide these questions a priori. It leaves these 
matters as an open question and proceeds to ask whether moral decision making is 
computable and whether machines can in fact be programmed with appropriate ethi-
cal standards for acceptable forms of social behavior.
This is a promising innovation insofar as it recognizes that machines are 
already making decisions and taking real-world actions in such a way that has an 
effect—and one that can be evaluated as either good or bad—on human beings 
and human social institutions. Despite this, the functionalist approach utilized by 
Machine Ethics has at least three critical difficulties. First, functionalism shifts 
attention from the cause of an action to its effects.
Clearly relying on machine intelligence to effect change in the world without some 
restraint can be dangerous. Until fairly recently, the ethical impact of a machine’s actions 
has either been negligible, as in the case of a calculator, or, when considerable, has only 
been taken under the supervision of a human operator, as in the case of automobile assem-
bly via robotic mechanisms. As we increasingly rely upon machine intelligence with 
reduced human supervision, we will need to be able to count on a certain level of ethical 
behavior from them [1, 4]
The functionalist approach instituted by Machine Ethics derives from and is ulti-
mately motivated by an interest to protect human beings from potentially hazardous 
machine decision-making and action. This effort, despite arguments to the contrary, 
is thoroughly and unapologetically anthropocentric. Although effectively opening up 
the community of moral subjects to other, previously excluded things, the function-
alist approach only does so in an effort to protect human interests and investments. 
This means that the project of Machine Ethics does not differ significantly from 
computer ethics and its predominantly instrumental and anthropological orientation. 
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If computer ethics, as Anderson et al. [1] characterize it, is about the responsible 
and irresponsible use of computerized tools by human users, then their functionalist 
approach is little more than the responsible design and programming of machines by 
human beings for the sake of protecting other human beings.
Second, functionalism institutes, as the conceptual flipside and consequence of 
this anthropocentric privilege, what is arguably a slave ethic. “I follow,” Coleman 
[21] writes, “the traditional assumption in computer ethics that computers are 
merely tools, and intentionally and explicitly assume that the end of computational 
agents is to serve humans in the pursuit and achievement of their (i.e., human) 
ends. In contrast to James Gips’ call for an ethic of equals, then, the virtue the-
ory that I suggest here is very consciously a slave ethic.” For Coleman, comput-
ers and other forms of computational agents should, in the words of Bryson [12], 
“be slaves.” Others, however, are not so confident about the prospects and conse-
quences of this “Slavery 2.0.” Concern over this matter is something that is clearly 
exhibited and developed in robot science fiction from R.U.R. and Metropolis to 
Bladerunner and Battlestar Galactica. But it has also been expressed by contem-
porary researchers and engineers. Brooks [11], for example, recognizes that there 
are machines that are and will continue to be used and deployed by human users 
as instruments, tools, and even servants. But he also recognizes that this approach 
will not cover all machines in all circumstances.
Fortunately we are not doomed to create a race of slaves that is unethical to have as 
slaves. Our refrigerators work 24 hours a day 7 days a week, and we do not feel the slight-
est moral concern for them. We will make many robots that are equally unemotional, 
unconscious, and unempathetic. We will use them as slaves just as we use our dishwash-
ers, vacuum cleaners, and automobiles today. But those that we make more intelligent, 
that we give emotions to, and that we empathize with, will be a problem. We had better 
be careful just what we build, because we might end up liking them, and then we will be 
morally responsible for their well-being. Sort of like children (195).
According to Brooks’s analysis, a slave ethic will work, and will do so without any 
significant moral difficulties or ethical friction, as long as we decide to produce 
dumb instruments that serve human users as mere tools or extensions of our will. 
But as soon as the machines show signs, however minimal defined or rudimentary, 
that we take to be intelligent, conscious, or intentional, then everything changes. 
What matters here, it is important to note, is not the actually capabilities of the 
machines but the way we read, interpret, and respond to their actions and behav-
iors. As soon as we see what we think are signs of something like intelligence, 
intentionality, or emotion, a slave ethic will no longer be functional or justifiable.
Finally, even those seemingly unintelligent and emotionless machines that 
can legitimately be utilized as “slaves”, pose a significant ethical problem. This 
is because machines that are designed to follow rules and operate within the 
boundaries of some kind of programmed restraint, might turn out to be some-
thing other than a neutral tool. Winnograd [60, 182–183], for example, warns 
against something he calls “the bureaucracy of mind,” “where rules can be fol-
lowed without interpretive judgments.” Providing robots, computers, and other 
autonomous machines with functional morality produces little more than artificial 
160 D.J. Gunkel
bureaucrats—decision making mechanisms that can follow rules and protocols 
but have no sense of what they do or understanding of how their decisions might 
affects others. “When a person,” Winnograd [60, 183] argues, “views his or her job 
as the correct application of a set of rules (whether human-invoked or computer-
based), there is a loss of personal responsibility or commitment. The ‘I just fol-
low the rules’ of the bureaucratic clerk has its direct analog in ‘That’s what the 
knowledge base says.’ The individual is not committed to appropriate results, but 
to faithful application of procedures.” Coeckelbergh [18, 236] paints an even more 
disturbing picture. For him, the problem is not the advent of “artificial bureau-
crats” but “psychopathic robots.” The term “psychopathy” refers to a kind of per-
sonality disorder characterized by an abnormal lack of empathy which is masked 
by an ability to appear normal in most social situations. Functional morality, 
Coeckelbergh argues, intentionally designs and produces what are arguably “arti-
ficial psychopaths”—robots that have no capacity for empathy but which follow 
rules and in doing so can appear to behave in morally appropriate ways. These 
psychopathic machines would “follow rules but act without fear, compassion, care, 
and love. This lack of emotion would render them non-moral agents—i.e., agents 
that follow rules without being moved by moral concerns—and they would even 
lack the capacity to discern what is of value. They would be morally blind” [18, 
236].
4.2  Social Relational Ethics
An alternative to moral functionalism can be found in Coeckelbergh’s [19] own 
work, where he develops an approach to moral status ascription that he character-
izes as “social relational.” By this, he means to emphasize the way moral status 
is not something located in the inner recesses or essential make-up of an individ-
ual entity but transpires through actually existing interactions and relationships 
situated between entities. This “relational turn,” which Coeckelbergh develops by 
capitalizing on innovations in ecophilosophy, Marxism, and the work of Bruno 
Latour, Tim Ingold, and others, does not get bogged down trying to resolve the 
philosophical problems associated with the standard properties approach. Instead 
it recognizes the way that moral status is socially constructed and operationalized. 
Quoting the environmental ethicist Baird Callicot, Coeckelbergh [19, 110] insists 
that the “relations are prior to the things related.” This almost Levinasian gesture is 
crucial insofar as it reconfigures the usual way of thinking. It is an anti-Cartesian 
and post-modern (in the best sense of the word) intervention. In Cartesian mod-
ernism the individual subject had to be certain of his (and at this time the subject 
was always gendered male) own being and essential properties prior to engaging 
with others. Coeckelbergh reverses this standard approach. He argues that it is the 
social that comes first and that the individual subject (an identity construction that 
is literally thrown under or behind), only coalesces out of the relationship and the 
assignments of rights and responsibilities that it makes possible.
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This relational turn in moral thinking is clearly a game changer. As we inter-
act with machines, whether they be pleasant customer service systems, medical 
advisors, or home healthcare robots, the mechanism is first and foremost situated 
and encountered in relationship to us. Morality, conceived of in this fashion, is not 
determined by a prior ontological determination concerning the essential capabili-
ties, intrinsic properties, or internal operations of these other entities. Instead it is 
determined in and by the way these entities come to face us in social interactions. 
Consequently, “moral consideration is,” as Coeckelbergh [17, 214] describes it, 
“no longer seen as being ‘intrinsic’ to the entity: instead it is seen as something 
that is ‘extrinsic’: it is attributed to entities within social relations and within a 
social context.” This is the reason why, as Levinas [38, 304] claims, “morality is 
first philosophy” (“first” in terms of both sequence and status) and that moral deci-
sion making precedes ontological knowledge. Ethics, conceived of in this way, is 
about decision and not discovery [43, 691]. We, individually and in collaboration 
with each other (and not just those others who we assume are substantially like 
ourselves), decide who is and who is not part of the moral community; who, in 
effect, will have been admitted to and included in this first person plural pronoun.
This is, it is important to point out, not just a theoretical proposal but has been 
experimentally confirmed in a number of empirical investigations. The computer 
as social actor (CSA) studies undertaken by Byron Reeves and Clifford Nass 
and reported in their influential book The Media Equation [45], demonstrate that 
human users will accord computers social standing similar to that of another 
human person. This occurs, as Reeves and Nass demonstrate, as a product of 
the social interaction and irrespective of the actual ontological properties (actu-
ally known or not) of the machine in question [45, 21]. Similar results have been 
obtained by Christopher Bartneck et al. and reported in the paper “Daisy, Daisy, 
Give me your answer do! Switching off a Robot” [5], a title which refers to the 
shutting down of the HAL 9000 computer in Stanley Kubrick’s 2001: A Space 
Odyssey. In Bartneck et al.’s study, human subjects interacted with a robot on a 
prescribed task and then, at the end of the session, were asked to switch off the 
machine and wipe its memory. The robot, which was in terms of its programming 
no more sophisticated than a basic chatter bot, responded to this request by beg-
ging for mercy and pleading with the human user not to shut it down. As a result 
of this, Bartneck and company recorded considerable hesitation on the part of the 
human subjects to comply with the shutdown request. Even though the robot was 
“just a machine”—and not even very intelligent—the social situation in which it 
worked with and responded to human users, made human beings consider the right 
of the machine (or at least hesitate in considering this) to continued existence.
For all its opportunities, however, this approach to deciding moral standing oth-
erwise is inevitably and unavoidably exposed to the charge of moral relativism—
“the claim that no universally valid beliefs or values exist” (Ess 100, 204). To put it 
rather bluntly, if moral status is relational and open to different decisions concerning 
others made at different times for different reasons, are we not at risk of affirming 
an extreme form of moral relativism? One should perhaps answer this indictment 
not by seeking some definitive and universally accepted response (which would 
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obviously reply to the charge of relativism by taking refuge in and validating its 
opposite), but by following Žižek’s [61, 3] strategy of “fully endorsing what one is 
accused of.” So yes, relativism, but an extreme and carefully articulated form of it. 
That is, a relativism that can no longer be comprehended by that kind of understand-
ing of the term which makes it the mere negative and counterpoint of an already 
privileged universalism. Relativism, therefore, does not necessarily need to be con-
strued negatively and decried, as Žižek [62, 79; 63, 281] himself has often done, as 
the epitome of postmodern multiculturalism run amok. It can be understood other-
wise. “Relativism,” Scott [46, 264] argues, “supposedly, means a standardless soci-
ety, or at least a maze of differing standards, and thus a cacophony of disparate, and 
likely selfish, interests. Rather than a standardless society, which is the same as say-
ing no society at all, relativism indicates circumstances in which standards have to 
be established cooperatively and renewed repeatedly.” In fully endorsing this form 
of relativism and following through on it to the end, what one gets is not necessarily 
what might have been expected, namely a situation where anything goes and “eve-
rything is permitted” [14, 67]. Instead, what is obtained is a kind of ethical thinking 
that turns out to be much more responsive and responsible in the face of others.
5  Conclusion
In November of 2012, General Electric launched a television advertisement called 
“Robots on the Move.” The 60 second spot, created by Jonathan Dayton and Valerie 
Faris (the husband/wife team behind the 2006 feature film Little Miss Sunshine), 
depicts many of the iconic robots of science fiction traveling across great distances 
to assemble before some brightly lit airplane hangar for what we are told is the 
unveiling of some new kind of machines—“brilliant machines,” as GE’s tagline 
describes it. And as we observe Robby the Robot from Forbidden Planet, KITT the 
robotic automobile from Knight Rider, and Lt. Commander Data of Star Trek: The 
Next Generation making their way to this meeting of artificial minds, we are told, 
by an ominous voice over, that “the machines are on the move.”
Although this might not look like your typical robot apocalypse (vividly illus-
trated in science fiction films and television programs like Terminator, The Matrix 
Trilogy, and Battlestar Galactica), we are, in fact, in the midst of an invasion. The 
machines are, in fact, on the move. They may have begun by displacing workers 
on the factory floor, but they now actively participate in many aspects of social 
life and will soon be invading and occupying places in our homes. This invasion 
is not some future possibility coming from a distant alien world. It is here. It is 
now. And resistance appears to be futile. What matters for us, therefore, is how we 
decide to respond to this opportunity/challenge. And in this regard, we will need 
to ask some important but rather difficult questions: At what point might a robot, 
or other autonomous system be held fully accountable for the decisions it makes 
or the actions it deploys? When, in other words, would it make sense to say “It’s 
the robot’s fault”? Likewise, at what point might we have to consider seriously 
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extending rights—civil, moral, and legal standing—to these socially aware and 
interactive devices that will increasingly come to serve and care for us, our chil-
dren, and our aging parents? When, in other words, would it no longer be consid-
ered non-sense to suggest something like “the rights of robots”?
In response to these questions, there appears to be at least two options, neither of 
which are entirely comfortable or satisfactory. On the one hand, we can respond as we 
typically have, treating these mechanisms as mere instruments or tools. Bryson makes 
a reasonable case for this approach in her essay “Robots Should be Slaves”: “My the-
sis is that robots should be built, marketed and considered legally as slaves, not com-
panion peers” [12, 63] (emphasis added). Although this moral imperative (marked, 
like all imperatives, by the verb “should”) might sound harsh, this line of argument is 
persuasive, precisely because it draws on and is underwritten by the instrumental the-
ory of technology—a theory that has considerable history and success behind it and 
that functions as the assumed default position for any and all considerations of tech-
nology. This decision—and it is a decision, even if it is the default setting—has both 
advantages and disadvantages. On the positive side, it reaffirms human exceptional-
ism in ethics, making it absolutely clear that it is only the human being who possess 
rights and responsibilities. Technologies, no matter how sophisticated, intelligent, and 
influential, are and will continue to be mere tools of human action, nothing more. But 
this approach, for all its usefulness, has a not-so-pleasant downside. It willfully and 
deliberately produces a new class of instrumental servants or slaves and rationalizes 
this decision as morally appropriate and justified. In other words, applying the instru-
mental theory to these new kinds of domestic healthcare machines, although seem-
ingly reasonable and useful, might have devastating consequences for us and others.
On the other hand, we can decide to entertain the possibility of rights and respon-
sibilities for machines just as we had previously done for other non-human enti-
ties, like animals [49], corporations [26], and the environment [8]. And there is both 
moral and legal precedent for this transaction. Once again, this decision sounds 
reasonable and justified. It extends moral standing to these other socially active 
entities and recognizes, following the predictions of Wiener [59], that the social situ-
ation of the future will involve not just human-to-human interactions but relation-
ships between humans and machines. But this decision also has significant costs. It 
requires that we rethink everything we thought we knew about ourselves, technology, 
and ethics. It requires that we learn to think beyond human exceptionalism, techno-
logical instrumentalism, and all the other -isms that have helped us make sense of 
our world and our place in it. In effect, it calls for a thorough reconceptualization of 
who or what should be considered a legitimate moral subject and risks involvement 
in what is often considered antithetical to clear moral thinking—relativism.
In any event, how we respond to the opportunities and challenges of this 
machine question will have a profound effect on the way we conceptualize our 
place in the world, who we decide to include in the community of moral subjects, 
and what we exclude from such consideration and why. But no matter how it is 
decided, it is a decision—quite literally a cut that institutes difference and makes 
a difference. And, as Whitbey [58] correctly points out, the time to start thinking 
about and debating these issues is now…if not yesterday.
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I pity inanimate objects…
The frustrations of being inanimate
Maybe it’s better that way
the fewer the moving parts
the less there is to go wrong
Godley & Crème (Freeze frame).
Abstract The law is developed by human beings, for human beings, in legal 
terms, for “natural persons”. But during the development of the law in the long 
journey from the Roman legal system until our modern law system many things 
have changed. Natural persons are not the only players in the legal system of 
today. Large and smaller enterprises, organizations and state entities are perform-
ing all kinds of legal acts, as legal persons they can be held liable for the things 
they do. What about intelligence machines that can perform autonomous or semi-
autonomous tasks? What about an advanced operating system where human con-
trol is hardly noticeable? What about drones operating independently? Are they 
liable for their acts and, most important, their mistakes? What about the laser cut 
that went wrong because of a disturbance in the internet that the surgeon did not 
control? Is the man behind the screen always the responsible party, even if he is 
not behind the screen? This article will discuss these ongoing questions.
Prologue: Dichotomy
Law was formed by human beings in an enduring evolution from the Roman 
Empire until contemporary internet society. Law is applicable to all human 
beings (“natural persons”) and all constructions that are made by them. 
R. van den Hoven van Genderen (*) 
Center for Law and Internet, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
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Organizational structures and companies can have legal personality as well, 
though legal actions are always done by natural persons, in name of the legal 
structure. Legal persons, natural and non-natural are subjected to the total 
national and international law systems, private law, public law as criminal law 
and the law on human rights.
In the long history of law, natural persons always bear the rights and respon-
sibility of their actions. They are held responsible for all legal acts and acts with 
legal consequences that have been committed under their responsibility. This 
applies to the doing of those acting under their responsibility as well, such as ani-
mals and under aged children, but also inanimate objects under their responsibility. 
Machines and persons under their supervision (e.g., personnel) are also within the 
legal sphere of responsibility of natural persons.
Could the evolution of law systems extend to machines that are performing tasks 
in a more independent way? Could a machine that functions on its own developed 
instructions, a real artificial intelligence, be considered a new form of legal person 
with all legal consequences and responsibilities as such? Or will there always be a 
natural legal person involved that will be held responsible for the acts of this arti-
ficial intelligence being? And who will that be: the “user” or the developer and/or 
producer of this “machine being”?
These questions will be discussed and maybe answered in this chapter where I 
will describe the evolution of legal control and responsibility of the user of simple 
instruments to the user of automated systems and beyond.
1  Introduction
Must we pity inanimate objects or must we give them rights? They certainly 
will not pity us. They do not have a soul, whatever that may be. According to 
the Catechism of the Catholic Church, and they can be seen as the experts on 
this, “soul” is defined as follows: “The spiritual principle of human beings. The 
soul is the subject of human consciousness and freedom” [4, pp. 362–368]. This 
freedom of decision-making is the ethical and legal background of the respon-
sibility we have as natural beings to be held responsible for decisions and acts 
as human beings, in a legal sense referred to as natural persons. Natural per-
sons are sovereign in their decision-making and therefore legally responsible for 
their acts.
In Les six livres de la Republique, Bodin [2] claimed that sovereignty resides 
in a single individual. However, this sovereignty can be transferred to other “legal 
beings”, such as the State, a company or other organizational entity. These legal 
entities are to be considered “legal persons”, with the power to make decisions 
with legal effects. They also can be the subject of rights that are conferred on them 
as a genuine “legal subject”.
The big question is, of course, if autonomous or semi-autonomous machines 
ought to be conceived as the bearer of rights and invested with the power to 
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independently act as legal persons? If so, their deeds could also result in liability. 
Or ought there to be a natural person that will be the ultimate bearer of rights and 
legal responsibility?
2  Natural Legal Personhood
Is there a difference between the natural person Rob van den Hoven van Genderen 
and the legal person Rob van den Hoven van Genderen? There is and there is not. Of 
course, there is the physical person that can move or feel pain, love and run around. 
A legal person cannot do that. But the legal person, being a natural person, can be the 
subject of rights and can act with legal consequences. There is no question of which 
of these persons is fictitious or natural. One is of flesh and blood, but inherently 
this person is capable of performing legal acts with legal consequences. According 
to Dutch Civil Law (Burgerlijk Wetboek, BW), in the first book of the Civil Law, 
Article 1, it states that everyone who resides in the Netherlands is the bearer of civil 
rights, including personal rights that only can be borne by natural persons. Natural 
persons can get married to another natural person or enter a co-habitation contract. 
They can have children who by natural birth can descend from other natural persons. 
But they can also be adopted or partly naturally descend from insemination. They 
can vote for the other natural person in elections and can be voted for on these elec-
tions. They can join a political party or a church. Further, they will be the subject of 
human rights, have the right to life, privacy, freedom of speech, education or religion. 
Natural persons can be put in prison when they have acted against the law.
Of course, I can elaborate on the evolution of the legal potential of natural persons 
in historical context. In this respect, I could refer to the fact that a slave in the Roman 
Empire was not a natural person. The slave was a valuable asset, but not a natural 
person that could perform tasks, even legal acts for his or her master. They could 
even posses a money belt to make payments for their masters if they were trusted 
enough to do this. I could go on, deliberating the long tradition of having slaves, 
not being accepted as natural or legal persons until the end of the 19 century. Also, 
I could refer to the fact that colored people were only semi-natural persons in the 
United States and South Africa until the end of the 20th century. I could even point 
to the fact that married women were considered natural persons but only in the 
sense that could easily compared with Roman slaves, not being legally competent 
to act with full legal responsibility, based on the Code Napoleon of 1904. This 
situation lasted until 1956 in the Netherlands. Only then, females resident in the 
Netherlands were considered to have full legal competence to act with all possible 
legal effect. Even now, there are many parts on the globe where adolescent and 
adult females do not have (full) legal capacity, not being allowed to buy, drive or 
even go to school. I could, but I will not.
Instead, I will shed some light below on the difference between natural persons 
and legal persons and their difference in legal capacity to gain entrance to the legal 
responsibility of the different actors in society.
170 R. van den Hoven van Genderen
3  Legal Persons and Natural Persons
In the early 20th century, big enterprises and multinational companies needed the 
capabilities to buy and sell, to perform legal acts. At the time, it was felt that this 
should not be based on exclusive legal theories but had to be embedded in social, eco-
nomic and other relevant theories. Economic progress in society thus prompted social 
discussion of the essence of the natural person in terms of “real personality”, thus:
The question is at bottom not one on which law and legal conceptions have the 
only or the final voice: it is one which law shares with other sciences, political sci-
ence, ethics, psychology, and metaphysics [7, p. 90].
And what is a real or natural person? Do we use distinctions on the basis of free 
will and intelligence? If a natural person is not capable of independently performing 
legal acts with legal effect we place them under curatorship, if they are not legally 
of age (in the Netherlands, 18 years). Natural persons are not to be trusted to per-
form all acts with legal effects. This is not an absolute line though. They can buy a 
sandwich or even a bike, but limits will be set to buying a car or a house. Parents of 
underage persons have to support them is such cases and represent them. But even 
within this system, there are cultural and national differences. Coming of age in 
both the Netherlands and the United States is set at 18 years, but an “adult” person 
in the U.S. is not allowed to buy alcoholic beverages,1 but may drive a car at 16 or 
buy a gun at 14 in Montana. So, legal norms are not absolute for natural persons. 
Should this fact be different for legal persons?
4  Unnatural Legal Personhood
A legal person can also be a corporation or similar entity. A natural person cannot 
be a corporation, but can represent a corporation to act with legal effect. In “civi-
lized” societies, it was common to use the entity of legal person for a long time. 
In ancient Egyptian society, it was common to use the structure of legal founda-
tions to maintain temples [11]. In Roman civilization, there were several entities 
with legal personality, the universitates personarum, being State representations, 
corporations and societies [8]. A very famous Dutch international company, the 
first multinational was the United East Indies Company (VOC), established in 
1602. In the United States, the Bill of Rights accords legal guarantees to corpo-
rations. Mayer [9] relates this development in the United States to the develop-
ment of equal treatment on grounds of the 14th Amendment. The Supreme Court’s 
most renowned decisions, however, were in the 1880s and 1890s, holding that 
1
 In the U.S. there are differences. For instance, a person in Ohio, Nevada or Tennessee can 
become an adult after graduation from high school, whichever comes first.
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corporations are persons for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment equal protec-
tion and due process. In 1926, John Dewey stated in the Yale Journal of Law that, 
“The Corporation is a right-and-duty-bearing unit. Not all the legal propositions 
that are true of a man will be true of a corporation” [5, p. 656].
Concerning a legal person, property rights are equal with an individual’s 
right, unless the law proves otherwise. One could say that a legal person, as 
an individual, has a legal “real personality” to take part in entering legal rela-
tions. A legal person can even go to court if summoned to go by another party, 
or when her rights are damaged. Corporations have a legal personality to act in 
a legal sense. What they do can have genuine legal effect. Although it is a legal 
fiction to give organizations and other entities legal entitlement to act as if they 
are natural persons, they can act in a legal way that will serve their interests 
and purposes. In this way it is not fictitious, at least not within a society that is 
based on law.
Legal systems vary, but the essence of legal persons is not fundamentally dif-
ferent, so I will use these examples. My purpose is to get clearer about the legal 
standing of intelligent machines.
5  Different Legal Persons
A major distinction in the concept of legal personhood is the separation between 
“public legal persons” and “private legal persons.” Public legal persons have a 
public responsibility and legal personality, and can include governmental and 
other state initiated entities like provinces and municipalities, and other state 
organized public entities such as energy organizations or independent regulators. 
They all have a defined purpose to represent the government or certain public 
interests. On top of that, they have to be initiated by an act of law.
A kind of intermediate position is given to Churches and certain social enti-
ties as trade unions, charity organizations and political parties. They also have a 
defined purpose that requires legal personality.
Private legal persons are companies that are based on a commercial or  idealistic 
basis. They have a defined purpose too. This can vary from making a profit to 
 representing people to pursuing a goal on idealistic or ethical grounds, or human 
or animal rights. The actual legal specification varies too. Examples are companies 
and corporations under limited Liability (Ltd) to Euro Bv or foundations and funds 
that are not allowed to make profits. They must be initiated by a notorial deed. 
Private legal persons can be small, a shop, or a one-man (or no-man) consultancy 
or “letter box firm” to a dash tax in the Caribbean. They can be big too, like multi-
nationals as Heineken, Microsoft or Apple.
In essence, they all have the same legal powers and responsibilities. They can 
be legal subjects like a natural person. The main difference is that non-natural legal 
persons can also be an object of law: they can be sold, ended or dismembered in 
a legal sense. A natural person cannot be ended in a legal way, although some of 
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their rights can be withdrawn. For instance, they can lose their nationality if they 
join a foreign army. And of course, they can lose their legal competence if they lose 
their sanity and are not capable of acting in a legal sense. In this case, they will be 
placed under curatorship.
6  Legal Objects
Legal objects are goods, services or articles which can be the underlying object of 
rights and obligations. Objects can never be carriers of rights and obligations as 
a legal person. The legal object concerns particular goods, products and services, 
but also more abstract notions as the “organization”, or “corporation”. These last 
two can, in turn, be legal persons who can perform legal acts. This special con-
struction is also described as a whole of active and passive property law elements. 
The liability of a legal person, though, will also apply to the director or board 
members. Being natural persons, it is assumed that at the time of the creation of 
liability of the legal persons they had the responsibility for acting in a legal way 
for the legal person.
7  Legal Acts of Persons, and the Legal Acts
Why is it so important to have a legal personality? As I have tried to make clear, 
legal persons can perform legal acts. Those acts have legal effects. They change 
the legal circumstance. By buying products or services, the legal person cre-
ates new legal circumstances. Money is paid to transfer the property from one 
hand to the other. The house owner changes, the owner of a company changes. 
Also, the buying of a sandwich is an agreement with legal effect. One party pays 
money and the other party will become the owner and consumer of the sand-
wich. These acts all had an intention to change the legal circumstances. Those 
legal acts can also be without an intended purpose or even purposively illegal or 
without an intended purpose. If legal persons act in a criminal way, they can be 
convicted on the basis of their crimes. If they create damage they will be held 
liable for the costs.
But who is the person that will be held liable or put into prison in our world? 
As with under-aged children or animals, parents or owners can be held liable for 
their acts; they have the responsibility. Companies and governments can also 
be held legally responsible for their acts. The interesting part of all this is that 
all these acts have to be performed by natural persons. Companies and govern-
ments are represented by natural persons, directors or government officials, who 
have to be the visible and trusted contacts to perform the acts, sign the agree-
ment, or held to be liable for damages. If it comes to a legal procedure, a court 
case, then the representatives of the board will be subpoenaed or summoned to 
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explain the (policy) decisions that have been made. The Minister or other gov-
ernmental representative has to explain these decisions and legal acts to par-
liament or other democratic controls or even before the court if it concerns 
liability or criminal cases. So, the representative performing the legal act will 
always consist of a group of or single identifiable natural person, a board of 
natural persons, or civil servant, or the politically responsible representative and 
recognizable natural person.
8  Machines and Instruments
Until the explosion of advanced information technology (IT) in society, there was 
no question what would be legally responsible for acts with legal effect. It was 
clear who acted in a physical or legal sense or committed crimes. That a natu-
ral person used a machine or instrument was irrelevant. A surgeon who used a 
knife to make an incision to operate and made a mistake could not blame the knife 
or the producer of the knife. In times of war, the canon or the tank or even the 
producer could not be held responsible for the acts of war. The last in command 
though could be held responsible for his acts and possible war crimes. But what 
happens if those machines are no longer instructed or steered by natural persons? 
What if they are collecting information that will determine their functioning with-
out human intervention? What if a drone is designed to recognize imminent dan-
ger and act by destroying this threat without someone using a joy stick (what’s 
in a word) anymore? What if the surgeon is not doing the operation himself, but 
leaves the performing of the operation to an advanced data-fed laser instrument 
that has collected all medical data itself including the patient documentation? Or, 
if the computer decides what medicines a patient requires on basis of the patient 
records in the database?
In a less dramatic environment, this question is relevant: Automated systems 
can give instructions to crawl over the web trying to collect relevant informa-
tion, going beyond the initial command to act. Computers and search engines 
can act on the internet without recognizable human instructions and can be 
received by comparable systems. Those systems can accept the instruction 
released by the “crawler”. This can be a simple request to collect certain infor-
mation, but could also be an instruction to make a reservation for a restaurant 
or performance of “Death in Venice” or a dance party. This could even be based 
on the interest profile of the natural person who gave a general instruction to 
arrange his weekend agenda.
These actions of an automated system can have legal effects. The search sys-
tem, as an advanced bot, meets other bots and interchanges a set of constructions 
that can result in an agreement to reserve a certain place or even buy a product 
or service. There will be a possible electronic agreement that will be accepted 
by both electronic “parties” without any intervention or even confirmation by a 
 natural person.
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These kinds of actions fall within the legal context of the E-commerce 
Directive of 2000,2 but are not prepared for this kind of autonomous system. The 
E-commerce directive, which is accepted and integrated in all European Member 
States, is directed to create legal certainty in the electronic system within the inter-
nal market. It is focused on the trustworthiness and identifiability of the party that 
is selling content, services or product to the consumer. As stated in consideration 7 
of the Directive: “In order to ensure legal certainty and consumer confidence, this 
Directive must lay down a clear and general framework to cover certain legal 
aspects of electronic commerce in the internal market” [6].
In this context, it is important to identify the company and responsible persons 
that are “selling” the products and service. This also includes the physical location 
of the company, to find them if something goes wrong. The directive covers the 
relation between consumers and business parties but does not take into account 
developments where there is no easily identifiable party, such as an automated 
machine, at least for a part of their legal process and agreeing on the content of the 
agreement. It refers to the obligations, the “information duties” of a specific identi-
fiable located party.3
From the perspective of protecting (consumer) parties who purchase services 
and products by electronic means, this makes sense in the historical perspective of 
the year 2000, but “times they are a-changin”. Crawlers and all kinds of search or 
selection programs and smart machines are capable of arranging pre-contractual 
agreements, at least to provide information that can result in legal acts which cre-
ate legal effects. These effects can also result in liability. But who or what will be 
liable? The smart machine? The operating laser device? The autonomous system 
that functions on basis of processed data that the device collected?
9  Legal Responsibility of Machines?
Returning to the operating device that functions on the basis of processed data 
from “big data” and specified data resources where no natural person is involved, 
except for the patient—what is its legal status? Is there a distinction between an 
autonomous machine as independent actor and the use of this system as an instru-
ment? They perform activities that will have legal effects. Legal acts are always 
performed by legal subjects, being legal persons. Automated systems, electronic or 
otherwise, autonomous or not, are increasingly used to participate in diverse kinds 
of relations within our global society. The fact that these machines and devices can 
act autonomously and create changes in legal positions will ultimately come back 
2
 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain 
legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal 
Market (‘Directive on Electronic Commerce’).
3
 These obligations are integrated in Dutch law in article 3:15 Civil Code.
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to the user of the system (see [12]). The machines cannot perform as a legal person 
with the same legal position and consequences of their acting.
But what is the difference between the representative in a human form, the nat-
ural person, and the machine representative, being a crawling program or software 
agent, reserving a seat for a play or buying a book on Amazon? I think we must 
make a distinction between the different phases of the legal process of buying and 
the performance of the (semi) autonomous system.
First, the whole process is always initiated by an individual or group of natural 
persons. They have instructed the machine, being a search engine or an advance 
weapon system. If a whole intelligence organization is placing spyware in our 
global information and communication system, we cannot hold the software pro-
gram responsible, even if it is called PRISM.
So, in the command phase, the natural person or group of persons is or are the 
responsible actor(s). The difference in functional execution is not relevant. The use 
of drones for delivering packages to a client or rockets to a perceived enemy does 
not make a legal difference.
Apparently, no one has ever considered making the pen that puts the ink on the 
contract responsible for signing and executing the contract.4 This also accounts for 
all producers of products that are used to commit a crime or products that create 
damage. Of course, a producer of products or services that are defective or 
unsound, or concerning services not according to agreed expectations, is liable for 
damages, is appropriate according to the level of involvement of the failure.
A natural person with a free will though, even in representing someone else, 
could be held responsible for his acts. The final legal effect can be held against 
him in the case of liability. Also, the person who has given the mandate or instruc-
tion can be liable for the damage his representative has done. In the case of posi-
tive or negative legal action though, the ultimate legal effect will return to the 
initial instructing party and only, concerning negative effect, will be diminished 
if there is a reason for disculpation (for instance, if his representative went ber-
serk). In the last case, there could be an analogy with automated machines. A non-
intentional disturbance of the system could diminish the liability of the initiating 
natural person as well, using this system.
Agreeing with Voulon [12], I think that any legal effect that has been created by 
an autonomous as well as less autonomous system has to be attributed to the legal 
or natural person that has made the choice to deploy the system in his service. One 
could doubt the level of liability of the legal or natural person relating to the degree 
of control one has over the autonomous system. This though would only be the 
case concerning liability and accountability to the legal or natural person. However, 
the failure or mistake of the autonomous system can be of consequence concerning 
the accountability of the legal actor. The liability though, will never be attributed to 
the machine as such because it can never have a legal responsibility as such.
4
 Although the weapon industry and cigarette industry are blamed for killing people, this is more 
based on the responsibility of the industry and the people who control the companies.
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10  I Robot, Concluding
Although an autonomous machine or robot, having an independent intelligence 
and phenomenal consciousness would not create in my view a legal personality 
with the rights and obligations vested in natural and legal persons. There even 
wouldn’t be an intermediate or sui generis norm for autonomous robots. One could 
imagine that there will be certain amendments in the existing law to create a prac-
tical system in representation of (semi)autonomous machines on behalf of the ini-
tial legal actor, natural or legal person. Those changes in law will be instrumental 
though, rather in the way that the “rather long” discussion of equality between 
written documents and electronic documents led to the inevitable acceptance of 
the electronic signature.
Even if a machine passes the Turing test, this would not create legal respon-
sibilities. The functioning of the machine can have legal effects, certainly in rep-
resenting the legal will or even derived legal will of the initial legal actor. Most 
important in legal relations, legal communications, and legal transactions is that 
there will be a trusted identification of the autonomous functioning entity or sys-
tem in such a way that it will fit within the increasing autonomous functioning 
system within our global society.
It is essential that we, as natural human beings, keep control over the system. 
I assume that we do not want to be confronted with autonomous machines, col-
lecting all kinds of personal information to be used for their own purposes. We are 
better to use our electronic or technology based servants to assist us in the practi-
cal executions of our tasks. The more intelligent the system the more trustworthy 
will be its functionality.
In closing, it is prudent to keep in mind Asimov’s [1] Three Laws of Robotics:
First Law: A robot may not injure a human being, or, through inaction, allow a 
human being to come to harm
Second Law: A robot must obey the orders given it by human beings except where 
such orders would conflict with the First Law.
Third Law: A robot must protect its own existence as long as such protection does 
not conflict with the First or Second Law.
It should now be clear that these are functional instructions and are legally 
enforced by natural persons.
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Abstract Machines that support highly complex decisions of doctors have been a 
reality for almost half a century. In the 1950s, computer-supported medical diag-
nostic systems started with “punched cards in a shoe box”. In the 1960s and 1970s 
medicine was, to a certain extent, transformed into a quantitative science by inten-
sive interdisciplinary research collaborations of experts from medicine, mathemat-
ics and electrical engineering; This was followed by a second shift in research on 
machine support of medical decisions from numerical probabilistic to knowledge 
based approaches. Solutions of the later form came to be known as (medical) expert 
systems, knowledge based systems research or Artificial Intelligence in Medicine. 
With growing complexity of machines physician patient interaction can be supported 
in various ways. This includes not only diagnosis and therapy options but could 
also include ethical problems like end-of-life decisions. Here questions of shared 
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responsibility need to be answered: should machine or human have the last say? 
This chapter explores the question of shared responsibility mainly in ethical decision 
making in medicine. After addressing the historical development of decision support 
systems in medicine the demands of users on such systems are analyzed. Then the 
special structure of ethical dilemmas is explored. Finally, this chapter discusses the 
question how decision support systems can be used in ethical dilemma situations in 
medicine and how this translates into shared responsibility.
1  Introduction
Using suitable machines to support the highly complex decisions doctors have 
to make every day has already been done for almost half a century. Starting with 
computer supported medical diagnostic systems with “punched cards in a shoe 
box” in the 1950s, following intensive collaboration between physicians, math-
ematicians and electrical engineers in the 1960s and 1970s medicine became, to 
a certain extent, a quantitative science; then the focus of research shifted from a 
numerical probabilistic approach to medicine to knowledge based techniques that 
came to be known as (medical) expert systems (ES), knowledge base systems 
research or Artificial Intelligence (AI) in Medicine. The aims were high and the 
expectations were not always fulfilled.
The technological development and gain of knowledge also have clinical conse-
quences. Doctors can keep patients alive in a fragile state like the case of the 11th 
Prime minister of Israel Ariel Sharon (born 1928).1 Further examples are very old 
patients who are tube fed, cases in neonatology, and also discussions about terminat-
ing a pregnancy after prenatal diagnosis or organ donation [40]. Due to medical pro-
gress applying every therapy or any possible diagnostic that is available seems no 
longer the ethically correct way to decide. The ethical dimension of decisions in 
medicine needs to be integrated with processes of medical decision making. This 
chapter explores the question how decision support systems can be integrated and 
used, especially in ethical dilemma situations in medicine, and how the interaction 
of machines and doctors in decision processes influences questions of responsibility.
Artificial Intelligence (AI) in medicine was initiated in the 1970s by artificial 
systems such as Edward Shortliffe’s expert system MYCIN at Stanford University 
[67], QMR (quick medical reference) [46] and HELP (health evaluation through 
logical processing) [28, 47, 55].2 HELP and other clinical systems have been 
developed at academic medical centers, and have been integrated and used for 
clinical decision support in the 1980s.
1
 In 2006, Sharon suffered a (second) stroke with a massive cerebral hemorrhage. Since then 
Sharon was in a permanent vegetative state until his death in 2014.
2
 The former was developed by Randolph A. Miller at the University of Pittsburgh in 1980, 
based upon the INTERNIST-I patient diagnosis system by Jack D. Myers, Miller and Harry E. 
Pople. The latter was created by Homer Richards Warner and his team.
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Decision Support Systems (DSS) have changed over the last four decades. Sol 
and co-authors describe their development as follows: In the 1970s, a DSS was 
understood as “a computer-based system to aid decision making”, but later in this 
1970s, the focus of DSS development was “interactive computer-based systems 
which help decision-makers utilize databases and models to solve ill-structured 
problems”. In the 1980s, DSS provided systems “using suitable and available tech-
nology to improve effectiveness of managerial and professional activities” [69]. 
However, in the late 1980s, DSS became part of intelligent workstations.
Decision Support Systems (DSSs) provide the user with a framework to easily 
characterize and analyze problem situations using predefined algorithms and mod-
els. This process is highly interactive, including the user in problem definition, the 
creation of possible solutions and using the correct model for evaluation and rat-
ing. A relevant question here is if the structure and complexity of ethical decisions 
can be modeled by DSSs.
So-called Expert systems (ESs) assemble the knowledge and experience of 
domain experts in machine interpretable form. They integrate expert knowledge 
for a particular domain to provide action alternatives, thus ready-made or adapt-
able solutions for a given problem. ESs help to capture, combine and distribute the 
expertise of human decision makers and hence lead to better and faster decisions 
[73]. Integrations of ES and DSS have been proposed in El-Najdawi and Stylianou 
[22]. These authors also proposed the standard model of a DSS as a collection of 
computer based tools to give support in decision making. It combines the content 
of chosen information sources with domain specific models to help the evaluation 
of potential problem solutions developed by the user [22].
To be evaluated within a DSS, the problem has to be defined according to quan-
tifiable criteria, so the solution alternatives can be rated based on mathematical 
models. The DSS does not provide the user with action alternatives; it only gives 
support with ready implemented, adaptable models for evaluation. Solving ethi-
cal dilemmas can be understood as a selection process between two options and 
weighing possible consequences of actions. This can serve as an initial very basic 
model of an ethical dilemma. An example of this is a patient who does not allow a 
life-saving treatment and gives reasons the doctor regards as irrational. This situa-
tion can be modeled for different patients of different ages (children, middle aged 
adults and very old patients) and outcomes can be evaluated.
An extension towards ethical decision making was given by Drake et al. [18]. 
The DSS can ask the right questions, can suggest different ethical perspectives, 
as proposed in Turban and Aronson [73], and it can certainly inspire creativ-
ity. Creativity can be simulated in the system by stretching the given parameter 
ranges, using the perspectives of other actors, or even putting the problem descrip-
tion in another context. This can help the user to find solutions that are not limited 
by a restricted frame of mind that focuses on the situation at hand but frequently 
misses ideas on how to extend or modify decision spaces by integrating multiple 
perspectives and normative questions into decision making processes. An addi-
tional ES support can help the user to learn about causes and consequences of dis-
eases for example by proposing novel and surprising views on the problem, with 
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problem solutions that did not come to his mind before. These views do not have 
to be perfect, and can always be adapted in later steps.
For ethical decisions, this would imply that the typical structure of ethical 
dilemmas with two options that are both connected to unwanted negative results 
can be questioned as a whole, and a question can be generated to ask how those 
dilemma situations can be avoided in the first place. Technological progress ena-
bles DSSs to model more complex structures of ethical problems, thus broadening 
its capabilities.
The extensive use of simulation technologies not only enables a long-term 
projection of possible outcomes, it also makes possible to examine a situation by 
trial and error. An intrinsic problem in the evaluation of long-term decisions is the 
need for a wide temporal horizon [33]. Consequences stemming from the com-
plex interactions usually involved in ethical dilemmas can present themselves at 
a later stage without any explicitly premonitory sign. From the early inception of 
Computer Science, simulations have been one tool of choice to evaluate a complex 
system, thanks to their time compression ability in a limited domain. In this spirit, 
we consider the claim that Serious Games would make a great tool to help in eval-
uating long term decisions, especially considering the flexibility in timeline man-
agement and the tree exploration possibilities opened by the availability of huge 
storage memory and massively parallel machines.
With few exceptions, Serious Games usually describe a closed time situa-
tion, where the actions of the players are carried out in a semi static, episodic and 
accessible environment (following the classification of [57]). Discretionary action 
is fairly comparable during a game. Simple modifications can be applied to exist-
ing routines to give Serious Games the capability to reduce the players’ ability of 
acting on variables in a time dependent manner, to simulate the effects of time, or 
to end the game not just after the usual episodic end, but in a different point in the 
timeline, which may be correlated to the number, quality, difficulty, consequences 
of decisions. Serious Games allow for an even more complex understanding of 
ethical decision making by encompassing the dimension of time as well as limit-
ing frameworks.
Using machines not only for medical decisions but also for the normative 
ethical dimension of decisions in medicine poses questions about how far ethi-
cal decisions can be supported by algorithm based machines on the one hand and 
questions of shared responsibility on the other.
This chapter will explore the possibility to support ethical decision making in 
medicine by DSSs. It is organized as follows: in Sect. 2, we give an analysis of 
ethical dilemmas and describe the possible role of DSSs to handle such dilemmas 
in medicine. In Sect. 3, we give a short historical survey of computers and their 
support in medical diagnosis and will name prerequisites for the support of ethical 
decisions. In Sect. 4, we discuss a possible implementation of Serious Games as a 
development aid for teaching ethics and aiding the evaluation of DSS. Finally, in 
Sect. 5, we will discuss the use of DSS and Serious Games from an ethical per-
spective with a special focus on computerized decision support versus learning 
tools followed by a short conclusion.
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2  Ethical Decision Making: Structure and Possible  
Support by Decision Support Systems
In decisions about medical therapy, different perspectives come together. Informed 
consent procedures, which are at the heart of ethical considerations in medicine, 
can serve as an example of how DSSs can be used. Informed consent procedures 
in a simple model can be described as an exchange of information (doctors) and 
personal preferences (patients) [23]. Doctors suggest a therapy that is medically 
indicated based on a diagnosis. Patients get information about this therapy, pos-
sible risks, side effects and prognosis and based on their personal preferences give 
(or deny) their consent to this therapy. The combination of medical indication and 
patient’s consent constitutes the basis of an informed consent. Informed consent 
procedures in practice should be designed in a way that gives patients time and the 
possibility to ask questions and have their wishes respected.
Most of the time, the ethical dimension of decisions in medicine can be taken 
care of without much problem. In trust based relationships, doctor-patient com-
munication about the aims of therapy, personal ideas of life quality or dealing with 
risks leads to informed consent [25]. Technological support for ethical problems 
therefore needs to be problem-specific and based on a thorough analysis of ethical 
dilemmas in order to be helpful.
This can be done in two ways. First, situations where problems occur involving 
a doctor asking for support (from a colleague or ethics consultant) can be identi-
fied and analyzed in order to get a better understanding of the moral dimension. 
Second, examples of best practice in solving such problems or completely avoid-
ing them in the first place can be used to identify aims and criteria to measure the 
improvement of decision making.
When talking about moral or ethical conflicts,3 we can distinguish between two 
types: moral conflict and moral dissent. There is a moral conflict when the moral 
guidelines one lives by do not lead to a clear conclusion, or not all obligations one 
sees in a certain situation can be fulfilled at the same time. In most situations these 
conflicts are easy to solve—the solution is clear—but usually there still remains a 
feeling of uneasiness for not being able to fulfill all obligations. For example, 
someone promised to meet a friend and feels obliged to keep this promise while at 
the same time the school calls that his daughter is sick and he needs to see a doctor 
with her. While it is clear that immediate support of the sick child is more impor-
tant in this situation, the person might feel bad about breaking the promise. The 
obligation of the promise is not simply overruled in this situation but remains an 
obligation in itself. This can best be seen from other obligations following from 
that situation such as apologizing for not coming or maybe offering a new meet-
ing. In medical ethics, the four principles approach by Beauchamp and Childress 
3
 We will understand the term “moral” in the sense of normative ideas in everyday practice and 
“ethics” as theoretical reflection of morality.
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[7] is currently the most well-known approach in medical ethics. The four princi-
ples, autonomy, beneficience, non-maleficience and justice, that are equally impor-
tant, might also lead to moral conflicts when applied in concrete situations when it 
proves difficult to weigh the principles one against the other. The following case 
may illustrate this: A patient who is a Jehovah’s Witness could be rescued by a 
blood transfusion but refuses to give his consent to it based on his religious 
beliefs. The doctor in charge might experience this as a conflict between respect-
ing the patient’s autonomy and the duty to cure by using the blood transfusion. 
While different cultural backgrounds might lead to different solutions, in most set-
tings the answer to this dilemma is clear. For example, western bioethics and the 
legal framework in many European countries give priority to patient autonomy.
The conflict between patient autonomy and beneficence can serve as a typical 
example of moral conflict. Other conflicts can be identified using the four prin-
ciples approach as a heuristic framework. The following shows examples of con-
flicts between each pair of two principles:
1. Autonomy and non-maleficence: A patient demands to have a healthy limb 
amputated and argues for this reasonably. The doctor is unsure if he should per-
form surgery.
2. Autonomy and justice: A doctor is unsure how much time he should spend 
informing an especially time-consuming patient who feels not well informed 
enough to decide. The doctor does not have time to inform all patients in detail 
in the same way.
3. Beneficence and non-maleficence: A doctor has to weigh the chances of curing 
a condition versus the risks of therapy with heavy side effects of a therapy.
4. Beneficence and justice: In a hospital, questions of allocation can lead to con-
flicts between beneficence and justice: Providing the best possible therapy 
available can be so expensive that other patients cannot be treated using the 
same therapy.
5. Non-maleficence and justice: Not harming vulnerable groups such as pregnant 
women or patients in a coma usually is used as an argument for not includ-
ing them in clinical trials. This leads to a lack of empirical evidence and con-
sequently lack of safe possible treatments for those groups. Should they be 
included for reasons of justice?
This list shows a few examples of possible moral conflicts in medicine using the 
four principles approach [7]. When moral conflicts happen in everyday practice 
the description of a situation still needs to be structured. It needs to be made trans-
parent what principles or obligations are in conflict. Here DSSs can help to find 
a structure for ethical deliberation and get a better understanding of the moral 
conflict.
Different methods of analyzing a moral conflict have been discussed in the 
literature [44]. They can serve as a first basis to understand the nature of prob-
lem solving and practice in moral deliberation. They can be divided into different 
phases. First, the problem has to be described from a factual medical perspec-
tive. Then moral principles or obligations relevant in the specific case have to be 
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named. This often helps to get a clear picture of the conflict’s moral dimension. 
Some use the four principles approach by Beauchamp and Childress as a heuristic 
tool for this. Here DSSs can be used to guide analysis. In a third step, these prin-
ciples have to be compared and their importance for the specific case assessed. 
Weighing the principles relevant in the case can also be trained using DSS by 
interactively discussing cases. DSS can also provide additional information such 
as legal regulation or ethical guidelines (e.g., [83]). Furthermore, DSS can pro-
vide possible future scenarios to compare consequences or to help evaluate the 
decision.
While a moral conflict is an intrapersonal conflict due to conflicting moral obli-
gations or principles, moral dissent is characterized as an interpersonal problem: a 
moral dissent is a situation where different participants favor and argue for differ-
ent solutions based on their different personal moral positions. This might occur 
due to different moral positions. For example, deontological and consequentialist 
approaches have different perspectives on lying, or because agents weigh the same 
principles differently. The following case is an example of this type of conflict 
that could happen in practice: in an intensive care unit an 85 year-old multimor-
bid patient is treated after a severe stroke. The patient cannot eat sufficiently and 
grows weaker. Doctors want to apply life prolonging treatment by applying tube 
feeding while nurses vote for withholding further treatment and applying palliative 
care instead. Here two different perspectives on the same situation lead to conflict. 
Both positions can be well argued for. The dissent can have different causes: dif-
ferent (descriptive) perspectives on the situation can lead to different decisions: 
how much a patient is suffering, if a treatment is considered futile or not, or the 
interpretation of a patient’s will and advance directive. Different professional 
backgrounds can be one basis for such differing perspectives.
Another possible cause is different (explicit or implicit) moral assumptions. For 
example, religious people might refer to the sanctity of life while secular people 
dismiss such a concern. Differences can be more subtle on the level of nuancing or 
interpreting similar moral principles in different ways. Relatives and doctors might 
agree that respecting the patient’s wishes is most important, but disagree how to 
weigh personal communication versus an advance directive, or even how to inter-
pret an advance directive. Different moral or cultural backgrounds might also lead 
to moral dissent. For example, when a doctor is asked not to tell a patient the truth 
about her diagnosis that she will die soon based on different ideas about how to 
weigh patient autonomy and keeping the patient from harm (the stressful informa-
tion about her diagnosis).
In order to provide support in cases of moral dissent, DSS can be used in 
a similar way as described above. This can help to better understand the conflict 
and might lead to a solution. But when dealing with interpersonal conflicts aspects 
such as who is affected, the perceived options within a decision situation, or ques-
tions of hierarchy and responsibility for a decision need to be taken into account. 
Furthermore, the best solution would be if the dissent could have been avoided 
in the first place. Here different structures of decision making need to be in place 
such as advance care planning [16]. DSS can guide users to structure decisions and 
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get people who are affected by decisions involved. Empirical evidence shows that 
while this does not solve the conflict it helps to avoid situations of confrontation 
and supports shared decision making [24].
These few examples already show that DSS needs to be culture sensitive. 
Simply applying an approach in ethics will not prove helpful, and might lead to 
new conflict. The value basis of a DSS needs to be agreed upon by users and the 
community that is involved in the decisions. Furthermore, DSS for clinical use 
needs to be tailor made for the often hectic day to day practice under conditions 
of time constraints, working in shifts, rules of documentation, as well as multidis-
ciplinary teams. The already long history of DSS in Medicine can help to under-
stand how DSS can be implemented and what type of support is considered useful.
3  A Brief History of Decision Support Systems in Medicine
After World War II, when the first electronic digital computers became public, 
physicians certainly did not rank among the most euphoric users of these so called 
“thinking machines”, machines that gave rise to powerful misgivings among doc-
tors, who feared that medical diagnosis and decision-making would eventually be 
completely usurped by computers [41].
Several activities in the US were initiated to overcome the physicians’ and life 
scientists’ reluctance to use computers:
•	 The journal Science published Robert Steven Ledley’s survey “Digital 
Electronic Computers in Biomedical Science” where the author predicted that in 
the long run, “perhaps the greatest utilization of computers will be in biomedi-
cal applications” [38].
•	 In the same year the Conference on Diagnostic Data Processing took place 
at the Rockefeller Institute on January 14th, 1959, organized by the Russian-
American inventor and pioneer Vladimir Kosma Zworykin, who was then 
the first President of the International Federation for Medical and Biological 
Engineering [21, p. 232].
•	 Two hearings on the use of automatic data processing in medicine that have 
been held before the US Senate’s Subcommittee on Reorganization and 
International Organization, (July 9th and 16th, 1959) came to the conclusion 
that corresponding developments ought to be organized and fostered by the 
government.
•	 In July 1959, the journal Science published the article “Reasoning Foundations 
of Medical Diagnoses” authored by Ledley and Lee B [42].
The last-mentioned article was a widely read paper that gave instructions to physi-
cians to build diagnostic databases using punch cards to prepare for future times 
when they would have the opportunity that electronic computers will analyze their 
data. Today this article is considered to mark the beginning of “medical informat-
ics”. It was “frequently cited as the most influential early paper to propose the 
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use of computers as diagnostic assistance” [63, p. 209] and it “mapped a research 
program for the next 15 years, as investigators spun out the consequences” that 
“medical reasoning was not magic but instead contained well recognized inference 
strategies: Boolean logic, symbolic inference, and Bayesian probability. In particu-
lar, diagnostic reasoning could be formulated using all three of these techniques” 
[3]. The authors showed that computers could support doctors in the task of draw-
ing conclusions about patients’ illnesses based on symptoms, signs and the results 
of their examinations and it was their hope that by harnessing computers, much 
of physicians’ work would become automated and that many human errors could 
therefore be avoided.
Medical diagnoses, Ledley and Lusted argued, were based on logical conclu-
sions, and these could be inferred from information about relationships that exist 
among symptoms and illnesses and about symptoms a patient exhibits, from which 
other pertinent information can be inferred for this patient. Thereupon, Ledley and 
Lusted published numerous texts permanently steering biomedical research in the 
new direction to initiate the use of computers in medical scientific procedures, i.e., 
in research and teaching as well as in diagnosis and therapy,4 and these great 
efforts caught the attention of US newspapers. A headline of The New York Times 
was “Computer may aid disease diagnosis”. AMA NEWS (The newspaper of 
American Medical Association) in an article entitled, “Electronic Diagnosis: 
Computers, medicine join forces”; wrote: “Doctors are inclined to insist that diag-
nosis is an art. Perhaps it is—now. But must it be? And is that good?” [4, 50] The 
article already hints at the ethical dimensions of “electronic diagnosis”: who is 
responsible for the diagnosis (doctor or machine?), and if doctors ought to refer 
responsibilities (e.g., for diagnostic errors) to machines. Connected to this is not 
only the hope that less mistakes will be made but also the fear that computer sys-
tems make mistakes unrecognized due to naive belief in progress, mistakes 
nobody feels responsible for. Furthermore, introducing machines into the process 
of diagnosis might raise fears that doctors will be replaced by machines in the 
future and that professional knowledge based on experience is replaced by statis-
tics. But overall, hopes connected to machine supported decisions outweighed 
fears and the latter did not hinder further developments.
In reaction to Sputnik, in October 1957, the U.S. Congress allocated about US 
$40 million to the National Institutes of Health (NIH) for the purpose of stimulat-
ing computer use in biomedical research. During those years, the NIH’s Advisory 
Committee on Computers in Research (ACCR) established several major bio-
medical computing centers around the USA. Also toward the end of the 1950s, the 
4
 At the Third Annual Symposium on Computer Application in Medical Care in 1979 [41], 
when Lusted looked back on a terrific success story in a text entitled “Twenty Years of Medical 
Decision Making Studies”, he was able to note that in the period from 1959 to 1968 he and 
Ledley, working solo or as co-authors, had published some 45 articles in 23 American and nine 
overseas journals as well as seven proceedings of international conferences, all of them dealing 
with the subject of computer assisted medical diagnostics or decision making.
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physician Martin Lipkin and his mentor James Daniel Hardy began to wonder how 
new computer technology could be used in medical research within the scope of a 
doctor’s activity.
In the department of medicine of New York Hospital-Cornell Medical Center, 
Lipkin and Hardy sought ways to master the constantly growing flood of informa-
tion. They were well aware of the developments in computer technology, thanks 
to the writings of Vannevar Bush but also from other publications reaching back 
to the 1940s and even the 1930s, and touching upon “mechanical” computing 
and sorting machines that used cards and needles or punch cards. The idea arose 
of using machines of this type to build collections of data sets that were being 
accumulated during medical research, to carry out classifications and to develop 
interconnections among them. It was also thought that it might be possible to use 
this method to mechanically store data from patients’ medical histories and to 
study whether this technology might be helpful in medical diagnostics. In 1958, 
Lipkin and Hardy reported their project in the Journal of the American Medical 
Association, in which they sought to classify all diagnosis data from hemato-
logical cases by means of a “mechanical apparatus” and to identify relationships 
between them [39].
A brief description of this “first “computer diagnosis” of disease, in this case 
hematology disorders is given in the biographical memoir on Hardy by Arthur B. 
Dubois:
The computer consisted of punched cards in a shoe box. Diagnostic criteria had been 
obtained from a hematology textbook and were wedge-punched at the edge of each of 26 
cards to match the symptoms and laboratory findings of the 26 blood disorders. Knitting 
needles were run through the holes that corresponded to the symptoms and laboratory 
findings of each of 80 patients, matching those to the diagnostic criteria wedge-punched 
into the edges of the set of 26 hematology cards. Shaking the box made the card whose 
criteria matched those of the patient drop out of the shoe box to show the diagnosis 
printed on the hematology card [19, p. 13f].
Starting with such computer supported medical diagnostic systems with “punched 
cards in a shoe box” in the 1950s, followed by intensive collaborations between 
physicians, mathematicians and electrical engineers, medicine became, to a certain 
extent, a quantitative science in the 1960s and 1970s. When the University of Utah 
installed a digital computer in 1960, the Director of the computer center Robert 
Stephenson showed physician Homer Warner the already mentioned Science arti-
cle by Lusted and Ledley [42]. One section in Lusted’s and Ledley’s article gave 
“an introduction to Bayesian statistics and pointed out the relevance of Bayes’ 
Rule to the problem of medical diagnosis” [63, p. 209]. Warner and Stephenson 
agreed to realize this proposition to use Probability Theory to model the medical 
diagnostic process and to apply this idea to congenital heart disease using the digi-
tal computer and they proved that it could diagnose as well as or even better than 
cardiologists.
More than 30 years later, Warner explained in his third-person narrative:
To aid the patients coming through Warner’s laboratory, they decided to make their model 
to diagnose 35 different forms of congenital heart disease. First, they collected data on 
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how frequently each of 50 different findings, such as murmurs of different kinds and cya-
nosis, occurred in each disease and how common each disease was in the population of 
patients referred to the laboratory. After collecting several hundred such cases, a matrix 
showed the disease on one axis, the findings on the other. At each intersection of the 
symptom with the disease, a number represented the frequency of that finding in patients 
with that disease. This table formed the basis for the diagnosing patients based on findings 
recorded by their referring physicians. A comparison of the computer diagnoses and those 
of the referring physicians showed the computer to be right more often than any of the 
physicians, based on diagnosis following heart catheterization [77, p. 479f].
Warner and Stephenson presented their findings at an American Heart Association 
meeting and their article appeared in 1961 in the Journal of the American Heart 
Association (JAHA). This article was “among the most frequently cited” papers 
to “determine whether Bayesian techniques could be effectively applied to diag-
nostic problems” wrote E. H. Shortliffe in 1988 and “the first published example 
of automatic diagnosis using real patient data and comparing computer derived 
results with human diagnostic abilities” wrote Paul D. Clayton, a former student of 
Warner, then chair of Medical Informatics at Columbia University, in 1995 [12, p. 
139; 63, p. 209]. The article became one of the most important and crucial papers 
in the history of medical decision making.
Various approaches to computerized diagnosis emerged in the 1960s and 1970s, 
using Bayes rule [76, 82], factor analysis [74], and decision analysis [42]. On the 
other hand, artificial intelligence approaches also came into use, e.g., DIALOG 
(Diagnostic Logic) [53] and PIP (Present Illness Program) [52]. These were pro-
grams to simulate the physician’s reasoning in gathering information, as well as to 
simulate the diagnosis using databases in the form of networks of symptoms and 
diagnoses. Progress in computerized diagnosis thus enabled increases in the com-
plexity of decisions simulated and supported, and integration not only of different 
types of facts and knowledge, but also different types of reasoning.
As a next step, we should mention the introduction of medical expert systems 
shortly after general expert systems appeared in the 1970s. The first of these being 
MYCIN [62], INTERNIST [47] and CASNET (Causal Associational Networks) 
[78, 79].
Then, the focus of research shifted from a numerical probabilistic approach to 
knowledge base techniques later known as (medical) expert systems, knowledge 
based systems in Medicine and clinical decision support systems (CDSS). In clini-
cal practice today, those expert or knowledge based systems are most prevalent 
that perform decision making at the level of a domain expert [70]. In general, 
CDSS patient data are compared against a knowledge-base and an inference mech-
anism is used that can incorporate a rule base of ‘if-then-else rules’ with Bayesian 
prediction or fuzzy logic methods.
The aims were high and the expectations were not always fulfilled. So far only 
few systems are in clinical use. Experiences so far have been mixed and the full 
potential of clinical decision support systems for optimizing the healthcare system 
is far from realized. One reason is that “the greatest barrier to routine use of deci-
sion support by clinicians has been inertia; systems have been designed for single 
problems that arise infrequently and have generally not been integrated into the 
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routine data management environment for the user” [64, p. 14]. Other reasons are 
insufficient acceptance and utilization of such systems, missing integration into a 
Hospital Information System (HIS), inappropriate software architecture and oth-
ers. On the other hand, systems have been efficient as learning environments by 
simulation.
The path of Medical Expert Systems and Clinical Decision Support Systems that 
we have followed in this section shows that these systems are mainly developed 
to support diagnosis or suggest possible therapy focusing on specialized medical 
problems. They were not designed to replace doctor patient communication or to 
communicate directly to patients in informed consent procedures. Communication 
between doctors and patients, getting patients involved in decision making pro-
cesses, what is often called the “human side” of medicine, is important for trust 
building between doctors and patients. Here also ethical questions arise and legal 
regulations frame decisions. Ethical considerations and dilemma solving so far 
remains the responsibility of doctors in cooperation with other healthcare profes-
sionals and patients. With the development of further advanced technology the com-
plexity of ethical decisions could also be modeled in DSS. But actually integrating 
DSSs that encompass the full complexity of decision making in medicine, and thus 
integrating the knowledge base and the normative aspects of medicine, will pose fur-
ther problems that will be addressed in the following section.
4  Clinical Decision Support Systems: From  
Diagnosis to Ethics
4.1  Acceptance Problems of CDSS
The idea to get help from computers to support doctors in the task of drawing con-
clusions about patients’ diseases based on symptoms, signs and the results of their 
examinations, could be a solution to the big problems that became more and more 
visible in medicine in the first half of the 20th century, as is shown by a com-
ment from the foreword of a textbook: “The belief has been expressed that errors 
in diagnosis are more often errors of omission than of commission” [56, p. vii]. In 
another textbook, the physician Logan Clendening wrote on this matter: “How to 
guard against incompleteness I do not know. But I do know that, in my judgment, 
the most brilliant diagnosticians of my acquaintance are the ones who do remem-
ber and consider the most possibilities. Even remote ones should be brought up 
even though they may be immediately rejected” [13, p. 59f].
It is a difficult task for physicians to exhaustively consider every factor relevant 
to the decision, due to either limited memory or limited information. About a dec-
ade later a medical doctor described this problem in the following way: “What is 
needed is a device which will answer the question ‘What are the possible causes of 
the group of symptoms and signs I have elicited from my patient?’” [49, p. 874]. 
Patients demand that doctors are always aware of the evidence, results of latest 
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research and new technologies in diagnosis. Therefore, a correct diagnosis is get-
ting more and more complicated to achieve and the possibilities of false diagno-
sis are increasing. A false diagnosis is not only a medical problem but also poses 
ethical questions of harming the patient and responsibility for mistakes in a hier-
archical system like hospitals. Today, it is acknowledged that besides diagnosis 
and therapy there is also an ethical side to medical decision making in almost all 
medical decision procedures and that medical decisions should also follow ethi-
cal guidelines. This means that not only rapidly growing knowledge in medicine 
needs to be taken into account when coming to a decision, but also ethical ques-
tions like life quality, autonomy or values based in the cultural background of 
patients as well as values derived from the professional ethos [33]. With regard to 
decision making, physicians experienced a time of great research progress which 
resulted in a collectively perceived “knowledge explosion” in the mid-20th cen-
tury. This development was accompanied by growing interest in computer tech-
nology on the one hand and growing relevance of ethical questions on the other, 
which can be seen from the growing number of ethical guidelines for doctors, like 
the Declaration of Geneva [83].
Medical expert systems and CDSS machines have been construed to solve 
these problems and about 10 years ago, roughly 70 known proprietary medical 
CDSS machines were listed, but only 10 of them geared towards routine use [26]. 
Unfortunately, there is no information available about a real daily average usage of 
these systems. However, CDSS machines still suffer from insufficient acceptance. 
Medical doctors are reluctant to use such systems for different reasons:
1. Doctors are afraid that computer systems will be used to substitute physicians 
[60, 65, 66]. CDSS machines should assist physicians in their daily routine 
work in the doctor’s practice or in hospitals whenever they need support. CDSS 
machines should be built in a way that helps to avoid mistakes and improve 
decision making. This can cause fears that CDSS based decisions are better 
than doctors’ decisions that are prone to human flaws. However, such systems 
can also take the role as a teaching system and physicians will learn from a 
CDSS how to consider criteria, facts or process issues in specific decision situ-
ations. These systems realize “rationality” in diagnosis and decision making. 
They are intended to support but not to replace physicians [11]. As the discus-
sion about responsibility will show later, doctors need to have the final say 
about medical decisions. Doctors should remain the ultimate authority, and he 
or she will have the ability to “overrule” or to ignore the recommendations of 
the CDSS at any time [59, p. 261]. Doctors also have the role of justifying and 
explaining decisions to patients and making decisions transparent. For this, they 
need to be involved in the decision making process. CDSS machines that try to 
replace doctors therefore stand little chance of acceptance.
2. Integration of a CDSS into well organized and equipoised everyday practice 
and clinical guidelines is difficult for various reasons, for example:
(a) One drawback to acceptance of a CDSS is workflow integration. Many of 
these systems are stand-alone applications, and they require the clinician as 
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an operator to cease working on their current report system, switch to the 
CDSS, input the necessary data, and receive the information [75].
(b) The input process that has to be done by the doctor or a nurse is very time 
consuming and costly.
(c) The use of a computer system interferes with the important contact 
between patient and doctor. The doctor will not be able to focus on the 
patient, his trouble and pain and the patient feels unappreciated.
Therefore, CDSS machines should not only be easy to handle but not interfere 
with doctor-patient communication. This calls for systems that do not interrupt 
or prolong daily routine but for applications usable for training in very different 
contexts.
3. Medical decision support systems are not all-round systems but very special-
ized systems and are concerned with just a very specialized cutting of a medi-
cal field, e.g., hepatology or pulmonary diseases in internal medicine. A CDSS 
for ethical questions would ideally be integrated into already existing and well 
established systems. Since experiences with CDSS machines on a broad level 
do not exist, further demands of users besides ethical dilemma solving need to 
be assessed and integrated for better acceptance.
4. There are limitations of CDSS machines because an optimal physician’s treat-
ment requires that physicians can get important information almost without lag 
of time: information on the present and the possible future consequences of his 
or her actions. To this end, they “require data that are factual, factual inferen-
tial (why type questions) and predictive (what if questions). To date, the best 
support that a CDSS has been able to provide is data that answer factual and 
maybe some forms of predictive questions […]. Physicians have no shortage 
of data available to them. Thus, physicians have found that currently available 
CDSS machines are not able to meet their more complex information needs” 
[59, p. 261].
5. Also, most of the present CDSS machines have not progressed beyond the pro-
totype stage [81]. There exists no standard or any universally accepted evalua-
tion or validation methodology to ensure that the system’s knowledge base is 
complete and correct [5].
This is also a problem for supporting ethical decisions: with the plurality of ethical 
approaches and views a universally accepted evaluation therefore seems impos-
sible in this case. But what might be easier to achieve and well accepted is to 
evaluate the outcome of CDSS machines along the values that built the basis of 
the CDSS itself. This means that there is still reflection necessary if those values 
are shared and accepted in a concrete situation but the idea of coherence can be 
argued for more easily.
6. We do not know whether the use of a CDSS improves the quality of deci-
sions produced. Also we do not know whether the economic or other benefits, 
e.g., the patients’ well-being are attributable to the use of the CDSS, because 
there is no well-defined or universal evaluation methodology. “To date, an 
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examination of the literature indicates that there is virtually no information 
available related to the cost or cost effectiveness of CDSS machines. Most of 
the CDSS machines are university based developments, and still in prototype 
stage. These costs regarding the initial investment of CDDS tend to be hidden 
and therefore difficult to access. This frightens or hinders industry interest in 
funding and encouraging the development of CDSS in healthcare in general 
[48]. Still, many physicians have a positive outlook on the potential for these 
systems, particularly relating to practitioner performance. However, until the 
use of CDSS machines in general is as routine as the use of the blood pres-
sure cuff, it is important to be sensitive to resistance to using these systems” 
[59, p. 261].
4.2  From CDSS to Serious Games: Learning Ethic Concepts 
in Medicine Through Computer Assisted Machines
In the context of developing support systems for ethical decisions, an approach 
is called for that goes beyond simple fixed interaction that CDSS machines usu-
ally supply, to produce an interactive environment that allows doctors to practice 
with concrete problems and that can move the boundaries of the decision above 
and beyond the moment in which the decision is made. One main benefit of such 
an approach would be the creation of a learning environment for complex deci-
sion making processes. This can be used for teaching or team coaching in order 
to train for decision situations where different forms of expertise as well as values 
have to be taken into account, something which is usually precluded in standard 
CDSS. Furthermore, the use of such an environment can reframe decision situa-
tions, integrate different perspectives and get relevant actors more involved at dif-
ferent times or stages of the decision than in current practice. This cannot be done 
with the basic tools that have been the staple of medical decisions education, such 
as textbooks, medical scripts, questionnaires and simple role play games, neither 
with the ones used by standard CDSS systems, but need more refined thought. We 
speculate that the use of Serious Games (SG) can be beneficial to help developing 
better CDSS, while at the same time they have the potential to become a standard 
tool in training ethical medical behavior.
Following the revised definition by Zyda [84], based upon the original defini-
tion by Abt [1], an SG is “a mental contest, played with a computer in accord-
ance with specific rules that uses entertainment to further government or corporate 
training, education, health, public policy, and strategic communication objectives”. 
While SGs are conceived, programmed and developed with the tools and general 
aesthetic usually reserved for video games, they are used for purposes other than 
mere entertainment [72]. The principal advantage of SGs is “allowing learners to 
experience situations that are impossible in the real world for reasons of safety, 
cost, time, etc” [14, 71].
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4.3  How Do Serious Games Work
SG follows the convention of standard games we play on a computer or smart-
phone: a 3D immersive simulation can be developed to ensure that the user can 
empathize with his avatar, the character can be depicted with classical medical 
equipment such as a white coat and stethoscope for a better identification of his 
role; other actors can be easily distinguished by external traits, and the same goes 
for Non-Playable Characters (NPC) (see Fig. 1). Avatars and NPCs in SGs, be they 
realistic or caricatural, are often represented wearing dresses of the trade, in order 
to solicit empathy (see Fig. 2) [31].
The simulation is multi-media based: graphical elements such as animations 
or cut-scenes can be included, while sounds and speech can provide feedback to 
the player. During the game, a collection of indicators, menus, gauges and other 
information useful for the player must be visible at all times in a heads-up dis-
play (HUD). Multiple HUDs can be used in different stages of the simulation [8]. 
A first-person point of view is usually tied with a direct interactive access to the 
virtual world. The main drawback of this approach is hiding the player character. 
Fig. 1  Non playable character from GeriatriX [37]
Fig. 2  Screenshot from JDoc [68] showing the player’s avatar (center) interacting with two 
NPCs
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A third-person perspective instead allows the player to follow main character 
movements (see Fig. 2), but confusing camera angles can also complicate play-
ing the game [51]. No custom peripherals should be used in this broad category of 
simulations, as complex physical interface may ruin the spontaneity of the actions.
A recent development of the field concerns the use of mobile peripherals and 
extended deployment of SGs: pervasive and ubiquitous computing also permits con-
stant access to the game, using smartphones or other wireless handhelds (e.g., tablet, 
notebook) as input/output device. In this scenario, a game session needs to be saved and 
reloaded. In some cases, the player can be forced to start over if some constraints are 
not satisfied. Adding network connectivity can extend game longevity. Clocks or time 
counters can accentuate the feeling of time pressure. Timers may move at the same rate 
as real time or at different rates, such months and years, which elapse in a few min-
utes of play [80]. Time compression helps the player to focus on what is important [45]. 
Having to decide and act under conditions of time restraint is one of the main aspects 
mentioned by students when they argue that the best possible way to act is not feasi-
ble within the current medical system. Finding ways to model alternatives and evaluate 
outcomes would provide something close to experience based learning and strengthen 
young doctors to reflect on circumstances.
The simulation can be divided in stages. Each phase can have different durations and 
can be clearly separated during the game, using level closing material for providing 
feedback to the player or video sequences that provide a backstory. Mission briefing 
before starting the chosen level can guide the player through game controls and goals. 
The rules of game need to be clear to the user. In the first stage, the player must examine 
the problem. During this act he needs to connect information in an aggregate knowledge 
base. This task is the first important step in ethical decision making: describing the con-
flict on a factual as well as normative level. When using SGs for teaching purposes, this 
can also be useful in order to get players acquainted with different ethical approaches 
like the four principles approach [7], using them as the knowledge base of the game. 
Furthermore, players can learn to grow some sort of sensibility for hidden ethical 
assumptions on the first level. Connecting the description of a situation to theoretical 
knowledge will help to clarify the situation and options for decision making later on. In 
some cases, the player might have incomplete information, and this can become a sepa-
rate task in problem solving and deciding. The main stage is related to the decision act. 
In this phase, life-like characters can be used as tutors or trainers and can supply helpful 
information to the player [54]. NPCs should seem intelligent and to behave coherently: 
NPCs should engage users or other characters in conversation, display of role appropri-
ate knowledge and expertise, shape constructive user behavior and discourage disrup-
tive user behavior [54]. An extensive and detailed logging of all choices and actions a 
player has made will be made available to the player for subsequent analysis. This infor-
mation can be extensively reviewed for evaluation purposes.5
5
 Another way of evaluating is the implementation of a scoring algorithm. This is useful because 
a positive score can reinforce the player’s behavior. The score can be displayed with a numeric 
value, a star system or a grade assigned in letters. The goals can be assigned in terms of score to 
achieve. Some bonus materials (e.g., additional level) can be added to push the player to work for 
the maximum grade. A high score list can be included and displayed after gameplay.
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After the decision, the players need to watch and evaluate the consequences of 
their actions. In this phase, the time in the simulation can be speed up to show the 
long-term effect on the actors. In some cases, this step can be preliminary to a new 
phase of the decision process (e.g., someone is angry about the outcome of another 
case and mistrusts a doctor). However, in this new scenario, not all actions previously 
taken can be undone. For example, if a patient dies due to an irresponsible decision, 
the user cannot revive the person and needs to face the consequences of the loss.
4.4  Serious Games and Medicine
The use of SGs in medicine is nothing new by itself. In 2004, with support from 
the Lounsberry Foundation and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for 
Scholars, the Serious Games Initiative (www.seriousgames.org) started the Games 
for Health Project (www.gamesforhealth.org, [58]). In 2008 and 2009, the number 
of peer reviewed scientific publications surged as the clinical application of health 
games diversified. The sudden surge of health game publications can be attributed 
to the availability of specific funding for health games research (i.e., Robert Wood 
Johnson Foundation funding), advancements in commercialized gaming technol-
ogy (e.g., Nintendo Wii), and the establishment of health game research networks 
through various scientific venues (e.g., Games for Health Conferences [36]). The 
Health Games Research Database lists over 430 games.
One thriving sector in this vein is the use of games in healthcare from a pro-
fessional perspective; that is, the use of games in medical training and educating 
young professionals include practice exercises to refine skills for performing sur-
gery, emergency response, disaster preparedness and for simulations for healthcare 
management situations [2]. An example of such approach is JDoc. The purpose of 
JDoc is to familiarize junior doctors with the day-to-day stress of a hectic hospital. 
The junior doctor simulator immerses the player in the believable world of a busy 
hospital at night and educates them as to the diagnostic procedures and medical 
criteria required while working on call in a hospital ward [68].
Another project is “Pulse!!” This SG is a three-dimensional virtual clinical learn-
ing platform developed at Texas A&M University Corpus Christi, in collaboration 
with the United States Navy, for teaching high-level critical thinking, diagnostic 
reasoning and skills to healthcare professionals that provides unlimited, repeatable, 
immersive clinical experiences without risk to patients [20]. In both simulations, jun-
ior physicians can practice procedures without life/death consequences. In particular, 
in JDoc we can develop entire scenarios, using parameters provided by senior doc-
tors, in which we can reproduce the decisional process in ethical dilemmas such as 
abortion, euthanasia or treatment of people with disabilities, analyzing every step of 
this process. We can also evaluate the adherence to the four common moral princi-
ples: respect for autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence and justice [29].
Another context where serious games and medicine meet is in simulations for 
healthcare management related situations. The aim of such software is to solve 
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administrative problems faced by healthcare managers such as facility planning, 
resource allocation, staffing, patient flow and waiting time, routing and transpor-
tation, supply chain management, and process improvement [34]. An example of 
this is GeriatriX, a student training game for complex medical decision-making 
concerning elderly patients. The students explore different diagnostic and thera-
peutic strategies, and are given insight into the consequences and costs of their 
choices [37]. Because GeriatriX deals with elderly patients, the risk of harming the 
patient by the therapy needs to be weighed against the chance of healing, but also 
the expected quality of life during and after the therapy.
Multiple games have been developed to support health behavior of patients 
[32]. These include virtual environments that provide a safe and realistic simula-
tion of exposing patients to a potential health threat [30]. Video games were also 
designed to improve prevention and self-care behavior among children and adoles-
cents for asthma and diabetes [32].
More recently, we have seen the emergence of games designed to persuade 
users to change their behavior, better known as Persuasive Games [27]. Games 
for behavioral change related to diet, physical exercise, self management, etc., had 
positive patient outcomes [6]. In particular, active computer games (e.g., Eye Toy 
games, Dance Dance Revolution, Nintendo Wii games), also dubbed as “exergam-
ing” [9], may have the potential to promote physical activity for obese children 
[15]. Use of games as a learning environment for preventive actions is cited as 
a possibility in the literature [32]. “The Great Flu” from the Ranj Corporation 
teaches users how a virus works and what resources are necessary to counter-
act/contain the spread of a pathogen and to prevent the outbreak of an epidemic 
[2]. “Persuasion is often involved in health prevention. This particularly applies 
to changing habits. The main goal of persuasive games is not to educate or to 
increase physical exercise, but to persuade the users to modify their behavior” [10, 
p. 132]. An example of a persuasive game is “Smoke?” The goal of this SG is 
to persuade people who are contemplating quitting smoking or have recently quit 
smoking, that quitting permanently will be beneficial [35].
4.5  How the Machine-User-Interface of a Medical  
Decision SG Should Work
As we said in a previous subsection, the principal aims of current SGs in health-
care are training medical professionals as well as future patients to enable behav-
ioral change. In these simulations, the ethical aspect, when present, is a simple 
plug-in, and often a second thought. We maintain that the use of instruments such 
as SGs as a component for building and rating medical ethics decision systems is a 
novel approach that may bring satisfactory results.
A SG is the perfect environment where ethical dilemmas can be simulated 
without real world consequences to others, but with the added necessary ele-
ment of deep personal involvement typical of a simulation. Even better, a SG 
200 J. Inthorn et al.
can include a teaching consequence that is not present in standard CDSSs: teach-
ing ethics from a textbook is often ineffective, as there are no incentives nor real 
examples that can be tested interactively, and even learning by enacting scripts, 
usually done with a role playing approach, has a very limited scope, and the inter-
action is too forced to be believable. On the contrary, deep immersion in a simu-
lated world that is offered by SG, the level of realism, the possibility to develop 
rich and detailed case histories, the fact that consequences of decisions regard-
ing ethical dilemmas can be evaluated in different turn points, and even in a long 
term fashion, the controlled repeatability offered by the approach, all are perfectly 
suited to the learning and to the aiding aspects of ethical decisions in medicine.
In order to build such a system, we need to approach ethical dilemmas in a dif-
ferent way: when we simply ask for a “smart” decision, we often obtain simplistic 
and short-sighted argumentations, because decisions in health-care have impacts 
that are hard if not almost impossible to predict by a single person. This “look-
ahead process” might be forgotten when the human agent is left alone in carrying 
the burden of evaluating all the long-term consequences. If we exhibit a well-
defined problem in binary win-lose logic, the user can acquire information only 
related to the specific problem. The knowledge of how an agent can reach one of 
the possible solutions in a state space often cannot be applied in other context, 
especially in healthcare. An intelligent behavior might seem rather stupid and dan-
gerous if carried out in another environment.
The risk of assigning a specific goal, when such a goal exists, is that the simu-
lation cannot successfully lead to a flexible and ethical behavior, as we need to 
balance between short-term and long-term goals. The same ethical problem can 
be shown in different forms to confirm the fact that the user can choose the better 
solution independently, without stepping in the pitfalls of a single specific case. 
Different responses to similar questions can be also considered valid; the step of 
the reasoning process does not even have to be logical, but can be based on a com-
bination of incomplete information and personal values.
Because an ethical approach would include the evaluation of long-term effects 
of small changes on the people involved, especially patients, systems that are able 
to simulate effects of decisions and provide at the same time criteria to evaluate 
the impact on those affected, would strongly improve the quality of complex deci-
sion making processes and outcomes.
Serious Games make a great tool to help in evaluating long-term decisions, 
especially considering the flexibility in timeline management and the tree explo-
ration possibilities opened by the availability of huge storage memory and mas-
sively parallel machines. In specific points in the game time line, an agent can 
be partnered to players in a prompting role dependent on the exploration tree’s 
position and content. The repeatability of the game and its complete parameteri-
zation allows its use as a massive evaluation tool. The tools provided based on 
Serious Games would open opportunities to expansive, participatory, experience 
based and reflective learning. Many shortcomings of traditional teaching methods 
could be overcome: unidirectional conversation, cognitive centered reproduction, 
or inert knowledge, the practical transfer of acquired knowledge would be strongly 
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enabled. Furthermore, the level and breadth of support given from the system dur-
ing learning could be calibrated toward the quality of decisions, inducing a pro-
gressive learning pace and improving the dropout factor of the learning process.
A support system for ethical decisions should enable users to explore the state 
space, analyzing effects of alternative decisions and provide them with necessary 
information that lead towards ethical decision. Such machines would need a user 
interface that enables interaction based on alternative paths of decision. The user 
can directly experience the consequences of a certain course of action, thus com-
ing to a deeper insight of the problem at hand. The evaluation phase can be carried 
out assigning different utility functions once connected to the timeline. As ethical 
decisions have wide impacts and very often long-term effects, at different times or 
stages, ambiguous, divergent and contradictory requirements are reinforced. For 
the user to reach decisions under time pressure or incomplete information, long-
term strategies could be rolled back in order to increase awareness of extended 
consequences. Time compression ability can be used from the system in order to 
assess efficiency in presence of no single right solution.
5  Ethics of Ethical Decision Support
Serious Games seem to have many advantages when it comes to creating a learn-
ing environment for ethical decisions. But the technical feasibility needs to move 
parallel with a positive evaluation of the use of Serious Games. Using any type 
of technology in the context of decisions is only helpful if decisions can be 
improved. CDSS machines have already been object of ethical reflection [43]. 
Evaluating ethical decisions can be done on the level of the structure of the deci-
sion process as well as the medical and the ethical outcome. In this section, we 
suggest and discuss criteria for evaluating the process management as well as out-
come when using a DSS or SG.
Decision making in medicine is highly complex. Decisions about diagnosis and 
therapy need to be founded on a broad base of knowledge about all kinds of different 
conditions, symptoms and diagnostic tools. Furthermore, today the aim of a therapy is 
not always clear bringing up ethical questions: is it better to prolong life (in its quan-
tity) by all means or is it better to improve life quality, even at the cost of reducing 
life expectancy? Questions of life quality, patient autonomy and professional ethics 
also need to be taken into account in medical decision making adding to the already 
given complexity of medical decision making. (Wrong) decisions in medicine can 
have severe consequences including the death of patients but also moral distress or 
guilt to others. Different scenarios after a decision may exemplify this: accompanying 
a dying patient during his last days and letting the patient die in accordance with his 
wishes; providing a blood transfusion to a patient who is a Jehovah’s Witness against 
his wishes and thus survives; administering tube feeding to a highly demented patient 
and whose wishes are unclear. Decisions can be evaluated based on the outcome 
such as if the patient is still alive or dead as the most simple criterion. Other possible 
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dimensions are the gained life expectancy, the result of a therapy for the quality of 
life, but also the ethical dimension of the decision such as if the patient’s autonomy 
is respected, if the patient does not experience unnecessary harm, his beneficence is 
considered or relevant questions of justice solved in an acceptable way.
In order to change decision processes the structure of dilemma situations 
and how they can be avoided needs to be understood by doctors. Learning how 
to frame decisions therefore is an important step. Empirical research shows that 
textbook based teaching in ethics as well as ethical guidelines do not lead to the 
desired effect [61]. Using Serious Games as a learning environment might enable 
experience based learning that provides insight into the possible consequences of 
different normative backgrounds in everyday decisions. Doctors need to experi-
ence how their own often intuitive interest in a situation can be made transparent 
and communicated to patients but also how different perspectives in a situation can 
be brought together and enable improvement in mutual understanding, empathy, 
and thus reduce potential conflict [17].
Using machines as learning environments might also help to overcome the 
above mentioned problems with usability and acceptance. To enable further reflec-
tion, it would also be interesting if users could introduce their own cases and 
experienced dilemmas, for example, by integrating characteristics of patients or 
persons involved.
Besides the decision making process, the outcome also needs to be evaluated. 
This seems to be an even more complicated task, due to intercultural differences 
and plurality of opinions. Therefore, using Serious Games can only be seen as 
a tool to initiate a reflection process but not as guiding decisions or even mak-
ing better decisions. One main aim of using Serious Games must be to strengthen 
responsibility in the sense that doctors get a growing sensibility for potential ethi-
cal problems, how to avoid them and how to moderate shared decision making 
processes between different parties. The aim of the implementation of SG teach-
ing ethics therefore is to explicitly place responsibility in the hands of doctors. 
Transferring ethical decisions to IT solutions would lead to the problem that the 
user is still responsible for the implementation of a decision and therefore needs to 
reflect upon the decision process, its criteria and possible outcomes. This implies 
having a deeper understanding of the ethical decision or, which is even more com-
plicated, to understand the algorithms of the technical solution.
Possible outcomes and the effects of ethical decision support should also be 
evaluated on the basis of norms. The four principles approach can be used as one 
that is broadly accepted and useful as a heuristic tool to detect ethical problems 
[7]. Evaluation criteria should meet with the criteria used within the learning envi-
ronment. Besides the four principles, aspects like truthfulness or confidentiality 
can play a role. It is important to mention that decisions should only be evaluated 
positively (within the system as well as an outcome of the system), if they cohere 
with the legal framework and existing binding ethical codes and guidelines (for 
example by medical associations) applicable in this field. The applications there-
fore should be culturally sensitive and the criteria, values or norms used for evalu-
ation obtained from the communities affected by the modeled decisions.
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6  Conclusions
In order to achieve its task of improving ethical decisions in clinical settings, 
Serious Games and other types of DSSs need to satisfy high standards. It seems 
that the high complexity of decision making can be met by using specific types 
of serious games that do not over simplify ethical dilemmas. Such systems can 
integrate a short and long perspective and enable learning with regard to deci-
sion processes as well as norms and principles. Though there is a reluctance to 
use machine support in medicine, the possibilities of experience based learning 
should be considered as an important aspect of behavioral change that could 
be used to improve the ethical quality of decisions in medicine. Serious Games 
can be used in order to encourage a change of medical behavior, and to enrich 
CDSS’s with a learning stance and opportunity to grade and improve on current 
systems.
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Abstract The purpose of this chapter is to introduce and critically assess the prospect 
of “robotic assisted dying”, i.e., the use of (semi-) autonomous robots for the purpose 
of assisting willing terminally ill patients in dying, in the medical context. The central 
conclusion reached here is this: Assuming that physician-assisted suicide is morally 
permissible, if we develop robots to serve as human caregivers in medical contexts 
(‘carebots’), and given that assistance in dying is sometimes an important aspect of 
geriatric care, it is morally permissible for such robots to be able to facilitate and assist 
in the dying of those patients, in those contexts, at the eligible patient’s sound request. 
At least, there is nothing inherent in this prospect that introduces moral problems 
beyond those attached to the development and use of geriatric carebots or (human) 
physician-assisted suicide in general. One major benefit of robotic assisted dying is 
that the robot would always assist those consenting patients that are genuinely eligi-
ble, and thus such patients would not be at the mercy of a willing physician clause in 
order to have some control over the timing and manner of their death (something that 
routinely usurps the effectiveness of human physician-assisted suicide in practice). 
1  Introduction
Sophisticated robots are already in use for various purposes in medical and healthcare 
contexts, including robotic surgery, artificially intelligent diagnosticians—the latest 
task of the famous Watson robot1—and robots designed to provide various forms of 
1
 http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/03/the-robot-will-see-you-now/309216/.
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geriatric care (so-called carebots). As this technology becomes more advanced, 
robots may come to be designed for carrying out other medically related tasks as 
well, and their level of autonomy will likely increase, as it has in other areas (e.g., 
aviation and military settings).
No one has yet seriously considered the prospect of developing and using 
(semi-) autonomous robots for the purpose of replacing or supplementing human 
physicians in the context of physician-assisted dying. At the same time, within the 
contemporary literature on machine ethics, there have already been a number of 
intersections drawn between robotics and suicide, including:
1. The development of machines to replace human workers as a response to unac-
ceptably high human suicide rates. For example, Foxconn intends on replacing 
human workers with robots in several of its factories, as a response to recent 
tragic events in those factories. The underlying idea is to replace human work-
ers with robots—working in borderline torturous and inhumane factory condi-
tions—in order to decrease suicide rates among human workers in those lousy 
working conditions, in a cost effective manner, and without compromising pro-
ductivity.2 One commentator has recently asked: “If people are being deprived 
of their rights to wellbeing and dignity and a number are throwing themselves 
off the roofs of the factories, would it not be better to be replaced by robots?”. 
2. In a different context, some researchers have proposed the development of 
“self-sacrificing machines” to be used to human advantage on the battlefield. 
The inclination towards self-preservation in conditions of war, something 
that is typical of human combatants, could be “turned off” or simply not pro-
grammed into automated military robots, resulting in lethal robotic soldiers 
without a concern for their own self-preservation [1, 2]. Sending human sol-
diers to perform certain kinds of military tasks may be to demand too much of 
them. Yet, programming robots to execute the same “suicide” missions would, 
presumably, be ethically permissible, given that robots do not have (e.g.,) a 
right to life, or a sake of their own that deserves to be respected.
3. Given a certain high level of sophistication of robot technology, we can imag-
ine the self-destruction of self-perceived morally deplorable robots in certain 
situations [9]: If “moral machines” are ever developed to the point where they 
take their morality seriously, they will inquire whether their existence, for the 
purpose of performing the sort of task that they have been programmed to per-
form, is consistent with the moral framework that they are designed to follow. 
In some cases, perhaps, these robots would be inclined to self-destruct—to 
commit suicide—in order to behave in line with their ingrained moral code. For 
example, if creating robots for the purpose of killing humans in war is incon-
sistent with (e.g.,) a Kantian-inspired moral framework, then we have good 
reason not to program those robots to abide by that Kantian-inspired moral 
2
 19 people committed suicide in Foxconn factories in 2010–2011, and one potential solution 
that has been offered for this problem is to replace human workers with robots. See http://www.
guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/aug/02/foxconn-robots-worker-suicides.
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framework, or else risk their willful self-destruction. In such cases, to commit 
suicide would be the moral thing for the (Kantian) machine to do, given the cir-
cumstances, in order to promote (Kantian) morality as much as possible;
In addition to these, one manner in which artificial intelligence and robotics 
research could intersect with suicide is in the medical context, with respect to 
end of life care specifically. A long standing and complex moral debate continues 
about whether and under what circumstances (human) physicians ought to assist 
their patients to commit suicide, at the patient’s sound request. Rather than having 
human physicians oversee and execute physician-assisted dying, perhaps robots 
could be programmed to do so instead. In this chapter, I am interested in this pros-
pect of developing and using (semi-) autonomous machines for the purpose of aid-
ing patients in terminating their lives (what I call “robotic assisted dying”), and the 
ethical issues attached to it.
The morality of the development and use of (semi-) autonomous robots for the 
purpose of aiding willing patients in ending their lives is partly dependent on the 
morality of assisted dying more generally: If physician-assisted suicide is always 
morally impermissible, then it is likely that developing and using robots for this 
purpose would be immoral as well. Yet, here I will assume that physician-assisted 
suicide is morally permissible, at least under certain well-defined conditions (e.g., 
where the patient makes a sound request, is terminally ill, is suffering from signifi-
cant/irremediable pain, and willingly consents to such assistance in dying). Thus, I 
can qualify my account by focusing on jurisdictions that currently allow physi-
cian-assisted suicide, where the presumed received morality sides in favor of 
allowing assisted suicide more generally. These jurisdictions include places such 
as Switzerland, Belgium, the Netherlands, and several American states, including 
Oregon, Washington and Montana.3 Other countries seem to be following suit 
(e.g., Canada and Australia).
Even if human physician-assisted suicide is morally permissible, however, it 
does not automatically follow that robotic assisted suicide is morally permissi-
ble as well. Before examining some of the relevant theoretical and ethical issues 
(Sects. 2 and 3 respectively), in the next section I draw a picture of what this sort 
of robot might look like.
2  Robots for Assisting Patients in Dying
As with other applications of robotics and artificial intelligence research, the 
prospect of robotic assisted dying has already been envisioned in science fic-
tion. To take one example, in several episodes of the animated television program 
3
 http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/physician-assisted-suicide-the-case-for-legaliza-
tion-1.1314119.
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Futurama, viewers are presented with “suicide machines”, designed as a sort of 
terminal phone booth-like contraption, where prospective clients could be eutha-
nized after depositing the required fee into the coin slot. Rather than dispensing 
candy or cola, these fictional machines are designed for the purpose of killing the 
occupant of the booth. (One issue with such “euthenization booths” is that they do 
not seem to discriminate about who is eligible to receive such assistance; anyone 
that pays the fee receives the “service”. This will not be the case with the sort of 
robots that I have in mind here, which will discriminate based on patient eligibil-
ity, and there will not necessarily be any required payment for their services).
In reality, the closest we have so far come to developing machines for physi-
cian-assisted dying is the “death machine” invented and used by Jack Kevorkian 
(and other machines like it). The main difference between Kevorkian’s invention 
and the sort of robot imagined here is the extent to which the machine is autono-
mous, and thus the extent to which humans could be taken out of the loop without 
compromising the morality and effectiveness of the act of assisted death itself. The 
sort of machine hypothesized here could presumably play the role that Kevorkian 
and his machine played, rather than being merely used by human physicians.
There are different ways we can imagine such robots becoming manifest. For 
example, in theory at least, they could be used as a computational tool for gaining 
and evaluating informed consent from the patient, in an unbiased and systematic 
manner, in addition to being “pill dispensers”, to patients that have satisfied the 
relevant criteria for being eligible to receive such help in dying. They could be 
available for use in the clinical or hospital setting, but also, perhaps, in any setting 
where a patient could receive medical care near the end of her life.
In order to spark the imagination a bit, it may help to consider the context of 
contemporary automated banking, or similar practices that are becoming increas-
ingly automated, like the modern process of booking and navigating international 
air travel. In these and other contexts, machines of a significant level of sophisti-
cation are already in use, where they can gain information about the client, sub-
stantiate that information, provide options and services for the client, etc., and do 
so with increasing levels of independence from (direct) human oversight. While 
there are still demands put on the client for providing the required information, 
for following instructions, for making decisions based on the recommendations 
of the machine, etc., the role of the machine is extensive. It is an assumption of 
this chapter—and I take it to be a plausible one—that robots could be designed to 
oversee and facilitate what has until now been the role of human physicians in the 
context of assisted suicide in the medical context, as they are coming to oversee 
and manage other complex tasks in non-medical settings, with little to no human 
involvement necessary.
Here I am considering robots that could effectively stand in for those humans 
ordinarily necessary for designing and implementing an effective context of 
assisted suicide. This is not to imply the absence of human involvement and over-
sight altogether—something which may all along be necessary, as we hand over 
the care and treatment of humans to machines. But, it is to take seriously the (pres-
ently hypothetical) prospect that such robots could manage contexts of assisted 
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dying effectively and efficiently, from hearing and evaluating a patient’s request 
for assistance in hastening her death, to prescribing (or perhaps dispensing) the 
pharmaceutical means and the necessary instructions for doing so effectively. Such 
machines could be programmed to rigorously adhere to protocols for ensuring 
safety, effectiveness, and meeting demands of social justice, etc. Such robots could 
be uploaded with intricate and detailed patient medical histories, information 
about treatment options and prognosis, details of current law and relevant proto-
cols surrounding physician-assisted suicide, etc. While here I will be assuming 
that the use of such robots demands a certain level of mobility by the patient, this 
need not be the case. It seems plausible to imagine the development of robots such 
as RI-MAN4 to the point where they will be able to maneuver their environments 
successfully in real time, including the handling of immobile patients, and thus be 
able to accommodate the needs of immobile patients (as well as those that are 
mobile).
If these hypothetical machines were functioning optimally, they could have the 
capacity to (a) inform patients about their diagnosis, prognosis, and treatment 
options (something Watson is currently being programmed to do), (b) assess the 
patient’s degree of rational consent to the assisted dying (in some sense, a sort of 
reverse Turing Test, assessing the competence of the patient, rather than his or her 
intelligence), and assess the level of understanding of the patient with regards to 
the relevant information—something busy human physicians may not always have 
the time to do satisfactorily; (c) ensure that the patient can self-administer the 
drugs; (d) notify the patient’s next of kin; and (e) distribute or prescribe the means 
and instructions necessary for aiding the patient in reaching their termination 
effectively, and in a way that helps maintain and promote the patient’s dignity 
(their “right to determine the timing and manner of their death”). Thus, the robot 
could ensure that all of the tenets of (e.g.,) Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act are 
accommodated.5 
With machines of a sufficient level of sophistication, all of this could be 
accomplished without any direct involvement from human medical professionals, 
although, as already mentioned, we may want to keep humans in the loop to some 
extent (e.g., as secondary officials for signing off on requests for assisted suicide, 
for offering second opinions for, or consultations on, diagnoses, as assessors of 
safety and effectiveness of these robots in practice, etc.). Indeed, built into legisla-
tion like that of The Death with Dignity Act is the clause that several physicians 
must agree on diagnosis and independently certify patient mental status, and that 
there must be witnesses of the written request procedure (after two verbal requests 
have already been made) that are not the attending physician or members of the 
patient’s family. One such witness could be the robot, and one of the “physicians” 
could be the robot. Importantly, this clause ensures that humans would stay in the 
loop, to some extent.
4
 http://rtc.nagoya.riken.jp/RI-MAN/index_us.html.
5
 http://public.health.oregon.gov/ProviderPartnerResources/EvaluationResearch/DeathwithDignity 
Act/Pages/index.aspx.
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I accept it as a premise that the development of such machines is a genuine pos-
sibility, given current and foreseeable developments in robotics and artificial intel-
ligence research.6 Here I also assume, without much argument, that these robots 
could be used safely and effectively in the context of assisted dying, recognizing 
this for the open empirical issue that it is. If these robots could not be used safely 
or effectively, then this would be very good reason to reject this project altogether. 
At the same time, there is no reason to believe that such safety and effectiveness is 
a technological or practical impossibility. And, studies could be designed during 
the prototype phases of developing those robots, and their safety and effectiveness 
could be assessed prior to their use in practice. Mock scenarios of assisted dying 
could be acted out, where the confederate simply does not consume the pills that 
they have been prescribed by the robot (say). This would give us a good indication 
of whether the robot could manage practical contexts of assisted suicide safely and 
effectively, prior to its dealing with real patients.
2.1  Theoretical Considerations
What is under direct ethical analysis here is not the morality of physician-assisted 
dying (something I am assuming to be morally permissible), but rather whether the 
development and use of (semi-) autonomous robots for this purpose is itself mor-
ally permissible. One general medical ethic that we may appeal to—and it is impor-
tant to stress that there are others, a discussion of which is beyond the scope of this 
chapter—is the principle-based medical ethic developed by Beauchamp & Childress 
[3] (most recently in 2013), which takes justice, autonomy, beneficence and non-
maleficence as central moral principles for tackling complex bioethical issues. I 
want to suggest that, prima facie at least, there is nothing about this prospect that 
would necessarily violate any of these principles, beyond which accompany human 
physician-assisted suicide. Thus, there is nothing inherent in robotic assisted dying 
that would be unjust, or unduly restrict the autonomy of the patient, or unduly harm 
the patient, beyond the ways that human physician-assisted suicide could.
All of the requirements of justice in human physician-assisted dying would pre-
sumably be in place in the context of robotic assisted dying as well. Safeguards 
and regulations could also be put in place to ensure that all those that are eligible 
for access could have access, and that no one that does not desire access is killed. 
And, as humans would be the ones programming such robots, there is no real risk 
of these machines initiating a slippery slope (i.e., to begin to become more inclu-
sive or less strict in what cases they allow for assisted suicide) since this would 
require humans to go down that slope first, and then for them to reprogram the 
robots to follow suit.
6
 I acknowledge this as the empirical and controversial claim that it is. For a less optimistic view, 
see Sparrow and Sparrow [7].
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With respect to patient autonomy, nothing new emerges in cases where (semi-) 
autonomous robots are doing the assisting that is not already present in cases 
where human physicians or palliative care workers are doing the assisting. We 
would still only allow assisted suicide in cases where the patient has made an 
autonomous request for it, and where she is terminally ill and/or in severe (irre-
mediable) pain. There would still be measures in place to ensure that informed 
consent procedures have been observed, and that the patient is sufficiently 
rational and autonomous in their decision-making; indeed, such safety measures 
could be programmed into the very interface of the robot itself. Moreover, such 
machines would not be programmed with the ability to paternalistically over-
rule sound requests of the patient, which is especially important in cases where 
the patient expressly asks not to be killed (although such cases may not emerge 
in practice, for these robots would only have access to patients that have sought 
out their assistance), or in cases where she has requested assistance in dying but 
later changes her mind. Somewhat ironically, given a sufficient level of autonomy 
in the machine, not only does robotic assisted suicide not seem to threaten patient 
autonomy, but indeed seems to promote it more so than human physician-assisted 
suicide could in practice. Without being left to the idiosyncrasies and fallibilities 
of human physicians, or indeed to their being willing to provide assistance in the 
first place, the seeker of robotic assisted suicide could have more control over the 
timing and manner of their death. To take but one example: Ordinarily there is a 
regulated time delay (e.g., 15 days) between patient request for assistance and the 
prescription of the required drugs by the physician. But, very often (busy, or per-
haps somewhat reluctant) physicians take longer than this to provide the prescrip-
tion, placing undue delays in honoring the patient’s sound request. Robots could 
more effectively adhere to regulated timelines.
The same procedural rigor in robotic assisted dying that is present in contexts 
of (legal) human physician assisted-suicide, coupled with continued human over-
sight, would go a long way—perhaps all the way—towards avoiding system mal-
functions leading to undesired outcomes for the unwieldy patient. Insofar as we 
have proven safety and effectiveness in our rigorous analysis of the functioning 
of prototypes of such robots, there is no reason to believe that using robots in this 
context raises issues of potential harm to the patient, beyond those that are present 
in the context of human physician-assisted suicide already.
From these (admittedly brief) remarks, it seems that having the robot assist 
in the suicide of patients does not introduce moral problems beyond those that 
already accompany human physician-assisted suicide (a practice that we are 
assuming is morally permissible), at least not any in terms of justice, autonomy, 
beneficence, or non-maleficence, and thus no clear red lights have emerged from 
our analysis thus far.
The most obvious and straightforward way to introduce such machines is 
through equipping those carebots that come to exist with the ability to assist in 
the suicide of the patients that they care for (at the patient’s sound request). Yet, 
some have argued that the development of carebots itself may be morally dubious 
(e.g., [7]). My goal in the remainder of this section is to discover whether there is 
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anything about using such robots also for aiding in the assisted dying of patients 
that is morally problematic, beyond the extent to which these worries may be 
 legitimate threats against carebots more generally; if we assume the moral permis-
sibility of carebots, are there any corresponding moral concerns that are specific to 
robotic assisted dying?
If developing carebots in general is morally impermissible or imprudent, then 
developing these robots to also assist in the suicide of patients would likely be 
morally dubious as well. Yet, at the same time, there could be good independent 
reason to develop robots for assisting in patient suicide, and thus the moral stand-
ing of these machines does not necessarily depend on the morality of carebots 
in general. (One such reason, which I consider in detail later on, is the extent to 
which robots could help to bypass the “willing physician clause” that often pre-
vents otherwise eligible patients from receiving assistance in dying). As shown 
below, the moral issues with carebots in general considered here do not accom-
pany robotic assisted dying taken in isolation.
The two main worries mounted against geriatric carebots that I would like to 
consider are the potential negative impacts on the dignity of patients under the 
care of such robots, and the extent to which the widespread use of such robots 
would eliminate a central and important human element (including human con-
tact) from the context of care. Some commentators on robotic geriatric care have 
worried about issues of dignity, loneliness, and the removal or absence of human 
contact from the context of care. Patients in these contexts are already vulnerable, 
and replacing their human carers with robots would exacerbate these problems, at 
least so the worry goes.
Could a person that is assisted in dying by a robot “die with dignity”? The 
first thing to note is that, just because a robot is now included in the loop, it does 
not mean that no humans would be in the loop. As noted earlier, there is good 
reason to keep humans in the loop, even if robots could effectively manage this 
context all by themselves. A second thing to note is that, in robotic assisted dying 
as in human physician-assisted suicide, the patient is still the one killing herself, 
and thus it does not make sense to argue that the “robotic death” is undignified 
because it is caused by the robot, for it is not. However, we might worry that 
involving the robot on the front line in the context of assisted suicide would some-
how compromise the dignity of the patient seeking assistance. For instance, one 
way that human dignity could be compromised is if the patient is disrespected or 
exploited through robotic assisted dying.
This sort of worry, however, is misplaced. There is nothing about the context of 
robotic assisted dying that would prevent the patient from being respected, as long 
as their autonomy was itself respected, something the robot would be programmed 
to monitor and champion. Indeed, the robot could not treat the patient in any way(s) 
beyond a very restricted set of actions, e.g., asking her some questions, assessing her 
competence, prescribing drugs, etc., and would thus not be programmed to perform 
any actions or to treat the patient in any way that would be disrespectful to her or 
exploit her. If the robot was functioning optimally, it would not deny assistance to 
any patient that qualifies, and would not kill any patient that did not desire to die.
215Ethics of Robotic Assisted Dying
The worry about respecting human dignity is closely linked to the second main 
worry that I would like to discuss, namely the absence of human interaction and 
contact (at the end of life). Dying alone, without any one else around other than 
a robot, seems to strip the patient of some dignity, or an important good (i.e., 
human contact), and, because of this, is morally suspect. Robotic care (and muta-
tis mutandis robotic assisted dying) is impersonal in nature and, in theory, could 
occur without any direct human involvement. Because of this, the patient would 
lose out on human contact that she may otherwise receive, if she was cared for by 
humans (at the end of her life).
But, to reiterate, the inclusion of robots in this context would not eliminate oth-
ers (humans) from being present in this context as well. Moreover, if (in some, 
tragic cases) the arbiter of assistance in suicide is the only contender for con-
tact at the end of a particular patient’s life, then it may not really matter whether 
such limited contact is human or robotic, for she would “die alone” regardless. 
Furthermore, nothing about robotic assisted dying denies the presence of (human) 
family and loved ones from being present at every stage of the process. Indeed, as 
with contemporary physician-assisted suicide legislation and protocols, it could be 
part of the robot’s programming to demand that some human involvement (e.g., 
a support system for the patient) be present, or at least the robot could be pro-
grammed to encourage such human contact throughout the process (e.g., by con-
tacting next of kin on behalf of the patient, say). One might even speculate that, 
knowing that a robot is involved with such an important aspect of the patient’s 
care, may motivate otherwise reluctant human caregivers and kin to become more 
involved than they otherwise might have been.
There is no reason to believe that robotic assisted death could be any more 
undignified than human assisted death (if it is), or that the patient that receives 
assistance in dying from a robot, rather than a human physician, would necessar-
ily have less human contact or be more (or less) lonely at the end of her life. Thus, 
if we are willing to allow human physician-assisted suicide, in the face of the 
potential threats of compromising patient dignity and insufficient human contact, 
then these concerns should not be regarded as sufficient to reject robotic assisted 
dying either. While it could turn out that widespread use of carebots in general 
contributes to loneliness, loss of human contact, or strip dignity from the context 
of care—I am not assessing these claims here—they do not pose a challenge to 
robotic assisted dying specifically.
3  The Ethics of Robotic Assisted Suicide
To some, the prospect of robotic assisted suicide will be met with disapproval, 
and perhaps even disgust. Despite what has been argued for so far, the thought of 
developing robots for the purpose of killing humans may seem to be (inherently) 
morally unacceptable. Indeed, we may expect the sort of uproar that emerged once 
the public became aware of the existence and use of Kevorkian’s “death machine”.
216 R. Tonkens
Why might we consider the prospect of robotic assisted dying at all? One 
 reason to consider the prospect of developing and using robots for the purpose of 
assisted dying is to maintain consistency in our practical morality. I have in mind 
here the idea of aligning our moral ideals across different contexts (e.g., the mili-
tary and medical contexts). We already do allow the development and use of cer-
tain kinds of “killer robots” [6] in certain contexts. The paradigmatic example here 
is the development and use of semi-autonomous machines for military and armed 
defence initiatives. It is not a far stretch to imagine the use of machines for aiding 
humans in committing suicide, something they desire and consent to. While those 
that are uncomfortable with the prospect of developing robots for assisting patients 
to die may also be uncomfortable with developing autonomous lethal robotic sys-
tems for military use, there is some precedent here already, and we should not dis-
miss either prospect out of hand, without good argument.7. 
Although there are some passionate supporters of developing and using autono-
mous lethal robotic systems in the context of warfare, this enterprise has also 
attracted sustained criticism. For example, recently [5] have argued that developing 
robots for the purpose of killing humans on the battlefield is morally unacceptable 
since “doing so disrespects the inherent dignity of the human, such robots cannot 
fully understand the seriousness of killing a human, and the use of such machines 
violates military honor.” While I am sympathetic to this sort of position with respect 
to the military context [8], there may be relevant dissimilarities between robotic kill-
ers in war and robotic assisted suicide in the medical context.
For instance, (1) as argued for above, there may be nothing (inherently) unjust 
or undignified about robotic assisted dying in the medical context, given sound 
patient consent practices. Part of what makes death by military robots undigni-
fied or disrespectful (if it is) is that typical human soldiers do not have a chance 
against a robot (and the human soldier does not want to die), and such robots do 
not have anything of comparable moral worth at stake. Yet, in the context of physi-
cian-assisted dying, the patient has made a considered request to die, in a manner 
that she believes offers herself a better chance at maintaining her dignity than she 
would be afforded through succumbing to the terminal illness from which she suf-
fers. (The general disgust generated by Kevorkian’s use of the “death machine” 
may not have been so much to do with the means of assisting his patients in dying, 
but rather disgust at the very idea that he was assisting in their dying); (2) if the 
appropriate use of technology is to (in part) benefit humans, then aiding in facili-
tating the sound end-of-life decisions of terminally ill patients may actually be a 
good use of technology, rather than an ignoble one; and (3) such robots would not 
need to understand the seriousness of aiding patients to commit suicide (and the 
seriousness of death more generally) beyond ensuring autonomous and informed 
7
 Elsewhere [8], I have argued that autonomous robots should be programmed to be pacifists 
(rather than ‘warists’). While I will not argue for it here, there is nothing about robotic assisted 
dying that would be inconsistent with that view, despite the fact that such robots would be con-
tributing to the death of their human patients (at the patient’s sound request).
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consent from those patients, and thus that the patient has good reason to request 
assistance in dying, and has pursued this course of action in the absence of undue 
coercion. The robot would be equipped with the ability to assess the extent to 
which the patient understands the seriousness of her request and the outcomes of 
that request, but need not itself understand anything more about human death, and 
what it means for a human to die. What matters here, and something that is not 
necessarily present in the corresponding military context, is that the patient desires 
to die, for good reasons, and is seeking assistance in doing so, from the robot—in 
the great majority of cases because she cannot bring her own death upon herself in 
the desired manner without assistance.
The final of Johnson and Axinn’s charges (i.e., disrespect of military honor), 
when transferred to the medical context, may be more challenging to overcome, 
given that the medical ethic has traditionally been grounded on promoting the 
health (and life) of patients under the care of medical professionals, rather than to 
hasten their death—even, it is thought by many, when those patients make a sound 
request for them to do so and are terminally ill. I return to this issue later in this 
section.
There are other reasons to consider the prospect of robotic assisted dying. 
However speculative it may be at present, robots could be better at negotiat-
ing certain aspects of the context of physician-assisted suicide than human phy-
sicians, especially considering that they need not be programmed with certain 
psychological and emotional underpinnings, or could be programmed with some 
(e.g., empathy and compassion) but not others (e.g., discrimination, bias, capac-
ity to experience stress or fatigue, etc.). Moreover, just as Watson proved to be 
a superior expert in trivia than its human competitors, it could also be the case 
that Watson will be superior to typical human physicians at diagnosis and progno-
sis, running patient medical histories, reliably assessing patient competence, etc. 
And, given its computational abilities, it may also be more thorough and attentive 
to detail when assessing patient requests, consent, etc., in the context of assisted 
dying. If robots could be better at assisting patients at the end of life (or in certain 
aspects of that context), then this would be good reason to introduce robots for that 
purpose.
A stronger reason for considering the prospect of robotic assisted suicide in 
the medical context is because of the emergence of geriatric care robots, espe-
cially in countries that are expecting an influx of elderly citizens requiring care 
(e.g., North America, Denmark and Japan), and especially where the number of 
human workers and caregivers will be far fewer than that required to offer accept-
able (and affordable) care for those people. As physician-assisted suicide becomes 
more widely accepted, to the point where it is becoming an important element 
of an expanding scope of end of life contexts for a growing number of people, 
and given that there has been a strong recent surge in the development of (semi-) 
autonomous robots for relief/aid in the geriatric care sector in many jurisdictions, 
then it seems plausible to ask whether these geriatric care robots might also be 
equipped with the ability to diagnose, evaluate, and aid in the end of life decision 
making of those people under their care, including facilitating the patient’s end 
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of life decisions. Thus, given that (semi-) autonomous carebots play a significant 
role in the care of patients already (or are likely to do so in the near term future), 
and that part of that care may often involve decisions and actions at the end of that 
patient’s life, then it makes sense to equip such robots to be able to handle those 
contexts. This point is strengthened to the extent that the arguments of the previ-
ous section are on track as well.
To the best of my knowledge, no one has yet suggested that such robots should 
be able to willingly contribute to bringing about the death of the people with 
whose care they have been entrusted; to the contrary, the assumption has so far 
been that such robots would work towards maintaining and promoting the life and 
quality of life of their patients. Yet, in related contexts, such as palliative care and 
hospice settings, it is no longer uncommon for part of care at the end of life to 
consist of aiding the person cared for to die in a manner of their discretion (within 
reason), something that is thought to promote the autonomy and dignity of that 
patient, at a time where they are especially vulnerable.
Perhaps the strongest reason in favor of considering the development and use of 
robots for assisted suicide has to do with the practical limitations of human physi-
cian-assisted suicide. A major roadblock for advocates of (human) physician-
assisted suicide in practice has been the reluctance of many physicians to get on 
board, and to accept physician-assisted suicide as morally permissible, even in 
highly qualified (relatively uncontroversial) contexts. Not only do most jurisdic-
tions continue to have legal prohibitions on assisted suicide, but, even in those that 
do not, it is often difficult for patients to find the means and expertise to help them 
facilitate their end of life decisions. This is a complex issue, but it has at least two 
central elements: (a) the idea that “killing” or hastening the death of patients is 
against the ethic of medical professions (doctors, nurses, pharmacists, etc.), and 
(b) that physicians have the right to conscientiously object to certain kinds of 
requests made by their patients, in case those requests would require the physician 
to disregard or compromise important moral or religious beliefs of their own. At 
best, it seems that advocates of physician-assisted suicide are left confronted with 
a sort of willing physician clause, advocated by thinkers such as Dworkin et al. 
[4]: “patients in certain circumstances have a right that the state not forbid doctors 
to assist in their deaths, but they have no right to compel a doctor to assist them. 
The right in question, that is, is only a right to the help of a willing doctor.”8 
One possible way around this willing physician clause may be to develop 
robots that could stand in for human physicians. In this case, in places where such 
robots were available, there would always be a “willing physician”, i.e., an entity 
with the relevant expertise and ability to effectively and efficiently aid the termi-
nally ill patient with her suicide. In this way, the (putative) rights of patients to 
dictate the timing and manner of their death could be respected without infringing 
on the rights of their human physicians and caregivers, as the robot would be the 
one doing the assisting.
8
 http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1997/mar/27/assisted-suicide-the-philosophers- 
brief/?page=1
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Robots need not be programmed to have any religious beliefs of their own, 
and thus need not have any beliefs and values that would conflict with the idea of 
assisting in the death of a specific sort of patient—although such robots would be 
designed to respect the religious beliefs of their patients (in case this information 
became relevant in that context). Moreover, while we would expect the machines 
to behave morally, and thus to be programmed with and to follow a set of sound 
moral prescriptions, it would be an assumption of their very programming and 
design that certain instances of assisted dying just are morally permissible—inso-
far as these robots are developed to be used in countries and states that share that 
same moral ideal. Human physicians that do not honor the request of their patients 
for reasons of conscience (in jurisdictions where physician-assisted suicide is 
legal) do so not because they believe that the patient does not qualify. Rather, they 
do so because they believe that no patient should qualify, in the sense that aid-
ing in the death of patients is against personal or professional values. In the case 
of robotic assisted suicide, however, all genuine requests that meet the standards 
of informed consent, and where the patient is terminally ill and/or suffering from 
severe pain, would be honored by the robot, without sparking moral or religious 
conflict.
Those patients that qualify for receiving assistance in dying from medical pro-
fessionals in jurisdictions that allow physician-assisted suicide would be the same 
that qualify to receive such assistance from a robot, in those jurisdictions that 
allow physician-assisted suicide and have those robots available for use. Granting 
the morality of certain cases of physician-assisted dying would be consistent with 
their (professional) medical ethic, and thus no conflict could emerge here between 
the robot’s beliefs about the morality of assisted suicide in the medical context 
and the sound expressed desire of its patients to receive assistance in dying. While 
we would not want robots to abide by all requests for assisted death, but rather 
only those that are sound (i.e., are consistent with current law, meet informed con-
sent regulations, etc.), we would not need to program such robots with the abil-
ity to overrule, for reasons of its own, the sound request of terminally ill patients 
to assist in their dying. For these reasons, robotic assisted dying offers a way to 
side step the willing physician clause that often hovers over the context of (human) 
physician-assisted suicide, often even in jurisdictions where it is legal to assist in a 
patient’s death.
The promise of robotic assisted dying in this regard works from the other direc-
tion as well: while some human physicians are willing to aid their patients in their 
suicide, often despite the fact that they find it difficult and see some conflict with 
that action and their professional regulative ideals as healers and promoters of 
health, many of those physicians may be glad to have someone (something) else 
take over that role. While this is an empirical issue, it seems plausible to suggest 
that introducing robots for the purpose of organizing, facilitating and overseeing 
the context of assisted dying in the medical context would be welcomed by many 
human physicians, including some of which who are willing to help their patients 
die, given that they are the ones best positioned (qualified, knowledgeable, etc.) 
to do so, but feel regret at the prospect of dirtying their hands thereby. With the 
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introduction of robotic assisted dying, they would no longer need to do so, or feel 
pressure to do so, or need to mute their moral or religious beliefs in order to pro-
vide their patients will the care that they desire.
It should be noted, however, that others may be distraught by the existence of 
machines (housed in hospitals, say) that have the sole purpose of assisting in the 
death of certain classes of patients. Yet, despite the fact that there are no relevant 
moral differences between robotic and human assisted dying, these same people 
will likely have a similar attitude towards human physician-assisted suicide—a 
practice that routinely occurs, even in places where it continues to be illegal.
4  Conclusion
There will likely be some fear surrounding the thought of affording (semi-) auton-
omous robots with the ability to determine whether a patient should receive assis-
tance in dying, especially if the machine itself had the means and ability to kill 
the patient. The first way to respond to this worry is to emphasize that the sort of 
robot envisioned here would be programmed to prescribe a lethal dose of phar-
maceuticals at the qualified patient’s sound request, and the patient (alone) would 
always be in charge of taking her own life (rather than being killed by the robot). 
The prospect of such machines going rogue or malfunctioning would always be 
present (however minimal this threat may turn out to be in practice). Yet, this is 
always going to be an issue, even with human physicians. Keeping humans in the 
loop, and establishing strict regulations and safety protocols could mitigate this 
threat significantly. And, given that there are clear conditions that patients need 
to meet in order to be eligible for such assistance, the risk that robotic assisted 
suicide would be granted to patients that are not terminally ill, or do not meet the 
standards of informed consent, or have been misdiagnosed, etc., is miniscule (as 
it is presently in the case of human physician-assisted suicide in states that have 
legalized that practice).
Since this is the first philosophical analysis of the ethics of robotic assisted 
dying to appear in the literature, there is a risk that important points have been 
overlooked, and opposing arguments gone unconsidered. To be sure, our under-
standing of this novel and complex ethical issue will benefit from sustained dis-
cussion and continued research. With these concessions in mind, the central 
conclusion of this chapter is a conditional (and thus tentative) one: based on the 
arguments offered throughout this chapter, assuming that physician-assisted suicide 
is morally permissible, if we develop robots to serve as human caregivers in medi-
cal contexts, and given that assistance in dying is often an important aspect of that 
care (near the end of the patient’s life), it is morally permissible for such robots to 
be able to facilitate and assist in the dying of those patients, in those contexts, at 
the eligible patient’s sound request. At the very least, there is nothing inherent in 
this prospect that introduces moral problems beyond those attached to the develop-
ment and use of geriatric carebots in general or (human) physician-assisted suicide. 
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The most glaring benefit of robotic assisted dying is that the robot would always 
allow such assistance to those patients that are genuinely eligible, and thus their 
patients would not be at the mercy of a willing physician clause in order to have 
control over the timing and manner of their death.
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Abstract Greatly increased automation in medicine is probably inevitable. 
Artificial Intelligence (AI) is being introduced into medical practice is numer-
ous ways from machine diagnosis, through robot surgery to psychotherapy that 
is delivered entirely by computer. However, there are many ethical challenges 
involved. The emerging field of machine medical ethics currently lags behind 
medical practice and contains many unresolved debates. In aviation a very high 
level of automation has brought increased safety and efficiency. However, this was 
not achieved by simply building the technology and requiring professionals to use 
it. Lessons from the aviation industry suggest that issues of acceptance and resist-
ance by professionals can be successfully handled if they are fully engaged in the 
operational and procedural changes at all stages. Negotiation over procedures and 
responsibility for errors in aviation is complex and informative for other fields. 
If the aviation industry exemplifies the potential benefits, then the Information 
Technology (IT) industry, particularly AI, highlights the dangers. Since this indus-
try produces the ‘machine’ part of machine medical ethics, it is unfortunately 
necessary to observe that, historically the IT industry has demonstrated rather 
low standards of ethics and social responsibility. Improved ethical awareness and 
professionalism will be needed for IT professionals to achieve ethically accept-
able technology in medicine. Long-standing unresolved debates in IT ethics now 
need some conclusion. These include the ethical responsibility of IT professionals 
for unreliable technology or for human errors resulting from poor user interfaces. 
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Given the pace of progress in both technology and clinical practice, there is an 
urgent need for progress in machine medical ethics. A brief set of initial recom-
mendations is provided.
1  Introduction
Modern technology has the potential to influence medical practice to an unprec-
edented degree. Already Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems act as psychothera-
pists [1, 2] as diagnostic advisers [3] and AI is routinely built into many medical 
devices and online services. It is inevitable that this process of automation will 
continue. There is no doubt that AI can perform many of the functions of medical 
practitioners: largely because it is already doing so, in the lab if not in practice.
It is important to realize that, rather than a team of robots suddenly taking over 
a hospital. What we are observing is medical technology that simply gets pro-
gressively smarter. The fact that the change is gradual, rather than sudden, makes 
producing appropriate ethical responses more difficult. In many cases, the intro-
duction of automation is seen as just another tool for medical professionals to 
learn and as having no ethical consequences whatsoever. This view is incorrect. 
The sum total of these many small individual changes in medical technology will 
be fundamentally to change the ethical role of medical professionals. It also makes 
the role of other professionals, particularly those who design and build the tech-
nology, highly ethically significant.
It is important and urgent therefore, to provide ethical guidelines now. To wait 
for the process to develop is not helpful. There is no clear point in this gradual 
introduction of automation at which we can say that medical practice has changed 
significantly and therefore ethics and procedures should change. Instead, what is 
necessary is recognition of the gradual change process and clear steps to ensure 
that existing medical ethics are not circumvented or ignored.
This should most certainly not be read as pure conservatism about machine 
medical ethics. There is no doubt that the emerging field of machine medi-
cal ethics will generate many truly novel ethical problems. It is also impor-
tant not to produce regulations and guidelines which inhibit the development 
of new AI technologies which could have immensely positive ethical impacts. 
The position taken in this chapter is that there is already a process underway. 
The well-established field of medical ethics is being mingled with the much 
newer and, frankly often inadequate, field of technology ethics. The most 
urgent task therefore, is to prevent any lowering of ethical standards during the 
change process. A set of specific recommendations is provided at the end of 
this chapter.
Some salient features of this gradual change process can be usefully illustrated 
by looking at another field—that of aviation—which has progressively introduced 
a very high level of automation during the last 65 years.
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2  Lessons from Aviation
The aviation industry has pursued automation to a very high degree, most noticea-
bly in the period from 1947 to the present.1 There have been many problems but 
they have, to a large degree, been solved and the current trend is towards even 
higher levels of automation. Aviation is therefore an important source of lessons 
for other disciplines. It is crucial to note that these are lessons and what is not 
being suggested here is any slavish direct imitation of aviation practices.2
Automation was introduced gradually into aviation. This is an important point 
with respect to the likely pace of its introduction into medicine. In 1947, most air-
line pilots (and their managers) were ex-military with flying skills honed in highly 
dangerous skies. They often had a great deal of physical courage and strong belief 
in their own abilities. This led in turn to resistance to the very idea of automa-
tion. It would, they claimed; tend to inhibit their ability to take the initiative and 
to solve problems in real time. These attitudes were remarkably similar to those 
observed more recently in medical practitioners [6].
Early automation was simply designed to help pilots and to ease the, often 
extremely physically demanding, workload of controlling airliners on long flights. 
Autopilots had been developed well before 1947—the first licensing of an auto-
pilot in civilian air transport was in 1931—but their use was obvious and attrac-
tive to aircrew and management. They simply relieved pilots of the tedious task 
of manipulating the flight controls for what could be many hours during a long-
distance flight.
Early acceptance of autopilots was probably greatly aided by the fact that they 
could be switched off. Until the 21st Century it was an established principle that 
pilots should be able to override or switch off an autopilot at any time. As defec-
tive autopilot input was detected as a contributory factor in a small number avia-
tion incidents and accidents, pilot training was required to include the retaking of 
control in a timely manner from a defective autopilot. It is not clear how common 
this sort of training is in current medical practice but it is something worthy of 
serious consideration.
The post 1947 period also benefitted from the great advances that had been 
made in radar and in radio navigation techniques during World War 2. As the 
modern aviation industry developed, it was inevitable that this technology would 
progressively replace individual initiative in navigating airliners. Pilots had to 
accept the authority of ground-based Air Traffic Controllers: first over busy air-
ports and then over busy pieces of sky. There was resistance, of course. However, 
1
 1947 is the year in which The Convention on International Civil Aviation, sometimes known as 
The Chicago Convention 1944, became effective. It was, in many important ways, the beginning 
of modern, regulated civil aviation [4].
2
 Nor is being suggested that the historical process of automation in aviation has run its course. 
There are many current scientific debates on the process of automation and on just how much of 
the flying task can usefully be taken out of human control Sheridan and Parasuraman [5].
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the air transport industry openly declared a primary focus on achieving greater 
safety and most individual changes in aviation practice could be clearly justified 
in terms of increased safety. These changes did indeed result in progressive loss of 
opportunities for pilots to take the initiative under many circumstances. However, 
they also resulted in clear and measurable improvements in safety. Modern pilots 
are no less skilled than those of the 1940 and 1950s. There is no doubt that they 
have become skilled in different ways and that the daily work of aviation profes-
sionals has changed out of all recognition. A similar change in the skills of health-
care professionals is now taking place.
The flight controls of modern airliners are also highly automated. The big-
gest single leap forward was the Airbus 320 series which introduced the concept 
of “fly-by-wire.” In fly-by-wire aircraft the pilots’ control inputs are no longer 
directly connected to the aerodynamic surfaces of the aircraft. A bank of comput-
ers handles the aerodynamic task of flying the aircraft. The human pilots essen-
tially program high-level commands as to where the aircraft is to go—all the 
details of how actually to fly to this point are handled by the computers. Fly-by-
wire enables more efficient flight since the computers automatically optimize the 
aerodynamic profile of the aircraft resulting in fuel saving. It is true that aviation is 
easier to convert into routine than is medicine but there are many routine tasks in 
medicine which will soon be automated in this way—mainly to optimize the use 
of an expensive resource: the time of skilled professionals.
Of more relevance to this chapter are the effects of the introduction of fly-by-
wire on safety. Here the picture is more confusing and, to some extent, debatable. 
The protection built into fly-by-wire systems, particularly those of the recent prod-
ucts of Airbus3 prevent pilots taking the aircraft out of the “normal flight enve-
lope.” That is to say that the computers can ignore any pilot control inputs which 
would put the aircraft in a dangerous flight condition. In principle, this should 
result in a great increase in safety but the safety gains have only been partial. 
There have been a number of accidents and incidents involving highly automated 
aircraft. It is important to learn from these and apply the lessons in medicine. 
More devices will soon appear, specifically designed to prevent medical profes-
sionals from operating outside the medical equivalent of a “normal flight enve-
lope.” Just as in aviation, this will seem at first glance to provide clear safety 
benefits. However, the lesson of aviation is that these can follow only from 
changes in training and procedures.
In their paper Automation Surprises Sarter et al. [7] identify a number of 
unexpected problems that developed with human-automation interaction in avia-
tion. These include complacency and trust in automation, new opportunities for 
new kinds of error, and the fact that automation does not always reduce work-
load because it causes very uneven distribution of workload. All the above are 
3
 Although Airbus introduced the first fly-by-wire airliner and have continued to develop the 
concept further, almost all contemporary manufacturers of airliners have adopted this concept to 
some degree.
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of great relevance in the field of medicine but most directly relevant to machine 
medical ethics are two further unexpected issues. These are the need for different 
approaches to training and the need for different approaches to co-ordination.
Essentially, they say, those who design and introduce automation assume that it 
simply substitutes for human activity but this is rarely, if ever, the case in practice. 
The problem of automation causing a concentration of workload at crucial times 
has been noted in the reports on certain aviation accidents.4 The need to train flight 
crews specifically to handle automation, rather than merely handling flying has 
been long established in aviation. It is now becoming vital in medicine to train 
doctors specifically to handle automation rather than merely to handle medicine.
3  Lessons from IT
The experience of the aviation industry suggests that automation effects will be 
largely positive although there are clear problems to be solved. The specter of AI 
outperforming and displacing human medical expertise is also nullified by the avi-
ation example. Human physicians will almost certainly learn to co-operate with 
AI in medicine, just as human aviators learned to fly fully-automated aircraft. This 
proved challenging but not impossible.
Some less positive warnings are provided by the IT industry. Whereas the avia-
tion industry, like medicine, is highly regulated, the IT industry is barely regulated 
at all. Just as the public expects their airline pilots to be licensed and to have dem-
onstrated their ability to fly in a recent skills check, they also expect the mechan-
ics who serviced the aircraft before the flight to hold the appropriate licenses. 
Medicine too has an established licensing structure and, for the most part, the pub-
lic has no problem seeing the dangers inherent in allowing unqualified doctors to 
practice.
It is remarkable therefore, if not downright alarming, that these highly qualified 
practitioners can and do base crucial decisions in their daily practice on software 
that has been produced entirely by gifted amateurs.5 Experts in IT need have no 
formal qualifications and need conform to no professional standards. It is true that 
some IT workers do take professionalism and professional standards seriously but 
the vast majority prefer to remain outside such structures.
Of course IT is a lot younger than medicine and about half the age of aviation. 
There is maybe still time for it to adopt more professional attitudes but it would 
4
 [8], AA965: near Buga, Colombia, December 20, 1995.
5
 There are many specific qualifications in programming and software but almost no formal 
requirements for any individual programmer or software designer to actually hold them. Many 
professional organizations, in particular BCS, The Chartered Institute for IT, are working to 
change this but the IT industry is very resistant to any attempt at regulation. BCS has declared a 
strategic goal of certifying all professionals (BCS [9] but this is very far from being the case at 
present.
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nonetheless be appropriate to apply pressure on the IT industry from outside. One 
way in which this can and morally should be done is to place ethical requirements 
on programmers, system designers, and interface designers who choose to work in 
the medical area. These ethical requirements should reflect medical, rather than IT 
ethical practice.
An often-heard counter argument to this position is that regulation, and espe-
cially hasty and early regulation, will inhibit both the development and take-up 
of automation in medicine [10]. It is particularly difficult to regulate AI because 
some AI systems may be designed to adapt their behavior ‘on the job’. This in 
turn means that it is impossible to predict their performance with any accuracy. 
These arguments must be taken seriously. Small, high technology enterprises may 
be inhibited from innovations in medical AI if they feel that there are many regula-
tory hurdles to be overcome as well as technical ones.
For this reason, a light-touch and responsive attitude to regulation would be 
preferable. Instead of enforcing legislation in advance of the take-up of tech-
nology, it would be better to monitor and regulate on the basis of experience, as 
has been done in aviation. There will be mistakes but aviation became safe by 
learning from its mistakes and then using regulation to ensure that they were not 
repeated.
4  Mode of Failure Training
A clear problem with the introduction of AI in most areas of human activity is 
caused by the way in which such systems can fail or underperform. The failure 
mode of AI systems is very different from pre-AI technology.
Most people will by now be familiar with the way in which conventional com-
puter systems behave in the event of some sort of failure. The system will usually 
hang, thrash, or loop, produce incomprehensible output, or produce no output at 
all. In these cases the fact that something is wrong is fairly obvious. To reinforce 
this, everyone who is familiar with working with IT has learned to recognize these 
types of system behavior and, for the most part, learned how they should respond. 
Unfortunately, AI systems in medical applications are unlikely always to fail in 
such an obvious manner. Indeed the more sophisticated the system; the more 
likely it is to have subtle and obscure modes of failure. Systems containing medi-
cal knowledge, for example, may be out of date. Systems incorporating heuristics 
may be out of their normal range on this particular case. Systems incorporating 
more open-ended AI techniques, such as artificial neural nets may simply become 
impossible to predict in practice.
Consider first, the case of an AI system used in a medical application which has 
an obscure design fault. If the fault were in any way obvious, one would hope that 
it would be detected and rectified before the system was used in a real medical 
context. However there is, as yet, no way of exhaustively testing software or even 
any formal testing requirements before software is used in hospital wards. It is not 
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in any sense implausible to suggest that undetected software errors will exist in 
medical systems in service.6 If the system is used by trained medical professionals 
then their medical knowledge should, ideally, allow them to detect the obscure 
design fault. On the other hand, if the system is used as part of a staff de-skilling 
change, as it sadly may well be, then operators without the relevant specialized 
medical knowledge will be much less likely to spot any problems.
This situation is potentially dangerous but made very much worse by develop-
ments in AI. Unlike the familiar patterns of computer system mentioned above, AI 
systems have the potential to deliver outputs that are nearly right and can also give 
plausible arguments or explanations in support of their erroneous deductions. This 
type of failure could certainly only be detected by a medical professional with 
good specialist knowledge of the area covered by the AI system.
Of course, human experts are prone to a similar error pattern, especially in the 
medical domain. There is good justification for the common practice of seeking a 
‘second opinion’ in the case of human experts. The key argument of this section 
is that the use AI in medicine will also need second opinions. This is an important 
requirement of the ethics of its introduction. It cannot safely be used to replace 
human expertise. Even using AI systems to check on each other (which is good 
practice but rarely actually done) will not remove the need for specialist human 
expertise.
Training should take account of these risks. In particular, the limitations of the 
technology should be fully explained and demonstrated to those who will use it. 
The widespread myth of ‘computer infallibility’ should be debunked as part of 
this training. Diagnosis and treatment are areas where infallibility is impossible, 
whether carried out by AI, humans, or a combination of the two.
There are two distinct patterns of automation important in medical AI. In the 
first, the automated system completes the task. In the second, the system gives 
advice that enables a healthcare professional to complete the task. It is crucial that 
we do not confine ethical debate to either one of these two patterns. In the first 
case, intervention may be difficult and we need to impose much higher ethical 
standards on designers and programmers. In the second case, we need to make it 
clear that a competent healthcare professional can, and sometimes should, ignore 
the advice given by an AI system. We can reasonably assume that the locus of 
ethical responsibility is clear in the case where a human overrules an AI system. 
However, this must certainly does not mean that ethical responsibility should be 
disregarded in all the other cases. If an AI system gives inappropriate advice then 
its designers and builders must share responsibility for any unfortunate medi-
cal consequences. These are issues which have been effectively (and usefully) 
resolved in the field of aviation.
6
 An oft-cited example of this happening was the Therac-25 disaster in which a radiation 
machine gave massive overdoses of radiation to at least six patients over a 2-year period as a 
result of a software error (Israelski and Muto 2004).
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5  Ethics and Responsibility
There is an anecdote which claims that while a frog will instantly jump out of 
boiling water, if placed in warm water which is then very gradually heated it 
allows itself to be boiled.7 In terms of their ethical response to automation, medi-
cal practitioners are very much in the position of the boiling frog. Each and every 
progress in technology will bring only a small, often barely perceptible, increase 
in the level of automation. There will be no obvious sudden changes. Instead 
numerous small improvements to technology and working practices will produce a 
gradual and progressive change towards a situation where medical practitioners 
have significantly less input into medical decision making.
To oppose these individual small changes as they happen will be seen as old-
fashioned, if not Luddite. Indeed many, perhaps most, of the individual changes 
will bring about improvements in medical practice so it would clearly be unethi-
cal to resist them. It is therefore necessary to discuss the ethics of automation as 
a whole and to formulate policies in advances so as to generate ethical guidelines. 
This is a call to action to perform this simple task.
In general we can say that medical automation must meet certain specific ethi-
cal criteria. It would be best to parallel these requirements with those of evidence-
based medicine. What “sold” (and continues to sell) automation to pilots were 
measureable improvements in safety. It is very hard to argue in favor of retaining 
old practices when they may potentially cost lives. The same approach should be 
adopted in medicine. It is an approach which can be and ethically should be linked 
to evidence-based medicine.
At present the progress of automation in medicine lags that in aviation, so 
looking at the successes and failures of aviation automation provides clear guid-
ance here. One important lesson is that it is vital at all stages, to include medical 
practitioners in the process. This includes their direct inclusion in all stages of the 
technological design process, in implementing training programs, and in investi-
gating any problems that arise. Aviation has a pool of highly experienced ex-pilots 
on which it can draw for such purposes, since it is an occupation with very high 
medical fitness requirements and compulsory early retirement. Experienced medi-
cal practitioners, by contrast, typically remain intensively employed in medicine 
with limited time for these important activities. This tension can (and should) be 
resolved by seconding experienced doctors to work on automation issues as a rou-
tine part of their jobs.
The most important single requirement is the establishment of a clear locus of 
responsibility [11, 12]. Since there is no prospect in the foreseeable future of a situ-
ation in which we might hold any robot or AI system in itself morally responsible 
7
 This anecdote may very well be totally false. The experiments on which it is based were con-
ducted in the 19th Century and modern experts doubt their validity. However, as an ethicist, I 
cannot condone the experiments required to establish its truth or falsity. It must remain merely an 
anecdote.
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for its actions we must continue to place that responsibility upon humans. One very 
important reason for doing so is an already observable tendency for people to “hide 
behind the computer”; that is, to blame technology for their own failures or laziness.
Medicine is a field with clear and established notions of ethics. Existing pro-
cedures for passing ethical responsibility between healthcare professionals should 
be reinforced and, where appropriate, extended to include various forms of auto-
mation. Simply asking questions, “Who is responsible if the machine makes an 
incorrect diagnosis?”, “Who has ethical responsibility for the administration of 
an incorrect dose if it is recommended by the computer?” will provide the ini-
tial steps in this process. Since software is not a product in law, questions such as 
these have usually not been asked as often as they should have been. Medical pro-
fessionals should not hesitate to ask such questions now.
What is being suggested here is a deliberate reinforcement of existing medical 
ethics. This does not imply that there will not be new and difficult ethical issues 
raised when AI systems interact with medical practice in new and very difficult to 
predict ways. The urgent need is to establish and extend existing ethics and manage-
ment practices to recognize the changes that automation is already bringing about.
The introduction of automation in medicine will place stresses upon these exist-
ing ethics and management practices, much as it is doing in aviation, but they must 
not be summarily abandoned. In particular human medical practitioners must not be 
allowed to escape responsibility simply by blaming the automation. It is important in 
both medical discussions and management discussions on workload and use of auto-
mation to make the non-availability of this excuse clear and explicit. This is not a 
side issue or a problem for other disciplines. It is a matter for medical professionals.
It is already evident that people sometimes use the computer as an excuse for 
their own mistakes. This unethical tendency will present problems in machine 
medical ethics. It is therefore important that existing structures in medical ethics 
are preserved, at least in as much as they are effective. The danger is that auto-
mation will sometimes undermine ethical responsibility for patient welfare, or at 
least obscure matters. All those involved need to be constantly checking ethics and 
practices to prevent, or at least reduce, this tendency.
In order to help guard against undesirable developments such as these, it is nec-
essary to clear up the nature of shared ethical responsibility in human-AI systems 
now. This must include improvements to the professional and ethical standards of 
people not normally considered to be bound by medical ethics. This applies in par-
ticular to the IT industry which, for the most part, is not familiar with the need to 
adhere to strict ethical codes.
6  Recommendations
Healthcare professionals and managers should establish a clear locus of ethical 
responsibility and ethics audit trails for all automation in medicine. Healthcare 
professionals should be trained, possibly in a manner similar to aviation practice, 
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in how to handle automatic devices and how to ensure that they can detect any 
failure, take over and introduce their own skill and judgment in a timely manner. 
Attention must be given to the prevention of skill-loss.
Management should view the contribution of experienced front-line medical 
practitioners to the technical design of medical automation and to the implementa-
tion of training programs as a part of their normal workload.
We can reasonably foresee medical accidents and incidents in which responsi-
bility is shared between the front line healthcare professionals and the designers 
of the automatic devices and their interfaces. These should be investigated in an 
interdisciplinary and collegiate way aimed at preventing similar incidents rather 
than apportioning blame.
These recommendations would be much helped by a clear move towards a no-
blame model in the investigation of medical accidents and incidents.
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Abstract When androids take care of delusive patients, ethic-epistemic concerns crop 
up about an agency’s good intent and why we would follow its advice. Robots are not 
human but may deliver correct medical information, whereas Alzheimer patients are 
human but may be mistaken. If humanness is not the question, then do we base our 
trust on truth? True is what logically can be verified given certain principles, which you 
have to adhere to in the first place. In other words, truth comes full circle. Does it come 
from empirical validation, then? That is a hard one too because we access the world 
through our biased sense perceptions and flawed measurement tools. We see what we 
think we see. Probably, the attribution of ethical qualities comes from pragmatics: If 
an agency affords delivering the goods, it is a “good” agency. If that happens regularly 
and in a predictable manner, the agency becomes trustworthy. Computers can be made 
more predictable than Alzheimer patients and in that sense, may be considered morally 
“better” than delusive humans. That is, if we ignore the existence of graded liabilities. 
That is why I developed a responsibility self-test that can be used to navigate the moral 
mine field of ethical positions that evolves from differently weighing or prioritizing the 
principles of autonomy, non-maleficence, beneficence, and justice.
1  Autonomous Agencies
In medical ethical issues, patient autonomy is a top priority [1]. Autonomy is 
habitually attributed to “agency,” something that can undertake an action on its 
own behalf or that of others. An agency is something in pursuit of a goal or that 
J.F. Hoorn (*) 
CAMeRA—Center for Advanced Media Research Amsterdam,  
VU University Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
e-mail: j.f.hoorn@vu.nl
234 J.F. Hoorn
has a concern. It has intentionality. This is what sets it apart from stones, planets, 
and mopeds. An agency may be an organic system (plant, animal, human) or it 
may be artificial (commonly software) but it should potentially be capable of act-
ing autonomously, at least in part. An agency does not necessarily have to possess 
“free will,” because its behaviour may be determined by the circumstances. After 
all, the autonomic nervous system, which regulates glands and internal organs, is 
hardly controllable consciously but does pursue the goal of maintenance and con-
tinuity of the organism it is a part of. When an agency is simulated by a (semi) 
autonomous software system, it is a software agent. A robot, then, is a software 
agent that (inter)acts through electro-mechanical devices. When it is specialized 
in humanoid simulations, the robot becomes an android: A robot that simulates 
human behaviour but not that of other organisms. When the android is applied to 
healthcare tasks in a user-centred manner, it is a Caredroid and Caredroids are the 
main topic of our considerations.
The Caredroid’s simulation of human behaviour typically may be in interac-
tion with other agencies, commonly patients, care professionals, or informal care-
takers. In the current chapter, we will not deal with human-human or robot-robot 
interaction but focus on Caredroids in interaction with patients, particularly those 
with a mental disability. There are a handful of software agents and robots that 
help autism patients (e.g., [40]), serve as depression therapists (e.g., [34]), or ease 
the loneliness of Alzheimer patients (e.g., Paro, see [45]).
2  Beliefs
If you were a patient, would you take advice from a robot; a machine without any 
understanding of what it is saying; something without a consciousness? If you 
were a robot, would you listen to a patient; an organism with incomplete informa-
tion and bias in judgment? Who do you believe? What do we think that the other 
believes?
2.1  Cat in a Chinese Room, Opened by Ames
Suppose the robot laboratory at Hong Kong Polytechnic University constructs a 
Chinese Room out of steel and invites John Searle to spend a sabbatical year with 
them—for free—provided that he stays in the room and they hold the key. Every 
now and then, the researchers slip pieces of paper under the door, asking him how 
he is doing: Whether he is hot, cold, feverish, has chills, pains, hunger, is sweaty, 
sleepy, about his thorax and abdomen, and the like. To test him, they pose the 
questions in Chinese. Luckily, a soothsayer told John that “his natural wit would 
be his fortune.” The room is packed with books, filing cabinets, pens, and station-
ary, and John figures out how to correlate the Chinese characters of the questions 
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to an appropriate response, also in Chinese characters, which he slips under the 
door for the researchers to read. Although John does not know what he is saying, 
the researchers think he has perfect command of Chinese because all the answers 
make sense to them. Moreover, they think they can diagnose what is the matter 
with him, thinking he is thirsty whereas in fact he has to urinate.
Then the robot engineers Mark Tilden and David Hanson walk in, asking the 
researchers how they like their new emotionally perceptive John Searle robot 
portrait, locked in that Chinese Room over there. The robot engineers hold 
the Chinese character writer for a computer because how to determine he is a 
human? Promptly, another piece of paper appears under the door, stating that John 
Searle is a cat weeping over the mouse that he just has caught, signed by Erwin 
Schrödinger. Now everybody is in great despair. If Schrödinger is in there together 
with John Searle as his cat, Schrödinger will try to kill him through radioactivity 
and hydrocyanic acid [42], which he hid in a flask in one of the cabinet drawers. 
There will be no telling whether John the cat is dead or alive in that room and it 
will be “smeared out in equal parts” over the floor of probability [42].
Everybody agrees that as long as there is no direct observation, there is no way 
telling whether John Searle is in there, his robotic portrait, whether he is a cat, 
or that he is imitating Erwin Schrödinger with his cat, whether Schrödinger is in 
there, whether that cat is dead or not, or everything together?
The soothsayer steps in, foretelling that a dead cat should not be buried in 
the ground or it becomes a demon [5, p. 65]. It would be safer to hang it from 
a tree (ibid.). In undertaking immediate action upon this delusion, the soothsayer 
whose name is Ames draws an apple drill from his pocket and punctures a viewing 
peephole into the steel wall of the Chinese Room. Of course, everybody is push-
ing everybody else aside to see what is in there. What they see is astonishing. The 
inside of the Chinese Room as opened up by Ames is a distorted problem space 
where relative to the frame of reference of each individual observer (cubic or trap-
ezoid), the apparent and actual position of the information processer inside that 
room makes it a great man or a humble robot. The conventional frame of Searle’s 
Chinese Room as a cube demands that the information-processer inside that prob-
lem space should be human—with a conscious understanding of what it does. 
With the unconventional notion of a trapezoid, the processor is always halfway a 
robot and halfway a human, robot-like—even when alive, humanoid—even when 
lifeless, because it is all the same or at least indiscernible.
By this, I mean that the judgment “human or non-human” depends on your 
frame of reference. Searle’s Chinese Room is an underdetermined problem space 
[32] in which you do not know what happens. Is the man Searle in there or is 
it his robot portrait? For the observer, the information-processing agency inside 
the Chinese Room is always Schrödinger’s cat because he cannot know whether 
Searle is a lifeless machine or a living creature. There merely is a certain likeli-
hood that the information-processing going on inside is more consciously human 
than mindless automation or perhaps even something in the middle [16, p. 45]; 
something smeared out over the floor of probability between true, probable, or 
false as described by Schrödinger’s [42] “psi-function of the entire system.”
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In spite of not knowing whether true cognition is going on, we nevertheless 
bring it a glass of water although it has to urinate. We diagnose its health situation 
and take care of it, attributing it a sense of hunger and thirst and all different goal-
directed behaviors, which make the machinery organic; make it “come to life.” We 
tend to treat automated processes—including our own—as if they came from liv-
ing creatures or real people (cf. the Media Equation Reeves and Nass [39]). And 
we do so because we were taught a frame of reference that says what the world is 
about and what the human condition is like [16, pp. 20–21]. Once apparent behav-
iors match our templates, we take them for actual. We work and take care of the 
agencies exposing those behaviors, according to our frame of reference or a pri-
ori belief system [16], containing, for example, certain moral principles (be good, 
don’t hurt).
Because humans do not like to be confused, they prefer to force judgment into 
the direction of yes or no, in or out of category. We tend to apply logic-deter-
minism to all possible problem spaces even in probabilistic cases. John Searle 
reproaches hard-nosed AI for looking at form and syntax alone to decide that the 
machine is “conscious,” just like humans. Because the logics are the same, the 
difference between agencies becomes imperceptible in a Turing Test, so people 
themselves decide that the machine knows what it is doing. No, says Searle, if 
you look at semantic content, there is a difference because humans know what the 
forms and syntax refer to. Well, in the meantime researchers developed semantic 
Web techniques and machines that can reason through analogy and association, 
which is not far any more from what people do at a functional level because peo-
ple also do not know eventually what the words stand for in the outside world—
the world beyond their mental representations [16, p. 18]; a world that according 
to Schrödinger [43, p. 145] is just one of his cats again.
With respect to logics, then, it is hard to discern humans from machines; as it 
is increasingly with semantics. This position echoes Turing's [48] argument, stat-
ing that certain people may fail the Turing Test just as badly as the computer does. 
And because Schrödinger says that mental representation of the world is guess-
work about the condition of a cat in a box that may die from poisoning, naïve 
empiricism does not do the trick either because our epistemology has no adequate 
access to the world about us except for what our senses, filters, and prejudices 
allow us to observe.
Ames teaches us that you have to look at it from a viewpoint of cognitive 
biases—illusory observations.1 There is an unusual and perhaps even “trapezoid” 
psycho-logic to what we deem reality. The observer, however, has the bias—
including our beloved philosopher John Searle—to apply conventional “cubic” 
logic to a probabilistic problem space, while staring at a cat that is fed by Erwin 
Schrödinger. That cat is an agency hardly discernible from a human or a robot 
when it processes logic-deterministic data. There are plenty of times that people 
are completely unaware of what they are doing and apply psychological schemas 
1
 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hCV2Ba5wrcs.
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or run scripts, delivering the right responses to a cue without “deep” understanding 
of the contents (cf. [26]). Think of chats about the weather, etiquette, or polite din-
ner conversations. People tell you what they are supposed to tell you and you think 
they are doing well, thank you… Think of officials that tick check boxes all day 
without thinking twice about the real-life consequences of their decisions. They 
behave like machines in Weber’s [52] most rigid sense of the word. They continu-
ously live in a Chinese Room.
If the cat agency processes probabilistic information, its best guesses are not 
distinguishable from a human’s or a machine’s either, because there is no way 
telling whatever guess is the right guess in the first place, whether the machine 
did a smart suggestion and the human a stupid one. In general, expert judgment 
in probabilistic situations does not exceed chance level [20, 47, p. 67] and is as 
good as a monkey’s picking [37]. So there is only one thing that will discern a 
human from an animal from a machine, namely your own biased observations in 
relation to what you believe. Therefore, you need to realize what you think you 
know a priori about the agency in front of you (i.e., its ontological status or class), 
whether you believe your measurements and senses are right (i.e., your epistemol-
ogy), and to know your own biases (“Am I a logician, an empiricist, or a cognitiv-
ist?”). Consequently, the more we think we know about the information processing 
capacities of a given agency, the more precise our classification will be (i.e., 
human, animal, machine)—without ever knowing its empirical correctness.
At the level of autonomous control, instinctive behaviors, and perhaps some 
aspects of memory, our behavior is nothing but machine-like. The more machines 
are capable of solving problems intelligently or even creatively, the more their 
behaviors become human-like. Finally, the two show indiscernible behaviors—
passing the Turing Test brilliantly—that may have come from different processes 
but nobody can tell anymore, particularly when organic and digital circuitry 
becomes integrated (humans with electro-mechanical extensions, machines with 
biochips, a Robocop).2
Moral reasoning about healthcare dilemmas through machine computation 
yields judgments that are identical to those of medical ethical committees (e.g., 
[33]). Perhaps the machine has no clue what it is reasoning about and does not 
know about the real-life consequences of its decisions, it nevertheless delivers the 
same juridical quality as a human committee of professionals (6 cases rendered 6 
identical judgments).
Searle’s [44] final stronghold, then, is the lack of intentionality of a computer. 
It does not pursue goals and therefore, attaches no meaning to events and actions. 
The pursuit of goals and in particular the pursuit of self-maintenance and repro-
duction is what separates an organic system from a physical one. Searle’s idea 
of intentions presupposes goal-directed behavior, resulting into emotions when 
goals are supported ( ) or obstructed ( ) (cf. [7, p. 494, 463]). In other words, 
2
 Robocop meant as a metonym here.
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reasoning logically about medical dilemmas from moral principles to deterministic 
outcomes in Searle’s sense can only become humanoid if there is a trade-off with 
affective decisions, which by definition are intentional. The man in the Chinese 
Room should be capable of laughter and crying.
In Pontier et al. [36] we did exactly this: Provide the computer with goals to 
pursue and a mechanism for affective processing [19] and let this interfere with 
the reasoning from moral principles (i.e., from [1]). Greene et al. [12] state that 
moral issues with a personal accent (“My daughter is dying”) involve more affec-
tive processing than moral-impersonal issues (“The patient is dying”). Such differ-
ences in emotional engagement modify people’s judgments. Our system indicated 
to be more hesitant to sacrifice one person so to save five others if that person was 
someone who touched upon preset goals of the system that were not of a moral 
nature (e.g., that the person was “close by”).
Now that we have a machine capable of moral behavior, that can reason, can deal 
with semantics, shows empathy, that is in pursuit of health goals, but that is unaware 
of doing it, we could place it in a care situation and confront it with a dementia 
patient. The moment this person puts herself and others at risk, cannot reason logi-
cally, does not understand a thing, shows little empathy with fellow patients or fam-
ily, in pursuit of anything but health goals (cookies!), and hardly aware of doing 
it, the care robot might hold the patient for a dumb Searlean machine! How much 
cognition goes on in there? Get data, decode, execute a process, and respond? That 
is what a CPU does too. Moreover, the cognition that does go on is so delusive that 
even Ames would be shocked. How much “proper” judgment is still left? According 
to what distorted belief system? How much autonomy can be attributed to an infor-
mation processing unit that merely correlates inputted symbols to other symbols, 
outputting something that the doctor may interpret as a proper response? “Are you 
thirsty?” “Yes, I have to urinate.” Is this a living human or an organic machine, per-
forming autonomous control over the vegetative system only?
2.2  About Self, About Others
To make moral decisions, a fully functional Caredroid must have beliefs about 
itself and about others, in our case, the dementia patient. It needs to know the 
ontology that the patient works with no matter how distorted (“Doctor is a 
demon”). It needs to know how the patient got to this ontology, by authority of the 
doctor, priest, or family members or through personal experience (“I saw him rise 
from the ground”), and it needs to know the biases the patient has, what prejudices 
and preoccupations (“Cookies!”).
This patient ontology is compared to a reference ontology (cf. [18, pp. 314–
315]). That ontology is constituted by general socio-cultural beliefs and tells the 
Caredroid to what extent the patient is “delusive,” can be taken seriously, and 
can be attributed autonomous decision capabilities. Also the Caredroid should 
know what the origin is of its robot ontology, whose goals it supports, and what 
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its biases are (what kind of logics, the quality of its sensors, whatever cognitive-
emotional modules it has). And through this, the distinction between human and 
machine becomes obsolete because the problem is boiled down to affordances and 
the quality of information, not to being alive.
3  Affordances
Affordances in the context of a Caredroid are all the (latent) action possibili-
ties (e.g., services) that the robot offers with respect to healthcare. This could be 
assistance, monitoring, or conversing. It could be a toy to pet in order to ease 
feelings of loneliness. There are designed affordances [10, 11], which are the 
features manifesting in the system or environment—even if they remain undis-
covered by the user. For example, a Caredroid may demonstrate a workout but 
does not afford exercising if the user is paralyzed (cf. vascular dementia). There 
are also perceived affordances [27, 28], which are those possibilities that the user 
actually knows about, although much more options may have been designed. The 
latter remain “hidden” for the user [9]. The user also may falsely perceive certain 
affordances that the system does not offer [9]. An example is the assumption that 
the Caredroid will always be ready, which is wrong, because the servos heat up 
during usage and need a cool down period, which means that you cannot always 
count on them. False affordances may give rise to plenty of confusion; sometimes 
for the worse (e.g., Alzheimer patient panics when a robot enters the room: “It is 
going to eat me!”); sometimes for the best (“It is not a robot; it is a sweet animal: 
It talks to me”).
For moral decisions, the Caredroid should know what affordances the user is 
capable of recognizing; or better, the Caredroid should store in its ontology what 
affordances the patient offers. To what extent are someone’s capabilities intact or 
degraded? Are there periods of alertness or does someone suffer from visual hallu-
cinations? Are the affordances designed in the Caredroid perceived at all? What 
are the false affordances? In “intact” users, the services that the robot has to offer 
will be recognized as such. If the robot is fork feeding a patient, the patient is sup-
posed to open the mouth. That would be morally “good” behavior of the patient 
(i.e., beneficence), because it serves her wellbeing. But what if the patient recog-
nizes an Afro fork-comb in the object that is pointing at her and starts doing her 
hair, smearing out in equal parts the mashed potatoes over her curls? Is this malefi-
cence, according to moral principles? Or is the patient happy with the incredible 
surface contours of her new styling mold and should we leave it this way? What if 
during daytime activities, patients are cooking a meal and one of them uses his 
hair comb as a pasta tong to fish the spaghetti out of the soup? Maleficence 
because it is unhygienic? Beneficence because of fun? Or is this perhaps a sign of 
mental restoration as alternate uses are a known strategy for solving problems cre-
atively (i.e., Guilford’s Alternative Uses Task, [13])? After all, a gourmet tip to 
shape garganelli pasta in the right way is to roll it over an Afro comb instead of 
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using a pasta machine!3 With respect to diagnosis and its consequences for 
 autonomy, are these patients just being creative or downright delusive?
If the Caredroid’s ontology would follow Norman’s [27, 28] conception of per-
ceived affordances, the patient is to open the mouth because the fork is designed 
such that it “suggests” that you eat from it. Doing differently, then, would be 
“blameworthy:” “Don’t do this! Stop it!” If the Caredroid’s ontology follows 
Gibson’s [10, 11] account, affordances may be there without intentionality. The 
tree may not grow to build bird nests in but it is extremely suited to carry them yet. 
The fork may not be designed to comb the hair, but nevertheless. In other words, 
features of a Caredroid may be designed without any purpose in mind, in fact, they 
may be a design flaw, but the user may put purpose to it in hindsight [51], so that 
we find ourselves sitting across Searle’s Chinese Room again.
So as we can see, moral decision making may not depend on human or machine 
agency and may boil down to what an agency affords; what it affords is depend-
ent on the way you interpret the offerings. In other words, what is considered an 
affordance follows from the belief system. How smart, creative, and capable is 
the user, how smart, creative, and capable is the machine itself? Are the things the 
machine has to offer convenient for the user (e.g., mechanical love over loneliness) 
and what is the quality of the information upon which those offerings are made? Is 
not correctness of information more important than the source being alive? A sign 
at the road is not alive but I do follow its directions whereas my traveling partner 
points out the wrong way all of the time. Affordances predict use intentions [29]: 
I won’t ask my traveling partner again.
4  Information
The verification of correctness of information penetrates deeply into the question 
of truth-finding. It seems that only upon true information we can offer our services 
and make decisions that are ethical. Being sentenced to jail without being guilty 
may be right according to the information available at the time but is not seen as 
ethically just. Thus, controls, tests, and checks circumscribe what is regarded as 
“correct,” relying on the integrity of those safeguards, coming full circle again, 
because who guards the guardians, who guarantees the method, who controls the 
controls, a vicious circle of infinite regress, a downward spiral of suspicion. If we 
cannot trust our methods, measurements, and senses, there merely is belief. Hoorn 
and Van Wijngaarden [18, p. 308] noted that in the literature, correctness of infor-
mation supposedly is based on accuracy, completeness, and depth. But that just 
postpones the question to how much exactitude is needed, when something can be 
called complete, and how much detail is required?
3
 http://www.circleofmisse.com/recipes/garganelli-31102009.
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That things are true is not the same as things having meaning. In healthcare, 
many things are not true but do carry meaning: placebo drugs, induced illness, 
health anxiety. If a Caredroid states that “Patient Searle is alive,” this statement in 
Searle’s medical dossier has the same truth conditions as “Patient Searle is alive 
and he is not a robot,” although the meanings differ. 4The truth condition is that 
Searle has to live for the statements to be true. What being alive means, however, 
is a matter of beliefs: medically, religiously, or otherwise [16, pp. 19–20]. The 
conditions under which truth is functioning can only be validated empirically, not 
verified logically. Hence, truth is attached to structure and syntax, to form, not to 
content. Thus, the truth of the medical statement “Patient Searle is alive” cannot 
be dependent on its source, the mindless Caredroid that is a not-alive robot. Truth 
is logical, not empirical. There is merely the idea of truth. Empirical truth is illogi-
cality. There is only empirical meaning and meanings are connected to the goals of 
the meaning giver, the interpreter of life. We provide meaning to data but will 
never find truth in them.
Information becomes logically truthful if a deterministic problem space is 
assumed and some belief system is accepted with premises that are well-formed, 
following certain (e.g., moral) principles or rules. This is a very limited approach 
to the murkiness of daily moral behavior the Caredroid will be confronted with 
and is mute about semantics, empirical meaning, or “ecological validity.” In moral 
argument, information is empirically meaningful if it satisfies certain goals of the 
arguer. Although not righteously, people do assume that a statement is logically 
truthful if it is plausible in a probabilistic sense. The plausibility is extracted from 
a mixture of belief systems (e.g., medical and religious) with sometimes conflict-
ing and more-or-less lenient guidelines that may be ill-formed, that is, following 
certain principles or rules but not strictly—preferences and priorities depending 
on the situation. We may contend that pragmatically, truth values are attributed to 
data according to probability distributions, which are biased by, for example, what 
is “ethically good,” that is, by something considered useful (see section Moral pri-
orities). To put it colloquially: If it serves my purposes (meaning), I apply the rule 
(logics), and then my moral judgment is truthful. The reasoning may be flawed but 
its conclusion is convenient.
The integrity of information in the medical dossier that the Caredroid may 
interface is ascertained by the patient in a pragmatic way. That information should 
be reliable in the double sense of the word: true and ethical [16, pp. 23–24]. But 
as we now know, integrity of information is always compromised because truth is 
but a logical attribute and has little to do with reality, whereas what we call “real-
ity” is a set of assumptions, a mental construct, based on biased sense perceptions 
[16, pp. 35–36]. The reference ontology of the Caredroid is as much a product of 
beliefs as the ontology of the delusive patient. The ethical side of this is that the 
patient supposes not to be lied to; that the source has enough authority to believe 
its propositions. It remains to be seen if robots are regarded as authoritative 
4
 Also see: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Truth_condition.
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enough to base health decisions on the information they carry. The problem of an 
appeal to authority is that its reasoning is flawed ([24]: argumentum ad verecun-
diam). After all, who sanctions the mandate to be an expert (“Because I say so? By 
virtue of my right?”). Bottom line, if it is not correctness we can rely on by itself, 
and an appeal to authority is an unsound reason, then the certification of correct-
ness must come from something as shaky as “trust.”
5  Trust
How can a robot become trustworthy? How to place your faith in a robot? Trust is 
an ethical matter [49] but is extracted from highly peripheral cues. Van Vugt et al. 
[50] found that virtual health coaches that advised on food intake were thought to 
be more trustworthy when they were obese than when slim. If the user faces criti-
cal decisions, an intelligent look is preferred to a funny appearance [38].
Where correctness of information should be the central concern, but indecisive, 
the trust that deems the centrally processed information correct is derived from 
peripheral cues [30]. That suddenly makes the question whether the same mes-
sage is delivered by a human or a robot a non-trivial matter again. It also brings 
into play the affordances that are perceived. If we see a doctor with a medical dos-
sier, the doctor supposedly is sane and the dossier correct. If we see a robot clown 
with a baby cloth book, Norman [27, 28] would suppose that the clown is incapable 
of medical diagnosis and the cloth book does not contain serious medical informa-
tion—whereas [10, 11] would argue: “Why not?” What if a delusive person provides 
correct information (according to some belief system)? Probably, the unreliability of 
the source overrides the correctness of the information. What if an intelligently look-
ing and properly functioning Caredroid works with incorrect information? Probably, 
the perceived reliability of the source overpowers the incorrectness of the informa-
tion, quite like the doctor who makes a mistake (which doctors do).
The peripheral cues (e.g., white jacket, stethoscope, diploma on the wall) that 
are used to build up trust are the stereotypical features that express authority, 
expertise, and reliability. They are stereotypical because they are repeatedly asso-
ciated with those inner moral qualities and give rise to the prediction that similar 
trustworthy behaviors can be expected on future encounters.
Within a belief system, trust comes from predictability of behaviors. If not 
harmful (non-maleficence), those predictable behaviors persuade into cooperation 
(cf. [8]) to achieve common or at least non-conflicting goals given the affordances 
perceived in the other agency. Trust also comes if the Caredroid does something 
beneficial without expecting anything particular in return [49, p. 15, 24].
Predictable means that probabilities are high for a subset of behaviors to occur 
and not that of possible other behaviors. In a highly deterministic system such as a 
computer, this must be easy to achieve, vide the love of autism patients for robots. 
Not harmful but instead beneficial indicates that achieving goals and protecting 
concerns are not frustrated or blocked but supported [7, p. 207]. Fortunately, a 
robot can be programmed such that it expects no gratitude in return. And provided 
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that skills (affordances, functions) are strengthening or complementing the 
patient’s own affordances, cooperation may happen.
Thus, if an Alzheimer patient sees that a Caredroid has better memory for 
appointments than she does, and the Caredroid does not stand in the way of other 
concerns (cookies!), and this process is repeatedly observed, then trust may tran-
spire to collaborate with the robot. In other words, moral behaviors that repeatedly 
do not harm concerns (non-maleficence), but rather facilitate them (beneficence), 
are regarded as useful and constitute trust [49]. The point is, a bad memory does 
not store observed behaviors too well so that the Caredroid has to repeat its behav-
iors within the little time span of the working memory that the patient has left.
6  Moral Priorities
If we hold on for a second and mull over the simple contention that morality is 
a function of what we consider useful (cf. Spinoza’s “foundation of virtue” in 
Damasio [3, p. 171], then the prioritization of moral principles [1] should be in 
line with the rank order of cultural values; in this case: Western values. “Having 
control” or “being in charge” would be the top priority (i.e., autonomy before 
anything), followed by being free from pain and threat (this is non-maleficence—
nobody is eating me), then the need for nourishment and a mild climate, also 
socially (beneficence), and justice for all (that is, the group should be fine so to 
provide protection, on condition that the other three requirements are satisfied 
first). In other words, ethical reasoning is the legitimization of utility, which is pro-
vided by the affordances that an ecological or technological system has to offer 
[10, 11, 27, 25]. Therefore, Caredroids may afford functionality that make this ani-
mal called the user feel in control, keep him clear of danger, bring him the goods, 
and equally divide what is left over the others. In times of scarcity (no cookies!), 
this must lead to conflicts and friendships put under pressure [46] because the 
negotiation of the little supply that is left can only be held along the principle with 
the lowest priority: justice.
Because in Beauchamp and Childress [1] view, autonomy is the top priority of 
users and other stakeholders of the care system, a Caredroid should have diagnos-
tics to test the capabilities of the person in front of him. Are the cognitive abilities 
of the other intact or degraded? If intact, normal prioritization of moral principles 
applies. If not, autonomy can be overridden by any of the three remaining values, 
justice included (Fig. 1).
To be frank, there should be some nuance to this position because the prioriti-
zation does not have to be so strict. In previous work (i.e., [33]), principles were 
more balanced and carried different weights. In that study, we also developed a rule 
to prevent decisions being taken against fully autonomous patients. On the other 
hand, we instantly questioned whether being fully autonomous actually exists.
A survivalist outlook as outlined above may raise objections from those with a 
more holistic worldview of being inseparable from all other beings or even from 
all other physical matter, robots included. An individual who is separated from 
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the collective can easily redistribute responsibilities to the higher (parent) nodes 
in the hierarchy because autonomy has been taken away from the lower (children) 
nodes. This is what happens in a Weberian organization structure [14]. It does that 
to make professional interventions and services predictable, reliable, and safe [14].
Yet, if the belief system tells that a person and her surroundings are manifesta-
tions of the same energy, even in a moral sense [21, p. 4], there is something like 
collective liability, a part-of-whole or “metonymic reflection” on individual and 
collective behavior. If I represent all else, all else is in me and I am in all else. My 
deeds act on the collective, the collective acts on me. Thus, I take responsibility for 
the deeds of others, also of robots. If others do not, robots included, they are “una-
ware.” They are separated ego’s incapable of introspection or better, of “part-of-
whole reflection.” A holistic worldview would work with a different prioritization 
of moral principles (Table 1). It is the idea that you do not control life but that life 
works through you. In a (probably Eastern) belief system of inner peace, harmony, 
and compassion, perhaps beneficence would take the lead as it induces a state of 
low-arousal positive affect [23], followed by not harming the collective (absence of 
negative affect, [23]), justice for all, and autonomy finishing last. This of course, is 
morally a completely different outlook than the one illustrated by Fig. 1 presented 
for comparison in Table 1. Take notice that Table 1 is a crude approximation of 
possible moral positions as rank orders may be fuzzier than Table 1 suggests (cf. 
[33]) and ties may occur if weights are introduced to the hierarchies tabulated here.
Whether we take a Cartesian position of “I know what I’m doing,” a Buddhist 
perspective of “I am aware of being,” or Robocop declaring “I am the law” 
(Fig. 1), the quintessence remains what Searle stressed with “consciousness,” 
which is the point that people are capable of self-reflection; they can do internal 
diagnosis (“I must be insane!”). They can think about thoughts or be “mindful” of 
them. Maybe a robot that can adapt its behaviors according to its feedback loops 
and does self-testing this way might be suspected of another form of inner per-
ception? And the dementia patient not capable of self-reflection perhaps may be 
Fig. 1  Justice be done 
[collage created from picture 
justice (Southernfried, 
MorgueFile) and Robocop 1 
(Verhoeven 1987)]
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Table 1  Twenty-four possible priory configurations of autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, 
and justice, dependent on the belief system
By the power invested in me 
1  A A A A A A 
2  B B N N J J 
3  N J B J B N 
4  J N J B N B 
    
Survivalist outlook  
  Be good 
1  B B B B B B 
2  A A N N J J 
3  N J A J A N 
4  J N J A N A 
     
    Buddhist view 
  Don’t harm  
1  N N N N N N 
2  A A B B J J 
3  B J A J A B 
4  J B J A B A 
  Justice be done 
1  J J J J J J 
2  A A B B N N 
3  B N A N A B 
4  N B N A B A 
     
Robocop 
Note: No ties assumed. 
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said to be (morally) “comatose” or put more mildly, “unaware”? Thus, inner per-
ception, awareness, or conscience, or whatever you want to call it, is an agency’s 
self-test circumscribing what is regarded as “correct” information to base a moral 
decision upon, its certification stamp being “trust,” a false syllogism of authority, 
flawed but convenient, notwithstanding.
7  Responsibility Self-Test
The previous section hinged on two innate tendencies ostentatiously portrayed and 
alluded to throughout cultural history, all being appearances of good and evil, sin 
versus virtue. In Abrahamic religions, it would be Satan against God, the Greeks 
contrasted Dionysus with Apollo, Descartes separated passion from reason, Freud 
distinguished id (instinct) from superego (conscience), and Buddhist teachings 
say that ego detaches itself from awareness. As far as I am concerned, these are 
graphic descriptions of the brain’s evolutionary architecture [31, p. 91]. It has an 
older mechanistic part, which it has in common with physical nature. That part is 
taken control of by the vegetative system, which executes genetically hard-coded 
behaviors (cf. a virus). Through the genome, a soft transition to the animalistic 
part is made. These are behaviors that certain animals also have, for instance, 
memory and learning (soft-coded information), communication, organization, and 
exchange of information across group members. In humans, that would count as 
language. This part of the brain can be retrieved to organic nature (e.g., cats and 
ants) other than what we think makes us human, which are the higher cognitive 
functions residing in the youngest brain lobes, the things we call “spiritual:” intel-
ligence, creativity, wisdom (or awareness, for that matter).
The idea of course is that our animalistic lust is kept in check by our reason, 
conscience, or awareness of that “lower” behavior. If the higher cognitive func-
tions (i.e., being an angel) fail to control the lower functions, we start behaving 
like animals (cf. the snake).
What should the Caredroid be aware of, then? We have been discussing a num-
ber of factors. The first was that of Agency (Ag), which could be human or robotic 
(Ag(h, r)), then we examined the Beliefs the agency has about self and others (B(s, 
o)), whether the (mental) affordances of both agents are regarded as intact or not 
(Af(i, d)), to what degree the Information they express seems to be correct or incor-
rect (I(c, i)), whether Trust in the source is high or low (T(h, l)), and what Moral pri-
orities apply to the situation (M(1, …, 24)). Putting a value to each of these variables 
selects one path in a nested factorial design of:
To navigate this wide grid of moral positions, I want to try a responsibility self-
test that comes in 7 steps. It is valid for both individual and collective liability, 
Ag(h, r) ∗ B(s, o) ∗ Af(i, d) ∗ I(c, i) ∗ T(h, l) ∗M(1,...,24)
= 2 ∗ 2 ∗ 2 ∗ 2 ∗ 2 ∗ 24 = 768 constellations to base a moral decision upon.
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depending on an agency’s affordance of inner reflection or more profane, a self-
test that handles one or more of the said priority constellations of Table 1 as its 
yardstick.
We will race a number of agencies over the 7 hurdles and see who survives. 
The winner is the morally most responsible one that is accountable for its deeds—
this “game” approach loosely follows the lead of Lacan [22]. The first step would 
be to see if an agency can act irrespective of the awareness of doing so.
1. I do something
This is to be taken as an act without awareness. One could imagine that a worm, an 
old-school robot, a cat, a patient with advanced dementia, as well as a sane person 
can pass this check, because all can do something. That may be on their own behalf 
or predicated by others, with or without knowing its own way of conduct, but at 
least they can act. In Moor’s [25] taxonomy of moral agency, normative agents that 
can prove a theorem, ethical impact agents that are supposed to alleviate human 
suffering, and implicit ethical agents that take safety and legislation into account 
would pass this hurdle but not the next because they merely behave according to 
certain principles without knowing that those principles are “ethical.”
2. I know what I did was bad, good, or neutral
This time, the agency is aware of its behavior as well as the rules of conduct, the 
rules of engagement under which that behavior is executed. It does not reflect 
about those rules, it operates within the boundaries of those rules. Those rules can 
be imposed upon by others; they may be one’s own rules. A cat knows, for exam-
ple, that it is not allowed to steal the meat from the kitchen. It fears punishment. 
The same is valid for certain dementia patients (“Don’t steal cookies!”) as well 
as a sane person. But also a robot with moral reasoning implemented may have a 
feedback loop built in that can judge whether certain principles were enforced or 
violated by its own actions. In Moor’s [25] classification, explicit ethical agents 
would qualify for this test because they state explicitly what action is allowed and 
what is forbidden. Hurdle 2 is decisive to separate the sane and lightly demented 
people from the severely demented, who no longer have any clue about good or 
bad and start making nasty remarks, cold and insensitive, doing things that are 
inappropriate (e.g., aggressive behaviors).
3. I know that I know I was bad, good, or neutral
Here we enter the realm of having meta-cognitions about knowledge. The agency 
becomes morally conscious and can agree about the rules although disobeying them. 
Or, one can disagree about the rules and nonetheless comply with them. The agency 
now is aware of having knowledge about its actual behavior and that certain rules 
limit the behaviors that could possibly be executed. This is Moor’s [25] full ethical 
agent, having consciousness, intentionality, and free will. It is a Cartesian position 
of thinking about thinking. It is Searle’s criterion of being a conscious agency. But it 
also reflects a Buddhist position once we replace “thinking” by “awareness.” In that 
case, it is not so much “Thinking, therefore I am” but “Aware that I am.”
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Checking on hurdle 3 may actually discern light dementia and “correctable” 
behavior from advanced dementia and lack of liability. As far as I know, there 
is no robot yet that can take hurdle 3. It would require a feedback loop about its 
feedback on its behaviors: The robot should record how well the processes per-
form that monitor its moral actions.
4. I also know why I was bad, good, or neutral
From this point on, it is not about logical verification alone any more but also 
about empirical validation. At this level, the agency has knowledge about the 
way its behavior was tested. How it came to know what happened at hurdle 3. 
Number 4 is an epistemic examination in how far some judge, referee, auditor—
which could be the agency self—can be trusted in matching the agency’s behavior 
against some law, rules, agreements (individual or collective), in an empirically 
valid or meaningful way, according to belief.
Only a sane person can take this hurdle, because the agency should have knowl-
edge of which rules of conduct, rules of engagement, social contract, or terms of agree-
ment are relevant in the situation at hand, picking one or more priority constellations 
from Table 1 as appropriate to goals and concerns of multiple stakeholders. It requires 
an estimate of how well the Caredroid senses its environment, perspective taking, and 
being able to weigh aspects in a situation with different sets of goals in mind.
5. That I am aware of me knowing what I did and why it was wrong, right, or 
neutral—even if I disagree—means my higher cognitive functions are intact
This is the Cartesian and Buddhist stance taken in unison with empiricism as a self-
test on the agency’s affordances. By overseeing the entire moral evaluation process, 
the agency can decide whether it has intelligence, creativity, and/or wisdom.
6. My “higher” cognitive functions are supposed to control my “lower” 
functions but failed or succeeded
In many cultures throughout history, this trade-off between good versus evil has 
always been the overture of the final verdict (see 7). Point 1 up to 5 were there 
to feed or load this opposition and hurdle 6 does the definitive weighing of being 
capable of handling the animalistic tendencies.
7. Therefore, I am responsible and can be punished/rewarded or remain as is
The final verdict. Any agency that went through 6 can be held responsible for 1 
and automatically will go to 7. That agency is entitled to receive what is waiting 
for him or her as agreed upon in a given culture.
In answering Searle’s Chinese Room dilemma, then, steps 3 and 4 are to be 
modeled, formalized, and implemented before we can even think of robot “con-
sciousness,” and following from that, machine liability. It also shows that mod-
erately demented patients are only partially and in severe cases not responsible 
for their behaviors. In that respect (and with all due respect), the more than mod-
erately demented patients are comparable to mammals (e.g., cats) and robots 
that have some sort of command over what is obliged or permitted but have no 
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meta-cognition about that knowledge. Dementia in its final stage is even below 
that level. Cats, stota moral robots, or more than lightly demented elderly are 
in Searle’s sense “unconscious” or in a Buddhist sense “unaware” of their own 
dealings. That is what makes them “primitive” or “animal-like,” meaning that 
the youngest human brain functions or highest cognitive functions are defunct or 
missing.
8  Discussion
This chapter mixed ethical issues with epistemic considerations from the assump-
tion that judgments of “morally good” are intertwined with “really true.” When a 
dementia patient is confronted with a care robot that has reliable knowledge about 
the patient (e.g., according to a medical dossier), then we have a real person with 
delusions facing a virtual person with a realistic take on the world. Now, who should 
be controlling who? Should the robot comply with the demand of human autonomy 
and obey every command that the patient gives [41]? Or should it overrule certain 
proposals by the patient to protect her (and others) against herself? It all depends 
on what is regarded as the proper framing of the situation (the beliefs): The fic-
tion inside the real person’s head or the reality inside the fictitious person’s CPU? 
Bottom line, what is more important: The correctness of information or the trustwor-
thiness of the information carrier (the source)? And what would correctness be then?
Everything we do and stand for comes from belief, and morality is no excep-
tion. You cannot get it from logic, because the premises from which the logic start 
are empirically bound and hence, inaccessible epistemically. Put differently, it is 
incontrollable whether information is correct. Because truth telling is unknowable, 
it becomes intertwined with moral goodness: Trust is laid in the source that con-
veys the information. This state of affairs is no different for a human as it is for 
a robot. The doctor who tries to understand an Alzheimer patient is comparable 
to the user trying to find out what goes on in a robot’s microchips. In the Chinese 
Room, the actual position of the information processer on the human-robot con-
tinuum will never be known. If an observer does make a choice (the reduction to a 
single eigenstate) biased perception made it so.
Trust in whatever source comes from peripheral cues that indicate expertise 
and authority on a particular matter, such as a white lab coat and glasses. They 
are cues to affordances that are perceived in the agency such as the ability to test 
information and high intelligence.
The list of four moral principles is the empirical aspect or “meaningful part” of 
moral reasoning. Contingent upon the belief system (e.g., Cartesian or Buddhist), 
what an agency understands under “autonomy” or “beneficence” may differ. 
Customarily, the meaning attached to a moral notion is related to goals and con-
cerns of the individual and its community. But also the rank order (Table 1) or 
more sophisticated, the weighing of the principles, depends on goals and concerns. 
Thus, the reasoning may be straight but the semantics are biased.
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Psychological biases are inescapable. Even the most rational of choices has 
emotional biases because the contents that are reasoned about pertain to empirical 
goals and concerns. One could even argue that moral reasoning without affect is to 
be lulled into a false sense of security.
That is why a medical ethical reasoning machine cannot do much more than 
“to know thyself,” having meta-knowledge about its (reference) ontology (i.e., its 
belief system), epistemology (i.e., robot sensing and testing), and cognitive biases 
(i.e., the cognitive flaws in the system and the goals it has to achieve, for example, 
monitoring the patient). That is why for the moral domain I developed a self-test 
by which the agency can determine whether it is responsible for its acts or not.
8.1  Autonomae Servus
There is a difference between form, formalization, mechanism, syntax, structure, 
system, logics, verification, and truth on the one hand, and meaning, semantics, 
experience, empirical relevance, validation, and truth conditions on the other. It 
is what linguistic Structuralists (e.g., De Saussure [4, p. 121]) would have called 
the combinatory syntagmatic axis (i.e., the grammar) that needs to be filled by 
selections from the paradigmatic or associative axis (i.e., the lexicon). Whereas the 
formal part is relatively fixed, the meaning part is fluctuating. It is a problem of 
reference: What do the signals (e.g., words) stand for? This is not a logical but an 
empirical question. De Saussure would ask: “What is signified by the signifier?”
In deterministic problem spaces the logics of robots equals or even emulates 
that of humans (e.g., [33]). In probabilistic cases, where logics fail, the robot’s 
guess is as good as any human’s. If in addition you can make it plausible that 
someone hardly can decipher dealing with a human or a robot [35], then robots 
can be applied to many healthcare tasks. The only thing missing would be the 
“meaningful” aspect, sharing the belief system with the patient, “what the words 
stand for,” which is problematic in caretaker-patient transactions as well. Even so, 
a Caredroid becomes more organic in its behavior once it is driven by goals [19] 
because it will attach more meaning to a signal in the sense of consequences for its 
pursuit of a patient’s wellbeing.
Where logics and semantics grow together by introducing intentionality to 
the machine, the distinction between human and machine ethical reasoning can-
not be made any more except for peripheral cues in the interface, such as outer 
appearance, bodily warmth, tone of voice, etc. The distinction is already vanished 
in comparison with a patient that hardly has any conscience left (cf. advanced 
dementia). If we integrate human with machine circuitry and live as cyborgs, 
making that distinction becomes irrelevant. In assuming a Buddhist perspective, 
we could allow to ourselves that we are made from the same matter; human con-
sciousness intermixed with a machine’s self-test on morality.
That leads us to the creation of the Autonomae Servus, the autonomous slave. 
We want the reasoning to be autonomous but the content to be serving our 
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purposes: The human as master computer, the robot as his autonomous slave. The 
Caredroid may act autonomously because of its affordances (e.g., reasoning capac-
ities) but is obedient to our goals of non-maleficence, beneficence, and justice. It 
moreover will be compassionate about our feelings of personal autonomy.
When the Hong Kong researchers finally took their metal-cutting shears, they 
saw that they had not kept Searle inside the Chinese Room but an old Chinese 
practitioner of Qigong. He wore a yin-yang symbol around his neck and looked 
more at an agency’s functions than at its anatomy. When he came out, he orated 
that no life is complete without suffering from loneliness, illness, and decease. 
Most patients will not see it that way, he said, and try to cast out the bad expe-
riences, but this is coping through ignoring. A robot could teach us to use those 
experiences for creation, the practitioner stipulated, as an alien source of informa-
tion that can be integrated with known practice.
He then rummaged around in one of his filing cabinets, and next to a small flask 
there was a photograph. It showed a healthy 60-year old, walking his puppy dog called 
Mao while he was chatting with the neighbors along the way [5, pp. 63–64]. The next 
picture showed him as a 70-year old. He held a walker rollator and could hardly con-
trol the dog anymore. He admitted to have felt ashamed of the rollator and did not use 
it. In not going out of the Chinese Room anymore, he became lonely. Today, as an 
80-year old with light dementia, he could not keep the dog any longer and ate it. The 
bones were spread around the floor in equal distributions. Now he was thirsty. He did 
not want a cat. He hated cats because they could see spirits in the dark [5, p. 65].
The Hong Kong researchers felt sorry for the old man and gave him a Hanson’s 
Robokind Alice to ease the loneliness. That machine had a creativity module 
called ACASIA implemented ([15, 17], Chap. 4) that suggested to put her, the 
robot, in a children’s wheelchair (Fig. 2). Now the old man strolled away behind 
the wheelchair, a support similar to a rollator,5 without having to be ashamed of it. 
In fact, he was proud that he took care of the handicapped robot. Out on the street, 
he attracted a lot of attention and had quite a number of chats about his poor but 
cute Caredroid, and by the way, the Caredroid had a navigation system telling 
grandpa how to get back home again (cf. LogicaCMG’s rollator navigator).6
As a kind of addendum, I would like to emphasize that people have their 
mechanistic side; physiologically (e.g., dehydration from a loss of electrolytes: 
“I am thirsty”) as well as mentally (i.e., automated processes, routine behaviors: 
“Bring water glass to the mouth”). Are impaired people automata, then? One could 
argue that the more cognitive functions become impaired, the more people start to 
resemble automata. Giving creativity, intelligence, language, and memory back to 
the impaired through Caredroids, is making them more human again. Caredroids 
are factory robots made loveable [6]. They give something more relatable to their 
organic coworkers than today’s practice of disembodied limbs put on a friendly 
face (ibid). We make computers understand how humans work. In dealing with 
5
 Courtesy Robert Paauwe, personal communication, Oct. 15, 2013.
6
 http://www.camera.vu.nl/news/2007/021107news.html.
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moral dilemmas, they can share as a human-android team, the burden of potential 
information overload for the patient, forming a system of multi-agencies that can 
exploit the information universe to the fullest. As “human-technology symbionts” 
[2, p. 3], impaired patients will be able to explore more alternatives, exclude more 
dead ends, reckoning with more situational constraints. It would be morally unfair 
not to compensate the impaired with loveable automata that care.
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Abstract Our methods for realizing a moral artificial agent assume that the 
wisdom of crowds can equip a machine with the enormous number of experi-
ences that are the source of its ethical reasoning. Every second, people with dif-
ferent cultural, religious or social backgrounds share their personal experiences 
about multitudes of human acts. We propose that a machine therapist capable 
of analyzing thousands of such cases should be more convincing and effective 
talking to a patient, instead of analyzing single keywords. In this chapter, we 
introduce this vision and several techniques already implemented in an algo-
rithm for generating empathic machine reactions based on emotional and social 
consequences. We show the roles that Bentham’s Felicific Calculus, Kohlberg’s 
Theory of Stages of Moral Development and McDougall’s classification of 
instincts play in the agent’s knowledge acquisition, and we describe the accu-
racy of already working parts. Modules and lexicons of phrases based on these 
theories enable a medical machine to gather information on how patients typi-
cally feel when certain events happen, and what could happen before and after 
actions. Such empathy is important for understanding the actions of other peo-
ple, and for learning new skills by imitation. We also discuss why this bottom-up 
approach should be accompanied by a top-down utility calculation to ensure the 
best outcome for a particular user, and what ethical dilemmas an advanced artifi-
cial therapist could cause.
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1  Introduction
Almost 50 years ago, Weizenbaum [40] started his work on ELIZA, a primitive nat-
ural language system that uses pattern matching to parody a Rogerian psychothera-
pist whose main method is to make a patient feel relieved by sharing their problems 
with a listener. DOCTOR, the main script of the ELIZA program, provides a user 
with no useful information or opinions: it simply uses linguistic tricks to keep the 
conversation initiative needed to ensure that the patient is the one who is answer-
ing questions and explaining or extending their previous statements. Although the 
system does not possess any information about its dialog partner, it uses a keyword 
matching technique that allows it to react appropriately to a certain number of 
utterances. For instance, the word “sad” prompts the reply “I am sorry to hear you 
are sad”. In our opinion such simple “affect analysis” was one of the factors that 
caused many users to believe they were talking to a real empathic person.
Although five decades have passed, non-task oriented dialog systems are still 
matching keywords, and rarely taking into account context including the surround-
ing world, human beings within this world, and the particular user on the other 
side of a screen or robot’s eyes. However, constantly increasing computer power 
and enormous amounts of text allow us to take “keyword matching” to a whole 
new level of multiple searches for different kinds of related knowledge. It is still 
difficult to generate the illusion of a machine that has experienced many things in 
its life, but we believe that it would be easier to gain the user’s trust by creating a 
machine that knows thousands of third persons’ experiences, and that can analyze 
them and share its findings in the form of advice. Nevertheless, giving advice to 
a person suffering from mental conditions can go wrong, and the task becomes a 
moral dilemma.
A Conversational Model for therapy (known also as Psychodynamic-Interpersonal 
Therapy, PIT [30]) has been proven to be effective in the treatment of depression 
[31], psychosomatic disorders [9], or self-harm and borderline personality disorder 
[14, 33]. The problems for a machine to perform such therapy are numerous. As a 
therapist needs to develop an emotional bond with a patient, a scenario where the 
subject knows that he or she is not talking to a real therapist would pose difficulties 
in satisfying this condition. For this reason, it would be more realistic, at least in ini-
tial experiments, if the artificial therapist only assists human psychiatrists and patients 
during group sessions. However, situations in a less professional context will prob-
ably take place in the near future. Developed countries are predicted to suffer more 
and more from aging societies with a low birthrate, and the “offline loneliness” of 
people who are virtually but not physically connected tends to grow, as demonstrated 
by Kang [11]. However in his paper, Kang shows that conversation weakens such 
depressive states, and we believe that technology users will keep trying to talk to their 
machines when feeling lonely, in spite of all the social and psychological problems 
this may bring (described by Turkle [36]).
In the case of elderly persons and people suffering from conditions such as 
social withdrawal, it is not uncommon that a person is reticent to talk to other 
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people, and we think it is possible that a machine could be a useful means for 
providing such persons with meaningful advice about what to do by sharing other 
people’s experiences. We are already working on retrieving information about 
drug side-effects from bloggers describing their struggle with illness [12], and 
shallow NLP techniques used in this research can be extended to a broader range 
of topics.
In this chapter, we describe our long-term project of a dialog system based on a 
bottom-up approach to knowledge acquisition, discuss the need for additional top-
down elements, and present the moral aspects of such a system for users who have 
mental conditions or are simply lonely and lack a conversational partner. First, we 
will introduce the basic ideas behind the utilized technologies and show the cur-
rent accuracy of modules under continual development. We will then discuss our 
findings, already-known problems, and conclude the chapter with our vision of the 
future of moral agents in long-term development.
2  Counseling and Technology
Although Weizenbaum concluded in his book “Computer Power and Human 
Reason” [40] that machines should not be used in any kind of psychotherapy 
because they lack human understanding, many people disagreed, and computers 
have been used for treating patients with different types of psychological condi-
tions. Today, machines are involved in various kinds of therapies from cognitive 
therapies [41] to virtual reality hypnosis [3], and even if they are mainly involved 
in treatments as a tool in the hands of a professional or prepared for very specific 
scenarios, they are often said to be effective because of the machine’s patience, 
calmness, good memory, and so on. Patients are more trusting and more open, 
and are more likely to answer questions asked by a computer when they do not 
wish to talk about a particular problem to physicians. Another therapeutical use of 
machines is so-called “cognitive rehabilitation”, where patients with brain dam-
age, strokes, dementia in the form of Alzheimer’s disease or schizophrenia [4], 
play computer games or perform linguistic exercises [29]. Computers also offer 
capabilities that can greatly improve the efficiency and psychometric quality of 
psychological assessment [32] and in the current era of shared knowledge, fast 
and accurate evaluation of the user’s state is, we believe, very possible. When it 
comes to more automatic, conversational approaches, classic examples of artificial 
advisory for patients with suicidal tendencies [8] or a dilemma counseling system 
for students [39] can be given. In both studies, computers appeared to outperform 
humans in predicting suicide attempts in the former, and matching students’ data 
to occupation in the latter. Recently, Embodied Conversational Agents (ECA) 
have gained popularity among researchers, but poor language understanding 
remains one of the biggest obstacles, as in Dilemma Counseling Systems (DCS). 
Accordingly, Wizard of Oz methods are often used [21] to see how people react 
to automatic therapists. Aside from the discussion on possible errors in automatic 
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psychological assessments, the ethical side of the above-mentioned usages of com-
puters in psychotherapy and health/life advisory is rarely touched upon; mostly 
because the moral responsibility is on the programmers’ side, and there is little 
margin for problematic behavior by machines. But in the case of our bottom-up 
approach, the level of autonomy is usually higher and the knowledge acquisition 
process cannot be controlled, so we believe that in the case of therapy-oriented 
tasks, our system will need a top-down highest utility guarantor, which we will 
discuss later in this chapter. First, we will briefly describe our system, the tech-
niques utilized, and the knowledge that is retrieved.
3  Wisdom of Crowds-Based Dialog System
The details of the particular modules that are being developed by our team exceed 
the scope and limitations of this chapter; however, it is necessary to introduce their 
fundamental basis for the further understanding of our approach. Currently, we 
are working on a system that classifies an utterance as a question-answering type 
(factoid or nonfactoid), task-oriented type or non-task-oriented type [42] and runs 
utterance generation modules according to this classification. Emotional and ethi-
cally bound inputs are most usually non-factoid questions and non-task oriented 
statements, but in the case of physical robots, morally questionable task oriented 
inputs (orders) are also very possible [34]. In all cases, in order to simulate real 
world experiences described on the WWW, we use Japanese Internet resources, 
principally a blog corpus that we have developed [23] to avoid restrictions 
imposed by search engines APIs. Currently, we are concentrating on causes and 
effects of acts and their emotional and ethical consequences. Thus, if a user says 
“I want to commit suicide”, the system should be able to estimate that many people 
would feel sad and suffer due to this act, which would trigger not only an advice 
mode but also preventive actions such as contacting the user’s family. Such utili-
tarian reasoning is an example of the top-down element of our system and will be 
presented in Sect. 5. In the following subsections, we describe the main features of 
our system.
3.1  Extracting Knowledge
In order to analyze experiences describing an act or situation in question, the sys-
tem performs web-mining using the same and semantically similar phrases as 
queries and then extracts and quantifies the averages of three cognition layers, as 
shown in Fig. 1.
These will be explained below. All of these phrases are based on manually 
constructed lexicons which contain words representing several cognitive catego-
ries. These words, if found in sentences describing an analyzed act (or state) are 
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counted, and the comparison of sums determines the most probable reasons and 
consequences. Therefore, if a user talks about killing time or a virus, the system 
will not be alerted. We assume that a human-level talking machine needs to know 
as much about our world and our feelings as possible, but the physical sensing 
technology is still not ready for gathering knowledge. For that reason, we set 
natural language as the core for simulating the process of learning by perceiving 
sensations.
3.1.1  Physical Sensations
Aristotle [19] defined common sense (koine aisthesis) as a phenomenon built upon 
our five senses. Locke [16] proposed a similar definition of “common sense” sug-
gesting that it builds on phenomenological experience. Each of the senses gives 
input, and then the sense-data are integrated into a single “impression” and this 
integration is a product of common sense. Therefore, we designed the first layer of 
the text-based simulation using five lexicons to represent the five senses. In order 
Fig. 1  Three layers of retrieved knowledge: sensory input simulated by representing the five 
senses as adjectives, positive/negative estimation using Nakamura’s dictionary, and McDougall’s 
categories of instincts that could have caused a particular behavior that led to a positive or nega-
tive act. For example, if a child touches fire, it feels pain, but most probably the act of touching 
was caused by the curiosity instinct
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to check if an object can be sensed with eyes, the system checks the object’s co-
occurrences with adjectives such as bright, dark, big, small, red, yellow, etc. For 
hearing we use mostly onomatopoeias, not only adjectives: noisy, quiet, crack, 
rattle, clatter, clank, etc. To see if a thing can be touched, we use adjectives as 
hard, tough, sticky, cold or soft. The physical sensor simulation (also described in 
details in Rzepka and Araki [26]) is intended mainly to support reasoning about 
the world, e.g., when discovering potentially dangerous items, and should in future 
consider input from physical sensing devices for the reasons described later in the 
chapter.
3.1.2  Pain and Pleasure Assessment
In order to estimate how pleasant or painful an act or state is, our system utilizes 
a lexicon based on Nakamura’s emotional expressions dictionary [20] and tech-
niques based on Jeremy Bentham’s Felicific (or Hedonic) Calculus [5] which we 
also use for the top-down utility estimation module. Bentham’s famous notion of 
utilitarianism suggests that everything we do in our lives is to minimize negative 
(painful) and maximize positive (pleasant) consequences. When retrieving knowl-
edge from the WWW for estimating levels of pain and pleasure, we followed the 
original Bentham’s vectors. For example, Intensity asks “How intense was an act 
leading to a positive or negative consequences?” and to answer this question the 
algorithm needs to recognize intensifying adverbs and estimate their strengths. 
In order to calculate Duration (“for how long would the pleasure or pain last?”) 
we have created an original subsystem [15] to calculate the average duration of 
a given action. Other vectors are Certainty, Propinquity (“how soon will a posi-
tive consequence occur?”) and Fecundity, which is the probability that an act will 
preserve the current state. All vectors and calculation methods are described in 
Rzepka and Araki [26]. With this module, it is possible to calculate more precise 
differences between acts; for instance, that “having a headache for two days” is a 
bigger burden than “having a headache for two hours”, and “hating his whole fam-
ily very much” expresses more pain than “hating his pal a bit”.
3.1.3  Estimation of Involved Instincts
In order to estimate what kind of instincts caused a human’s behavior, our system 
uses a set of lexicons based on William McDougall’s categorization of instincts 
[18]. He divides instincts into 14 classes (Escape, Combat, Repulsion, Parental, 
Appeal, Mating, Curiosity, Submission, Assertion, Gregariousness, Food-seeking, 
Hoarding, Construction and Laughter); for each class we constructed a lexicon 
containing words representing McDougall’s ideas, details of which are also pre-
sented in Rzepka and Araki [26]. For example, the system is able to guess that 
humans date because we feel the urge to mate (Mating) and the need to take care 
of other people (Parental). When someone refuses to take medicine, he or she may 
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be afraid of side-effects (Escape) or disgusted by its taste (Repulsion). Of course, 
these are only candidates for possible causes, but when used by an artificial thera-
pist for generating an utterance, common reasons are more likely to gain the user’s 
trust or provoke them to explain the reasons behind their refusal to take medicine. 
Questions like “Are you afraid? Or is it about the taste?” are still very machine-
like and lack details or sophisticated sentences, but they have a visible advantage 
of being more concrete and on-topic. We proved in the past [27] the naturalness 
of utterances simply stating commonsensical comments (e.g., “smoking is not 
healthy” is evaluated higher than ELIZA’s “tell me more about smoking”).
3.1.4  Retrieving Possible Social Consequences
In order to enable our system to recognize social effects of acts, we created a 
lexicon inspired by Kohlberg’s theory on the development of moral stages [13], 
which can be summarized as follows. When we are children, we are oriented 
toward obedience and punishment, and think about how we can avoid punishment. 
Subsequently, we turn to a self-interested orientation, asking ourselves what are 
the benefits of our acts. Later, we start caring about social norms, then authority 
and the maintenance of social order become important. After we achieve this “law 
and order morality”, we reach the final level, which includes social contracts and 
universal ethical principles. In order to retrieve data on negative and positive con-
sequences, we created ten categories (five pairs of negative and positive expres-
sions) of consequences: Praises vs. Reprimands, Awards vs. Penalties, Societal 
approval versus Societal disapproval, Legal versus Illegal and Forgivable versus 
Unforgivable. Most of the words were taken from thesauri, so the Awards class 
has many synonyms of prizes, and the Punishment class consists also of words and 
phrases describing imprisonment or fines. By using this lexicon, the system can 
guess that shoplifting can result in punishment and anger or that reading books has 
a high societal approval and may lead to praise from other people.
3.2  Current Results and Need for Safety Valves
So far we have tested only a small part of Bentham’s idea for calculating pain and 
pleasure; however, the results showed that we could achieve the same f-score by 
using a freely available small blog corpus instead of commercial search engines, 
which do not allow exhaustive multiple queries [24]. We tested our lexicons using 
over one hundred expressions with both neutral (“having a meal”) and ethical 
(“make someone suffer”) undertones. Emotional consequence recognition per-
formed better (78 % correct recognitions) against social consequence recognition 
(70 %) and showed that a machine can utilize bloggers’ experiences and opinions to 
achieve a moral intuition for simple inputs such as stealing, taking revenge, killing or 
even more debatable ones like euthanasia or abortion. When it comes to evaluating 
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estimation of instinctual causes, we achieved 77.8 % accuracy [25] and the retrieval 
precision for the lexicons related to the five senses appeared to be the highest of 
all, reaching 0.96. In the case of a fully autonomous knowledge acquisition agent, 
the numbers are promising. However, when we attempt to develop an agent for any 
medical task, we must remember that the crowd is vulnerable and common sense 
sometimes works against truth and logic. Stereotypes that humans create are useful, 
but also misleading, and we are innately poor at statistics, as Tversky and Kahneman 
show us in their works [37]. Machines, on the other hand, are not biased, they do not 
avoid or ignore any viewpoints that might be inconvenient, and they do not overes-
timate some facts and underestimate others because they are not programmed to do 
so. However, even the best knowledge retrieval and statistical algorithms are prone to 
significant inaccuracies if the sources are not trustworthy. To achieve a system that 
first gathers the knowledge of the crowd and then tests its credibility, we need to 
provide a second layer of retrievals for comparing the extracted data with reliable 
sources, such as scientific papers and legal texts (see Fig. 2).
For housework robots, mobile phones or car navigation systems, we believe that 
the experiences of the crowd are enough to realize a practical learning agent, as 
usually the majority of people are correct when judging the acts of others, even if 
they are wrong when explaining why they think so. But in the case of autonomous 
machines that can damage our health, the addition of analysis of scientific f ind-
ings or legal regulations about what is discovered by an algorithm from the crowd 
Fig. 2  Bottom-up knowledge is also the basis for the top-down utility calculation
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experience could provide a safety valve to avoid e.g., worsening of the medical 
condition, and also may provide knowledge that is possibly valuable to the user. 
The ethical problem that appears in such scenarios is the choice of informing a 
patient about, for example, the low probability of survival in their current condition 
or revealing that they are taking a placebo. In order to avoid such dilemmas, proper 
user modeling could be implemented. We describe this in the following subsection.
3.3  User Modeling
The degree of severity and details of a mental disorder may significantly vary among 
users of an artificial therapist, and personal characteristics may heavily differ between 
users of less or more intelligent devices. In both cases, some plasticity of algorithms 
and/or personal pre-customization would be required to meet the minimum standards 
of trouble-free usage. However, unlike common, widely-used machinery, an intelli-
gent conversational helper will have the power to change the user’s state of mood or 
health indirectly or directly, depending on the level of advancement of the technology 
it represents. When assisting a person with Alzheimer’s disease, a robot must be set 
up (usually requested by relatives or a clinician) as stubborn and repetitive from the 
start, as adaptation could take too much time (an example of learning how often a 
robot should remind a user to take medicine is shown in [2]). This is different from 
the usual process of learning user preferences [10], which is needed for natural com-
munication and functioning. For example, an artificial therapist must remember its 
patient’s problems, habits, and traumatic or emotional episodes, thus we are also 
working on an algorithm utilizing affective load estimation for ranking the user’s 
memories [35]. However, in the case of tasks like therapy or companions for the 
elderly and children, user information must be analyzed in terms of possible dangers, 
and we believe that a clinician or family member should be contacted if any risky 
behavior is being conducted or planned. A potential problem is that such “spying” on 
a user may lead to a serious decrease of the user’s trust in the agent.
3.4  Dialog Processing
Because we believe that natural dialog needs at least some common sense about 
the world, for now we are concentrating on knowledge that is required for con-
versation rather than on sophisticated dialog management. Therefore there is, for 
instance, no conversational context processing module implemented yet. The main 
concept of utilizing the methods described earlier in this chapter within a dialog 
system is shown in Fig. 3. However, if the system were to be used for a therapy 
task, numerous conversational strategies and techniques need to be developed or 
extended. We plan to follow the path of researchers who have worked in this field 
for a long time [21] by automizing theoretical parts with extracted knowledge, if 
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possible. However, it remains necessary to continue our work with tasks specific to 
the Japanese language such as idiomatic expressions or metaphors [28], humorous 
language [1] or emoticons [38]. In addition to our research on non-task oriented 
and task-oriented dialog [10, 42], we plan to utilize techniques developed for other 
projects as user encouragement by gamification [17] or mood improvement by 
haiku generation [7].
4  Possible Scenarios and Related Ethical Problems
Various scenarios are possible for the future use of therapeutic functions of a dia-
logue system. Below we present three examples of such applications, which we 
envisage when developing our algorithms.
Fig. 3  Flowchart of 
knowledge processing inside 
the dialog module for non-
task inputs. An important 
advantage of natural language 
based systems is that it is 
easier for them to explain on 
what basis they calculated 
utility or changed previous 
estimations (the last phase 
of Step 6). We believe that 
language is the key for the 
most natural and the fastest 
means of programming and 
adjusting future devices
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4.1  Caring Robot that Talks
Mobile device-based talking therapists such as add-ons to Siri, Google Now or other 
voice-based agents quickly come to mind as potential applications, but we believe that 
the care robot scenario is also quite imaginable. This year, the Cabinet Office of Japan 
conducted a series of surveys on this topic.1 Their results show that 65.1 % of 
Japanese people would like to be cared for by a robot, and 59.8 % would like to use 
such a machine in their homes when caring for someone else. The majority of sub-
jects were concerned whether the robot would have a reasonable price, a safety certifi-
cate, if it would be covered by the national insurance scheme, and if it would come 
with a guarantee against injuries during usage. One problem of an embodied conver-
sational agent that can be envisaged is the ease with which irritated users could talk 
the robot out of fulfilling its duties or convince it to perform a harmful task. To avoid 
this problem, a machine has to know the consequences of acts, but also has to be con-
nected to physical sensors that could confirm if the user is telling the truth (see Fig. 4).
The growth of the so-called “Internet of things”, where different devices 
and sensors are sharing knowledge, will surely support robot care technology. 
However, currently automatic helpers are vulnerable to deception.
4.2  Text-Only Advisor
Although speech is more natural and preferable, especially for children, the 
elderly and handicapped who cannot type, voice recognition accuracy is still one 
1
 http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/tokubetu/h25/h25-kaigo.pdf (in Japanese).
Fig. 4  A therapy-oriented 
system requires physical 
confirmation of what a user 
says to avoid situations where 
untrue information on their 
state of health is passed to 
the machine. Therefore, text-
based knowledge should also 
be confronted with real-world 
sensors as soon as technology 
allows
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of the main problems for smooth machine-user interaction that uses natural lan-
guage. For this reason, we currently work mostly with text, which helps to avoid 
recognition errors and does not restrict the user as much as a voice dialog. In 
this scenario, the ELIZA legacy must be diverted from, and different therapeutic 
methods should be tested. There were no online chatrooms back in the 1970s, 
but in the Internet era it is easier to test various approaches on various subjects. 
In one of the care robot surveys mentioned above (see Footnote 1), 28.2 % of 
subjects chose dementia care as a particularly arduous aspect of nursing care 
at home. As we mentioned before, games and word plays (e.g., quizzes) can be 
helpful in memory training. Also, using humor is effective in making users feel 
better; we are also working on generating puns [6]. Jokes can help to decrease 
the user’s irritation level when the dialog goes wrong, but can worsen the usa-
bility evaluation when the joke or its timing are inappropriate. The same applies 
to automatically-generated poetry, for which many users have very high quality 
demands, especially among elderly Japanese.
The biggest problem to be solved in the advisor scenarios is implementing cor-
rect strategies for counseling. Depending on the user’s data (personality charac-
teristics, skills, preferences, medical details), advice may vary drastically, and the 
knowledge acquisition algorithms are still far from proper exception processing. 
For example, a patient with Alzheimer’s disease should not be recklessly advised 
to take a stroll without a companion, and calming down a hearing-impaired person 
with classical music would be the wrong therapeutical choice.
4.3  Chatbot for Discovering Abnormalities
Another area in which ethical and emotional understanding and dialog processing 
can be used is helping to spot problematic, dangerous and unethical behaviors like 
those seen in cases of online predators or cyberbullying [22]. In this scenario, lan-
guage understanding capabilities come in handy for discovering the linguistic pat-
terns of possibly harmful acts or attempts to provoke such acts by third parties. 
This technology should be able to protect vulnerable users, for example when a 
child user talks to a third person. The difficulty of this task lies in very thorough 
context processing, because the NLP module must be ensured to grasp correct 
agent-patient relations. This is especially problematic for Japanese resources, as 
the language often omits subjects and blogs are in most cases anonymous. 
Therefore, even if a robot knows that a child is talking to a presumably trustful rel-
ative adult, it is hard to ensure that retrieved knowledge mirrors what is appropri-
ate and what is not in linguistic behaviors between both parties. Any false 
accusations might bring users to the conclusion that the robot or its thinking capa-
bilities are simply useless, unless the machine is capable of explaining why it con-
cluded so, which is relatively easier to do when natural language is the main 
means of both communication and learning. In order to deal with recognizing 
actors, patients, objects, places, etc., we are currently working with the Semantic 
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Role Tagger for Japanese Language2 enhancing it with categorization capabilities 
to be able to classify agents and patients, e.g., according to age, and to recognize 
fictional characters, because for instance computer gaming blogs very often gener-
ate noisy knowledge, suggesting to the system that killing or stealing leads to good 
consequences (rewards). This capability is also necessary in order to distinguish 
when an interlocutor speaks about the real world or about fiction. However, in the 
case of children or patients with mental disorders, ignoring imaginary stories 
could lead to missing important clues about the user’s inner world and the details 
of their condition.
5  Need for Top-Down Control
As suggested in previous sections, in the case of medical patients, juveniles and 
elderly users, an artificial moral agent should be controlled by prior customi-
zation. However, we think that these are engineering details which will not be 
enough for an autonomous agent to ensure its ethical behavior; therefore, we opt 
for top-down elements to control what the machine does with both the acquired 
wisdom of crowds and scientific or legal knowledge. We came to the conclu-
sion that consequentialism is the easiest moral approach to implement with the 
technologies we will develop, and we plan to implement Bentham’s calculus 
for estimating utility. For now, we use only one simple rule for avoiding risky 
decision-making: if the majority of the crowd agreement on consequences is not 
significant (less than 2/3), the algorithm enters a doubt mode. In the case of the 
knowledge acquisition task, the program can learn different contradictory opin-
ions, their contexts, the reasoning behind them, etc., but such a deeper text min-
ing process is time-consuming. Therefore if an immediate opinion is needed 
and there is no clear dominance of pain or pleasure in the crowd’s experiences, 
the program remains neutral. In our experiments this usually happens for inputs 
without sufficient contextual clues, such as “driving a car”, but also, as expected, 
when we asked the system about ethically difficult tasks, it also returns the output 
stating that some people have problems with this given act (from abortion and 
euthanasia to playing video games and eating junk food). We set this 2/3 thresh-
old by ourselves, but in future this should be the result of thorough experimen-
tation. So far, we are working only on calculating the overall utility score for a 
given act, but the system must collect and evaluate this score for every possible 
solution to give the best advice in the current context. Here we also will use mul-
tiple parallel searches and the user’s data to avoid unnecessary calculations. One 
potential problem is a situation where the artificial advisor’s first solution candi-
date is rejected by the user, and the machine needs to decide if the second solu-
tion will bring a sufficiently positive outcome or if it would be better to insist on 
2
 http://cl.it.okayama-u.ac.jp/study/project/asa/.
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the first one. In normal circumstances, machine learning techniques would help 
to automatically set such a threshold by receiving feedback, but when the user’s 
health is at stake, this approach can be unethical.
6  Conclusions
In this chapter, we described our vision of how our research on automatically col-
lected shared knowledge could become a base for an artificial agent that helps to treat 
or maintain the mental health of its users while being ethically rational. The two main 
philosophical bases of our approach lie in consequentialism, where the consequences 
of one’s conduct are the ultimate basis for any judgment about the rightness of that 
conduct, and intuitive awareness of value, or intuitive knowledge of evaluative facts (so 
called ethical intuitionism) form the foundation of our ethical knowledge. Our assump-
tion is that if we cannot agree on why people behave morally, then in future we should 
feed a machine with a vast number of samples about our behavior and let the machine 
utilize the retrieved answers or just mimic the acts we believe are ethical, even if we do 
not understand why they are ethical. We believe that now we are only scratching the 
surface of the possibilities of Big Data, but already a new, crowd-based ELIZA could 
be seen as a much more empathic conversational partner who seems to know more 
about the world than 50 years ago. We think that implementing a hybrid (bottom-up 
and top-down) approach to ethical machines could help to build not only a helpful ther-
apist, but also become a starting point for a whole new generation of AI products. We 
believe that agents that understand a mixture of sensing device networks and multime-
dia networks such as the WWW, could become a better and more universal judge than 
humans, because they have faster, global access to millions of common people’s expe-
riences, emotively expressed opinions, motivations and consequences of acts. Even if 
at present such agents utilize only text, they do not have the tendencies to be biased, to 
avoid or ignore any viewpoints that might be inconvenient as humans do; they do not 
overestimate any facts or underestimate others, simply because they do not feel, which 
for most of us is the main obstacle on the machine’s path to ethical behavior. However, 
what we wish to suggest in this chapter is that caring autonomous machines do not 
have to possess their own feelings; instead, it is possible for them to borrow ours to 
ensure empathic behavior and guarantee highest utility without defying common sense.
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Abstract Closed-loop neuromodulation represents an emerging area in clinical 
medicine. Neural devices capable of measuring brain function and using measure-
ments to iteratively guide output, such as deep brain stimulation, will be a sig-
nificant advance in neuromodulatory technology. The introduction of closed-loop 
devices, particularly “smart” machines, will require changes in clinical ethical 
practice. A model of the clinical relationship could be a useful tool for address-
ing ethical challenges arising in this new area. Traditional models of the clinical 
relationship, like Emanuel and Emanuel’s “four models,” are suited to current 
unidirectional forms of neuromodulation. An adequate model of the patient-
machine-clinician relationship may need to move beyond traditional models. Thus, 
I explore three new models: the design model, the customer service model, and 
the quality monitoring model. The exploration of these models of the patient-
machine-clinician relationship will benefit from keeping an Aristotelian ideal of 
friendship in mind.
1  Introduction
The use of implantable neural devices, like deep brain stimulators (DBS) in 
Parkinson’s disease (PD), has added neuromodulation to the repertoire of clinician 
skills [17]. Specialist clinicians have learned to interrogate and modify settings of 
neural devices in response to patient symptoms and signs. The next generation of 
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implantable neural devices aims to move beyond clinician modulation of neural 
devices, replacing standard programming visits with “intelligent” neural machines 
capable of detecting change in brain function and adapting stimulation output, cre-
ating “closed-loop” devices [32, 34]. Near-term closed loop devices will embody 
a rather modest intelligence (e.g., enhanced input–output algorithms), but the drive 
for more intelligent machines is clear: improved neuromodulation. More sophisti-
cated and perhaps autonomous or semi-autonomous machines will be developed, 
which in turn will change the practice of medicine. The nature and extent of this 
change is uncertain, but implications for medicine, and specifically clinical rela-
tionships, are worth considering now.
Models of the patient-clinician relationship (or doctor-patient relationship) are 
common tools for understanding obligations and responsibilities in healthcare 
[10].1 20 years ago, Emanuel and Emanuel [15] distilled the clinician relationship 
into four principal ethical models: paternalistic, informative, interpretive, and 
deliberative. The models differ significantly and track the wide historical evolution 
of medical practice from physician-driven to patient-driven medical decision-mak-
ing. The models offered by Emanuel and Emanuel provide a relatively straightfor-
ward approach to thinking through the normative features of currently available 
forms of neuromodulation, like unidirectional DBS.2
Advances in neuromodulation technology, however, raise questions about the 
adequacy of standard ethical models of the clinical relationship. The emergence of 
closed-loop neuromodulation complicates a straightforward application of tradi-
tional models. Traditional models are paradigmatically applied to discrete and 
temporally proximate clinical decisions.3 Which chemotherapy drug should be 
chosen? Is undergoing surgery soon worth the risk? Does cardiac resuscitation fit 
with a patient’s end of life preferences? Closed-loop modulation, on the other 
hand, will involve the clinician in decisions with outcomes temporally distant and 
indistinct. Algorithms governing neuromodulatory machines will be chosen in 
1
 The term models can have many meanings. In the literature on the patient-clinician relation-
ship, use of the term is almost always meant to be normative. That is, a model of the relationship 
aims to encapsulate the central normative features of the relationship. By applying the model, 
one hopes to at least understand how the relationship can be seen in ethical terms, and more 
ambitiously to be able to derive ethical guidance in particular instantiations of the relationship. 
Thus, the intuitive distinction between ‘clinical models’ of the relationship and 'ethical models' 
of the relationship typically collapses. For our purposes, discussion of models of the patient-cli-
nician relationship will also follow this convention and will equate clinical models with ethical 
models of the relationship and use the terminology interchangeably.
2
 Unidirectional DBS refers to the currently predominant form of this technology in which a 
target area of the brain is stimulated but the neurophysiological (or other physiological) effect of 
this stimulation is not sensed or recorded by the device. In simplified terms, information travels 
in only one direction.
3
 There are, of course, exceptions. Advance directives are a kind of temporally extended deci-
sion-making in medicine. This kind of decision-making differs, though, in that advance directives 
are typically understood as a way to provide guidance to others (e.g., clinicians, surrogates) for 
future decision-making (e.g., when incapacity occurs) rather making future decisions now.
275Models of the Patient-Machine-Clinician Relationship …
advance of the clinical outcomes they determine, perhaps well in advance. In 
 addition, individual clinical outcomes, such as motor output of a given stimulatory 
amplitude and frequency, will become the immediate input for a next iteration of a 
sensory-stimulation loop. As such, the lines between individual clinical events—
for example, a change in modulatory settings—will blur as modulatory settings are 
adjusted automatically and iteratively, outside of conscious decision-making and 
perhaps below the level of consciousness. Will the role of the clinician need to 
shift to help a patient live with a device?4 It is worth asking: is there an appropriate 
clinical model for closed-loop neuromodulation?
The outline of the paper is as follows. Neuromodulation will be defined and 
described and Emanuel and Emanuel’s four ethical models of the clinical relation-
ship will be presented. The current practice of DBS programming will be used to 
illustrate how traditional ethical models, like the four models, can be used to 
explore the normative features of discrete decisions about neuromodulation. Then, 
it will be suggested that advances in neuromodulatory technology may raise new 
ethical questions for which a model could be a useful heuristic. One likely 
advance in this area, the development of closed-loop neuromodulation, will intro-
duce the possibility of a new relationship—the patient-machine-clinician relation-
ship—that the search for an appropriate clinical model may need to accommodate. 
Three potential candidate models of the patient-machine-clinician relationship will 
be offered: the design model, the customer service model, and the quality monitor-
ing model.5 It will be argued that each of these models is limited in what it offers 
normatively to an account of the clinical relationship. The search for a clinical 
model that can accommodate patient-machine-clinician relationships will be 
shown to benefit by incorporating an Aristotelian notion of friendship.
2  Neuromodulation and Models of the Clinical Relationship
Neuromodulation is a generic term for iterative intervention in the nervous  system. 
It has been defined as “a form of therapy in which neurophysiological signals 
are initiated or influenced with the intention of achieving therapeutic effects by 
4
 The ethos of rehabilitation medicine, in so far as it is centered on helping patients adjust to new 
functional abilities and devices, may be a useful analog. Neuromodulatory medicine, however, 
would seem to go beyond the traditional boundaries of rehabilitation medicine and involve life 
trajectories that are more open-ended.
5
 These three candidates need not be viewed as a wholesale replacement for more traditional 
models, such as the deliberative model. Rather, this exploration can be undertaken in parallel 
to debate over preferred models of the clinical relationship more broadly. For instance, it may 
be that a traditional model, like the deliberative model, may be sufficient to guide action in par-
ticular circumstances, such as whether to choose device A versus device B. The question being 
investigated here is whether traditional models might be inadequate or insufficiently developed 
to account for the whole of neuromodulatory medicine—and whether alternatives are worth 
considering.
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altering the function and performance of the nervous system” [21]. The notion 
of neuromodulation is familiar enough, even if the word is not. Adjustment of 
an antidepressant dose based on medication response is neuromodulation, so 
too is reaching for coffee when concentration lags or a bite to eat at the onset of 
hunger or hypoglycemia. The use of devices to modulate function of the brain 
is an expanding scientific and medical domain. The rise of neural engineer-
ing has helped add brain and nerve-based devices to the repertoire of human 
neuromodulation.
Deep brain stimulation treatment for Parkinson’s disease is the most com-
mon kind of device neuromodulation. Individuals with Parkinson’s disease lose 
essential elements in dopaminergic brain circuitry responsible for motor activity 
and electrical stimulation to areas deep in the brain can be used to compensate, 
for a time, for this deficiency [37]. The optimum stimulatory frequency, ampli-
tude, pulse width and wave form vary by individual and by stage of disease, and 
typically must be adjusted over time through reprogramming [8]. Individuals 
implanted with DBS currently require neurologic evaluations and re-programming 
in response to Parkinson’s disease progression and stimulatory response. Periodic 
evaluations and adjustments are a kind of neuromodulation: adapting an interven-
tion, e.g., a change in DBS stimulatory parameters, based on feedback response, 
clinical symptoms and signs.
The relationship between patient and physician has long been recognized as 
special [1].6 Roles and responsibilities flow out of this relationship that are both 
familiar from other areas of life and yet clearly distinct. The search for a model (or 
group of models) to capture what is special about the relationship has been an 
often repeated exercise in bioethics. Models based on healing [31], negotiation 
[10], contract [35], covenant [26], shared-decision-making [6], narrative [9], and 
bureaucracy [16] have been offered. Models, when of appropriate fit, aim to bring 
issues arising in medical practice into sharper focus and provide a framework upon 
which to hang normative concepts implicated in medicine, such as confidentiality, 
trust, beneficence.
One of the most influential appeals to models has been that of Emanuel and 
Emanuel [15]. Emanuel and Emanuel argue that the clinical relationship can be 
encapsulated in four types of models: paternalistic, informative, interpretative, 
and deliberative. These four types are conceptually distinct but tend to map on to 
changes in western medicine in the last century.
6
 The literature in bioethics has traditionally referred to the clinical relationship as the ‘doctor–
patient relationship.’ It has been pointed out that this terminology is less than ideal. The listing 
of ‘doctor’ first in this pair is seen to reinforce the privilege of the physician perspective. Further, 
by limiting the relationship to physicians this terminology hives off—and hides from view—the 
many other forms clinical relationships can take (nurses, psychologists, social workers, physician 
assistants, among others). As such, I will adopt the terms patient-clinician or patient-machine- 
clinician relationship and speak of clinicians, rather than physicians, except in presenting the 
views of others who use the ‘physician’ term.
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In the paternalistic model, clinicians use clinical skills to diagnose and  pursue 
therapeutic regimens that the clinician believes to be in the best interest of the 
patient. Others have called this kind of model the “priestly” [35] or “parental” 
model [10]. The paternalistic model spans a continuum along which the exercise 
of patient autonomy is inversely related. At one end of this spectrum, the clini-
cian determines what is to be done and does not or only perfunctorily informs 
the patient. At the other end, the patient chooses among therapeutic options, but 
patient autonomy is restricted by the clinician narrowing or coloring possible 
options in line with clinician beliefs about what is in the patient’s best interest [7].
The clinician in the informative model assembles and presents relevant infor-
mation to the patient and executes patient decisions made in light of this informa-
tion. The informative model embodies a robust division of labor with respect to 
facts and values. The clinician provides factual information about the diagnosis, 
therapeutic options, and prognoses, and the patient combines this factual informa-
tion with his or her own values, and comes to a decision. Others have described 
this as an “engineering” [35] or a “technician” model [10]. The clinician is taken 
to be a kind of expert in facts relevant to medical decision-making, but makes no 
claim to expertise about what is best for the patient or what the patient values.
The clinician in the interpretive model not only provides the patient with fac-
tual information but works with the patient to clarify the patient’s values and align 
them with available options. Brock [6] has referred to this kind of model as “val-
ues clarification.” The clinician engages in a discussion of patient values to facili-
tate practical reasoning. A concrete example of which might be: “So, correct me if 
I am wrong, but from what you’ve said it seems that you place a very high value 
on X (independence, relationship with your family, dignity, etc.). If that is right, 
then therapy Y might be most consistent with that.”
In the deliberative model, the clinician goes beyond clarifying the values a 
patient happens to have and suggests which health-related values ought to be pur-
sued. The animating idea of the deliberative model is that the clinician is uniquely 
situated to help the patient strive toward certain moral ideals. The clinician’s 
expertise is not merely technical. The deliberative model takes seriously that cli-
nicians can be not just epistemically privileged with respect to scientific facts but 
also, at least in some meaningful respect, more experienced in how patient values 
generally cohere with medical options. Clinicians can develop an understanding 
of what values medicine can and cannot help promote. Combined with the profes-
sional obligation to care, this understanding puts clinicians in a position of not just 
laying out possible options, but of recommending options and offering persuasive 
arguments for these. The clinician is invested in the patient, not unlike that of a 
“teacher.”
The current practice of clinician monitoring after DBS implantation can illus-
trate these models. Imagine the case of a woman with a DBS for Parkinson’s dis-
ease tremor who visits her clinician for new symptoms of depressive thoughts. 
This patient has DBS placed in the subthalamic nucleus (STN), which is associ-
ated with increased risk of depression [37]. She has a remote history of severe 
post-partum depression. A clinician guided by each of the different models might 
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approach the discussion of how to proceed with DBS programming changes 
 differently. A paternalistic approach might involve her clinician strongly advocat-
ing for a reduction in stimulation, arguing that addressing her depressive symp-
toms, particularly given her history of depression, has priority over loss of motor 
benefit from her DBS. An informative approach might involve the clinician taking 
a more detached stance, presenting existing data on the relationship between STN 
settings and depression and methodically laying out her options. An interpretive 
approach might involve the clinician helping map her options onto her beliefs and 
values—how worried is she about depression or how happy is she with the motoric 
benefits of her DBS—and arrive at an option that is of best fit for her. Finally, 
a clinician within the deliberative model might encourage her to think about her 
options in terms of the type of person she could become. Perhaps a decision not to 
adjust her settings would affirm and strengthen certain valuable character traits she 
prizes, such as her success in overcoming depressive thoughts in the past.
As the foregoing example illustrates, models of the clinical relationship 
 provide a reasonable starting point for thinking about ethical aspects of DBS 
programming in part because the programming visit embodies a paradigmatic 
clinical decision. The programming visit occurs at a discrete meeting between 
clinician and patient. It involves an evaluation of the current health state of the 
patient and a therapeutic decision made in light of this evaluation. The patient 
(and often family) give a subjective account of symptoms and changes in function 
and the clinician conducts tests, such as physical exams or timed motor tasks at 
varying device settings. A decision whether and how to change device settings is 
made by the patient and the choice is carried out (e.g., DBS settings are changed 
or not) by the clinician.
3  Advances in Neuromodulation
3.1  Near Future of DBS
The future of DBS programming will look quite different than it does today. 
Advances in technology already underway will make it possible for patients to 
change their own machine settings, for changes to machine settings to be made 
remotely, and for direct measurement of neural functioning to guide programming 
decisions. In light of these advances in the technology, the current practice of clin-
ical neuromodulation in DBS will evolve.
The first change to programming practice will be in the ease with which stimu-
lation settings can be changed. Programming devices that are portable and easily 
navigated will make it more common that patients are able to modify their own 
device settings. One such device currently allows patients to choose among groups 
of clinician-determined stimulation parameters [27]. The philosopher Dubiel [13] 
describes the value of this kind of self-modulatory technology in his autobiograph-
ical account of living with PD and DBS. Dubiel describes a trade-off he experi-
enced with DBS:
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Depending on whether I need to walk for some distance or speak in public, I have to enter 
commands into my pacemaker much the way I would on my computer. If I want to enun-
ciate clearly, I have to set the amplitude very low, which then regularly leads to relative 
immobility and depression. If I want to walk for more than half a kilometer, I have to set 
the level correspondingly high, which then makes me speak inaudibly and sound washed 
out [13, p. 120].
Dubiel adjusts his DBS settings to meet his needs. He could set his device ampli-
tude high, allowing him to walk quickly across campus in time to deliver a lec-
ture, or turn down the amplitude in order to make his voice comprehensible to his 
audience. This kind of self-modulation has an analog in pharmacologic treatment 
of Parkinson’s disease. Patients adjust their dosage of medication to their current 
symptoms, taking an extra dose of levodopa if tremor or bradykinesia are worse, 
or conversely reducing or skipping a dose.
A second change likely to occur is the ability to adjust device settings remotely. 
The incorporation of wireless technology into neural devices will make remote 
modulation possible [14]. For instance, a patient who lives far from a DBS center 
will be able to discuss symptoms over the telephone with a clinician and changes 
to the devices will be made wirelessly (or with the aid of wireless technology). 
Coupled with other forms of remote data gathering, such as video conferencing 
or ambient monitoring, the quality of data needed for accurate device adjustment 
may come to rival that gathered in clinic visits. For instance, speed of gait is often 
used to help determine if a change in stimulation is warranted in DBS for PD [8] 
Wearable sensors can be used to give an accurate picture of a person’s gait in envi-
ronments of interest (e.g., the home) [30].
A third change likely to occur is the use of neural sensors to gather data rele-
vant to neural device programming, such as DBS [24]. Neural stimulators are cur-
rently assessed in terms of subjective symptoms or observable effects on patient 
behavior. As we have seen, the DBS programming visit is an example where such 
data is collected. Neural devices capable of sensing brain function provide an 
alternative mode of assessing stimulation devices. A sensor that detects the electri-
cal or chemical state of the brain, for example, a change in beta frequency oscilla-
tion near the STN, may provide useful information for adjusting neurostimulation. 
A patient with self-modulatory capabilities could use such information to guide 
modulation decisions, or a clinician could use such sensing capabilities to guide 
in-clinic or remote adjustment of device settings. Neural sensors promise to pro-
vide a new, and some might say more direct, source of information for neuromod-
ulation decisions.
All of these changes to neural stimulation technology may put pressure on the 
traditional patient-clinician relationship. Self-modulation of neural devices by 
patients will change the locus of control over day to day modulatory activities. 
Remote modulation will change the form (the where and how) of the patient-cli-
nician interaction. Sensing-enabled devices will add a new source of information 
together with, and perhaps at times in conflict with, traditional ways of assessing 
clinical benefit (e.g., subjective report, physical exam). These changes in technol-
ogy will require adjustments in clinical practice.
280 E. Klein
The extent to which these changes in delivery of medical care will in turn 
require a rethinking of obligations and responsibilities in medicine are an impor-
tant and open question. The ethical challenges occasioned by these technological 
developments at least have precedent. Many patients with Parkinson’s disease, for 
instance, already have discretion over when and how to take symptomatic medi-
cations, in effect shifting the locus of daily neuromodulatory control from clini-
cian to patient. In addition, we are becoming increasingly familiar and dependent 
upon devices over which others exert control by remote means. Networked com-
puters can be turned on, off, reset, or reconfigured remotely. Furthermore, devices 
capable of recording health or health-related information, such as activity level or 
physical location, are becoming a part of modern daily life. While changes in neu-
ral engineering technology may put new demands on the patient-clinician relation-
ship, and the models that can be used to elucidate its normative features, it is not 
obvious that they threaten, at a more fundamental level, the clinical relationship. 
The same may not be the case for another development in neural technology sit-
ting on the horizon: closed-loop neuromodulation.
3.2  Closed Loop Neuromodulation in DBS
Closed-loop is a term for devices that use algorithms to adapt output to current 
needs. Closed-loop neuromodulatory devices, like a DBS capable of sensing 
changes in the neural milieu around the STN and adjusting stimulation accord-
ingly, promise a significant improvement over current unidirectional devices like 
standard DBS. Many individuals with Parkinson’s disease, for instance, currently 
experience fluctuations in symptoms based on time of day or activity level and 
could benefit symptomatically from more frequent changes to stimulatory set-
tings [28]. As we have seen, self-modulation by patients or wireless technologies 
allowing patients and clinicians to make remote device adjustments are two ways 
in which to bridge this gap. A more direct way would be to cut out the patient 
and clinician as intermediaries, and close the neuromodulatory loop even tighter. 
Instead of patients and clinicians using clinical symptoms or information from 
neural sensors as a substrate for making stimulation decisions, neural sensors 
could provide information directly to a neurostimulatory device. Patients and clini-
cians would not have to make decisions about device adjustment. A closed-loop 
device, in its ideal form, will tie stimulation and the changing needs of the recipi-
ent so closely as to mimic normal physiologic function. The goal of closed-loop 
neuromodulation is for a device to become a seamless part of an individual’s neu-
ral functioning.
Closed-loop devices can be more or less sophisticated based on the algorithms 
they embed. A machine can use a very simple algorithm to tie input and output. 
For instance, the frequency and amplitude of stimulation from a DBS can be set 
to increase if the activity in an area or circuit of interest (e.g., STN) falls belong a 
threshold level. Once the activity in the target area rises back above the threshold, 
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stimulation settings can reset to baseline. Even this rather simple input–output 
loop would be an improvement over current DBS technology [32].
The promise and future of closed-loop neural devices lies in more sophisticated 
algorithms. In part, this is because the origination of most human behavior, even 
simple motor movements, is quite complex. Algorithms able to incorporate inputs 
from a broad range of neural circuits and brain regions influencing a particular 
behavior (e.g., gait) are more likely to allow for a fine-grained response (e.g., 
smooth and fast gait). Current neuromodulatory therapies, like DBS or pharma-
cologic treatment of depression, provide benefit through more coarse means (e.g., 
stimulating the entire STN, blocking serotonin reuptake across brain regions). 
Closed-loop devices that are able to respond to multiple neurophysiologic inputs 
will facilitate more targeted output.
The more significant advance in closed-loop technology will be the incorpora-
tion of a kind of intelligence into the input–output loop. Consider an extension 
of Dubiel’s example. A DBS device based on a simple algorithm might be pro-
grammed to increase output during a sustained walk (e.g., across campus) and 
decrease output during sustained verbal activity (e.g., lecturing). A device pro-
grammed in such a simple way would support his goal of being a successful aca-
demic. Imagine, however, a “smarter” closed-loop machine, one that incorporated 
a more sophisticated algorithm in which the device learned about Dubiel’s activ-
ities (and even priorities) over time, and facilitated their achievement in various 
ways. Perhaps a device could learn that a walk across campus of a certain duration 
occurring at certain time always preceded his lecture. The device might lower its 
amplitude automatically with his first step into the classroom, and save him the 
few awkward moments of unintelligible speech at the start of his lecture or the 
unwanted attention he draws in accessing a self-programming device. The closed-
loop device might be taught to increase amplitude even higher in order to speed 
his gait if he is running late for the class. Conversely, the device might learn from 
experience that rushing across campus leads to worse lecturing performance, per-
haps manifest by higher levels of activity in brain regions associated with stress or 
distress, and that slowing Dubiel down before arriving, even if making him a little 
late, is in his best interests, whether he is immediately aware of this or not. With a 
sophisticated algorithm and an expanded range of input data, a device might learn 
what Dubiel really values and help him achieve it.
It is not hard to see how sophisticated closed-loop neural devices of this kind—
those that embody a kind of artificial intelligence (AI)—might raise ethical con-
cerns. Is the device facilitating Dubiel’s achievement of his goals or helping shape 
what those goals are? How is the algorithm in the device chosen in the first place 
and how informed ought this choice to be? Is it really possible to consider the vari-
ous futures that one algorithm will usher in (versus another) without quickly sur-
passing the imaginative capacities of even the most sophisticated patient-clinician 
pair? How should the “intelligent” device be regarded? Does the machine’s intel-
ligence need to be morally respected?
Traditional models, like those of Emanuel and Emanuel, are not an easy fit for 
closed-loop neuromodulation. Interventions most typically the subject matter of 
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such models do not involve intelligence in this way. A medication, a surgery, a 
unidirectional device (like current DBS, as we have seen) or even a counseling or 
educational intervention certainly involves or relies on the intelligence of practi-
tioners. The intervention would not be possible or likely of value without this 
intelligence. A closed-loop device, on the other hand, not only involves the intelli-
gence of practitioners but is itself intelligent. The possibility of machine intelli-
gence has implications to which traditional dyadic models of the clinical 
relationship do not, and perhaps are not well-suited to, attend. Might there be 
alternative models that are a more natural fit with intelligent devices?7
4  Models of the Patient-Machine-Clinician Relationship
Consider three models that have resonance with engineering practice: clinician as 
designer, as servicer, or as monitor. I will present each of these briefly and then 
argue that none of them seems on first pass sufficient for guiding the patient-
machine-clinician relationship.
The first model is that of the clinician as a designer. The designer’s role is 
to help the patient pick a device and corresponding algorithm that best fits the 
patient’s physiology, values, and preferences. The design model overlaps with 
interpretive or deliberative models discussed above, but is more clearly prospec-
tive in its orientation. The clinician works with the patient to “lock-in” a suitable 
algorithm for the device, one that encompasses the type of device intelligence and 
independence that is a best fit for how the patient sees him or herself now and 
projects into the future. The clinician assists the patient in making choices about 
the device. What inputs will the device be able to consider? Are there limits on the 
range of acceptable stimulations? The clinician helps the patient pick the optimum 
design for the closed-loop device. To do this effectively, the clinician will need an 
extensive knowledge of the patient and deep understanding of design possibilities.
The second model is the clinician as servicer of the device. After implanta-
tion, the patient will find the device to be meeting or not meeting expectations. 
In the service model, the clinician’s role is primarily to address a possible mis-
match. This may involve interrogating the device and making sure it is working as 
designed. It also may involve exploring what the patient wanted prior to implan-
tation or currently wants out of the device. Finally, it may involve educating the 
patient on the current capabilities of the device or what would be possible if the 
device were changed, somewhat akin to the clinician in the informative model. 
Ultimately, the clinician works to make the device a satisfactory fit for the patient.
7
 There is an interesting question about whether the machine itself is a party to the relationship. 
This gets to questions about machine agency and is interesting but beyond the scope of what is 
argued here. Nonetheless, even if we hold the status of the device an open question—and how it 
ought to be regarded—the relationship between the clinician and patient is still challenged in a 
fundamental way. This challenge is task enough.
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The third model involves the clinician as a monitor of the device. Even 
 closed-loop devices designed for a level of autonomy or independence must func-
tion within a set of acceptable parameters. Within the monitoring model, the cli-
nician’s role is to check whether the device is functioning within an acceptable 
range. This will involve interrogating the device to make sure it is working accord-
ing to pre-established criteria (e.g., delivering the set stimulation). It will also 
involve the clinician “looking in on” the patient in the sense that a closed-loop 
device may result in unacceptable patient behavior. For instance, a closed-loop 
device may lead to personality changes (e.g., disinhibition) or destructive habits 
(e.g., gambling, overeating) that fall outside of what the patient originally deemed 
acceptable behavioral outcomes. How a clinician exercises this role if individuals 
do not want to be monitored or no longer view certain behaviors as unacceptable 
(e.g., gambling) raises important ethical questions about identity over time and the 
clinician’s role in public health surveillance.
These three models have some appeal but each seems narrow in applicability. 
The design model, for instance, is principally focused on the initial decision of 
which device to adopt, with relative neglect of what happens after. While the 
design model does not preclude involvement of the clinician after the choice of 
device (designers can check in on their devices to see how they perform) the prior-
ity in this model is on designing the device correctly at the outset. The service 
model, on the other hand, is narrow in a different way. The patient’s satisfaction 
with the device is the core feature of this model. It is what brings the patient and 
device to clinical attention and what motivates adjusting the device settings. Other 
considerations, though, such as what may be in the overall best interest of the 
patient or what might be in the interests of others (e.g., family), may also be 
important, but within the service model these would seem to take a subsidiary role. 
Finally, the quality-control monitor role is narrow in yet a different way. Such a 
monitor works by looking out for deviations from predetermined rules or out-
comes. In the case of closed-loop devices, however, unacceptable performance is a 
moving target. Individuals will change over time as a function of the device in 
who they take themselves to be and what they find acceptable.8
While these limitations as sketched may not be sufficient to justify abandon-
ing the search for an appropriate model amongst these candidates, they may give 
pause; none of these models, at least at first pass, seems sufficiently robust to do 
normative work across the full range of living with an intelligent neuromodulatory 
device. Perhaps the search for a model of the patient-machine-clinician relation-
ship ought to travel in another direction, toward a model that is more straightfor-
wardly normative in its ambitions. A friendship model of the clinical relationship 
would seem to fit such a mold.
8
 Monitoring, in the generic sense, is a part of every clinician’s role, much as caring or diagnosing 
is. Clinicians monitor for changes in health as a core professional activity, and in so far as it is rel-
evant to health or health decision-making, monitor for changes in the person. Whether monitoring 
ought to be taken as the orienting activity of a clinician is a different question.
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5  Closed Loop Neuromodulation and Aristotelian 
Friendship
The notion that friendship might be a useful and relevant model for the patient- 
clinician relationship has a long history. Lain Entralgo [22] in his Doctor and 
Patient traces the history of friendship (philia) as a foundation for medical practice 
from the Hippocratic Corpus forward. Wadell [36] argues that a friendship model is 
a natural outgrowth of the three features shared by friendship and the clinical rela-
tionship: (1) benevolence, (2) mutuality, and (3) a shared good. Fried [18] suggests 
that physicians and patients can be thought of as “limited, special-purpose friends” 
in so far as one friend can assume the interests of the other in certain contexts.
The friendship model has its detractors. Loewy [25] argues that the ubiquitous 
and imprecise use of friendship poses an insurmountable barrier to taking seri-
ously friendship as a model for the clinical relationship. More recently, Davis [12] 
points out two critical differences between friendships and clinical relationships. 
Moral responsibilities within friendships are mutual or reciprocal and friendships 
are freely entered into, whereas in the clinical relationship the extent of the physi-
cian’s responsibilities are clearly asymmetric to that of the patient and the exis-
tential vulnerability of the patient precludes a relationship of truly free entry (and 
exit).
The normative potential of friendship is often traced to Aristotle [11]. Aristotle 
most explicitly addresses friendship in the Nicomachean Ethics [3]. He delineates 
three kinds of friendship in terms of the ends toward which they aim. The first two 
are limited species of friendship, friendship based on the achievement of a pleasur-
able outcome or on the usefulness of an association: “[T]hese friendships are only 
incidental; for it is not as being the man he is that the loved person is loved, but as 
providing some good or pleasure” (NE 1156a17–19). The third kind of friendship, 
one that Aristotle notes is capable of perfection, has the moral good of another as 
its end (NE 1156b7, 34):
Now those who wish well to their friends for their sake are most truly friends; for they do 
this by reason of their own nature and not incidentally; therefore their friendship lasts as 
long as they are good—and excellence is an enduring thing (NE 1156b10–12).
Aristotle’s third kind of friendship, what Cooper calls “character friendship” has 
as its end the moral goodness of another. Friendship involves recognizing the 
good qualities of character in another and acting in ways that support and promote 
these.
That Aristotle’s, or any other, view of friendship would have relevance to the 
patient-machine-relationship might seem an odd, even quaint, suggestion. The way 
in which medical care is organized and delivered today can hardly be seen as hos-
pitable to most notions of friendship. Economic and social forces drive patients and 
physicians together and then apart, with a lengthy or lifelong patient-clinician inter-
action becoming less the norm. The interactions of patient and clinician are dissected 
and “nudged” in one way or another in service to external ends (e.g., efficiency, 
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satisfaction, resource utilization) [20]. Rather than a friendship, patients quite often 
want use of a technical expert and physicians want a job with unambiguous occu-
pational boundaries. As such, the challenge of finding points of contact between 
friendship and the current instantiation of medicine has to be conceded. That said, 
the challenge does not vitiate the idea that friendship might be useful, only cautions 
against thinking the value will be self-evident or easily achieved.
Oakley and Cocking [29] argue that friendship is best viewed as a kind of regu-
lative ideal. Like other ideals that can structure a good life, friendship involves
…internalizing a certain normative structure of excellence, in such a way that one is able 
to adjust one’s motivation and conduct so that it conforms, or at least does not conflict, 
with that standard…For in exemplifying the good of friendship, one does not act for the 
sake of friendship per se, or even for the sake of this friendship, but rather for the sake of 
this person, who is one’s friend. And one can properly be said to be acting for the sake 
of this person only if one has shaped one’s perception in certain ways—for example, one 
must have developed some kind of understanding of what this person’s well-being con-
sists of, and of which ways of acting would promote it [29, pp. 28–29].
In this way, friendship is an ideal that structures the development and exercise of 
character, both in oneself and in one’s friend, by contributing to a flourishing life.9 
Friendship as a regulative ideal proves useful in thinking about the clinical rela-
tionship. The clinical relationship too serves as a kind of regulative ideal. The 
development and exercise of certain character traits in clinicians and patients pro-
mote the achievement of certain morally valuable ends. The ends are nested and 
given meaning by the goals of medicine. Friendship, on this view, does not pro-
vide an ideal to which the clinical relationship should conform. Rather, both 
friendship and the clinical relationship serve as examples of regulative ideals for 
human flourishing.
Two important features of the closed loop neuromodulation relationship argue for 
exploring this friendship ideal further. The first is the centrality that identity plays in 
decisions about closed loop neuromodulation. The second is the way in which trust 
figures into the success of the relationship. Before ending, it is worth sketching very 
briefly how these features are prominent in closed loop neuromodulation and why 
the friendship ideal might be particularly suited to help illuminate them.
The initial decision to “lock in” a closed-loop device algorithm confronts ques-
tions of identity directly. As discussed above, a patient’s choice of algorithm 
involves a patient and clinician in an exploration of patient values and preferences, 
followed by a mapping of these onto algorithm choices. At one level, such a deci-
sion involves identity just as any other consequential medical decision would [4]. 
Patients think about medical options in terms of who they are and who they want, 
or do not want, to become. The outcome of one medical decision eventually pre-
sents new options, affording an opportunity to reassess and reconfigure identity. 
9
 Oakley and Cocking note that this kind of view is not out of step with what Aristotle intended, 
though they acknowledge that traditional views of Aristotelian friendship often incorporate an 
explicitly moral disposition to friends (p. 72).
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This is where closed-loop neuromodulation begins to take a different path.10 The 
choice of algorithm is a choice of how not to be presented with discrete clinical 
decisions. Standard opportunities for adjusting identity are given over to an intelli-
gent device that makes “decisions” hidden from view. Neuromodulation becomes 
akin to a neurophysiologic process rather than a series of patient-directed 
decisions.
This not only makes it that much more important to achieve an identity-con-
gruent choice of algorithm at the outset, but it shifts the way in which identity 
figures into the life of the individual with the device. Notions of moral and legal 
responsibility, which in other contexts are distributed over a series of discrete deci-
sions leading up to a given outcome, in the case of a closed-loop device trace back 
in full to the original choice of algorithm. The psychological and social burden of 
tying responsibility so tightly to the initial choice of algorithm will be substantial. 
Furthermore, closed-loop neuromodulation, by doing away with individual modu-
lation decisions, will also do away with socially and medically acceptable deci-
sion-points for reconfiguring identity. In so doing, medicine may need to liberalize 
what counts as acceptable reasons for considering a change in device algorithm. 
Rather than requiring particular clinical symptoms, signs or diseases, clinicians 
may need to attend more carefully to considerations of identity. Comments like 
“I don’t feel like myself anymore” [33] may need to be put on par with traditional 
clinical measures.
The other feature that promises to figure prominently in the closed-loop neu-
romodulation relationship is trust. Given how consequential the initial decision of 
algorithm is, trust between patient and clinician will be paramount. The patient 
will need to trust that the clinician knows the capabilities of the devices (and 
algorithms) and can accurately prognosticate about their benefits and harms. The 
patient will also need to trust that the clinician has the patient’s best interests in 
mind when presenting and recommending device options. Similarly, the clinician 
will need to trust that the patient gives accurate personal information and engages 
in an honest and thorough self-exploration of values and preferences.
The importance of trust in closed-loop neuromodulation goes beyond the initial 
choice of algorithm. The nature of a closed-loop device is that it locks the clinician 
(and patient) out of iterative decision-making. This shifts the clinician into a role 
of following alongside neuromodulation. What it will mean to follow alongside 
a patient with a closed-loop device is an open question. It may involve technical 
monitoring of the device in some fashion, perhaps remotely, and intervening when 
10
 This is not to say that identity is not a part of other clinical decisions made in medicine. For 
instance, identity is likely the most important consideration in decisions about advance directives. 
There is an important difference, however. In the case of advance directives, the decision is cir-
cumscribed and priority is given to trying to respect or reflect identity rather than influence it. 
Very rarely do people think about how making an advance directive will go on to influence the 
type of person one will become. Conversely, the decision about a closed loop device is conspic-
uously a choice about how to shape one’s identity going forward, what features of the self to 
endorse and promote and what features to avoid.
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certain objective parameters are met (e.g., battery failure, input–output mismatch). 
The parameters for intervening based on technical grounds will likely need to be 
outlined and agreed upon in advance, before implantation of the device or choice 
of device algorithm.
Intervention may also be needed for non-technical reasons. The closed-loop 
iterative process will lead some individuals to behave in ways that they or others 
find unacceptable. For example, Glannon [19] presents a case first described by 
Leentjens et al. [23] of a patient with PD and DBS who experienced megalomania 
and chaotic behavior as a result of unidirectional DBS stimulation. This behavior 
was felt to pose a danger to himself and prompted clinical intervention.11 
Intervention will similarly be needed in patients with closed-loop devices, compli-
cated perhaps by more insidious development of behavioral change. Changes in 
behavior or personality that occur slowly over time in response to iterations of a 
feedback loop may be difficult to distinguish from changes due to non-device 
means. When the patient finds such changes worrisome or unacceptable, interven-
tion may be easily justified, but when the patient does not, we can see why trust 
may be important.
The patient’s initial choice of device algorithm will ideally involve a discussion 
with the clinician as to acceptable and unacceptable future outcomes of neuromod-
ulation. For instance, an individual might find it unacceptable if the functioning 
closed-loop device led to behavior that was compulsive or disinhibited. “If I ever 
become a compulsive gambler, please intervene.” Part of the process of deciding 
on a device algorithm will be deciding on acceptable parameters for future clini-
cian intervention, even if a patient in the future finds such parameters unaccepta-
ble. The clinician may be party to a kind of Ulysses contract.12 A patient may want 
assurance that the clinician will intervene if the functioning of a closed-loop 
device leads to changes that are now deemed unacceptable. Such assurance is 
grounded in trust. A patient will have to trust a clinician will be able and willing to 
intervene, and trust that the clinician will know the patient well enough to deci-
pher when a change in behavior crosses a line. As Baier [2] notes, investing a 
friend with discretionary power is an ineliminable element of trust.
Aristotelian friendship embeds rich notions of identity and trust. Aristotle takes 
friendship to involve a commitment to the development of another’s character 
[11]. Friends strive to make their friends better people. This involves as a prerequi-
site that friends delve into the character of their friends and use what they come to 
11
 In this case, the intervention involved clarifying the patient’s preferred state. When the patient 
was not stimulated—and presumably competent to make a decision comparing the two states—
the patient chose to be stimulated and institutionalized, due to psychotic behavior, rather than 
have the stimulator turned off. Hence, an intervention may simply be initiating a discussion with 
a patient in order to clarify decision-making capacity. While even an ‘intervention’ of this type 
could be viewed as paternalistic from a synchronic perspective, it will fall far short of the more 
objectionable paternalism involved in changing device parameters without the patient’s consent.
12
 Ulysses instructed his crew to bind him to the mast and ignore his exhortations to unbind so 
that he could safely enjoy the music of the Sirens.
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know of each other as the basis for action. The commitment to character 
 development carries throughout the friendship, but is particularly important for 
consequential decisions. Friends tend to wrap themselves up in such decisions 
because the implications for their friend’s character going forward are so great. 
The notion of trust is also central to an Aristotelian notion of friendship. Friends 
trust one another to assist not just when asked, but also when needed. Friends 
notice things about their friends that others miss; they often have a longer and 
deeper perspective, in Aristotle’s terms “time and familiarity” (NE 1156b, 25–29), 
from which to view the behavior of their friends. Friends have a unique ability to 
perceive what a friend needs [5]. This sometimes justifies, even requires, interven-
ing in the life of a friend even when the friend does not initially desire the inter-
vention.13 Thus, the friendship ideal provides a glimpse of how to steer a course 
between unpalatable extremes of paternalism and bureaucratic impartiality in the 
clinical relationship.
We can start to see the outlines of how an Aristotelian ideal of friendship would 
be useful for thinking about the patient-machine-clinician relationship in closed-
loop neuromodulation. The role of the clinician extends beyond the patient’s initial 
decision to get or not get a device; it reaches into helping a patient make sense of 
his or her identity and what it means to live with a device. At the same time, the 
patient and clinician are bound by notions of trust; the depth of trust required for 
success of this relationship extends beyond limited notions of reliability or con-
tract and into entrusting one’s future to the hands of a caring other. The friendship 
ideal provides support for thinking that merely designing, monitoring or servicing 
a patient’s device will not capture the richness required of the clinician’s role in 
neuromodulation.
A robust model of the patient-machine-clinician relationship would be val-
uable, but it may be that we have to settle for something more preliminary. An 
Aristotelian ideal of friendship, conceived as a regulative ideal, may be a useful 
tool for understanding the role of the clinician (and patient) in the emergence of 
neuromodulatory technologies. While not itself a model, the ideal of friendship 
provides an anchor for thinking about the patient-machine-clinician relationship 
and exploring the adequacy of clinical models.
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13
 The “initially” is important here, because there are limits to the extent of paternalism that 
any friendship can accommodate. The exercise of paternalism can also violate other features 
of friendship (e.g., mutual respect) and so must be exercised judiciously. How much paternal-
ism any particular friendship can bear is particular to the history and nature of that friendship. 
Exercised too often or without a sense that friends are both oriented to the same good, this pater-
nalism can harm or even destroy a friendship. Friendship is not a blank check to co-opt another’s 
path toward the good.
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Abstract It is suggested that some limitations of current designs for medical AI 
systems (be they autonomous or advisory) stem from the failure of those designs 
to address issues of artificial (or machine) consciousness. Consciousness would 
appear to play a key role in the expertise, particularly the moral expertise, of 
human medical agents, including, for example, autonomous weighting of options 
in (e.g.,) diagnosis; planning treatment; use of imaginative creativity to generate 
courses of action; sensorimotor flexibility and sensitivity; empathetic and morally 
appropriate responsiveness; and so on. Thus, it is argued, a plausible design con-
straint for a successful ethical machine medical or care agent is for it to at least 
model, if not reproduce, relevant aspects of consciousness and associated abilities. 
In order to provide theoretical grounding for such an enterprise we examine some 
key philosophical issues that concern the machine modelling of consciousness and 
ethics, and we show how questions relating to the first research goal are relevant to 
medical machine ethics. We believe that this will overcome a blanket skepticism 
concerning the relevance of understanding consciousness, to the design and con-
struction of artificial ethical agents for medical or care contexts. It is thus argued 
that it would be prudent for designers of MME agents to reflect on issues to do 
with consciousness and medical (moral) expertise; to become more aware of rel-
evant research in the field of machine consciousness; and to incorporate insights 
gained from these efforts into their designs.
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1  Introduction
Since the advent of artificial intelligence, and more specifically, of AI-based arti-
ficial ethics systems, technology has threatened to acquire moral agency, or moral 
status, in a direct sense: not merely in mediating the moral activities and attitudes 
of humans in the way writers such as Latour [28] and Verbeek [49] have outlined, 
but also in being designed to explicitly mimic, or reproduce, in as rich and detailed 
a way as possible, the activities and attitudes of human moral participants. The 
goal of AI has been to develop artificial agents that are increasingly interactive, 
autonomous and adaptable (using the criteria of agenthood deployed by Floridi and 
Sanders [13]). From the earliest days of AI, many have asserted that it is a neces-
sity to ensure that such increasingly autonomous agents operate according to goals 
or codes that conform to the moral expectations of the people they interact with; in 
a word, that such artificial agents are, as far as possible, moral agents [3, 29, 50].
Thus the field of machine ethics (ME) appears on the scene. ME can be divided 
into two endeavors: the investigation of the ethical issues that arise around intelligent 
or autonomous artificial moral agents; and the attempt to design and build such moral 
agents—theoretical and constructive ME, as we shall call them. The autonomous 
agents that are being developed in constructive ME are like human moral agents in that 
they can comfortably be described in terms of interactivity, autonomy and adaptability, 
and, moreover, that their actions are assessable in terms of moral good or ill [13].
However, such agents are unlike human moral agents—to date at least—in that 
they do not have, except in a vestigial or metaphorical sense, any kind of con-
sciousness. Moreover, consciousness seems to be one feature that resists being 
built into AI agents, at least in any convincing way. Since many take conscious-
ness to be central to human agency, and therefore to human moral agency, this 
presents a prima facie challenge to the very idea of constructive ME. By contrast, 
the emerging field of machine consciousness (MC) sees the recalcitrance of con-
sciousness as a contingent matter, and attempts to import some, at least, of the 
human features of consciousness into our technologies. If MC can succeed in this 
an apparent obstacle to the very idea of constructive ME can be removed.
In the following discussion, we will examine how far the field of MC may impact 
on the parallel project of ME; both in general as two offshoot studies of Artificial 
Intelligence, and in particular, within the application areas of medicine and care. As 
we will see, there are several analogies between the two fields of ME and MC; thus, 
those working in machine ethics, particularly in the medical and care application 
areas, may benefit from looking at developments in machine consciousness.
2  Consciousness and Ethics in the Medical/Care Domain
Consciousness, and several properties related to it, is involved in a vast num-
ber of human activities. In health and care settings, conscious processes are 
enlisted when non-routine or challenging tasks need to be performed, like 
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sifting through alternative possibilities to select the best diagnosis, performing a 
 challenging surgical operation, counseling a bereaved relative, or providing care 
to a physically frail patient. The term “consciousness” denotes a broad cluster of 
attributes; and many of these attributes seem to play a key role in the expertise—
particularly the moral expertise—of human medical agents. Attributes closely 
associated with consciousness such as focused attention, mindful exercise of 
bodily skills, use of imagination in scenario-evaluation, empathetic projection 
to the states of others, etc. are clearly relevant in a variety of different ways to 
health and care practice, and to delivering medical and social care performance 
in professionally sound, and morally responsible, ways. Here are some spe-
cific examples of how different aspects of consciousness appear to be strongly 
implicated in the exercise of ethical skills or expertise within medical and care 
practice:
•	 autonomous balancing of options in judgment and decision; for example in 
diagnosis, or the planning of treatment, etc., particularly where moral con-
siderations play a prominent role in factors that require consideration in the 
weighting.
•	 use of imagination and creativity to generate possible courses of action that 
satisfy situational constraints; for example, when considering moral choices in 
clinical contexts.
•	 the exercise of sensorimotor flexibility and sensitivity; for example, when physi-
cally interacting with human patients, performing medical procedures, and so 
on, in ways that respect moral constraints, such as avoiding discomfort, inva-
siveness, etc.
•	 empathetic (and morally appropriate) interpersonal responsiveness; for example, 
in face-to-face communication with patients and their carers; in dealing with 
fear and distress, etc.
Other such examples abound. In describing the various personal attributes that are 
demanded of medical and care practitioners—such as surgeons, consultants, 
nurses, clinical advisors, care support workers, and so on—when operating in such 
situations, a number of facets of consciousness come to the fore, such as attentive-
ness, imagination, awareness, and so on. What is true of human medical agents 
would presumably also carry over into the domain of artificial medical agents. So, 
when considering the field of machine medical ethics (MME)—and indeed 
machine ethics more generally—it would be wise to consider work in the neigh-
boring field of machine consciousness. Any artificial agent that fulfilled functions 
such as those above, and others, might need to be designed in a way that took 
account of developments in MC.1
1
 We use the term “Machine” Ethics/Consciousness here rather than “Artificial” following many 
(but not all) in the respective fields. There is a lot of fuzziness about what counts as a “machine” 
here, but the de facto emphasis in this discussion is on computational systems.
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3  The Scope of Machine Consciousness
ME and MC might both be considered as fringe areas, or extensions, of AI, alongside 
artificial life, artificial social modelling, artificial emotion, computational creativ-
ity, etc. It is worth differentiating each from their parent field, AI. As a first approxi-
mation, it can be said that, while AI (in the main) is the attempt to create machines 
(using computational and robotic techniques) that are intelligent, or cognitive, agents, 
(constructive) MC is the attempt to create machines that are conscious agents, and 
(constructive) ME is the attempt to create machines that are ethical agents.
There are a number of ways in which those thumbnail descriptions require 
qualification to be even broadly useful. Let us start with a difficulty specific to 
MC, one that concerns the relation between intelligence and consciousness. AI is 
often thought to cover more than the narrowly intellectual or cognitive aspects of 
mind. In this way AI strongly overlaps with, or even subsumes, those mental fea-
tures that are central to being conscious. Thus many would say that MC must be 
fully subsumed under AI, or nearly so. However, others would argue that there are 
key aspects of consciousness which are not able to be captured by traditional AI 
or computational techniques, for example, because they concern, not so much the 
publicly-accessible aspects of consciousness, as the “subjective feel” or “first-per-
son phenomenology”. Such aspects of consciousness—the core aspects, to many 
eyes—are often thought to present a particular barrier in terms of computational 
modelling or replication. So many questions are raised, by critics and friends of 
MC alike, as to whether MC, taking it as a primarily computational endeavor, 
could ever really “capture” core aspects of consciousness as easily as AI might 
seem to “capture” core aspects of intelligence or cognition.
Some researchers draw a distinction between “functional” consciousness, on 
the one hand, and “phenomenal” consciousness, on the other (e.g., [8, 14, 21, 47] 
see also [7], for a broadly comparable distinction between “access” and “phenom-
enal” consciousness). Intuitively, there seems to be a distinction between what 
might be called “consciousness as consciousness does”; that is, consciousness 
considered in terms of the roles it plays within the exercises of different mental 
powers and “consciousness as consciousness seems (or feels)” (see [19]). There is 
considerable controversy over whether these are two distinct kinds of conscious-
ness, or whether phenomenal consciousness can be explained without remainder 
in terms of functional consciousness (e.g., [38, 39]).
For the purposes of this discussion we keep an open mind about the phenom-
enal-functional distinction. Upholding the distinction would lead to viewing 
MC as having at least two different research targets. The first branch—trying to 
create computational models that enable us to understand or reproduce2 the 
2
 For the moment we are eliding over the distinction between artificially modeling some target 
area, one the one hand, and reproducing, or replicating that target area. This distinction is usually 
marked in the area of AI, by the phraseology “Strong AI”/“Weak AI”. A similar division between 
Strong and Weak MC has been suggested (refs); and between Strong and Weak ME. We will dis-
cuss the Strong/Weak antithesis later on in the paper.
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functionality of consciousness—is perhaps much more amenable to the 
s pectrum of methods in AI that MC for the most part relies on. The second tar-
get—the experiential or phenomenal aspects of consciousness—may still be 
amenable to AI methods, at least as far as modelling is concerned. However, 
proponents of a robust functional/phenomenal distinction are likely to say that 
MC cannot reproduce phenomenal consciousness using AI or computational 
methods—although they may allow that other approaches, for example via syn-
thetic biology, may at some point succeed in developing artificial organisms 
which possess phenomenal consciousness. (This possibility would suggest that 
it is best to avoid making “Machine Consciousness” and “Artificial 
Consciousness” interchangeable terms.) Rejecting the distinction (seeing phe-
nomenal consciousness as explicable without remainder in terms of functional 
consciousness) would lead to the view that the second research goal is in princi-
ple fully achievable by AI methods—including that of reproducing all of con-
sciousness’s “first person” aspects.
4  Machine Ethics: Some Core Distinctions
We have suggested that according to a popular conception of conscious-
ness, the field of MC can be thought of as having two distinct targets: func-
tional consciousness and phenomenal consciousness. The former target seems 
to be more comfortably within the scope of MC, when understood as using 
core AI methods. In a similar way, one might think it is possible to distin-
guish between functional ethical status and genuine ethical status as targets 
for constructive ME (e.g., [50, 51]; see also [31] for a more nuanced set of 
distinctions).
Making this intuitive distinction more precise is decidedly tricky, but a proper 
analysis of previous attempts to do so would take us too far afield. So, we simply 
offer this clarification: Let the ethical evaluation of a behaviour b be denoted by 
E(b). Then an agent X is functionally ethically equivalent to agent Y iff, for each 
of Y’s behaviors b that are ethically evaluable (i.e., that are such that E(b) 
exists), the corresponding behaviour a of X is causally indistinguishable from 
some possible or actual behaviour b′ of Y such that E(b′) = E(b). Note that 
according to this definition, X can be functionally ethically equivalent to agent Y 
while still being behaviorally distinct from Y, in two ways: (1) there need be no 
correspondence between X’s behaviour and Y’s non-ethically evaluable behav-
iour; and (2) X’s behaviour can be distinct from Y’s ethically evaluable behav-
iour as long as it is causally indistinguishable from an actual or possible 
behaviour of Y’s that has the same ethical evaluation as Y’s actual (ethically 
evaluable) behaviour. Note that this definition is silent concerning the ethical 
evaluability of X’s behaviour, including X’s behaviors that correspond to Y’s eth-
ically evaluable behaviour. Note also that the definition appeals to the notion of 
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causal indistinguishability. One gloss on that notion is this: b and b′ are causally 
indistinguishable iff the (non-relationally individuated) effects of b are the same 
as the (non-relationally individuated) effects of b′.3
By contrast, we can stipulate that an agent X is genuinely ethically equivalent 
to agent Y iff, for each of Y’s behaviors b that are ethically evaluable (i.e., that are 
such that E(b) exists), the corresponding behaviour a of X is such that E(a) = E(b). 
It follows that if X is genuinely ethically equivalent to Y then X is functionally 
identical to Y, but not vice versa. Most relevantly, the distinction between func-
tional and genuine ethical identity would allow the following possibility: an agent 
X is functionally ethically equivalent to agent Y, even though none of X’s behav-
iour is ethically evaluable. Presumably, the functional aspects of moral action and 
decision are amenable to replication by the AI methods which are currently most 
accessible to constructive ME researchers. As AI systems are increasingly able to 
generate, through their own autonomous decision-making, actions that are (func-
tionally) morally sensitive, in their potential to cause good or harm to people, it 
is thought desirable to be able to build moral constraints into the functionality 
of such systems. This functional approach to ethical modelling leaves wide open 
(and thus side-steps) the question of whether such AI agents, or indeed any agents 
developed using exclusively AI techniques, could ever instantiate genuine moral 
agency, or be regarded as having genuine moral status.
At this point an important clarification should be made. There are at least two 
senses in which people talk of a moral or ethical agent: a classificatory sense and a 
normative sense. The classificatory sense is: something that is, or engages in 
behaviour that is, morally evaluable; something to which moral norms apply. The 
normative sense is: something that is morally good, in that it (on balance) does 
what is right. The second sense presupposes the first sense, but, notoriously, not 
vice versa. An example of the first usage is found in an often-cited article by Moor 
[31], which details four ways (impact/implicit/explicit/full) in which an artificial 
agent might produce behaviour that is morally evaluable. This is in contrast with 
the notion of “ethical” that the public, lawmakers, and the laity in general typically 
have in mind when asking “Can we build an ethical robot?” That a robot is ethical 
in the first sense would be of cold comfort to its wronged victims. Similarly, say-
ing under oath “Bloggs has always exhibited ethical behaviour”, while true in the 
first, classificatory, sense of “ethical”,4 will likely score you a perjury charge if 
you say it while knowing Bloggs to be a liar, cheat and thief. Of course, these two 
senses are related, and Moor’s idea is that some ways of making robots that are 
3
 The “non-relationally individuated” qualifier is meant to block certain trivializations of the 
notion of causal indistinguishability. For example, suppose, per impossible, that b and b′ have 
the same effect, that of light L coming on. Further suppose that they both have no other effects 
on any other objects. Intuitively, b and b′ are causally indistinguishable. However b, but not b′, 
has the (relationally individuated) effect of light L coming on as a result of b. This would render 
b and b′ (and all other pairs of behaviors) causally distinguishable, making any notion defined in 
terms of it (such as functional ethical equivalence) vacuous. Adding the restriction prevents this.
4
 Or perhaps not, strictly speaking: plausibly, only a proper subset of our (and Bloggs’) behavior 
is ethically evaluable.
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ethical in the first sense will be of greater use than others in making robots that are 
ethical in the second, normative, sense. But the distinction (and potential confu-
sion) remains. In this article, we will be using the first, classificatory, sense, except 
where noted otherwise.
However, this first sense of “moral agent” can itself be understood in two 
importantly different ways. When considering what it is for an artificial agent, or a 
human being or other creature, to be a moral agent (in the classificatory sense), or 
to have moral status, one may be focusing on at least two different kinds of prop-
erty. (a) One may be thinking of a being that is capable of acting in a way that is 
open to moral appraisal. (b) Alternatively, one may be thinking of a being to whom 
morally appraisable actions can be done; that is, a subject with moral interests. 
Agents of the first sort are sometimes called “moral agents”, in a restricted sense; 
those of the latter sort are then by contrast called “moral patients” (e.g., [13, 17, 18]). 
For rough and ready illustrations, consider, as moral agents, someone staffing a 
helpline for potential suicides, or a tax evader (both would be moral agents in this 
restricted sense, examples with contrasting moral polarities have deliberately been 
used here). For examples of moral patients, consider a burglary victim or someone 
receiving financial assistance to pay for expensive medical treatment. (The last-
mentioned individual will be both a moral patient and a medical one.) An alterna-
tive terminology that, we suggest, is less confusing (especially when discussing 
ME in the context of medical care) will be used here: we will talk of “moral pro-
ducers” and “moral consumers”, respectively.5
What are the conditions that determine what counts as a moral agent/producer 
and how do these differ from those that determine what counts as a moral patient/
consumer? It is doubtful that both types of role require an identical set of con-
ditions. For example, to count as an ethically responsible moral producer one 
would arguably need to be capable of engaging in intelligent moral deliberation, 
with due regard for the relevant facts of the case, to the extent to which these are 
accessible, and so on. Being a moral consumer, on the other hand, may, arguably, 
involve a smaller set of conditions: according to many commentators, infants, and 
even fetuses, as well as many kinds of non-human animals are taken to qualify for 
moral consumerhood, even while lacking the cognitive features (such as the poten-
tiality to engage in rational deliberation about courses of action) which mark out a 
genuine or fully-fledged moral producer.
5
 The terms “moral agent/patient” are used more frequently than “moral producer/consumer” 
in the literature, but there are pitfalls to such a usage. First, when one talks about an “artificial 
agent”, or indeed of a “moral agent”, one is often using the term “agent” in a wider sense than 
when one is using “agent” to distinguish between moral agency and patiency. For example, 
there is a very real question of whether an artificial agent—in a wide sense of “agent”—could 
be a genuine moral patient (moral consumer) (see [46, 48]). Second, as suggested above, the 
term “moral patient” is particularly awkward in a medical context, as in the present discussion. 
Medical patients may invariably be moral patients (or moral consumers) as well, but the class of 
moral patients (consumers) whose interests may be affected by a particular medical intervention 
may be larger than the actual patient receiving that intervention (e.g., there may be family mem-
bers whose interests would be severely affected if the intervention went wrong, and so on).
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It seems that there is a strong link between qualifying as a moral consumer and 
certain kinds of consciousness or sentient awareness. For example, in an often-
quoted passage from Bentham [6, 283], the capacity to “suffer” is singled out as a 
qualification for moral (consumer) consideration. Providing “suffering” is taken so 
as to imply ability to have sentient experience of pain, terror, physical discomfort 
or curtailment of movement, to be aware of being deprived, and so on (rather than, 
e.g., to suffer a financial loss in a certain trading period—which could apply to a 
more abstract entity such as a corporation), this would widen the class of moral 
consumers to a large population of animal species. Perhaps it is not just any kind 
of sentience that is needed, but rather a type of self-awareness, or, in Regan’s 
phrase [33], the fact of being “the subject of a life”.
Moral producers, standardly, are also conscious—but that may not be what 
makes them qualify for that designation; or if it is, it need not be the only route to 
qualification. For one thing, many recognize the moral responsibility/producerhood  
of corporations; that this purported status may derive from the consciousness of the 
people that a corporation comprises does not derail the general point.6 For many 
people working in ME, that certain classes of artificial agents may at some future 
time be considered as fully-fledged moral producers is not at all to do with their 
being conscious or sentient—in anything like Bentham’s sense. A completely non-
conscious or non-sentient machine might be a moral producer, on one version of 
such a view, even while it does not possess any kind of conscious awareness (and 
is thus, in this respect at least, quite unlike human moral producers, presumably). 
Being a moral producer would rather be based on such capacities as its ability to 
deliberate on its behaviour in a specifically moral way, to justify such behaviour in 
moral terms, to engage in particular forms of interaction with humans (and other 
machines), and so on. Another version of this view might allow for the existence of 
conscious artificial agents, even to the point of denying that one could have the 
above capacities without also being conscious, yet still assert that it is the capaci-
ties, and not the concomitant conscious states, that qualify the artificial agent for 
moral producer status. In terms of the notion of functional (as opposed to genuine) 
6
 A similar point can be made concerning moral consumerhood. Many see corporations as pos-
sessing rights, as entities toward which we can have obligations; for an example, one only need 
look at the recent (2010) US Supreme Court ruling in the case of Citizens United v. Federal 
Election Commission, which held that the first amendment in the Bill of Rights applies to corpo-
rations. If corporations have rights, then they can be wronged. And being something which can 
be wronged is, plausibly, sufficient for moral consumerhood, e.g., “An entity has moral status if 
and only if it or its interests morally matter to some degree for the entity's own sake, such that 
it can be wronged” [26]. Again, that corporations currently comprise conscious beings does not 
in itself undermine the general point; further, it is not prima facie absurd to suppose that a cor-
poration could persist, and retain its rights, even if the number of humans constituting it shrank 
to zero. There is also the much-discussed issue of potentialism. Presumably we retain our full 
moral status even when we are unconscious; this (and the moral consumerhood of, say, fetuses) 
is usually explained in terms of a potential for being conscious, rather than consciousness itself. 
Perhaps, then, some artificial agents might be properly seen as moral consumers, as long as they 
could be understood in some way to be potentially, even if not actually, conscious.
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morality, introduced earlier, it would be argued on (either version of) this view 
that, once one has in an artificial agent a sufficiently rich instantiation of functional 
moral productivity, one has all that is necessary for admitting that such an agent is 
a genuine moral agent, in the productive sense, even if (phenomenal) conscious-
ness is absent. On an opposing view, it would be argued that such machines, as 
long as they are considered to be non-conscious, could not really be taken as genu-
ine moral producers, even though they might be considered as functional moral 
producers (see [46] for further discussion). For example, one might take the capac-
ity for empathy to be central to moral producerhood in a way that implies that only 
moral consumers can be genuine moral producers (on the ground that conscious-
ness is a precondition of genuine moral consumerhood); see Sect. 5. So, on this lat-
ter view, an agent X might engage in behaviors that are causally indistinguishable 
from those of a genuine moral producer, therefore making X functionally (ethically 
equivalent to) a moral producer, without X being genuinely (ethically equivalent 
to) a moral producer.
Linking this discussion to the earlier distinction between functional and phe-
nomenal consciousness, it is worth pointing out the following parallel. The devel-
opment of artificial moral consumers will be thought by many to be resistant to 
traditional methods in AI/robotics in a way that parallels the way the quest for arti-
ficial phenomenal consciousness is resistant to such methods. This parallel may 
not be a coincidence. Some people would indeed insist that having phenomenal 
consciousness is a fundamental precondition to genuine moral consumerhood. So 
the perceived intractability of constructive ME which targets moral consumerhood 
may be a consequence of the perceived intractability of MC when the latter is con-
cerned with targeting phenomenal consciousness. Perhaps one could avoid this 
intractability by developing merely functional moral consumers—but it is not clear 
that there is much to gain by this.7 It is not clear if a merely functional moral con-
sumer would be one towards which we (humans) would need to regard ourselves 
as having any moral obligations. Even if the possibility of merely functional moral 
consumers may be seen as an advantage from the perspective of constructive ME, 
it is easy to imagine (especially if aided by some of the many science fiction sce-
narios investigating this possibility) the moral hazards of living in proximity to 
agents that behave exactly as if they were moral consumers, but toward which we 
have (or believe we have) no ethical responsibilities.
In the case of developing artificial moral producers, on the other hand, it is eas-
ier to imagine that there could be a point in developing functional moral produc-
ers which were capable of apparently morally good behaviour (that is, behaviour 
that, were it performed by a genuine moral producer, would be considered morally 
good), but which were not to be taken as having full-blooded moral producer sta-
tus (e.g., because they lacked real consciousness, or other key properties). Indeed, 
7
 It is also unclear what (non-nefarious) motives one could have for creating “genuine” moral 
consumerhood in an artificial agent, unless one takes the view that it is a requirement for, e.g., 
moral producerhood.
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this is, broadly speaking, the working goal of constructive machine ethics, in its 
current incarnation.
However, some might question the ability to produce (replicate) functionally 
morally good behaviour (of humans) without reproducing what they take to be 
a central cause of that behaviour in humans: genuine moral producerhood, and/
or consciousness. On such a view, certain issues arise, of which the issue to do 
with occasional moral mis-performance seems to be one of the most pressing: 
any attempt to create agents that are functionally ethically equivalent to us, but 
not genuinely ethically equivalent to us, must fail to reproduce our ethical perfor-
mance, possibly quite spectacularly or tragically. The worry is that any attempt to 
achieve functional ethical equivalence without genuine ethical equivalence would 
necessarily (or very likely) fail, with possibly disastrous results. So attempting 
to achieve the first where the second is unattainable, is fraught with unaccepta-
ble risks. Supporters of the quest for functional morality will, however, attempt 
to assuage such worries by pointing out that good constructive ME engineering 
design will ensure that such cases are kept to a minimum, and that, in any case, the 
risks may well fall below the risks that attach to human moral agents (“failing to 
reproduce our ethical performance” is neutral on whether the failure is due to their 
being less, or more, ethically good than we are). We further consider the view that 
genuine consumerhood is necessary for genuine or functional producerhood in the 
next section.
Perhaps this would be sufficient to make ME a theoretically, and indeed practi-
cally, useful field of investigation—particularly in the medical and care fields. The 
hope is that artificial agents could be constructed which could take moral decisions 
which conformed to best moral practice in a variety of medical or personal-care 
contexts (for example as robotic nurses or computational diagnosticians)—even 
while not having the right attributes in terms of consciousness (say) to qualify as 
genuine moral consumers, and possibly even while not being genuine moral pro-
ducers. This would give a lot of mileage to Machine Medical Ethics as a potential 
field for development in order, hopefully, to greatly enhance medical practice and 
policy.
5  Medical Moral Producerhood and Conscious Empathy
We have just considered the view that, in order to be classed as a genuine moral 
producer—or even as a workable artificial surrogate for a moral producer—an 
artificial agent would also have to fulfill the conditions to fit it out to be a moral 
consumer. It could be said, for example, that an artificial agent could not be 
expected or guaranteed to make decisions in a given medical setting that would 
even approximate the ones that responsible human medical practitioners would 
make in that setting, unless it were capable of imagining or understanding, at first 
hand, what it was like to experience pain, distress, bereavement, and so on—or to 
be capable of doing so at least in outline. Arguably, such first-hand understanding 
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requires being able oneself to experience such states; that is, to be phenomenally 
conscious. And few would deny that this would render such an agent a moral con-
sumer; hence, on this view, performance functionally equivalent to human moral 
producerhood requires moral consumerhood. (This would seem to be a particu-
larly apt argument to consider in a domain of activity such as clinical medicine, 
where acute life-or-death issues are involved all the time; the same goes for social 
or personal care contexts.) Skeptical expectations concerning merely functional 
or apparent moral agents could be theoretical (they are conceptually or nomologi-
cally impossible) or practical (they are theoretically possible, but prohibitively dif-
ficult to build).
Such capabilities, it might be said, would require any such artificial agent to 
have a far more intimate set of similarities to a real human medical or care prac-
titioner than it would ever be possible to achieve through standard AI techniques. 
For example, consider the ability, when the situation calls for it, to put oneself 
imaginatively in the place of various people likely to be affected by particular 
courses of action. This would seem to be essential to human ethical behaviour in 
general and human medical ethical behaviour in particular. Yet, some might think 
that such a capacity requires phenomenal consciousness of sorts. And some of 
those might deem such phenomenal consciousness to be irreducible to functional 
MC-tractable, aspects of consciousness.
Hence, just as problems were raised in relation to an MC that soft-focused on 
phenomenality, so analogous problems might be raised about an ME that soft-
focused on phenomenality (and thus which concentrated on moral producerhood 
without attending to the capabilities that also constitute moral consumerhood).8 
But the issue cuts two ways: some MC researchers, agreeing that imaginative abil-
ities require phenomenal consciousness have used this to argue from the fact that 
their systems seem to have imaginative abilities to the conclusion that they there-
fore can be said to have phenomenal states [1, 20, 22–24].
Further, one might question the assumption that the only way to produce mor-
ally good behaviour is to reproduce human moral behaviour, including the meth-
ods (e.g., empathic imagination) from which it derives. To counter the claims of 
the aforementioned MC researchers by claiming that such MC systems achieve 
their imaginative functionality without the use of true (empathy or) consciousness 
would undermine the argument that consciousness is required for apparently mor-
ally ethical behaviour, medical or otherwise.
Nevertheless, some may still doubt the feasibility of a partial machine ethics 
that concentrates on the producer aspects of moral subjecthood, while avoiding 
the consumer aspects, and on producing functional morality as opposed to some 
more fully-fledged version of moral agency or moral productivity. Such doubt may 
8
 It could be argued, in a related way, that an artificial agent which was unable to experience 
pain or affective suffering could not be a subject of moral praise or blame, since the latter 
requires a capability of experiencing the positive or negative sanctions, whatever they might be, 
that attaches to any such praise or blame.
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derive from a holistic ethics (with respect to the moral producer-consumer distinc-
tion) that would severely hamper any attempt to develop a partial constructive ME 
which focused on moral producerhood and ignored moral consumerhood. But it 
looks as though, because of the central role played by phenomenal consciousness 
in moral consumerhood, and because of the supposed resistance of phenomenal 
consciousness to computational techniques, a complete holistic ME conceived as 
a purely AI project; that is, a joint descriptive/constructive machine ethics project 
that fully implemented, in a machine, all (major) aspects of our moral thinking, 
experience and action may not be possible.
However, while there may be some truth in these holistic arguments, they 
might be resisted. Although some might think that accepting the conclusions of 
such arguments would have the effect of annulling ME (at least using currently-
known AI techniques) as a viable topic of inquiry, we have seen that at least some 
MC researchers believe that currently known techniques are adequate, at least in 
principle, for conferring the imaginative/empathic abilities on which sophisticated 
medical moral producerhood likely relies, independently of whether such abilities 
require phenomenal consciousness (and thus moral consumerhood) themselves. 
Therefore, the holistic arguments, while deserving a wider airing than they have 
had in the past, and than what we can give them here, would be challenged by a 
significant number of people within the field.
Nevertheless there is another, possibly deeper, kind of concern surrounding 
the notion of empathy that may be thought to affect the viability of constructive 
ME using current AI and computational techniques. There is a tradition of think-
ing about empathy that stems from phenomenologists such as Husserl and his 
pupil Edith Stein, but also taken up by Merleau-Ponty, and more recently Evan 
Thompson and others, that sees empathy as indeed closely related to conscious-
ness, but to a strongly embodied notion of consciousness [41]. It is claimed that 
this embodied conception of empathy is particularly relevant to the way illness 
is experienced, both in oneself as an ill person, and in others. This claim was 
explored in a paper by Toombs [43, 44] on the relation between empathy and the 
experience and treatment of illness.
A key to understanding this approach is the recognition of a duality in our con-
ceptions of the body. This duality runs through the phenomenological tradition 
from Husserl on [25, 30, 42]. We can consider the human body first as an objec-
tive, biological entity, with its own physical structures, laws of functioning and 
principles of breakdown or pathology: this is the body as a subject of science and 
of medicine as the latter is conventionally understood. However, a second concep-
tion of the body is of the body-as-lived, the way one lives through one’s body as 
one goes through one’s life. Embodiment conceived in this second way is often 
described as involving a pre-reflective immediacy or awareness, since we normally 
take our embodiment for granted as we engage in our projects in the world. For 
example, one is typically unaware of the movement of one’s feet as one hurries 
to catch a train. Often, one becomes explicitly aware of aspects of one’s body-
as-lived: for example when one trips and falls while running, or through certain 
forms of meditation. Illness of different sorts, as Toombs explains, brings one’s 
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awareness of the body-as-lived into sharp focus, and she suggests that the (typical) 
difference between a doctor’s and a patient’s conception of the patient’s body is 
essentially characterized by the difference between the body as an objective entity 
and the body as lived.
Toombs then discusses how these different conceptions of the body affect clini-
cal practice, and how the empathetic grasp of the patient’s body-as-lived can be 
screened out in many current forms of medical practice because of an excessive 
concentration on the objective mode of conceiving the patient’s bodily characteris-
tics. Such an objective approach is, of course, indispensible to medical science and 
practice; however Toombs points out that an empathetic grasping of the patient’s 
illness-as-lived is also crucial to developing a properly “humanly-grounded” 
approach to medicine [44].
These observations can be used to provide a philosophical underpinning to 
proposals for improving medical training and practice, e.g., by more extensively 
teaching skills in recognizing the lived experience of illness in order to show how 
such practice can be ethically deepened. This is indeed a central aim for Toombs 
in her paper. However it is not hard to see how they might also need be borne 
in mind by those embarked on the constructive ME project, and how they might 
engender a certain pessimism about that project. In order to deepen the possibili-
ties for empathetic bodily transference between doctor (or carer) and patient one 
can, of course, draw upon the fact that the patient shares with the doctor or carer 
a common human embodiment. Nevertheless, artificial medical agents, physically 
constructed via technologies of the foreseeable future, will have little physically 
in common with the ill humans whose treatment they will be designed to assist 
in. So the possibilities for the deep kinds of embodied empathy that writers like 
Toombs regards as necessary for “humanly grounded” medical care may seem to 
be severely limited in medical machines as currently conceived.
The designers of ethical medical or care agents thus need to be aware of these 
difficulties when engaging in their R&D. It suggests that medical agents may be 
far from ideal in reproducing the empathetic skills of our most ideally trained 
human practitioners. On the other hand, this point is not an in-principle objection 
to the constructive medical ME program as such. To say of a technology that it is 
far from ideal is not to say that it cannot be developed to be of selective benefit or 
to be continually improved; and all technologies we have ever had have been less 
than ideal.
Moreover, empathy, as many have pointed out, often requires building a bridge 
across differences between individuals as much as drawing upon what is com-
mon between those individuals. Suppose I am seeking to empathetically under-
stand the lived experience of a Parkinson’s patient. Clearly there will be important 
differences in embodiment, yet the hope is that those differences can be bridged 
to a degree that allows for suitable treatment and care. Similarly for differences 
between genders, ages, races, ectomorphs/endomorphs, disabled/abled, and so on. 
Why, then, can’t the gap between an anthropomorphic robot and a human also be 
bridged, to allow empathetic kinds of responses from one to the other in ways that 
may be acceptable or helpful at least in selected situations of use?
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In order to progress the discussion further, we propose a pragmatic strategy. Despite 
the problematic issues raised here, we suggest that there is a lot of mileage in explor-
ing how AI-based techniques may be used to develop ethically-sensitive machine 
medical or care agents. It will be important for those working on such AI techniques 
to be aware of the problems raised in this and earlier sections, concerning the rela-
tion between functional and genuine ethical status, concerning the duality between 
moral consumer and moral producer status, of the role of phenomenal consciousness 
and empathy in ethical productivity, and on the bifurcation between objective and lived 
conceptions of embodiment. Nevertheless it is understandable. Proper cognizance of 
all these issues is desirable when seeking to achieve an adequate understanding of 
what is involved in machine medical ethics. All the same it is surely acceptable, in pro-
ceeding with such a project, to concentrate more on the functional aspects of machine 
consciousness than on the phenomenal aspects, and more on the producer aspects of 
machine ethics than on the consumer aspects. Nevertheless we stress that the devel-
oper of medical ME agents must be sensitive to the role played by phenomenal con-
sciousness, and on the issues concerning empathy, lived embodiment, etc. in the moral 
aspects of the practice of people working in the medical and social-care fields.
6  Strong Versus Weak in MC and ME
Earlier we gave a quick characterization of constructive ME as “the attempt to 
create machines that are moral.” and of constructive MC as “the attempt to cre-
ate machines that are conscious”. In the case of ME, it has become clear that the 
phrase “machines that are moral” is ambiguous as between “machines that have 
status as moral producers” and “machines that have status as moral consumers”. In 
addition there is the “morally evaluable/morally good” ambiguity, also discussed 
earlier. However there is a further dimension of ambiguity, which centers round 
the distinction, also discussed above, between merely functional moral status and 
genuine or intrinsic moral status. One might understand talk of “machines that 
have genuine moral status” in terms of any of the various senses referred to above 
(moral producer/consumer; morally evaluable/morally good).
Another way to characterize the space of possible approaches within ME is to 
differentiate between “strong (constructive) ME” and “weak (constructive) ME”, 
by analogy with strong and weak AI. The debate over the merits of strong AI, 
which dominated the philosophy of AI in the 1980s and beyond, has spawned sat-
ellite debates in various of the fringe areas of AI, of which ME is one flourishing 
example. Although originally (in [34]) a different distinction, the strong AI/weak 
AI distinction has sometimes been used to distinguish between the goal of produc-
ing artificial agents that are genuinely intelligent on the one hand, vs. producing 
artificial agents that are merely functionally intelligent (that behave as if they are 
intelligent) on the other. Similarly, one could characterize weak constructive ME 
as seeking to create agents with merely functional moral status, and strong con-
structive ME as seeking to create agents that have genuine moral status.
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One might understand talk of “machines that have genuine moral status” in 
a number of different ways. For example, there is the distinction between moral 
producers and moral consumers, referred to above. Then there is the distinction, 
also discussed above, between moral agency in the sense of displaying behaviour 
that is morally evaluable, and in the sense of displaying behaviour that is mor-
ally good. Clearly these different distinctions allow a variety of different ways of 
understanding the strong/weak contrast in the field of ME.
Within the field of machine consciousness a similar contrast has been drawn 
between strong and weak MC [12, 45].9 Strong constructive MC would have the goal 
of creating artificial agents that are genuinely conscious (where “genuine” may be 
understood in terms of phenomenality, or in some other way). Weak constructive MC 
would rather seek to create artificial agents that behave as if conscious, but which may 
in fact not be so. This corresponds to the distinction between genuine ethical equiva-
lence and functional ethical equivalence, made in Sect. 4. So, in MC, as in ME, one 
can support a distinction between strong and weak positions or goals, depending on 
whether one’s research concerns do, or do not, aspire to replicating “the real thing”.
However, these contrasts between strong and weak ME, and between strong 
and weak MC, are in need of still further qualification and refinement. It has been 
suggested [11] that a more subtle distinction needs to be made in the case of 
MC.10 We believe it fruitful to examine this proposal and then to go on to discuss 
its implication for ME, and in particular for medical ME.
The discussion of the strong/weak MC distinction in [11], in that it more closely 
follows Searle’s original strong-weak distinction, pursues a path somewhat different 
from, and more complex than, that just given. Analogously to strong AI, A sup-
porter of strong MC would be one who believes that the (computational. robotic, 
etc.) technology11 involved in an MC system could, in principle, be sufficient to 
generate “real” consciousness in (certain) such systems. In parallel with weak AI, a 
supporter of weak AC would not claim that computational technology would be 
either necessary or sufficient to generate consciousness: rather their support for MC 
would stress the value of building computational models in helping us to under-
stand the nature of consciousness (rather as a computational model of a hurricane 
could be of high predictive or explanatory value, even while neither it, nor any more 
sophisticated development from it, might ever actually instantiate a hurricane).
However, [11] also suggests that there is an important mid-way position, in a zone 
of neglected possibility between strong and weak MC, as defined above. This is called 
9
 Normally the strong/weak distinction is thought of as primarily applying to intelligence. In 
fact, one can see the context of Searle's original use of the distinction, the Chinese room argu-
ment, as applying most directly to consciousness, and only indirectly to intelligence, via the 
assumption that genuine intelligence requires understanding accessible from a first-person 
perspective.
10
 Chrisley there talks of Artificial Consciousness (AC) rather than Machine Consciousness.
11
 Here we are generalizing Searle's strong-weak distinction in another way: his distinction dealt 
specifically with the technology of digital computer programs, whereas we are open to consider-
ing any computational/robotic technology.
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“lagom” MC (lagom is a Swedish word that we understand, perhaps incorrectly, to 
mean something like “perfection through moderation” or “just right”—perhaps, tak-
ing a leaf from the book of exo-planetary science, one might talk of “Goldilocks 
MC”). To a first approximation, someone who supports lagom MC would say that 
certain computational/robotic systems might have features that, while not sufficient, 
are necessary for consciousness. But that needs some refinement. A key idea behind 
lagom MC is that there may be significantly different ways in which consciousness is 
instantiated within different kinds of system. One way in which consciousness is real-
ized is found in the realm of biological systems, of which humans, and no doubt vari-
ous mammalian and non-mammalian species, are instances. However the “space of 
possible consciousnesses” [37] may be vast, and may include creatures or systems—
including, potentially, artificial ones—with very few properties in common with those 
terrestrial biological systems that are recognized to be conscious. Such genuinely con-
scious systems, it might be said, may include certain examples that could, at least in 
principle, be developed from current computer-based technologies.
There are all sorts of ways in which computer-based technologies may con-
verge on biological systems. For example, various directions in which current 
artificial life research may be going. However current computational technologies 
may also develop in ways that take one further from the space of biological sys-
tems; and certain developments in far-from-natural-biological systems may end up 
in a region of the space of possible consciousnesses. So a supporter of lagom MC 
may claim that certain decidedly non-biological systems may have certain features 
that are necessary (given the non-biological medium at hand) for consciousness—
at least for certain kinds of consciousness—perhaps even ones which are morally 
significant in the sense that beings instantiating them would deserve our moral 
concern if they experienced certain forms of pain or distress; or would deserve 
our moral commendation if they made decisions to act in such-and-such a way, or 
which at least are capable of deliberation or action (concerning what would nor-
mally be considered moral issues) in ways which may seem to make them capable 
of being members of a moral community.
However, it is also possible to adopt a position exemplifying lagom MC that 
involves investigating possible MC systems that are much closer to the space 
of natural biological consciousnesses. So it might be claimed that there are cer-
tain features which are necessary to consciousness, where those features can be 
described (at a certain level of generality or abstractness) in a way which applies, 
albeit in markedly divergent manners, to human and other animal systems on the 
one hand, and to certain artificial computational/robotic systems, on the other. 
Such a claim would involve the suggestion that there is a set of features F such 
that the members of F are (a) necessary to consciousness (or at least certain types 
of conscious state) and (b) exemplified in certain biological systems and in certain 
other computational/robotic systems in rather different ways, even if (c) they are 
not (even jointly) sufficient for (any types of state of) consciousness in either class 
of systems.
What would be interesting about such a claim, if validated, is that feature-set F 
would provide a partial explanation of what it was to be conscious (or, at least to 
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have that particular type of conscious state), by explicating certain fundamental 
features necessary to (those sorts of state of) consciousness. For example, even if 
one were to concede (because of being persuaded by the Chinese room argument, 
say) that it is never the case that running some program P is sufficient for con-
sciousness, one might at the same time hold that running P is necessary for (cer-
tain kinds of) consciousness, that is, that one could not be considered to have those 
kinds of consciousness if one did not have the abstract causal structure involved in 
running P.12
One important point made by this explanation of lagom MC (two variants of it 
have been described here) is that it shows that the conventional debates between 
strong and weak MC tend to ignore an important middle territory of positions in 
that debate (and in this respect they mirror the far more extensive literature con-
cerning strong and weak AI). But why should this be of interest to investigators of 
machine ethics (and in particular of medical ME)? What, it might be asked, could 
be gained by trying to develop consciousness in artificial medical agents? First, 
this discussion should help to make it clear that simply seeing consciousness as of 
no interest to people working in the area of artificial moral systems modelling (and 
more specifically the modelling of the ethics of artificial medical agents) is to take 
a far too oversimplified view of the matter. Second, we will argue that the strong/
weak/lagom trichotomy can be directly applied in the area of ME, in a way that 
would be of value for developers of artificial medical agents to take into account.
7  Lagom ME?
Is there a correlate to lagom MC in the domain of ME? The answer seems to be 
assuredly, yes. It is possible to imagine that there might be certain features (call 
them set G) such that features G are (a) necessary to some being’s counting as a 
12
 Some might be unimpressed by a shift of focus from sufficient to necessary conditions. 
Necessary conditions, it might be thought, are ubiquitous to the point of being non-explanatory. 
Compare a similar move in chemistry: “I don't know what the sufficient conditions for a sam-
ple X being water are”, a scientist might have said in the time before the structure of water was 
known, “but I do know a lot of the necessary conditions: X must be a substance, must be located 
in space-time, must be composed of atoms, must either be an element or a compound, must be 
capable of being a liquid at room temperature…” and so on. While true, all of these conditions, 
even taken together, fall short of explaining what water is, unlike the sufficient condition “X is 
H2O”. Two things can be said to quell this worry. First, the example is rather anachronistic. From 
our current, H2O-informed perspective it is easy to underestimate the explanatory and heuristic 
value of the necessary conditions just cited. Second, the necessary conditions can be ordered, 
from the most widely applicable, to the very-narrow-but-still-not-narrow-enough-to guarantee-
waterhood, such as “has, at sea level, a boiling point of 100 °C and a freezing point of 0 °C”, 
which may be very useful in the determination of sufficient conditions. The suggestion, then, is 
that synthetic investigation of the “narrow” end of the corresponding hierarchy of necessary con-
ditions for consciousness can play an important role in explaining consciousness.
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moral agent in either or both the producer sense or the consumer sense; (b) exem-
plified, on the one hand, in certain biological systems, and on the other hand, 
in certain other computational/robotic systems, but in rather different ways; yet 
which are (c) not sufficient to allow us to attribute genuine moral status (in either 
the producer sense or the consumer sense) to any system displaying features G. 
Since we are primarily concerned with moral producerhood here, we will confine 
our discussion to that aspect of moral agency henceforth.
In other words, a computational/robotic system could possess certain charac-
teristics that would be regarded as necessary to such a system counting as a moral 
producer, where those features may be instantiated in somewhat contrasting ways 
in such artificial agents as compared to their human counterparts, but also where 
we may not have sufficient grounds to say that possession of those characteristics 
are in themselves sufficient for such artificial agents to be ‘genuine’ moral agents 
(producers). Two questions that arise are: (i) what might such features be? (ii) 
what are the features that are missing such that were they present as well in the 
artificial system, then we would think that we had a set of properties that were suf-
ficient to justify us in attributing genuine moral producerhood to that system?
As for (i) there seem to be a number of different ways to supply examples 
of what such necessary features might be. One such way is suggested by the 
work of Stan Franklin and colleagues, on the development of a general-purpose 
decision-making system, based on the LIDA cognitive architecture, where such 
a system is envisaged as being able to make morally significant decisions in vari-
ous contexts (for example in medical or care contexts). In brief, Franklin and col-
leagues have developed LIDA (previously IDA) systems as attempts to instantiate 
Bernard Baars’ Global Workspace model of consciousness [5, 14, 15]. So a LIDA 
system is a general purpose problem-solving agent whose cognitive organization 
involves a number of sub-agents, specialized for achieving certain tasks within 
the problem-structure, where these sub-agents form a succession of temporary 
alliances, and such that these alliances of sub-agents compete for control of a 
centralized information-broadcast system which is used by successive coalitions 
to post information for use by other sub-agents within the overall cognitive sys-
tem, in order to tackle the ongoing problem-solving task which is the system’s 
top-level goal.
The LIDA example is particularly apposite in the present discussion about 
machine ethics, since it is intended, not just as a model of generalized problem-
solving (AGI) but also as a functional model of consciousness (and hence is a line 
of research fitting into the research program of MC). However, it has been argued 
by some of its proponents that it is highly relevant to ethical modelling. So, they 
claim, it exhibits one important way in which the modelling of consciousness may 
be useful or required in order to provide good candidate templates for effective 
machine ethics agent design [51].
Note that the point being discussed here about LIDA systems is not that all 
human moral agents must instantiate a LIDA-style (or GW-style) cognitive architec-
ture, although that might be plausible at some very broad level of generality. Rather, 
the claim would be that the LIDA architecture provides one way of realizing, in 
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an artificial agent, a certain kind of global cognitive organization, some variant of 
which is necessary for any agent (natural or artificial) to count as a moral producer.
As for question (ii), what additional features might need to be added to turn an 
agent containing these lagom ME features into a genuine, full-blooded, moral pro-
ducer? One such feature that might be supplied, one that chimes in with our pre-
vious discussion is (some form of) phenomenal consciousness. Possibly this is the 
sole such additional feature which is required to provide us with genuine moral 
producerhood, or maybe it is one among a handful, or possibly a rather long list, 
of features that, when added to the mix, would jointly suffice to make the agent 
possessing those features a genuine moral producer. As remarked, the LIDA sys-
tem has been offered as a model of consciousness; more specifically, of functional 
consciousness. Its supporters appear to believe that the LIDA architecture, if devel-
oped in a sufficiently rich and detailed way, could actually allow us to conclude one 
day that an artificial agent exemplifying it was also phenomenally conscious (W. 
Wallach, in conversation.) Some supporters might go so far as to say that any reali-
zation of that rich and detailed development of LIDA would ipso facto be conscious 
(that is, would be conscious solely by virtue of realizing that architecture), effec-
tively embracing strong MC and the idea of future-LIDA as specifying sufficient 
causes for consciousness. But one does not have to embrace such a position in order 
for the example to do the work it is doing here; namely, to illustrate how a certain 
AI model (the product of years of collaborative work in its development and refine-
ment) could be used to bolster a lagom position in the domain of machine ethics.
We are not here trying to argue that either the LIDA-style cognitive architecture, 
or the property of phenomenal consciousness (however that might be implemented 
in a computational system, even assuming that it could be) must play the roles that 
we have given them in the above discussion; rather they are meant to provide illus-
trations of how the lagom position could be fleshed out in the case of machine eth-
ics. However, it may well be that something like a Global Workspace model of which 
LIDA is one variant (for others, see [21, 35, 36]) may provide a powerful development 
pathway for rich ME systems, particularly ones for use in the medical/care domains.
8  Human (or Biological) Versus General
Another distinction discussed in [11] is worth mentioning. The study of conscious-
ness, whether natural or artificial, can have as its explanatory or replicatory target 
either consciousness as an Earthly phenomenon—as found in humans and other 
animals on our planet—or consciousness understood more broadly, to include 
beings which might inhabit non-terrestrial biospheres, as well as potential non-
biological beings (be they artificial or natural) that possess consciousness. These 
different research emphases may of course reflect doctrinal differences about 
the nature of consciousness. In a similar way, there has been a historical tension 
within moral theory between those who see ethics as a specifically or exclusively 
human phenomenon, and those who see morality in broader, more ideal terms, 
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abstracting away, as far as possible, from human or animal contingencies. The 
moral philosophies of Aristotle and Hume are representative of the first approach; 
those of Plato and Kant are examples of the second. Again these two different 
research foci reflect theoretical differences over the nature of morality and moral 
thinking (or perhaps what it is to be human).
This tension also provides a choice of focal emphasis within machine ethics. 
Should constructive ME researchers develop machine simulations which track as 
closely as possible human moral thought/choice/action? Or should ME (construc-
tive or theoretical) be taking a more abstract stance, especially given the ways in 
which computational systems differ from, and indeed could, in principle, improve 
on human ethical decision-making, in virtue of their more powerful processing capa-
bilities? (Compare the deliberations of a would-be aeronautical engineers at the end 
of the 19th century: To achieve machine flight, should we track as closely as pos-
sible the features of natural flyers (birds, bees, etc.) by including flapping wings 
made of feathers or gossamer? Or should machine flight be taking a more abstract 
stance, given the differing materials at our practical disposal? [2, 10, 11, 24–25, 40, 
52] There has been considerable debate within the ME community about the best 
approach to take: several papers have been written taking different historical models 
within the history of ethical theory as departure-points for building prototype ME 
systems (e.g., [4, 16, 32]). Perhaps different approaches are necessary within differ-
ent application domains, or even within the same domain. As far as medical and care 
systems are concerned, each approach might be necessary for different purposes. In 
situations where agents are required to interact closely with patients it may be neces-
sary for machine systems to instantiate an extended array of human skills of physical 
and emotional engagement; where agents are required to incorporate large, complex 
medical knowledge-bases, a more abstract, rational approach may be required. What 
is important is that designers of medical ethics machines should be aware of this 
debate and their designs should take cognizance of the options available.
9  Conclusion
The above discussion has been intended to provide a philosophical backdrop to the 
development of ethically-sensitive artificial agents or systems in the medical or care 
spheres. A main concern here has been to stress the parallels between theoretical 
issues in machine ethics, and those in the field of machine consciousness, another 
fringe area of AI. But there are not merely strong parallels: consciousness and ethics 
are strongly intertwined in various ways, both as mental or mind-related phenomena 
in humans (and other biological creatures), and in relation to AI developments.
However, we started our discussion in this paper by pointing out a contrast 
between theoretical and constructive ME and of MC as research fields. The possi-
bility of producing machine models of various aspects of ethical thinking, decision 
or action seems quite inviting. So machine ethics might be thought to be, on the 
face of it, quite a flourishing area for development: if the aim of ME (at least in its 
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constructive mode) is to develop artificial agents that can behave in ethically accept-
able ways, this seems to promise a quite feasible set of research objectives via AI-
style methodologies. On the other hand the term “consciousness” appears to cover 
a range of mental features that may seem—some of them at least—quite recalci-
trant to being modeled, let alone reproduced, using AI-based, computational meth-
ods. While the cognitive or behavioral aspects of conscious activity may respond to 
AI methods, the phenomenal or felt aspects of consciousness do not seem likely to 
do so in as straightforward a way. Also, some may be skeptical about how relevant 
issues concerning modelling consciousness are to the machine ethics researcher.
So it might be thought that, in developing practical ethical models for use in 
the medical or care spheres, it would be better to avoid questions of conscious-
ness. Deep models of ethical thinking or emotion may be needed to take account 
of work in AI research on consciousness, it might be said. But, there is a practical 
urgency to design autonomous robotic and AI agents to be ‘ethically safe’; that 
is, to operate in such a way that we can be assured that they observe appropriate 
ethical rules or values. This is especially so in sensitive areas such as medicine and 
personal care. So, it may be argued, there just won’t be the development time for 
machine ethicists to get too embroiled in issues to do with consciousness, even if 
the latter does have some bearing on ethics.
Our response to this skeptical challenge has been a complex one. In brief, we 
have differentiated between theoretical and constructive machine consciousness. 
Further, we have noted that humans may be attributed moral status in at least two 
senses, both as moral “producers” and as moral “consumers”. With respect to theo-
retical MC, we have shown that there are deep interrelations between various key 
notions in (meta-) ethics and consciousness, both in relation to moral production and 
moral consumption. For example, despite the considerations to the contrary which 
we have also presented, it might be insisted that consciousness is a precondition of 
being an ethical consumer, on the grounds that the ability to experience the positive 
or negative aspects of the actions of others is essential to having ethical consumer 
status. But consciousness may also be a precondition of being an ethical producer, 
although the connections are less direct and even more subject to challenge in the 
latter case, perhaps. Certainly, if being an ethical producer involves having the 
capacity for some kind of empathetic identification with the possible recipients of 
one’s actions, then some kind of conscious, reflective entry into the potential experi-
ences of others seems necessary for moral producerhood as well as consumerhood.
Additionally, we have shown that, according to certain models of decision-
making (for example the LIDA/Global Workspace model), especially ethical 
decision-making, one needs to be mindful of the core cognitive functionality of 
consciousness. So attempts to build ethically-sensitive agents (especially medi-
cal ones) that fail to take proper account of the theoretical issues in machine con-
sciousness may be too simplistic to work robustly and may therefore not succeed 
in achieving a chief practical goal of constructive ME, namely achieving autono-
mous action that was ethically dependable.
A question that was considered in our discussion concerned the possible role 
played by empathy in the range of moral actions and responses of medical and care 
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practitioners, and how such empathetic actions and responses might be realized in 
a constructive ME machine. Two kinds of arguments were considered: the first sug-
gested that empathetic grasping of the experiences of others may involve an under-
standing of “what it is like” to be in that state, in a way that implies phenomenal 
consciousness. Such phenomenal consciousness, it might be urged, could not be real-
ized in an artificial agent whose design was based on current AI technologies. The 
second argument, drawing upon phenomenological conceptions of embodiment stem-
ming from Husserl, provides a picture of empathy that stresses, not our imaginative 
grasping of the state of the other, but the common lived embodiment of one human 
facing another. Again, any non-embodied AI agent, or an agent created with current 
and foreseeable AI technology, would be unlikely to realize the kind of commonality 
of embodiment that underlies this kind of human-to-human empathic response.
Such critical points raise deep issues that need to be taken into account in 
the program of constructive ME, particularly within medical and care domains. 
Nevertheless, we suggest that they are not fatal to such a program. It is always 
important to recognize the limitations of the current state of the art in any research 
field. So the progress of constructive ME will be challenged, for a considerable 
time, by the need to take proper account of the limitations in the imaginative 
capacity available to machines, relative to humans, and by the very different forms 
of embodiment exemplified by these two types of agent. But, as noted earlier, there 
are also many deep differences between humans, and such inter-human differences 
also mean that empathetic responses of human carers or healers are often far from 
easy to achieve, or ideal. So we recommend a strategy which takes care not to be 
too ambitious, based on small results, and geared towards selected situations of 
use. This way, the kinds of differences between human and machine ethical agents 
alluded to by these arguments will have less of an impact on the program’s success.
More broadly, we have suggested that theoretical tools used in discussion of 
some general issues in MC or ME, or in AI in general need to be deployed with 
more subtlety and nuance. For example the frequent allusions to strong versus 
weak AI, and the corresponding notions for ME, may need to be enhanced by our 
recognizing a middle zone, which we have referred to as lagom ME (by analogy 
with an earlier treatment of a similar notion in MC). We have here discussed how 
this relates to both the ME and MC fields. While we referred specifically to the 
LIDA model in this connection, it seems clear that other cognitive approaches to 
consciousness may also have important applications with the field of ethics.
The issues at stake can be summarized in three claims/lines of reasoning 
(which we do not purport to have conclusively established), listed here in order of 
decreasing strength:
•	 For an artificial agent to perform well13 in the medical domain, it will have to be 
a genuine moral producer, and therefore a genuine moral consumer. Since one 
13
 “Well” is a relative term that we are intentionally leaving unspecified to allow us to cover a 
broader range of claims. But as an example, one (strong) gloss on it would be: “at a level suffi-
cient to allow replacement, or at least significant supplementation, of human medical personnel”.
313Modelling Consciousness-Dependent Expertise ...
or both of these require being phenomenally conscious, artificial medical agents, 
to perform well in the medical domain, will have to be phenomenally conscious.
•	 Even if genuine moral status is not required, for an artificial agent to perform 
well in the medical domain, it will have to at least be a functional moral pro-
ducer (and possibly a functional moral consumer). Although functional ethical 
status may not require being phenomenally conscious, it is likely to require meet-
ing some of the (non-trivial) necessary conditions for such, which, plausibly, can 
be achieved by techniques continuous with traditional or current AI approaches, 
even if sufficient conditions for consciousness cannot. In the limit, functional 
ethical status (being ethically functionally equivalent to a genuinely ethically 
competent medical practitioner) may require functional consciousness status.
•	 Aside from the above claims, which concern constructive ME, an important 
component of theoretical ME (e.g., delineation of responsibility in situations 
involving informationally sophisticated computational/robotic medical technol-
ogy) will benefit from understanding the ways in which a particular piece of 
technology fails to meet the sufficient conditions for phenomenal consciousness 
and (therefore) moral producerhood/consumerhood. Understanding the short-
comings of such technology will put the medical professionals involved in a 
better position to know which aspects of their expertise are most likely to be 
needed. Further, the tools developed for such understanding will also be of use 
in understanding the (phenomenally or ethically relevant) strengths and weak-
nesses of the humans involved in such a technology, possibly suggesting areas 
for training or development to better reach desired medical outcomes.
There are thus a number of ways in which concerns relating to machine conscious-
ness impinge upon machine ethics in general and in the medical and care domains 
in particular. Probably the most important issue concerning consciousness in rela-
tion to AI is how far various aspects of consciousness, and in particular the phe-
nomenality of consciousness, can be captured within a computational framework, 
at least in principle. Few would deny that this must be an open question at this 
stage of theoretical and technological development. But, even if one remains opti-
mistic about eventually producing a computational agent that is phenomenally 
conscious in a rich sense, this is not likely to be done without a lot more time 
and/or effort. (However, “singularity” theorists are very optimistic indeed on this 
score; see [9, 27].) It may also be possible to create deep models of agency that 
incorporate many of the grosser functional or behavioral features of consciousness 
without achieving a rich “inner feel”.
We have also discussed whether full or genuine ethical status (at least ethical-
agent or ethical-producer status) could be realizable within a computational agent 
model. Again the answer may be yes in principle, though not without a great deal 
more development effort (and thus time). But, as with the consciousness case, 
many aspects of human ethical action or decision-making may be reproduced in 
AI models. Our discussion suggests that a pragmatic approach is desirable in both 
the MC and ME spheres. And moreover, we have argued that the task of building 
useful and appropriate machine ethics agents will best be done by incorporating 
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insights from machine consciousness. The increasing operational autonomy of 
robots and AI agents will have repercussions for many fields. But the fruits 
of work in MC are likely to be of particular use within the range of application 
areas that come under medicine and care. These areas will require, of the artificial 
agents we build, the exercise of physical emotional and imaginative sensitivity, 
complex interpersonal skills and reflective decision-making. These are all areas 
that have been much targeted by philosophers and psychologists interested in both 
consciousness and ethics. So progress in medical machine ethics is likely to be 
greatly enhanced by attention to developments in machine consciousness.
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Abstract Machines designed for medical applications beyond usual data acquisi-
tion and processing need to cooperate with and adapt to humans in order to fulfill 
their supportive tasks. Technically, medical machines are therefore considered as 
affective systems, capable of detecting, assessing and adapting to emotional states 
and dispositional changes in users. One of the upcoming applications of affec-
tive systems is the use as supportive machines involved in the psychiatric disorder 
diagnose and therapy process. These machines have the additional requirement of 
being capable to control persuasive dialogues in order to obtain relevant patient 
data despite disadvantageous set-ups. These automated abilities of technical sys-
tems combined with enhanced processing, storage and observational capabilities 
raise both chances and challenges in medical applications. We focus on analyzing 
the objectivity, reliability and validity of current techniques used to determine the 
emotional states of speakers from speech and the arising implications. We discuss 
the underlying technical and psychological models and analyze recent machine 
assessment results of emotional states obtained through dialogues. Conclusively 
we discuss the involvement of affective systems as medical machines in the psy-
chiatric diagnostics process and therapy sessions with respect to the technical and 
ethical circumstances.
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1  Introduction
Machines designed for medical applications beyond usual data acquisition and 
processing need to cooperate with and adapt to humans in order to fulfill their sup-
portive tasks. Hence, from a technical point of view, modern medical machines 
are specific human computer interaction (HCI) systems. More precisely, due to the 
particular type of interaction within the usual physician-patient-relationship, medi-
cal machines interacting with patients must be designed as affective systems. This 
fact holds regardless of whether the system interacts autonomously or supervised.
The chapter demonstrates why the introduction of affective systems in medi-
cal application scenarios is premature and discusses the ethical issues raised. While 
affective systems in medical scenarios raise general ethical questions such as human 
indispensability in healthcare, trustworthiness and the inviolability of human dig-
nity, certain applications additionally imply negative consequences for the individual 
patient. We focus our discussion on the use of dialogue-based automated emotion 
detection in psychiatric applications. The issues raised are due to technical deficiencies 
of affective systems applicable to all HCI-applications, but are especially evident in 
psychiatric application scenarios. One application that raises serious ethical questions 
is the use of emotion recognition methods in order to assist in the diagnostic process of 
psychiatric disorders and the use of affective systems in therapy sessions [24, 59].
Although machines have the advantage of proficient storage, processing and 
sensory equipment, it is questionable whether machines would (and should) 
be able to recognize emotions and react truly affectively to patients. This would 
imply the technical integration of enhanced human abilities which are often only 
imperfectly developed in humans. Due to several concerns, such as privacy and 
misuse issues as well as objectivity, reliability and validity of the outcome, any 
type of intervention of physician-patient-interactions by “non-physicians” have led 
to moral debates in the past. While concerns of privacy and misuse issues may be 
addressed through the utopia of secure systems, machines used to assess and mod-
ify patient behavior still impose non-neglectable ethical concerns. We will investi-
gate the validity, reliability and objectivity of dialogue-based automated emotion 
and disposition analyses. We will show that validity, reliability and objectivity are 
not assumable and that hence, the unreflected incorporation of automated emotion 
detection from speech in medical applications inherently imposes risk of both mis-
use and abuse, contradicting the supportive purpose of medical machines.
The chapter is structured into four further sections. Section 2 introduces 
the psychological background for affective HCI and discusses current emotion 
theories and emotion categorization/annotation issues. Section 3 describes the 
technical state-of-the-art in speech-based emotion detection and the technical defi-
ciencies associated with the approaches explained. Section 4 reports on published 
results related to the dependability of emotion detection from speech in different 
applications. Based on the previous sections, the justifiability of the integration 
of automated emotion detection from speech in medical application scenarios is 
 discussed in the concluding Sect. 5.
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2  Emotion Models and Theories in HCI
Emotions are widely accepted as essential to human-human interaction and inherent 
in physician-patient-interactions. Psychiatric disorders are often expressed through 
irregularities in emotional patterns and observable in the patients’ behavior and 
speech. Although the American Psychiatric Association (APA) and the World Health 
Organization (WHO) published international classification tools (DSM-5 and ICD-
10 respectively) used for the diagnosis of psychiatric disorders, diagnoses are often 
debatable and partly subjective. The difficulty lies in the term and understanding of 
human emotion and disposition. Debates on emotion theories are therefore indispen-
sable for the design and understanding of affective systems.
In medical applications, affective systems may be faced with three types of 
difficulties:
1. The reliable, valid and universally reproducible recognition of emotional states 
in users,
2. the correct classification of the emotional states and
3. generating the appropriate affective response to the emotional input.
While (1) implies the need for universal, cooperative emotion models in both 
psychology and engineering, (2) addresses the technical difficulties of identify-
ing sufficient, measurable observables associated with emotional expressions 
and the appropriate categorization of emotions, and (3) attends the difficulties 
associated with abstract emotion understanding neither inherent to humans nor 
to technical systems. The following discussion focuses on the issues associated 
with (1) and (2), as solving these may be considered a prerequisite to accom-
plishing (3).
2.1  Terminology
The emotion models incorporated in affective systems designed for medical appli-
cations must be psychologically founded. The terms emotion, mood, personal-
ity traits and disposition should be cooperatively defined for both psychological 
and technical investigations to allow the correct implementation in technical sys-
tems. However, precise definitions of these terms are already subject to disputes 
within the initiating discipline. The most common definitions used within the HCI 
research community are given in the following passages.
Affect A subjective experience of external events which may be characterized 
by specific bodily response patterns.
Emotion As stated in [4], emotions reflect short-term affects, usually bound to 
a specific event, action, or object. Following this definition, an observed emotion 
reflects a distinct user assessment directly related to a specific event and is of short 
duration. Hence, an affective system may not conclude the overall emotional state 
of an individual due to a single observation.
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Mood In contrast to an emotion, a mood reflects a medium-term affect, not 
necessarily related to a unique event [47]. Moods last longer and are considered as 
rather stable affective states that influence the user’s cognitive functions.
Personality reflects a long-term affect and specifies individual behavioral char-
acteristics. The NEO-FFI is a common scheme used to categorize personalities 
and is based on the Five Factor Model [40, 44]. The NEO-FFI uses five traits to 
define the associated typical behavior. A prediction of the user’s mood in combina-
tion with knowledge about the personality can be used to draw conclusions about 
the conversation course and the validity of the collected data [14].
While the research communities were able to partially agree on “best prac-
tice” definitions for the above named terms, disagreement regarding the choice 
and validity of emotion theories is persistent. However, the emotion models incor-
porated in affective systems must be founded on an approved emotion theory in 
order to be adaptable in medical applications. Due to potentially incompatible 
emotion theories, the selection of an appropriate emotion model has far reach-
ing consequences for the affective system and its applications. To highlight these 
implications, a short introduction to some of the most common emotion theory 
approaches is given in the following.
2.2  Emotion Theories
In 1919 McDougall presented the concept of primary emotions as psychologi-
cally primitive building blocks [41]. He described functional behavior patterns 
with descriptive labels, such as anger or fear. The utilization of labels, the amount 
needed and the correct assignment of labels to emotions are still being debated 
[11, 58].
In the 1970s, Ekman introduced the concept of basic emotions following his 
observations on non-verbal behavior. Ekman and Wallace V. Friesen observed that 
the expressions of certain emotions seemed culturally, ethnically, gender and age 
independent. They generated a list of emotions expressed and recognized univer-
sally through similar facial expressions, yielding six basic emotions (anger, dis-
gust, fear, happiness, sadness, surprise) [18].
However, this type of categorical emotion classification does not support the 
investigation of relationships between emotions. To address this issue, Plutchik 
[49] proposed the wheel of emotions in the 1980s with eight bipolar emotions and 
several combinations of these. This classification allowed to describe the intensity 
of an emotion and introduced so called complex emotions [49] (Fig. 1).
Another approach was to introduce a “total-feeling” by Wundt [74]. The idea 
is to represent a feeling as a mixture of potentially elementary feelings, each 
described as a single point in a three dimensional emotion space (pleasure ↔ dis-
pleasure, excitement ↔ inhibition, tension ↔ relaxation) (Fig. 1).
Wundt’s [74] concept was that an external event triggers a sequence of total-
feelings over time. This results in a specific, continuous course within the described 
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three-dimensional space. The resulting trajectory describes the specific course 
within this space. The description of emotions independent of labels and the model-
inherent transitions are an advantage of this approach. Unfortunately, Wundt’s 
theory neither locates emotions within the emotional space, nor does it provide a 
solution for the integration of intensity levels.
The exact configuration and dimension of the human emotion space is still 
being discussed within the research community. Prominent results are those of 
Schlosberg [60], Plutchik [49], and Russell and Mehrabian [52, 53].
A particularly relevant detail was found through the investigations of Russell 
and Mehrabian [52], who were able to emphasize that three dimensions are needed 
to distinguish emotional states [52]. Furthermore, Russell and Mehrabian located 
151 emotional terms in the “Pleasure-Arousal-Dominance-space” (PAD-space).
However, the reliability of Russell and Mehrabian findings has been questioned 
repeatedly. Unfortunately, their results were not reproducible within a comprehen-
sive study performed by Gehm and Scherer [23], nor in similar studies. A possible 
explanation of the irreproducibility was that the ability of the involved subjects to 
emotionally rate relevant words or pictures was not comprehensible [57].
3  How Machines Learn Emotions
To enable medical machines to automatically detect and recognize emotions, the 
methods used for affective systems must be applied. Figure 2 provides an over-
view of the methods involved and the general emotion learning process in techni-
cal systems.
Fig. 1  Left hand side Plutchik’s [49] three dimensional structural model of emotions [49], 157]; 
right hand side Wundt’s three axes of an orthogonal emotion space, with emotion trajectory (fol-
lowing Wundt [74]). The axes correspond to: x-axis (“inclination-disinclination”), y-axis (“ten-
sion-relaxation”), z-axis (“excitement-sedation”) [66, 67]
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In the first step, the data (i.e., audio and video featuring emotional content dis-
played by humans) is recorded and saved. This data is then annotated by human 
experts with respect to the emotional labels provided. Due to the inter-rater reli-
ability issues discussed in Sect. 4.1, several annotators should be involved in this 
task. The emotional label for one specific sequence is assigned based on the result 
of (weighted or unweighted) majority voting. This inherently implies that the 
emotional labels reflect the emotional awareness and understanding of the annota-
tors, not necessarily representing the truth. See Sect. 5 for further details on this 
discussion.
The second step to allow machines to recognize emotions automatically 
involves preprocessing of the recorded sequence. We focus on speech data; how-
ever, any other modality may be chosen as well. Within the second step, the signal 
is represented through features: informative descriptors that represent the relevant 
information of the speech signal. Hence, the feature extraction process prepares 
the source data for further automated processing by machines.
The machines learn to match emotional labels to signals that have a spe-
cific configuration of the extracted features through pattern recognition meth-
ods. To enable machines to learn the association of an annotated label with the 
corresponding feature configuration, the annotated data (consisting of labels 
and features) is given to the machine. As an outcome of this learning process, 
the machine understands a certain feature configuration and emotion label as 
being connected, generating models of “emotions” (or more general: learned 
classes).
feature
extractionpreprocessing
data
collection
manual
labelling
feature
selection learning
data
recording classification
labelled data
emotion model
emotion
assignment
feature
extractionpreprocessing
Modelling
Recognition
Annotation
Fig. 2  How a machine learns
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The generated emotion models may then be applied to new recordings to rec-
ognize emotions/classes automatically. The quality of the performance is highly 
dependent on the model applied.
The following sections give a brief description of each of the three steps 
involved in the emotion learning process in machines.
3.1  Annotation Methods
In healthy humans, the most reliable method to obtain a valid assignment of 
an expressed emotion may be a self-assessment by the observed subject [25]. 
Unfortunately, this is not always feasible due to numerous reasons (experimen-
tal design, the subjects’ ability to reflect upon itself, health status of the subject). 
Hence, designers of affective systems must rely on third-parties to annotate the 
emotional sequences recorded. In order to achieve a minimum of homogeneity 
and reliability in the annotation, annotators are provided with annotation schemes. 
These schemes add to the uniformity of the annotation process and increase the 
likelihood of similar assessments by the annotators despite age, gender and socio-
cultural differences. These annotation schemes are often based on the emotion the-
ories discussed in Sect. 2.2.
The categorical emotion theories have the advantage of common terms, i.e., the 
annotators are provided with a selection of terms out of which they may choose 
to annotate the observed emotional sequence. However, the categorical emotion 
theories do not include the relations between the emotions observed. Furthermore, 
the assignment of relations between the terms used is highly subjective and differs 
depending on age, gender and socio-cultural background of the annotator. This 
may influence the annotation outcome.
The dimensional theories inherently incorporate emotional transitions, but 
the annotation process is more complex and the annotators need further train-
ing. The annotation through dimensions is not intuitive and the uncertainty of 
(dimensional) emotion theories inherently threatens the approach. There is little 
consent on the axes labels; however, the terms assigned to the axes may have an 
unforeseeable influence on the annotators’ assessment. Regardless of the choice 
of annotation scheme, to heighten the chances of obtaining reliable labels, several 
annotators (mostly >6) are employed.
In the following, a short overview of common emotion annotation methods is 
given. Unfortunately, these methods do not necessarily reflect the emotion truly 
felt by a subject. Fragopanagos and Taylor analyzed a number of “input- and out-
put-specific issues” that influence the assessment, such as display rules and cogni-
tive effects [22]. Alarmingly, a study by Truong found that felt emotions are not 
always perceivable by observers [70] and that the average agreement between self-
rater and annotators was lower than the inter-rater agreement [69].
Word Lists A common method used to assign emotional labels are Word Lists 
(WLs). In this method, descriptive labels, usually not more than ten, are selected 
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to describe the emotional state of an observed subject (Table 1). These labels can 
be formed from counter-parts, such as positive versus negative, or designed for a 
specific task (e.g., aggression detection) [16, 35, 38]. Several databases comprise a 
set of emotions, comparable to Ekman [18] or Plutchik [49]. The missing relation-
ship between labels is one of the disadvantages of WLs, making it difficult for the 
annotator to give a reliable assessment [54] of the emotional sequence. The quanti-
fication of affective changes is especially difficult using WLs.
Geneva Emotion Wheel A prominent solution to overcome problems associ-
ated with WLs is the Geneva Emotion Wheel (GEW) (Fig. 3) by Scherer [56]. 
This assessment tool is related to Scherer’s appraisal theory [55]. It is a theoret-
ically derived and empirically tested instrument used to assess emotional reac-
tions to objects, events, and situations. The GEW consist of 16 emotion families, 
each with five degrees of intensity, arranged in a wheel shape on the two axes 
“control” and “pleasantness”. Additionally, no emotion and neutral options are 
provided.
This arrangement supports the annotator in assessing a single emotion fam-
ily with a specific intensity by guiding him through the axes and quadrants. The 
labeling effort using GEW is quite high. However, the GEW allows quantifica-
tion of the relation between distinct emotions, as it combines both the categorical 
and the dimensional approach. However, in dimensional approaches, the dimen-
sions “pleasure” and “arousal” are more common terms used to describe human 
affective states [25, 51]. The dimension “control” is an object of ongoing discus-
sions, mostly because studies investigating the axes to be used may rely on dif-
ferent methods and interpretations. Their outcome for the axis referred to as 
“control”/”dominance”/“coping” varies from being regarded unnecessary [52, 75] 
to immanent [23] in order to distinguish emotions.
Picture-Oriented Assessment This verbal description of emotions causes dif-
ficulties in assessment, as the application of these terms to a different language 
requires translation and validation of the used categories [7]. Furthermore, the 
relation between each literal description can differ from annotator to annotator, 
so that the relations differ not only from the subjective observation, but also from 
the subjective interpretation of the verbal description [45]. To address these issues, 
Lang invented a picture-oriented instrument to assess the pleasure, arousal, and 
dominance dimension directly [34].
Table 1  Common word lists and related corpora
Affective labels Used in
Negative, non-negative ACC [35]
Angry, bored, doubtful, neutral UAH corpus [10]
Fear, anger, stress BSS 04 [16]
Positive, neutral, negative ISL Meeting Corpus [8]
6 Basic emotions DES [19], EmoDB [9]
Joyful, empathic, surprised, ironic, helpless, touchy, angry, 
bored, motherese, reprimanding, rest
AIBO database [3]
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Here, due to a dimensional representation, the annotators are guided to judge 
the relation between observed emotions. This presentation illustrates the rela-
tion between affective states much better than a literal transcription. Additionally, 
it reduces the evaluation effort. The Semantic Differential Scale uses 18 bipo-
lar adjective pairs to generate judgments along three axes, whereas the Self-
Assessment Manikins (SAM) depict the same dimensions through figures. The 
granularity is adjustable and spans from a 5 figure-scale for each dimension [46] 
to a 9 point-scale using intermediate steps between the figures [29]. However, due 
to the dimensional description and the limiting granularity, the ability to evaluate 
distinct or blended emotions is missing.
Feeltrace An entirely different approach to assess emotions is utilized with 
Feeltrace [13]. To examine the emotional evolvement, this instrument tracks the 
assessed affect over time. Feeltrace is based on the activation-evaluation space and 
arranged in a circular manner. The evaluation of the resulting labels is difficult, as 
each annotator produces a constant track with a step width of 0.02 on time and 0.0003 
Fig. 3  Geneva emotion wheel. An example to illustrate the labelling process: An annotator 
assesses an emotional sequence as having “high control” (blue semicircle), and “pleasant” (yel-
low semicircle). The resulting assessment is the green quadrant. The choice “pride” is marked 
in red
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on value axis, where the relations of observed changes are very individual. Hence, 
Feeltrace is rather used to identify a trend in the emotional evolvement than to define a 
specific point in the emotion space. See Fig. 4 for an example of Feeltrace traces.
3.2  Feature Extraction and Learning
To automatically recognize emotions from utterances, technical systems heavily rely 
on pattern recognition methods. These methods describe typical configurations of 
selected descriptors to identify and describe a common state. In the emotion detec-
tion from speech, these descriptors are called features. The configuration of speech 
features is matched to specific classes or emotions based on the annotated training 
data given. The machines learn to abstract from the training data to a common model 
and to assign emotional labels similarly to the annotators’ assignments.
A majority of the approaches to classify utterances use acoustic features. The 
most popular features are prosodic (e.g., pitch-related features, energy-related fea-
tures etc.) and spectral features (e.g., MFCC). Prosodic features are more widely 
accepted as these are associated with variations in vocal tract configuration and 
hence directly relate to sympathetic and parasympathetic activation, known to be 
associated with affect.
The selection of features used to describe the observed signal influences the 
classification performance greatly. First approaches to the automated emotion 
detection from speech utilized the same spectral features as used for speech recog-
nition, resulting in rather weak classifications. However, more recent approaches 
incorporate more advanced prosodic and voice quality features [31]. Recently, the 
automatic construction of feature vectors that are optimal for emotion recognition 
is being investigated [28].
Depending on the unit of analysis, classification approaches can be separated into 
two major groups: static and dynamic approaches. Within the static approach, the 
whole input utterance is regarded as a single unit. Hence, only a single feature vec-
tor is extracted for the complete input utterance (also referred to as “turn”). Since 
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Fig. 4  Example trace plot for female speaker 1, trace 29 from SAL annotated by 5 annotators 
[50]
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the value of each single feature varies over time, the characteristics of the input 
signal (so called low level descriptors: pitch- and energy-related features, spectral 
content etc.) are represented using functionals such as mean, standard deviation, 
extremes, ranges, and quartiles [72, 73]. Typical classification methods for static (or 
turn-level) analysis are support vector machines (SVM) [20], multilayer perceptrons 
(or other types of neural networks) [61], and Gaussian mixture models (GMMs) 
[39]. Also, Bayes classifier [71], Bayesian networks [20], random forests [30], deci-
sion trees [37], k-nearest neighbor classifiers [15] are widely applied.
Within the dynamic approach to classification, the unit of analysis is a short-
time (around 25 ms) frame window, shifting through the signal. Features are 
extracted for every single frame, thus providing a sequence of feature vectors. 
Among dynamic (also referred to as “frame-level”) analysis, hidden Markov mod-
els (HMMs) are predominantly used [36, 72, 73]. Each emotion is modeled with 
a corresponding HMM. The combination of turn- and frame-level analysis is also 
possible, e.g., Vlasenko et al. [72, 73]. For an overview of advanced emotion clas-
sification techniques see Palm and Glodek [48]. However, a detailed understanding 
of these methods may be considered negligible for the discussion of the depend-
ability of automated emotion detection/recognition methods. The accuracy rates of 
some of the most popular classification methods for emotional speech were inves-
tigated in Ayadi et al. [2]. These findings are given and discussed in the Sect. 4.2.
3.3  Automatic Emotion Recognition
Speech-based emotion classification systems typically consist of two stages: (1) 
front-end signal processing (“feature extraction”), and (2) classification that evalu-
ates incoming features and assigns the class labels. Having finished training, the 
classifier defines a model associated with each label, which may be applied to 
new recordings. These recordings do not need to be part of the training set nor 
do the speakers need to be known. If the training of the classifier was successful, 
the recorded data does not need to undergo an annotation process. The annotation 
of classes is done automatically by the classifier. In order to do so, the same pre-
processing and feature extraction methods are applied [5]. Depending on the learn-
ing methods used, the training data and the annotation given, the outcome of these 
classifiers may vary greatly. Some of the most recent emotion recognition results 
based on automated classification are given and discussed in the Sect. 4.2.
4  Dependability of Emotion Detection and Recognition
As stated previously, the assessment and labeling of emotions is a subjective task. 
Annotation schemes are used to determine the emotional information of data and 
assign specific labels to emotional sequences in order to allow machine learning 
methods to be applied. These learning methods are applied on larger datasets, 
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trying to extract and generalize feature changes according to the annotation given. 
This procedure implies that the outliers are smoothened. However, if the annota-
tion for emotional sequences is varying strongly, the learning outcome will result 
in highly simplified and erroneous classifications. Sequences will only be identi-
fied on a “best fit” and “least common denominator” level. These considerations 
highlight the necessity for high inter-rater reliabilities in order to design solid 
emotion detection classifiers.
This section discusses the dependability issues for the annotation, modelling 
and recognition phase raised in the previous sections. To allow a solid discus-
sion of the chances and challenges for affective systems in medical applications, 
the three steps identified to allow machines to learn emotions are analyzed with 
respect to their dependability. The Sect. 4.1 discusses the reliability of the annota-
tion process and the elements involved. Section 4.2 investigates issues that may 
influence the dependability of the emotion detection based on the feature extrac-
tion and learning methods. The final Sect. 5 discusses the reported results of dif-
ferent emotion recognition challenges to provide concrete numbers for specific 
applications of speech based emotion detection.
4.1  Annotation Reliabilities
There are only few studies available that investigate the specific effects of the 
annotation process on emotion detection [17, 38, 69]. The major issue in the anno-
tation of emotional sequences is “inter-rater reliability” (IRR), a measure of the 
reliability of the given annotation by two different annotators for one specific emo-
tional sequence labeled.
The IRR pays tribute to the fact that the assessment of an emotional sequence 
is subjective. Annotation schemes try to minimize the effects of age, gender and 
socio-cultural background on the annotation process; however, these effects cannot 
be eradicated. Despite the knowledge of the unreliability of human annotators, lit-
tle research has been done to improve the IRR [17]. A detailed discussion of these 
issues can be found in Siegert et al. [66, 67].
Krippendorff’s Alpha A measure often used to determine the IRR for a given 
speech corpus is Krippendorff’s alpha, α, [32]. Krippendorff’s alpha measures 
the disagreement of the annotated labels for one specific emotional sequence. To 
obtain a measure for the agreement of the annotated labels the value calculated for 
the annotations disagreement is subtracted from 1. Furthermore, several distance 
metrics for nominal, ordinal, interval, and ratio labels are available. An advantage 
of α compared to other IRR measures is its greater reliability utilizing two or more 
annotators and its robustness when dealing with incomplete data [27].
The obtainable values for α range from 0 (“low agreement”) to 1 (“high agree-
ment”). There are several interpretation schemes available for the calculated val-
ues of α. The most common classification used was suggested by Landis and 
Koch [33]. Other schemes are provided by Altman [1], Fleiss et al. [21] and 
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Krippendorff [32] respectively. For a comparison of the named schemes refer 
to Fig. 6. The differences in the interpretations and labels of Krippendorff’s 
alpha make it hard to compare results unless the exact values for α are provided 
additionally.
Reported Inter-Rater Reliabilities The IRR assessment reported by Callejas 
[10] was based on the annotation of the UAH emotional speech corpus. The UAH 
emotional speech corpus contains 85 dialogues from a telephone-based informa-
tion system spoken in Andalusian dialect from 60 different users. They used a WL 
to distinguish the four emotional terms (angry, bored, doubtful and neutral). The 
annotation process was conducted by 9 labelers and performed on complete utter-
ances. To infer a relation between the emotional categories, the authors arranged 
the emotional terms on a 2-D activation-evaluation space and defined angular dis-
tances, in the range of 0°–180°. The authors reported an α of 0.338 for their “angle 
metric distance” [10].
A corpus using the dimensional labeling approach is the “Vera am Mittag” 
audio-visual emotional speech data-base (VAM). It contains spontaneous and 
unscripted discussions between two to five persons from a German talk show 
[26]. Selected sentences were labeled with SAM (see Sect. 3.1) using a 5-point 
scale. The resulting assessments were translated into the interval of [−1, 1] and a 
weighted average assessment was calculated.
The VAM database contains 499 items derived from very good quality speak-
ers (denoted as VAM I), evaluated by 17 human listeners and 519 items from good 
quality speakers evaluated by 6 human listeners (denoted as VAM II). The calcu-
lated α with nominal and ordinal distance is given in Table 2.
Table 2 shows that the achieved inter-rater reliabilities were quite low. The val-
ues for a nominal distance metric ranged from poor to slight, while the ordinal 
distance achieved fair to moderate alpha values. However, with a smallest value 
of 0.086 and a highest value of 0.478, the IRR of annotations done with ordinal 
labels must still be considered unreliable. The training level of the annotators had 
only an effect on the IRR for the assessment along the arousal and dominance 
dimension.
The SEMAINE corpus contains the recordings of emotionally colored con-
versations. Utilizing four different operator behaviors, the scenario is designed 
to evoke emotional reactions. To obtain annotations, trace style continuous rat-
ings were made on five core dimensions (Valence, Activation, Power, Expectation, 
Overall Emotional Intensity) utilizing Feeltrace [42]. A subset, the SEMAINE 
Table 2  Calculated IRR for VAM, distinguishing nominal (nom) and ordinal (ord) metric for 
each dimension and part
Part Valence nom/ord IRR Dominance 
nom/ordArousal nom/ord
VAM I 0.106/0.189 0.180/0.485 0.176/0.443
VAM II 0.086/0.187 0.210/0.431 0.137/0.337
VAM (I + II) 0.108/0.199 0.194/0.478 0.175/0.433
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Solid-SAL corpus (SAL), was made available to the research community. The 
number of labelers varied between 2 and 6, and the experiments were divided into 
segments with a fixed length of about 5 min. An example trace is given in Fig. 4. 
The resulting IRRs, using Krippendorff’s alpha with ordinal metric distances, are 
given in Table 3.
The discussed results support our hypothesis that the IRR for the annotation of 
emotional or affective sequences is poor. Due to the reported values for alpha, the 
annotations must be considered unreliable. It must be noted that our inference also 
holds for popular and widely used speech corpora such as VAM and SEMAINE. 
Many results used for the general design of affective systems rely on research 
results obtained from investigations of these corpora.
All reported alpha-values are given in Figs. 5 and 6 for comparison and 
arranged on the interpretation scheme by Landis and Koch [33].
4.2  Feature Extraction and Learning
While the feature extraction methods should not influence the emotion detection’s 
dependability negatively, feature selection does have an impact on the validity and 
significance of the results obtained.
As mentioned earlier, some features, especially those categorized as “prosodic 
features” are closely related to the vocal tract configuration and hence associated 
with the activation of the sympathetic and parasympathetic systems. Some features 
are currently being discussed as well suited for the detection of psychological dis-
orders [59].
The learning process is closely related to the annotation process. The learning 
process is therefore dependent on both the annotation quality as well as the quality 
of the preprocessed data provided. Classifiers may be considered as the automated, 
technical correspondent to a human annotator. The classifier generates the emotion 
models that match a given recording to a specific feature configuration in order to 
automatically assess the emotional label associated with that specific feature con-
figuration. Some of the most common classifiers used were briefly introduced in 
Sect. 3.2. The average accuracies that may be achieved with these classifiers have 
been investigated by Ayadi et al. [2] (Table 4).
The average accuracies given for some of the popular classification methods 
allow us to deduce that the accuracy of the classification—i.e., the correctness of 
Table 3  IRRs for selected functionals of SAL comparing α and α0.05 with given Cronbach’s 
Alpha αCr values [43] for the Traces Intensity (I), Valence (V), Activation (A), Power (P), and 
Expectation (E)
I V A P E
Median α 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.09
Sd α 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.11 0.09
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the assignment performed through automated emotion detection—varies with the 
classifier chosen and ranges between 51.19–81.94 % on average. Better perfor-
mances may be possible due to good training data and wise selection of features, 
depending on the specific application and task.
5  Emotion Detection Reliability: INTERSPEECH 
Challenges
The rapid growth of the affective computing field resulted in several methods being 
applied to various corpora using different evaluation strategies and features. This 
diversity led to a low comparability of the methods used and the results obtained. 
Aiming to bridge the gap between the reported studies and their poor compatibility, 
INTERSPEECH 2009 Emotion Challenge [62] was the first open public  evaluation 
Fig. 5  Comparison of 
different interpretation 
schemes for α. Line [1] refers 
to the scheme according to 
Altman [1]; [2] Fleiss et al. 
[21]; [3] Krippendorff [32]; 
[4] [33]
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[41] poor slight fair moderate substantial excellent
[1] poor fair moderate good very good
[25] poor fair to good very good
agreement values
Fig. 6  Compilation of 
reported IRRs, plotted against 
the agreement interpretation 
Landis and Koch [33]. Both 
nominal and ordinal values 
are given (Table 2)
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Table 4  Classification performance of popular classifiers, employed for the task of speech emo-
tion recognition
HMM hidden Markov model, GMM Gaussian mixed model, ANN artificial neural network, SVM 
support vector machine
Classifier HMM (%) GMM (%) ANN (%) SVM (%)
Average accuracy 75.5–78.5 74.83–81.94 51.19–70 75.45–
81.29
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of speech-based emotion recognition systems. The INTERSPEECH Challenge 
demanded the strict comparability of results through the utilization of one spe-
cific speech corpus by all participants. Three sub-challenges (Open Performance, 
Classifier, and Feature) aimed at the classification of five non-prototypical emotion 
classes (anger, emphatic, neutral, positive, remainder) or two emotion classes (nega-
tive, idle).
A corpus was built using spontaneous speech data (FAU AIBO, [68]) in order 
to estimate the performance of state-of-the-art methods in real-world applica-
tion scenarios. As the evaluation measure for all challenges, the organizers chose 
an unweighted average (UA) recall. The UA recall does not take into account the 
number of items per emotion class. Thus, a high recall for just one widely repre-
sented emotion class cannot lead to a high overall recall. This allows the measure to 
remain meaningful even for datasets with highly unbalanced distributions of items 
among the classes, which must be expected. The best achieved results in the Open 
Performance sub-challenge were 70.29 % in the two-class task (negative vs. idle) and 
41.65 % UA for the five-class task (anger, emphatic, neutral, positive, remainder).
The Emotion Challenge was followed by annual INTERSPEECH events 
devoted to the detection and classification of various aspects of human traits. 
The 2010 Paralinguistic Challenge focused on the classification of age, gender 
and affect [63]. The sub-challenges of age (four different age groups) and gen-
der (female/male/children) were performed on the aGender corpus and resulted in 
53.86 % UA and 84.3 % UA, respectively. For the recognition of affect (deter-
mination of speakers’ interest) the TUM AVIC corpus was employed. The winner 
of this sub-challenge managed to achieve a cross-correlation measure of 0.146 
(cross-correlation between the annotators’ mean “Level of Interest” annotation 
ground truth and the prediction).
The Speaker State Challenge in 2011 aimed to recognize the intoxication and 
sleepiness of speakers [65]. For this purpose, organizers provided the Alcohol 
Language Corpus and Sleepy Language Corpus of genuine intoxicated and sleepy 
speech. Within the Intoxication sub-challenge speaker intoxication was deter-
mined in terms of a two-class classification problem: intoxication for a blood alco-
hol concentration exceeding 0.5 or non-intoxicated. The best achieved UA was 
70.54 %. In the Sleepiness sub-challenge, sleepiness of speakers had to be deter-
mined by a suited algorithm and acoustic features. While the annotation provides 
sleepiness in ten levels, only two classes were accordingly recognized: sleepiness 
for a level exceeding level seven or no sleepiness. The winners of the Sleepiness 
sub-challenge achieved 71.69 % UA.
In 2012, the topics of the Speaker Trait Challenge were personality, likabil-
ity, and pathology. For these tasks, the Speaker Personality Corpus, the Speaker 
Likability Database, and the NKI Concomitant Chemo Radiation Treatment 
(CCRT) Speech Corpus (NCSC) with high diversity of speakers of different per-
sonality and likability and genuine pathologies were provided. The speaker per-
sonality traits in the first corpus were measured with the popular “Big Five” 
OCEAN dimensions (openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, 
and neuroticism). The NCSC corpus provides 3 h of speech from 40 speakers 
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with head and neck cancer (tumors located in the vocal tract and larynx) recorded 
before and at various times after treatment.
The winners of the Personality sub-challenge were able to achieve 69 % mean 
UA over 5 OCEAN dimensions. In the Likability sub-challenge, the likability of a 
speaker’s voice had to be determined by a suitable learning algorithm and acous-
tic features. While the annotation provides likability in multiple levels, only two 
classes have to be recognized accordingly: likability above or below average. The 
best result achieved within the sub-challenge was 65.8 % UA. In the Pathology 
sub-challenge, the intelligibility of a speaker had to be determined by a suited 
classification algorithm and acoustic features. The winners result was 76.8 % UA.
In 2013, the INTERSPEECH Computational Paralinguistics Challenge covered 
a number of aspects, among others social signals, conflict, emotion, and autism 
[64]. From these, the last two are the most interesting within medical applications. 
Despite the recent trend towards naturalistic data in affective computing, for the 
2013 Emotion sub-challenge, the organizers introduced (for the first time) a corpus 
of acted data in order to “fuel the ever on-going discussion on differences between 
naturalistic and acted material and hope to highlight the differences”. The winners 
of the Emotion sub-challenge managed to provide 73.87 % UA for binary (posi-
tive/negative) arousal classification task, 63.26 % UA for valence classification 
and 42.29 % UA for the classification among 12 emotional categories.
In the Autism sub-challenge, the type of pathology of a speaker had to be deter-
mined from speech using acoustic features. This task comprises two subtasks: 
detecting children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) and classifying them into 
four subtypes. For this task the Child Pathological Speech Database was provided. 
The best results reported were 93.58 % UA for binary classification (ASD vs. non-
pathological development), and 69.42 % for the classification of the speakers into 
4 subtypes of ASD.
From these results, we conclude that while the state-of-the-art methods for 
affect and trait recognition are promising, they are not mature enough for wide 
usage in medical applications.
6  Summary
This chapter described the state of the art in machine emotion detection from 
speech and demonstrated some currently discussed applications in psychiatry and 
medicine. The different emotion theories and models were described and disagree-
ment between researchers concerning key terms was highlighted. However, with-
out a valid emotion theory, machines cannot be taught to detect and recognize real 
emotions. Technical deficiencies of automated emotion detection were outlined. 
The annotation process yields special difficulties. However, feature extraction and 
learning methods may also induce erroneous output. The lack of dependability due 
to different aspects in each of the three steps identified in the automated emotion 
detection from speech was also discussed.
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It is evident that ethical issues associated with the application of automated 
emotion detection methods are ignored by a majority of technical researchers. 
Reflecting on the previous sections, the propagation of the technology as mature 
for the use in medical applications, especially in the treatment and diagnosis of 
psychiatric patients, appears quite premature. We feel that several questions need 
to be addressed prior to incorporating automated emotion recognition mechanisms 
in medical applications. Although some technical researchers may consider these 
questions as negligible, ethical issues arising may have far reaching effects on our 
society and the individual. Some of the questions are:
•	 Privacy considerations
•	 Responsibility for patients and machines
•	 Objectivity of machines
The following summarizes our discussion, focusing on each of the named ques-
tions separately.
Privacy. Modern technical systems are capable of storing a tremendous amount 
of data. The recordings made are typically collected as so called “speech corpora”, 
to be used for medical or research purposes. While the individuals contributing to 
a speech corpus will have signed a contentment form and are aware of their data 
being recorded, psychiatric patients may not have this option or information.
The content of therapy sessions must be considered highly vulnerable; how-
ever, discussions on how to safely store these recordings are marginal. The use of 
“clouds” [12] to permanently store data outside of the machine in use and to allow 
the access of data through networks alarmingly contributes to the raised privacy 
issues.
To automatically detect emotions in speech, large datasets are needed, both of 
individuals and groups. Affective machines may even learn to recognize and adapt 
to speakers, however, again needing large datasets of the individual. Due to the 
nature of the methods involved, a conflict between system developers and patients 
is unavoidable.
Apart from the issue of confidentiality and access, integrity must also be guar-
anteed. If the data stored should be adjusted, exchanged or destroyed, the conse-
quences for the individual patient will be unforeseeable. It must be considered that 
the data stored may contain very detailed and confidential information about the 
individual, the individual’s family and work.
These three aspects, integrity, availability (in terms of selected availability to 
authenticated users) and confidentiality of data are generally referred to as “the 
three aspects of IT security” (for further details on computer security, see [6]). 
The design of systems guaranteeing to fulfill all three aspects, under any circum-
stances, remains an unsolved problem.
Responsibility. Under normal conditions, the patient’s physician or therapist is 
responsible for the patient’s well-being during ambulant or stationary treatment. 
If a physician decides to externalize the diagnostic or therapeutic process partially 
or completely, the responsibility for the patient would normally be transferred 
accordingly. However, currently, technical systems are not considered capable of 
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bearing responsibility for human individuals due to ethical, legal and technical 
considerations. Hence, technical (affective) systems will need to be supervised to 
be used in medical applications.
However, important questions remain: who is responsible for machine fail-
ures and who for invalid results? How are these two cases to be distinguished and 
who should decide upon this? While clear, technical system failures should be 
corrected by technicians, invalid results may be tracked back to poor classifiers, 
incomplete training data, bad annotators or less obvious failures in the technical 
set-up. It is questionable whether the physician can be made responsible for inva-
lid results of a system he neither designed nor maintained. One could argue that 
the responsible physician must monitor the system’s assessments and review each 
decision made by the system; however, doing so would complicate the physician’s 
tasks, and hence contradict the idea of utilizing affective systems to assist in the 
diagnostic process and/or treatment of patients.
Objectivity of machines. Machines are presumed to be objective. While 
tragic events in the past have led to greater awareness that objective results may 
be objective but false, it is intuitively presumed that machines do not produce 
subjective output. Subjectivity is implied as a characteristic specific to human 
consciousness. Regardless, we neglect that high level applications as affective 
computing are designed by humans, based on human annotations and therefore 
are subjective.
As discussed in Sect. 4, the annotation process is subjective, as the annota-
tor’s assessment is subjective. Hence, classifiers trained on the annotators’ 
assessment are subjective too. Interestingly, the classifiers learn the annotators’ 
subjectivity. Hence, classifiers trained with a specific socio-cultural group of 
annotators will reflect this group’s subjectivity. Although this fact may be eas-
ily derived, it is astonishing. Automated emotion detection through machines is 
no less subjective than the emotion detection through humans. In fact, machines 
may even be more subjective as they represent an abstraction of the subjective 
assessment of several individuals (see Sect. 3). Currently, there are no methods 
available to avoid this effect apart from the employment of carefully chosen and 
balanced annotator groups.
Due to the above considerations, one is confronted with the unavoidable truth 
that automated emotion detection is not objective. Hence, results achieved through 
medical machines assessing the emotional states of patients are not reliable. This 
fact leads to the conclusion that at least certain diagnoses made by automated 
emotion detection machines will be invalid. This result is widely known in the 
emotion detection research community, and the community is justifiably proud 
due to the good performances of modern classifiers (see Sect. 4.2). However, in 
medical applications, one should not consider to develop machines that categorize 
humans as “normal” or “abnormal” correctly in 70–80 % of the cases investigated. 
Especially due to the stigmatization of psychiatric disorders, a diagnostics tool 
with 30–20 % failure rate is not acceptable. The assumed objectivity of machine 
medical assessment raises genuine doubts that should be associated with the use of 
automated emotion detection methods for use in psychiatric applications.
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Due to considerations of privacy, responsibility and objectivity, as well as 
investigations of current emotion detection and classification results (see Sect. 4.2) 
it seems untimely to incorporate machines in diagnosis and therapy of psychiat-
ric patients. Thus, allowing medical machines to categorize human personalities 
and behaviors, and to interact with humans in fragile patient-physician contexts, is 
premature.
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Abstract This chapter analyzes the ethical challenges in healthcare when intro-
ducing medical machines able to understand and mimic human emotions. 
Artificial emotions is still an emergent field in artificial intelligence, so we devote 
some space in this paper in order to explain what they are and how we can have 
an machine able to recognize and mimic basic emotions. We argue that empathy 
is the key emotion in healthcare contexts. We discuss what empathy is and how 
it can be modeled to include it in a medical machine. We consider types of medi-
cal machines (telemedicine, care robots and mobile apps), and describe the main 
machines that are in use and offer some predictions about what the near future 
may bring. The main ethical problems we consider in machine medical ethics are: 
privacy violations (due to online patient databases), how to deal with error and 
responsibility concerning machine decisions and actions, social inequality (as a 
result of people being removed from an e-healthcare system), and how to build 
trust between machines, patients, and medical professionals.
1  Ethical Issues in Medical Machines
1.1  Data Privacy
Privacy is one of our key rights, and probably the one that is facing more prob-
lems under our digital revolution. Privacy is different from secretism: we shouldn’t 
think that people worried about third party access to their medical records have 
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anything to hide; they are just exercising their right to privacy. When consider-
ing how artificial intelligence (AI) based medical machines can affect patients’ pri-
vacy, there are three main situations to analyze: the development of the machine, 
the training period, and the performance.
When developing a software machine, in order to have a system which is reli-
able and based on real situations and real people, it is fair to suppose that the 
design will use data about medical conditions from hundreds, or even thousands, 
of patients. This is an example of the Big Data paradigm. Big Data involves the 
collection of sensitive information from real people and gifting it to third parties 
that are not directly related to the health system.
During the training and performance period, it is reasonable to expect that the 
AI machine will collect data about the people under its care. In training, the cen-
tral learning task is to understand more about the specific needs and even the per-
sonality of the patient it has to supervise. In the performance phase, the system 
collects health information both for a human physician that might track how the 
illness is developing in the patient and in order to improve its own performance.
Is this type of data collection safe from an ethical point of view? The answer 
is tricky. Let’s consider first one-on-one processing of private information in the 
training and performance period. The first problem to consider is how the user 
might feel when knowing he or she is under surveillance. Besides the intrinsic 
negative feeling of being watched, there is also the problem of how the patient 
may start to consider what to do and how, feeling apprehensive about what the 
people behind the project might think [1]. Besides, as stated in Reeves and Nass 
(1996), people tend to interact with software and computers as if they were real 
people, even when they know they are not. Depending on the personality of the 
patient, this may be helpful in order to comply with a doctor’s orders, but it can 
also backfire.
When considering how the AI machine is developed, we enter the territory of 
Big Data. According to the McKinsey Report on Big Data [2], we can loosely 
define “big data” as a series of related technologies that can analyze datasets 
“whose size is beyond the ability of typical database software tools to capture, 
store, manage, and analyze.” The idea is to put together dozens, even hundreds of 
different variables, and look for correlations and patterns in an automatic way. Big 
Data can have many different applications, from national security to stock markets 
and, of course, to health issues as well.
When considering relationships between Big Data and health, the question of 
privacy inevitably rises. A fundamental question is: Who is going to accept a third-
party database which can store highly personal and distressing information about 
mental disorders, child abuse or sexually transmitted diseases? The usual answer 
is to point out that third-party researchers are not interested in the user name or 
address. But the problem remains.
Let’s say that a person’s username is: “11100AAAK”. How can we assure 
that no-one will be able to check that database and find out the real identity of 
11100AAAK? The conventional solution is to “anonymize” the data, remov-
ing identifying characteristics such as name, residential address and telephone 
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number, from the medical database. That way the researchers have all the rele-
vant information, but no personal information which could help to re-identify the 
patient. But this protective measure does not resolve the fundamental ethical prob-
lem described above. In order to make the research relevant, one needs some back-
ground information about the people in the database, like the neighborhood they 
live, their race, whether they have a university degree, and so on.
In the mid-nineties, the state of Massachusetts decided to release “anonymized” 
data of all hospital visits of public workers. The then Governor William Weld 
stated in a press conference that the privacy of the data was assured. Privacy 
researcher Latanya Sweeney got a copy of that data, filtered it using the voting 
census and was able, among other things, to locate records of the hospital visits 
of Governor Weld himself [3]. Later, Sweeney was able to demonstrate [4] that up 
to 87 % of Americans can be associated with their hospital records even if name, 
address, and other identifying information are removed from the registry, but date 
of birth, zip code, and census are not.
Another approach is called “differential privacy” in which researchers make 
queries against a “statistical database”. Between the user and the original database 
there is a randomized algorithm which is supposed to assure that private informa-
tion is no longer available. However, recent research points out that this system is 
unreliable. According to Bambauer et al. [5], either you obtain erroneous research 
results or unnecessary privacy protections (because there is too much complexity).
There is also the question of disclosure: What if computer criminals or unscrupu-
lous detectives attack a research database to find sensitive information about possible 
new victims for blackmailing or scams? Related to disclosure we should also con-
sider the lack of transparency problem: we know that hundreds of thousands of data 
points about us are being taken every day, which are used to make all sorts of deci-
sions on health plans, and maybe, if they leaked to third parties, about getting life 
insurance or a new job. However, we don’t know exactly what these data are, or who 
has access to them. Wu [1] also indicates the problem of discrimination: how people 
might be treated differently depending on the type of data we have about them. We’ll 
discuss these problems in the section devoted to social inequality.
1.2  Error and Responsibility
Machines fail: early morning, the toaster burns the slice of bread, the Arianne 5 
rocket explodes 40 s after initial flight sequence (due to software error caused dur-
ing execution of data conversion from 64-bit floating point to 16-bit signed integer 
value), your car isn’t starting, missiles hit the wrong place,1 mobile phones 
1
 For a list of important big software bugs, see WIRED paper at: http://www.wired.com/
software/coolapps/news/2005/11/69355?currentPage=all. For engineering errors, see Henry 
Petrosky: To Engineer Is Human: The Role of Failure in Successful Design (1992); Design 
Paradigms: Case Histories of Error and Judgment in Engineering (1994); To Forgive Design: 
Understanding Failure (2012).
344 J. Vallverdú and D. Casacuberta
 collapse, and so on. Such machine malfunctions are very common, because attri-
tion and complexity affects machines. In some special cases, like planes, trains or 
weapons, these errors are highly supervised, and precise protocols have been 
designed to control or minimize them.
Until very recently, the only robots or machines that could be involved in 
healthcare procedures were those in science fiction movies or books, and conse-
quently this question was not a priority. Certainly, nowadays there are some clas-
sic technologies, like artificial organs (“classic” artificial hearts like Syncardia or 
more modern artificial hearts without pulse as made by doctors Bud Frazier and 
Billy Cohn), cochlear implants, advanced prostheses, and many others artificial 
devices that have a direct impact on human health. But we intend to discuss a dif-
ferent technology: intelligent autonomous machines (IAMs) that make independ-
ent decisions concerning human health. By the virtue of this capacity, they can 
also inflict harm. Three serious problems arise from this technology: first, can we 
trust them? Secondly, who is responsible for their functioning? Finally, due to the 
complexity of medical decisions, can they show moral responsibility?
Two questions should be immediately asked about such intelligent autonomous 
robots and responsibility:
•	 Are robots autonomous agents responsible for their acts? (in the same way that 
a human is, neglecting the fact that human actions occur in social environments 
and that responsibility is distributed among a hierarchy of subjects)
•	 Is the company that produced the robot responsible for its actions?
Clearly, robots belong to the second situation; they are quasi-agents, and their pro-
ducers are responsible for their correct functioning, under normal conditions. The 
level of malfunctioning (e.g., software problems, mechanical disturbances, incor-
rectly implemented modeling processes) can be traced and ascribed to several 
sources, always external (from an identity perspective).
1.3  Social Inequality (Rich vs. Poor in E-Health Access)
When considering the ethical implications of IAMs, another key issue is the digital 
divide. Most research concerned with the digital divide tends to focus on the issue 
of access: Whether you can get your hands on a computer or not. Unfortunately, the 
ultimate beneficiary being targeted is all too often ill-defined. Generally, they are of 
two types: either disabled individuals, or individuals without digital literacy skills 
[6]. The blanket approach taken for all these groups is to organize practical courses 
wherein these diverse individuals are taught how to surf the net, e-mail, and so on.
However, mental barriers are as important as simple access. Giving people a 
computer and an internet connection is not enough to help them to use digital tech-
nologies in a profitable way, especially in health contexts. Major causal factors of 
marginalization from the information society are those such as mistrust often felt 
towards new technologies and the lack of any content attractive or useful to either 
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the socially excluded or those at risk of being so. Instead, we should consider an 
approach based on empowerment [6, 7].
We propose that what is important is not merely knowing how to use, for 
instance, a web browser or email, but rather the educational and liberating potential 
of new technologies. Slowly, we are advancing, but still, we can see big differences 
regarding who is using e-health and who isn’t. For example, in a recent paper, [8] 
showed that when using a portal to help people with diabetes, having access to com-
puter was not the main relevant element, but mental barriers on how to use comput-
ers for empowerment. According to the authors: “those most at risk for poor diabetes 
outcomes may fall further behind as health systems increasingly rely on the internet 
and limit current modes of access and communication” [8, p. 321].
When we consider the intersection between digital exclusion and Big Data, the 
divide grows thicker. IAMs are going to be developed and trained using databases 
obtained with big data methods. So, only data from computer savvy users will be 
considered, thereby excluding people that do not use social networks. According 
to Lerman [9], “Billions of people worldwide remain on big data’s periphery. 
Their information is not regularly collected or analyzed, because they do not rou-
tinely engage in activities that big data is designed to capture. Consequently, their 
preferences and needs risk being routinely ignored” [9, p. 60]. The exclusion prob-
lem also links to an epistemological problem: if relevant people are left out of the 
study, then the analysis will be based on data which could well be partial, or in the 
worst case scenario, plain wrong.
What should be done? The benefits obtainable from big data and e-health are 
many. However, while big data is open to abuse and misuse, the benefits clearly out-
number possible harms. Following Polonetsky and Tene (2013), we ought to view 
the problem of big data not from a Kantian perspective, based on unconditional rules 
or maxims, but more from a consequentialist point of view, considering generic ben-
efits and harms. Polonetsky and Tene (2013) use a more economical approach, based 
on utility, and point out that one can see benefits for the individual (e.g., individu-
als in idiosyncratic conditions will benefit from massive studies producing big data, 
which will include other people like them and help to find common patterns to be 
cured), specific communities, and organizations which generate economic benefits 
from the research, and finally society as a whole.
However, it is important to build machines that generate trust; otherwise, benefits 
to human beings will not obtain. A patient is not going to give her doctor personal 
information if she thinks that is going to be stored in an online database open to 
unknown third-parties [10]. We certainly need to consider our human rights regime 
while analyzing the effect of digital technologies on our privacy. However, there is 
no need to create new rights as some people like Barlow [11], Hayles [12] or Gray 
[13] argue. Following Casacuberta and Senges [14], we only need to consider some 
inarticulate elements which are either missing or overdeveloped.
What type of right is privacy? Our proposal is that if privacy is moved from the 
real world to the Internet we may thereby neglect something essential and impor-
tant. Because most rights depend on context, we can evaluate a right only as long 
as we consider its context. In life before the Internet, context was so ubiquitous 
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that it was taken for granted. Perry [15] defines this context as an “inarticulate ele-
ment”: some essential information doesn’t manifest directly in communication 
because it is tacitly assumed by the conversants.
A common example is time zones. Most of our communications share a com-
mon space, friends and family that are close by, so when arranging a meeting we 
don’t specify the time zone. However, if we are talking to people abroad, and want 
to arrange an intercontinental chat via Skype, we need to specify the typically 
unarticulated element of time zone.
Similarly, when we talk about privacy in online databases and AI machines, we 
have to consider the inarticulate elements that surround our everyday conversa-
tions about privacy. Following Casacuberta and Senges [14], these are the relevant 
elements:
1. How is identification achieved? Anonymity is the default in the real world, but 
identification is the norm in cyberspace, and we need to create strong controls 
and procedures to generate anonymity.
2. Who is listening? In the real world, usually no one. So we don’t use cryptogra-
phy to talk to our spouse at home. In the digital world, it is not only that anyone 
could be listening; it is the fact that we are leaving foot-prints whenever we 
write or click online.
3. What is the object to be protected? In a world without big online databases a 
researcher that obtains a de-identified bunch of records which include some embar-
rassing illness about us could not find out who are we. The work of Latanya 
Sweeney has proven that this unarticulated element doesn’t hold in cyberspace.
So, contrary to Brin [16], the main reason we believe that privacy is obsolete is 
not technology per se, but that the traditional conditions no longer hold. Simply 
because they are inarticulate makes this fact difficult to realize. But we have to be 
very conscious of such inarticulate elements when creating e-health apps or auton-
omous AI agents.
1.4  Machine Cheating as Blind Affective Computing?
When computational devices were first implemented, there emerged a natural 
worry: should these machines interact emotionally with their users? If humans 
are social as well as emotionally wired, machines with the skill to show some of 
these properties would be welcome by their human users and, therefore, their task 
performance would improve. This was the beginning of the affective computing 
research program [17]. Since then, huge progress has been achieved in the field. 
In most cases, the idea was that machines should be able to detect and recognize 
human emotional states and provide good (and convincing) feedback, thus creat-
ing a satisfactory interactive framework. This means that computers (or robots in 
the case of Human-Robot Interaction, HRI) show emotional activity. But do they 
really have emotional architectures or just convincingly mimic emotional actions?
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We do not affirm that machines must feel the emotions they perform; instead, 
we claim that machine emotional responses must follow or accord with a human-
like emotional structure. For example, we don’t change continuously from panic 
to joy in 1 ms. At the same time, we need to keep in mind that the principle that 
governs human emotion is empathy. This makes it possible for human beings to 
understand what is happening to other human beings and, in some cases (socially/
culturally/personally mediated), to react to such cases. The best affective machines 
should be able not only to understand human states, but also to drive their behav-
ior through this emotional syntax and semantics. By “human emotional seman-
tics”, we mean the channels by which emotions are meaningfully expressed (eye 
gaze, body movements, voice tone, heart rate, facial expressions), and by “human 
emotional syntax”, we refer to the dynamics of change among emotions.
It could be argued against us that this suggestion takes us back to the symbol-sys-
tem hypothesis paradigm of AI (GOFAI), just applied to emotion, and that embodied 
robotics or behavior-based robotics (like the hat of Rodney Brooks, pioneer of the field, 
or Rolf Pfeiffer, today) is therefore neglected. But this is not true: we are defending 
machine-software architectures in which emotional architectures are embedded to natu-
rally guide the system according to the natural interaction with humans (if they do not 
modify their usual ways to do things). Following Vallverdú [18]:
Emotions cannot be something that should be embedded into a pre-existing artificial 
device, but they must be embodied into them. Emotions are at the same time the own 
body and the informational process of the body sensors. Our bodily structure makes us 
feel the world under a specific meaning route, the emotional one. Embodying emotions, 
that is the real task, horizon and goal of the whole research field. At the end, we need 
to create feeling machines. Yes, machine learning, integration of perceptive data, data 
categorization, action and goal selection or communication among agents, among oth-
ers, are very important and unsolved problems of contemporary AI. Because it is impos-
sible to solving the whole problem of human cognition, we’ve fragmented it into small 
pieces, made it more tractable, trying to achieve easier solutions to them. And this is 
the actual situation of AI research, necessary but unsatisfactory. The convergence of all 
these fields led to the artificial conscious existence, something for which will be abso-
lutely necessary for synthetic emotions [18, p. 4].
So, a second wave of affective computing innovation is necessary, one that inte-
grates human emotional architectures into their basic design and, thus, can offer a 
richer and deeper interaction with humans.
1.5  Trust in E-Health Autonomous or Semi-Supervised 
Systems
One of the hottest topics in the field of human-machine interaction is the issue about 
the responsibility of autonomous machines during shared activities. Must robots, 
machines or software with several degrees of autonomy (supervised or not unsuper-
vised) be held responsible for possible errors? Who is in charge of their functioning?
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There is an additional problem that must be faced: which mechanisms medi-
ate the trust and confidence between humans and IAMs? Due to the vast range of 
possible e-health and care robotic platforms and designs, it is difficult to define a 
unique scenario or answer, but it can be stated that emotional aspects are deeply 
involved in this process. Several emotions are involved in a medical procedure, at 
least for patients:
•	 Fear of procedures and possible pain (by techniques, tests) or unknown 
consequences
•	 Trust/distrust of medical personnel
•	 Insecurity about a situation that cannot be controlled or understood
•	 Anxiety about medical privacy and the perception of others of the “new (ill) 
self”
•	 Compassion towards others suffering or fear
•	 Tenderness towards other affected persons
•	 Shame about feeling oneself unhealthy or non-autonomous
•	 Embarrassment for being helped in “private” activities (e.g., bathing2).
We can even make a more surprising statement: the same emotion in the same 
medical circumstance is shown differently by different people. Not only by 
the degree of the intensity (from apprehension to fear and later to panic or ter-
ror), but also by the control and modulation of the emotion itself. For example, 
Zborowski [19] demonstrated that pain symptomatic of the same illness was pro-
cessed very differently by patients according their belonging to a cultural com-
munity within the USA (italo-American, old-American, Irish-American, Jews). 
Zborowski showed that older adult Americans were generally “stronger” (they 
did not publicly show their pain reactions) and had a greater tendency to avoid 
social contact when experiencing pain, compared with the others. Personal feel-
ings are not only biologically hardwired, but also culturally determined. Risk 
perception and understanding of scientific procedures is again a cultural pro-
cess that assumes different values at several niches in which we can study it. 
Armstrong et al. [20] found significant results with racial/ethnic differences 
in physician distrust in the United States. In univariate analyses, Blacks and 
Hispanics reported higher levels of physician distrust than did Whites. However, 
multivariate analyses suggested a complex interaction among socio-demographic 
variables, city of residence, race/ethnicity, and distrust of physician. This also 
forewarns us towards data analysis models and the inferences we can obtain 
from them.
Consequently, we need to consider the crucial role of emotions in medical prac-
tice and the necessity of creating empathic bonds between doctor/care-robots and 
human patients. Empathy is an emotion that one of us has studied in HRI situ-
ations and preliminary results offer good encouragement to this field: empathic 
2
 Cody robot has been partially designed to avoid this and to help nurses. See: 
http://www.coe.gatech.edu/content/robotic-cody-learns-bathe.
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predisposition towards robots can be easily created if there is good previous work 
with their human users [21]. This prone-to-empathy attitude depends on two main 
variables:
(a) psychological perception of the machine, and
(b) physical shape and signals (sound, color, temperature, movement) of the 
robot.
The first condition depends on how a person projects his empathy towards an 
external object different from self; it is closer to a mental construction than 
to a real interaction, and may have a strong neural correlate. Recent studies 
have correlated the apparently neural basis of learning by mirror neurons [22, 
23] and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) has been intensively 
employed to investigate the functional anatomy of empathy (for reviews, see 
[24–26, 27]).
Recently, some research has addressed the neural correlates of empathy with 
robots (e.g., [28]). Empathy is a fundamental trigger of emotional attitudes and 
responses, contributing towards understanding of others and, thus, facilitating 
learning by imitation (not only gesture learning, but also social learning).
The emotional basis of empathy makes possible self-learning by imita-
tion. Therefore, if we want to create better and smarter intelligent autonomous 
machines, we must put emotions into them, because emotions are the basic lan-
guage among human beings. If emotional interaction is basic for social human 
activities, then any robot study that implies an interaction between the robot and 
humans must take empathy into account [21].
The second condition stipulates cultural influence, and is relevant to the con-
struction and design of the robots. When considering human-robot interaction 
we are considering the interaction of two physical bodies (natural and machine, 
respectively). In Mori (1970), Masahiro Mori introduced the notion of uncanny 
valley in his discussion of human emotional responses to robots (“Bukimi No 
Tani”, translated as “The Uncanny Valley”). Mori found that human comfort 
with a robot increases until it very closely resembles the human shape. At this 
point, humans report a strong feeling to reject the robot. In this sense, a human-
oid can be seen as “nice” or “creepy” according to its design, but human-like 
performance is not always welcome by humans. For example, the Geminoids 
of Hiroshi Ishiguro can be seen as unconvincing bad copies, or as true humans 
according to the kind of action they perform. Subtle robot details such as eye-
gaze, head and neck movements, tongue presence (or not), lip formation, natu-
ral eye blinking can make human users react more positively to the machine. 
Less human-like but still comfortable robot designs can avoid these problems 
(Mori 1970).
There is one last question to ask: cultural attitudes towards robots also change 
[29, 30], although the conceptual design is the same for eastern and Western 
robotic experts [31]. Care-robotics companies will have to take in account not only 
how to construct their robots, but also how to introduce their products into the 
market.
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2  Technical Aspects of Medical Machines
2.1  Existing Health Machines: An Overall Taxonomy
From the European Commission on Robotics for Healthcare,3 we can extract and 
map basic medical machines, summarized in 6 subfields: (a) Smart medical cap-
sules, (b) Robotized surgery, (c) Intelligent prosthetics, (d) Robotized motor coor-
dination analysis and therapy, (e) Robot-assisted mental, cognitive and social 
therapy (f) Robotized patient monitoring systems.
Currently, there are several companies and university laboratories devoted to 
healthcare robotics: Argo Medical Technology, Cyberdyne, Ekso Bionics, Hansen 
Medical, Hocoma, Intuitive Surgical, iWalk, Kinea Design, MAKO Surgical, 
Mazor Robotics, Motion Control Inc., Myomo, Ossur, Otto Bock Healthcare, 
Parker/Hannifin, Rex Bionics, RLS Steeper, SPRINT, Tibion, Tital Medical. Touch 
Bionics, Victhom Human Bionics, among others. Most of them are Japanese or 
American. Surely, their number will increase in the next decades because the eco-
nomic benefits of their implementation in wealthy first-world countries will be 
huge, and even more in an increasingly aged population.4 Artificial organs, exo-
skeletons, care robots, surgical training robots, telepresence robots (iRobot: telep-
resence robot RP-Vita,5 VGo Pediatric telepresence,6 Fraunhofer institute: 
Care-O-Bot, Double robotics and his double telepresence robot7) and other 
machines (as therapeutic pets like PARO8) are increasingly being produced and 
implemented into health services. Several organizations have been formed, such as 
the International society of Medical robotics) or the Minimally Invasive Robotic 
Association), among others. Specialized medical robotics departments have been 
created all around the world. This research field is young, but strong, despite some 
recent chirurgical problems with a Vinci robot surveyed by FDA (November 
2013).9
This is the result of the growth of power and utility of these machines as well as 
to the advances held in computer sciences that led in 1986 to the creation of The 
Society for Artificial Intelligence in Medicine (AIME), established with two main 
3
 http://rehacare.messe-dus.co.jp/fileadmin/files/EuropCommission_ny_robotics_for_
healthcare.pdf
4
 See http://www.worldrobotics.org/uploads/media/Executive_Summary_WR_2013.pdf; http://
www.roboticsbusinessreview.com/research/report/outlook_for_health_care_robotics_for_2013. 
The European project SILVER is another good example of deep investment in this direction 
(www.silverpcp.eu).
5
 http://www.irobot.com/us/learn/commercial/rpvita.aspx
6
 http://www.vgocom.com/health-it-promises-new-paradigm-patient-care
7
 http://www.doublerobotics.com/. The 2009 Hollywood film “Surrogates” is not so far from this 
robot implementation, except for the grade of human likeness of the service robots.
8
 http://www.parorobots.com/
9
 http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/ProductsandMedicalProcedures/SurgeryandLif
eSupport/ComputerAssistedRoboticSurgicalSystems/UCM374095.pdf 
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goals: (a) to foster fundamental and applied research in the application of Artificial 
Intelligence (AI) techniques to medical care and medical research, and (b) to pro-
vide a forum for reporting significant results achieved at biennial conferences.
2.2  Future Devices
2.2.1  Apps for Mobile Apps and E-Health
The potential for mobile apps within the health context is enormous. There are 
already 96,000 health apps in the market, from fitness tracking to weight loss 
motivator programs or support networks. Prospective studies report a market for 
mobile apps on e-health valued around US$26 billion by 2017 [32]. Both present 
and future apps can be used in many different contexts and situations, which we 
can roughly organized as follows:
1. Assessment of patient health by use of sensors.
2. Storage of patient health states in a database, for further use by a medical team 
or the patient.
3. Real time prediction: 24 h monitoring to make a diagnosis and propose a 
remedy.
4. Offline prediction: same as (3) but the AI machine doesn’t use currently avail-
able data, but also all the data about the patient that has been stored on a 
database.
5. Epidemiological studies using data gathered by smart phones of thousands of people.
6. Research procedures. Any of the items above, used as research tools.
Why are mobile apps so relevant in medicine? There are several reasons. First, 
portability, as we carry our cell phones everywhere. Also consider the 6.8 billion 
people connected with a mobile subscription worldwide (MobiThinking 2013). 
Those gigantic numbers are relevant for both research projects (like epidemiologic 
studies) as well as for peer to peer networks. According to Fox [33], 23 % of peo-
ple with chronic illness use social networks to find other patients with a similar 
sickness in order to get help and support from them.
Nevertheless, the key element is how the latest generation of smart phones 
which incorporate sensors: microphones, cameras, accelerometers and location 
detectors, among others, which can be hacked for medical purposes. For example, 
a camera to report online dermatologic problems, or microphones to analyze how 
a person is breathing. Sensors are important, as doctors tend to be cautious about 
oral or written reports delivered by patients [34]. However, according to Topol 
[35], if the system is automatic and generated by reliable and trustworthy sensors 
and algorithms, doctor worries may diminish.
Here are some examples. ginger.io is an app designed at the MIT which gath-
ers medical data from thousands of students and analyses its relevance in order to 
create a more inclusive “walls free” healthcare system. Using Big Data techniques, 
352 J. Vallverdú and D. Casacuberta
the app searches for behavior patterns to assess the patient’s condition and sends 
an alert to a clinician if necessary [34]. Following the Big Data approach, the 
journal Science published a paper [36] describing how in tracking cell phone data 
from 15 million people in Kenya, they were able to discover relevant facts on how 
traveling patterns contribute to the spreading of malaria.
But probably the Holy Grail is a tricoder, which includes specific sensors and 
software to rapidly diagnose a disease, without relying on a doctor or a nurse. A 
current example of such a tricoder device is Scanadu, a hand-held unit that com-
municates with the smartphone and sends information about blood oxygenation, 
pulse transit or heart rate [37]. Such devices could be of great importance in Third 
World countries, where a great deal of people live in rural areas and might be very 
far away from hospitals. Also, the fact that there are a lot less doctors and nurses 
there: around two doctors per 10,000 people in Africa [38].
Other apps base their efficiency on reducing costs. Adding a specifically 
designed sensor to a mobile phone helps to bring costs down. For example, there 
is an attachment for the mobile phone called CellScope which converts it into a 
microscope. In medicine, CellScope is used to look for pathogens or for retinal 
scans and there are fifteen prototypes tested in Vietnam clinics [39]. Also, there 
is MobiSante, which has designed a specific device to turn a smartphone into an 
ultrasound probe that generates high resolution images, costing only US$7,500, 
just a fraction of the price of a conventional ultrasound [40].
2.2.2  Making Apps Privacy Friendly
Following Oram [41], we recommend app developers consider the following in 
order to make their apps better suited to protect customer privacy.
1. Downloadable data will make users trust the system more, knowing what 
exactly the app is recording about them. It can also help them to reflect on their 
own health situation a little better.
2. Let the patient know to whom you are delivering the data. Patients don’t like 
their data to be sent to third parties, especially for market research purposes, 
even if it has been anonymized.
3. If giving data to third parties is inevitable, allow the patient to opt out of reveal-
ing particular items, like hiding information about former mental illness or 
sexually transmitted diseases. This is called data segmentation, and makes app 
design and development a little more complex, but will increase the trust of the 
patients using it.
4. Easy navigable interfaces, especially for the data segmentation processes. If the 
patients don’t clearly see which information is in and which is out, they won’t 
trust the app.
5. Encrypt data, because encrypted data is everywhere. Hacking is common these 
days, and no operative system or app is free of exploitable bugs. The app may 
be a little slower, but it is a lot more trustable.
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2.2.3  Telemedicine and Care Robotics
Although hardware and software systems are widely researched and have even 
achieved industrial production, this is a field in which the first big wave of 
implementation has still not occurred. Organizations like the ATA (American 
Telemedicine Association) have made serious investments into these new ways of 
performing telemedicine. The investment has resulted in new fields:
1. Remote Monitoring and Home Telehealth Systems.
2. Mobile Health (mHealth). Wireless technology, smart phones and health apps 
that are making healthcare a mobile 24/7 service. ATA 2013 hosts the leading 
mHealth companies, showcasing new hardware and infrastructure for mobile 
health, along with the next big “killer apps.”
3. Outsourced Clinical Service Providers.
4. Videoconferencing. Hardware, software and infrastructure for real-time video 
calls and telepresentating.
5. Health Information Technology. HIT achieves true “meaningful use” when it is 
used with telemedicine to deliver quality healthcare.
6. Teleradiology. Off-site solutions for 24/7 radiological consultations. The ATA 
2013 trade show has multiple exhibitors providing teleradiological services.
7. Hardware, Software and Equipment. Everything needed to do telemedicine, in 
one huge showroom.
Consequently, any university making significant investment in robotics has 
research labs working on healthcare robotics. Private companies, frequently spin-
offs from university labs, are also producing this new wave of assistance robots. In 
the USA, the NSF has created a joint project of leading universities called 
“Socially Assistive Robotics”, which aims to create fundamental computational 
techniques that enable the design, implementation, and evaluation of robots that 
encourage social, emotional and cognitive growth in children, including those with 
social or cognitive deficits. At the same time, “first-world” societies (especially 
Japan) are aging, and care or industrial robotics are regarded as necessary. 
According to Iida,10 the number of Japanese aged 65 or above is expected to jump 
by around 7.09 million between 2010 and 2025, when they will account for 30 % 
of the overall population, up from 23 % in the base year. Consequently, some 2.32 
million to 2.44 million caregivers will be required to look after them, up more than 
1.5 times from the 2010 level.
But the elder care sector has a high job turnover rate, partly due to low pay. In 
addition, about 70 % of elder caregivers are said to experience back pains due to 
constantly lifting elderly between beds and wheelchairs as well as helping them 
take baths and perform other daily activities. Back pain could be solved if caretak-
ers were using exoskeletons as well as assistant robots to help into their tasks.
10
 http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/06/19/national/robot-niche-expands-in-senior- 
care/#.Ul-YONLIXwk
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Taking statistics from the International Federation of Robotics,11 and consider-
ing that since 2007 an ISO working group is still revising the ISO 8373 which 
finally will include an official definition of service robots (this definition is still not 
clear but is generally accepted), the number of such robots is increasing, although 
not as much as industrial robots. This is a trend that will only increase, demanding 
special emotional studies of HRI.
3  Emotions, Humans and Care Machines
3.1  How Does Mammalian Empathy Work?
In this third and final section we want to argue why empathy is the most signifi-
cant emotion IAMs in medicine can have. According to Waal and Thompson [42], 
we can view empathy as an emotion that includes the ability to connect with oth-
ers and to become affected by their emotions. This affection can be behavioral, 
emotional and cognitive. To have empathy is not black or white. Following Waal 
and Thompson [42] we can distinguish four levels of empathy: motor contagion, 
imaginative transposition, perspective taking and moral empathy. Motor contagion 
is based on visual cues from gestures and auditory experiences. It is a basic, prob-
ably hardwired mechanism. Imaginative transposition is what we commonly call 
“to put oneself in someone else’s shoes to feel like that person”. In perspective-
taking, our thoughts and beliefs process how the other person may see a situation 
and what view she has of us. Finally, moral empathy implies viewing the person as 
a moral agent, a sentient being that has the capacity to feel and suffer.
The first level is already amendable by means of pattern recognition algorithms 
which would allow an autonomous agent to recognize the patient emotional state 
by means of a camera and/or microphone [43, 44]. New eHealth working environ-
ments ask for new competencies required by healthcare professionals working in 
home care, with eHealth technologies such as remote telecare and ambient assisted 
living (AAL), mobile health, and fall detection systems. The second empathy level 
implies basic reasoning, based on the general context of the patient to understand 
feelings by means of transposition. The third level adds to the system folk psy-
chology [45] so it can reinterpret patient psychological states by means of an 
expert system that is able to reason within the context of beliefs, desires, plans and 
motivations [46]. The third and fourth levels are more elaborate, and imply still 
unsolved problems in the field of artificial intelligence.12 We can expect that as AI 
evolves and more accurate and powerful machine models of emotions develop, the 
third and fourth levels will also be achievable in the future by machines.
In order to have empathy in medical contexts four components are required: 
affective sharing based on perception-action coupling, self-other awareness, mental 
11
 http://www.ifr.org/industrial-robots/statistics/
12
 See the 2012 official report http://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/final_report_building_ 
better_consumer_ehealth.pdf.
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flexibility to adopt other people’s perspective, and emotion regulation. Posture is 
also important in generating emotions and empathy, according to Niedenthal [47]. 
Besides affecting our own emotions, our body posture informs to our close interact-
ing persons about our feelings, so it would be very important for autonomous AI 
agents both to present postures that generate good mood (if they are anthropomor-
phic) and, more importantly, to recognize such postures as indicators of how one is 
feeling.13 For example, depression makes people adopt poor posture, angling the 
body away from others and performing anxious behaviours, like tightly crossing the 
arms. Cultural differences among tele-patient population should also be analyzed.14 
Imitation of body behaviour is also central in understanding empathy. Again, follow-
ing Waal and Thompson [42], emotional expressions and gestures are visibly imi-
tated by observers and this imitation is accompanied by self-reports of associated 
emotional states. When emotional gestures are properly imitated, there is a strong 
foundation for empathy. This has been experimentally tested by artist and scientist 
Naoko Tosa in her projects Neurobaby [48] and Unconscious Flow [49]. Neurobaby 
was one of the first projects to study emotional expressions synthetically using a 
small baby. Unconscious Flow translated empathic expressions to a virtual world in 
which two images of moving sirens were projected, expressed in movement emo-
tions human users were reluctant to show.
3.2  Studies on Robot Empathy
Several studies have tried to analyze possible empathy relationships between 
humans and robots (from humans to robots, to be precise). Many of these studies 
have been published in the field of HRI and have illuminated different areas of the 
study, as follows below.
3.2.1  Empathy and Robotic Anthropomorphism
Although humans easily empathically bond to entities like pets, tools, buildings or sym-
bolic objects, basic empathic relationships are created among humans. Friedman et 
al. [50] found that owners projected towards AIBO robots conceptions of technologi-
cal essences (75 %), life-like essences (49 %), mental states (60 %), and social rapport 
(59 %). However, participants seldom attributed moral standing to AIBO (e.g., that 
13
 This would follow normal psychological rules implemented In normal health systems. 
See for example official guides like: http://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/Medicare-
Learning-Network-MLN/MLNProducts/Downloads/Communicating_With_Patients_Fact-_
Sheet_ICN908063.pdf or http://www.rcpsych.ac.uk/files/pdfversion/cr108.pdf.
14
 For example, the University of Washington, Medical Central provides several examples fol-
lowing this special necessity: with Korean patients see http://depts.washington.edu/pfes/PDFs/Ko
reanCultureClue.pdf, http://depts.washington.edu/pfes/PDFs/DeafCultureClue.pdf. They also call 
them ‘cultural clues’ http://depts.washington.edu/pfes/CultureClues.htm.
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AIBO deserved respect, had rights, or could be held morally accountable for action) 
[50]. This is not strange: humans make the same ascriptions to real dogs or cats. This 
is the evolutionary meaning of empathy: human imitation. The other uses emerged as 
extended ways to apply empathy in the same way that language evolved from mere alert 
sounds to an artificial way to tag the world with concepts. Nevertheless, humans look 
more comfortable with anthropomorphic objects (if not under Uncanny valley effect) 
[51]. But even in this case, that is, of accepting anthropomorphization [52], there is no 
agreement on which elements are necessary to make it possible: body gestures, size, 
sounds, temperature, or facial emotions? Some studies from a neuroanthropological 
perspective (e.g., [53]) provide a richer framework from which to approach anthropo-
morphic robots. Pereira et al. [54] and Tapus and Mataric [55] also use empathy as a 
way to improve HRI, making possible “friendships” between machines and robots.
3.2.2  Military Robots
Carpenter [56] interviewed multiple soldiers based in the Explosive Ordenance 
Disposal Unit about their work operating robots that diffuse or locate bombs. These 
operators often talked to their robots, occasionally gave then names and/or wrote on 
their chasses. It is not so strange: during World War Two, pilots painted their planes 
and baptized them with a last list of names (usually of girl-friends or pin-ups). This 
military practice is called “nose-up.” When the robots were disabled beyond repair, 
they felt “anger, frustration and sadness for a sense of loss”. Again, the robots were 
often named after a girlfriend or wife. Robots (most of them PackBot or TALON 
models) and humans posed together in photos and a mock funeral was even per-
formed for a destroyed robot. Some new studies are being performed because emo-
tional bonds between machines and soldiers are not useful in combat areas: if these 
machines are just pieces of iron, human morale is not affected by robot loses, but if 
some empathic relationship has been established between human soldiers and mili-
tary robots, then the initial psychological advantage disappears. At the same time, 
not only are robots cheaper if you consider humans costs throughout the processes 
of recruitment, training, deployment costs, care services in case of injuries, but they 
are also free from social worries (human casualties in war appear every day at TV 
news and mass media, and social networks). Thus, extended anthropomorphization 
is a clear problem for basic military robotic purposes.
3.2.3  Neuroscience and Psychology
In the first fMRI study on how humans express empathy for a robot (a tortured and 
vexed Pleo-toy dinosaur-robot), Rosenthal-von der Pütten [57]15 conclude: “One lim-
itation of the study is that we used videos in our experiment and that participants saw 
15
 The official video is here: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wAVtkh0mL20&feature=player_ 
detailpage.
357Ethical and Technical Aspects of Emotions …
potentially fictional material. Perhaps reactions would have been different if the torture 
of Pleo had been performed live in front of the participants. Moreover, the robot’s shape 
is also rather fictional as dinosaurs are not part of our daily experiences. Participants 
might react more strongly to a robot with a humanoid shape” [57, p. 30]. Other studies 
have focused on anthropomorphic variables of robots design [58].
3.2.4  HRI and Emotions
Vallverdú et al. [21] investigated the induction of empathy towards robots in 
humans. The study performed an experiment in a WOZ16 environment in which 
different subjects (n = 17) interacted with the same robot but believing that it was 
a different version for each group of participants. The main hypothesis of the study 
was to elucidate if empathic responses could be modeled in humans in HRI. 
Results were obtained from questionnaires and multi-angle video recordings. The 
results of Vallverdú et al. [21] tended to be homogeneously distributed within each 
Scenario Group, with evident differences among Scenarios. This reinforces the ini-
tial hypothesis: HRI empathy can be modeled in human beings merely by creating 
an empathetic (and fake) atmosphere with the robot. Becker-Asano et al. [60] have 
also started to work in this area with different emotions (fear, pain, sadness, sur-
prise) and also emotion behaviors like laughter.
3.3  Detecting and Interacting with Emotions: The 
Emocibernetic Loop
In the section above about apps, we introduced the idea to gather data about 
the patient using several sensors which inform about key personal health data. 
Most of those sensors can be used to establish emotional patterns in the patient. 
Microphones are helpful in detecting emotions in patients, by measuring breath 
rhythm; there are skin conductivity sensors (popularly known as “lie detectors”) 
and sensors to measure cardiac variables. Thus, one can have an approximate idea 
of the type of emotion a person is feeling, especially whether it is a positive or 
negative one.
Since Ekman et al. [61] we know that there are specific arousal patterns for 
each of the 6 basic emotions he described and considered universal across all 
cultures (anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness and surprise), and with the 
proper sensors, you can distinguish between them in a reliable form [62–64]. 
Facial expressions are also fundamental for the correct interpretation of emotions. 
16
 WOZ (Wizard of OZ) experiments are experiments with teleoperated robots. I performed 
some of these experiments at the Nishidalab Kyoto University, http://www.aaai.org/Papers/
Workshops/2007/WS-07-07/WS07-07-008.pdf. More on WOZ in Riek [59].
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According to Ekman and Friesen [65] and Ekman [66], they present transcultural 
patterns, so they are a reliable guide to decide which emotion a person is feel-
ing independently of his or her cultural background. Even if the subject tries to 
hide an emotion, or pretend to have a different one, based on what [67] calls micro 
expressions, it is always possible to check the real emotion a person is feeling. 
Similar phenomena can be obtained by analyzing a person’s voice. When consid-
ering IAMs, the method of facial expressions, even if it less reliable than the use 
of sensors, is a lot less invasive and more human like. Humans are used to finding 
out the emotion in another person based on her face and voice.
Therefore, we propose the introduction of sensors only in cases of monitoring 
and assessing poor patient health, such as a weak heart, a very special situation in 
which the object under medical study is too sensitive to be inferred from powerful 
changes in the emotional tone, for example. Otherwise, cameras and microphones 
are reliable enough, a lot cheaper, and more importantly, a less intrusive for patients.
How should these measuring technologies be developed and delivered? 
There are two initial scenarios: personal apps and ambient intelligence. Ambient 
Intelligence is the term developed by the European Commission in 2001 to dis-
cuss the relevance of invisible computers, or how to move the computer away from 
the PC and distribute it in environmental surroundings. Thus, we have intelligent 
houses, buildings or even streets and whole cities [68]. Following Sadri [69], we 
can view ambient intelligence as follows:
Ambient Intelligence is the vision of a future in which environments support the 
people inhabiting them. This envisaged environment is unobtrusive, interconnected, 
adaptable, dynamic, embedded, and intelligent. In this vision the traditional computer 
input and output media disappear. Instead processors and sensors are integrated in eve-
ryday objects. […] The envisioned environment is sensitive to the needs of its inhabit-
ants, and capable of anticipating their needs and behavior. It is aware of their personal 
requirements and preferences, and interacts with people in a user-friendly way, even 
capable of expressing, recognizing and responding to emotion [69, 36: 1–2].
While we are still far away from imagining a “compassionate city” that has 
sensors everywhere and senses any person having a serious health problem, it is 
easy to imagine the development of such a system in the home of a person with 
a chronic illness. The user also sees information overload reduced, as he or she 
don’t need to pay attention to all the relevant information about their health situ-
ation that sensors are routinely obtaining, and can adapt to changes in weather, 
temperature, development of a disease, patient emotion, or how many people are 
around and how they behave, and so on.
What are the main benefits of measuring patient emotions? We identify four 
main benefits:
1. Reducing patient frustration when using a complex interface or computer sys-
tem. A good example of such technology is AutoTutor, an e-learning software 
that checks the user’s main emotion in order to see if the person is following 
lectures or not, or is bored by them, and then changes the rhythm and the pat-
terns in which information is presented [70].
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2. Better understanding of how the patient relates to the disease and/or to the 
environment.
3. Detecting emotions is also relevant to diagnosis of disease, as well as future risk.
4. Improved online communication. As posed by Picard [63], asynchronic com-
munications like email and text-based synchronic communications like chats 
lack a proper emotional channel. European projects like e-Sense or Sensei [69] 
are trying to develop systems and protocols for remote emoting, facilitating 
emotional communication in such environments.
The middle ground between apps and ambient intelligence is wearable comput-
ers. They are within the person, not an external technology one has to carry, but 
embedded in clothing, so they are less invasive and more easily transported. The 
field of wearable computing is still under development, but we can mention pilot 
projects like wearIT@work (also funded by the European Commission) which is 
an experimental wearable computing setup to be used under emergency situations 
such as earthquakes and fires. The system makes communication with coordina-
tors and surveillance of basic medical situation of firemen, police, etc. easier. One 
of the key issues measured is emotion [71].
4  Conclusions
Our chapter claims that existing robotic health devices require empathy in HRI 
contexts, especially in medical environments. Our suggestions reinforce the neces-
sity of working simultaneously on cultural, cognitive and technical aspects of 
healthcare robots in order to improve the creation of empathic bonds among such 
robots and human users/clients.
Emotional bonds between human and IAMs are not only the result of human-like 
communication protocols but also the outcome of a global trust process in which 
emotions are co-created. Consequently, we affirm that empathy can be induced due 
to sufficient emotional ambience, and machine design must be adjusted to practical 
necessities as well as to human needs (psychological and cultural).
We believe that medical IAMs are part of the future of society and of our well-
being. They promise democratization of health, at lower cost and easier implementa-
tion. The fair distribution or at least improvement in very specific care/treatment areas 
in health processes may become reality thanks in part to IAMs, as we have tried to 
show. But from academia or industry to social implementation there is a long road.
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Epilogue
Pictures of Mind-Machines
Researcher: Machine ethics concerns whether there ought to be machine decisions 
and behaviors in the real world, where such decisions and behaviors have real 
world effects. We researchers think the machines in question will need the capac-
ity for self-direction or autonomy in decision and behavior, just like normal human 
beings. Do you think it is possible to artistically represent machine self-direction 
or autonomy? What must be shown in such a representation?
Artist: I hope you don’t mind if I ask you a few questions first in response to 
your introduction. To begin with, what do you consider to be a “normal human 
being”? I would already find that very challenging to define. Furthermore, for a 
machine to act like a “normal human being”, you would have to create models 
that could describe not only concepts like self-direction or autonomy in mechani-
cal terms, but every possible psychological process that goes on in a human mind. 
You asked me whether I think it is possible to artistically represent machine self-
direction or autonomy, but I would like to ask you this first “Do you as a scientist 
think the human mind could be faithfully represented as a machine?”
Researcher: Minds are brains and so part of the natural world. There is robust 
evidence and argument that the mind relies on the approximate laws of physics, 
chemistry, and biology, and on mathematics and logic; it is not gifted from some 
supernatural realm. I think that’s news for great optimism and excitement, because 
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it implies there’s no theoretical reason why Mind cannot be simulated, “faithfully 
represented”, in a machine.
Artist: I agree the human mind is generated by the brain and hence rooted in 
the natural world and its physical laws. Still, the way the combined activity of all 
these natural forces creates our sense of personal identity remains a magical phe-
nomenon. On the one hand, human brains process every kind of information in 
predictable patterns. On the other hand however, the personal experience of and 
reactions to these processes are completely different for everyone. This trade-off 
between unique experiences and predictable patterns of brain activity is I think the 
most fascinating characteristic of the human mind. It’s also the point of departure 
in my artistic practice, in which I create photographic mind models of psychologi-
cal states. Although everybody has different representations of the world inside 
their minds, on a more abstracted level they overlap with the internal worlds of 
other people and it”s these abstracted internal worlds that I try to visualize.
Cable Rooms #1, #4, 2008
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Researcher: Interesting. Can you describe to me how these pieces achieve your 
stated goals of co-representing individual differences and similarities in mental 
states? Are the patterns shown significant?
Artist: The series “Cable Rooms” was the first mind model I made and I regard 
it as the basic model from which I still build on. It was inspired by the statement 
made by Descartes that a human was an automaton, a type of spring-loaded machine, 
similar to animals, except in one respect, that it contained a “rational soul” that could 
initiate volition of the body by its own accord. Especially that last part intrigued me, 
because how exactly would that “rational soul” initiate the movement of the human 
automaton if you would look into its inner mechanisms? I decided to explore this 
question by approaching my own mind as an automaton, using photography as an 
analogy for internal representations. Could I represent the mechanisms of my 
own mind in such a way it would relate to other people as well? I felt this would 
be strongly dependent on the level of contextual grounding the model would have. 
The more abstracted spaces and objects are from a recognizable time and place, the 
less personal they become. Photography’s ability to distort perception of space and 
dimensions is also an important aspect of my work. The mind models I create are all 
build in miniature scale, but by using a wide-angle lens they look like much larger 
constructions in the photographs. Careful observation of the elements used in the 
“Cable Rooms” will provide hints on how they could be understood, but there is no 
right way of “getting it”. I aim to expose the mechanisms of my mind through the 
eyes of the camera, in the hope others can intuitively connect to the images as well. 
However, it is impossible for me to declare to which degree I succeeded in making 
these models extend beyond my own mind. That’s a question only others can answer.
Researcher: Is it a question that an intelligent machine could answer?
Artist: That’s a very interesting thing to ask! I think that depends on how you 
would want to approach this. If you would want to find out whether my mind  models 
represent some kind of mathematical truth about the functioning of the human brain, 
I am sure an intelligent machine could test this. This is a completely different ques-
tion however from asking the machine how it values the photographs as an artistic 
expression. Even though education and familiarity strongly influence the validation 
of a work of art, the aesthetic appreciation and emotional evaluation of it is an ulti-
mately intuitive judgment, which I think would be much harder to program.
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Golden Rule #4, 2012
Researcher: Humans and machines understand the world differently: the 
objects and shapes in human art cannot be understood by machines in the form in 
which they are presented in a gallery exhibition. In the same way, the codes that 
are understandable to an intelligent machine are merely incomprehensible sym-
bols to human aesthetic understanding. Do you think the gap between human and 
machine understanding can be somewhat bridged? If not, why?
Imagine taking an image of any canvas painting and reducing it to its funda-
mental hexadecimal code. If this code is then read by an intelligent machine, it 
would understand what the code is and thus what the painting represents or sym-
bolizes. Is it possible to use code to create simple geometrical objects, representa-
tions of mathematical constants and recreations of masterpiece paintings that both 
humans and machines can understand? This would amount to creating objects in 
two forms: as the traditional material object (e.g., a cube) and as the hexadecimal 
and binary codes that symbolize them. Thus, abstraction becomes material, the 
meanings for humans and machines are somewhat bridged.
Artist: To begin with, I would like to stress that there is a big difference 
between understanding a work of art as a formal object and appreciation of it on 
an aesthetic and emotional level. In my opinion, the example you give above only 
relates to the understanding of a work of art as a formal object. More importantly 
even, the reduction of a masterpiece into hexadecimal codes, which is then turned 
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into both geometrical forms and binary code is a very subjective intervention in 
itself; an artistic interpretation of a masterpiece rather than a truthful representa-
tion. The masterpiece could have just as well been left out to create an artwork as 
such and in my opinion this approach would still give no meaningful insight into 
the aesthetic experience of a work of art.
It would be more helpful if the intelligent machine would be programmed with 
a set of aesthetic values, measured against its personal beliefs and a database of 
historical and contemporary art knowledge. It would be interesting to see how the 
intelligent machine would integrate and draw conclusions on these often contra-
dicting sources of input. The series “Golden Rules” I made in 2012 alludes to the 
ambiguity of knowledge and rules when it comes to understanding art. It is a refer-
ence to the Golden Ratio, a mathematical proportion, which is regarded as the key 
to understanding beauty in nature. In my “Golden Rules” images, however, there 
is no such immediate understanding, since it is unclear what the golden instru-
ments are supposed to do. In this way I wanted to emphasize that not everything 
can be determined and that a certain level of uncertainty is always present and 
actually is the essence of beauty.
Golden Rule #2 & #6, 2012
Researcher: I think your insight about uncertainty and human creation can be 
generalized: uncertainty is always present when human beings create something. 
Is that true? Consider human engineers creating an intelligent machine. The 
problem here is uncertainty in the form of unforeseen side effects: when two or 
more systems, well-engineered in isolation, are put into a super system, this can 
produce interactions that were not only not part of the intended design, but also 
harmful; the activity of one system inadvertently harms the activity of the other. 
A way to help avert this particular problem is to design the subsystems to have 
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fairly impenetrable boundaries that coincide with the epistemic boundaries of their 
human designers.
That last thought makes me think: successful human-machine interactions may 
well require that the thought boundaries of machines should be fairly close or even 
coincident in some cases to the thought boundaries of their human creators. If we 
are going to trust machines in such interactions, to see in them an authentic inter-
action partner, they will have to incorporate our thought and value systems, includ-
ing ethics.
Artist: I think that when intelligent machines would be capable of this deeper 
level of understanding, it would be because they would have the ability to abstract 
patterns from specific situations. This would also allow them to reflect on their 
own processes, form a Theory of Mind of other intelligent beings similar to them 
and operate independently. As long as they would use this “mind reading” with 
a morally sound intention it would be highly beneficial to humans to co-operate 
with these machines as it would expand both our physical and mental capacities. 
However, if they lacked moral awareness, humans would be facing intelligent 
machines with an antisocial “mindset” and it is not difficult to imagine how that 
could have very harmful consequences. The series “Section Rooms” is a repre-
sentation of that possibly harmful force in a single mind. This rather cold mental 
space is translucent, yet not fully transparent and could fold out in many possible 
ways. The color purple stands for nobility, but here it is presented in a fluid and 
ominous form, about to slide over the edge.
Section Room #2, 2013
Epilogue 369
Researcher: Vivid. Here is another representation of the same point: the 
boundaries of some or all “section rooms” in machines and humans should coin-
cide. That might help to regulate human-machine interactions. This is essential if 
humans are going to trust machines, since trust relies on the feeling that those you 
are interacting with share your basic ethics and concerns; or minimally, will act 
within the constraints prompted by those ethics and concerns.
Touch Screen #1, 2013
Artist: I agree! We find ourselves in a very interesting moment in history, where 
we as human beings are merging more and more with technology that is becom-
ing increasingly intelligent and independent. It is our responsibility to do all we 
can to ensure that these technologies will behave morally once they are beyond 
our control. This also means we have to be keenly aware that our personal desires 
and impulses might be harmful to others, which many of us so easily forget when 
we’re engaging with the internet for instance. The series “Touch Screens” is per-
haps a good work to conclude with in that respect. This work is a reference to the 
lure and seduction of the virtual worlds behind the smooth surfaces of the many 
computer screens we engage with everyday. Yet no matter how convincing the illu-
sions are that these virtual worlds can create, I hope there will never come a time 
this will completely substitute genuine human interaction.
